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ABSTRACT 
In 1893 the Keewatin Lumber and Power Company planned the first hydroelectric 
generating station on the north shore of Lake of the Woods (near present-day Kenora, Ontario). 
Approximately fifty years later, federal officials seeking employment for Canadian veterans 
turned to Northwestern Ontario and its “underutilized” water resources, envisioning a 
manufacturing hub on the Precambrian Shield. Between 1950 and 1958, the Hydroelectric Power 
Commission of Ontario remodeled the Winnipeg River drainage basin to produce power for 
federally-sanctioned peacetime industries, namely pulp and paper production. To redesign the 
Winnipeg River drainage basin, however, hydro officials needed to encroach on Anishinabek 
lands: both federally-recognized reserves and unrecognized, but heavily occupied, ancestral 
territories. This dissertation tells the story of how Anishinabek families used a diverse array of 
strategies – adaptation, cooperation, and passive resistance – to manage environmental change 
caused by Whitedog Falls Generating Station. 
Anishinabek families worked to stabilize their communities in an era of imposed 
environmental and economic change. Historians have long argued that hydroelectric 
development is necessarily at odds with Indigenous culture and subsistence economies. This 
dissertation provides a counter-narrative, arguing that cultural and economic damage, although 
linked to environmental damage, correlated more strongly with Anishinabek exclusion from 
resource negotiations. Moreover, this work complicates historical representations of a uniform 
Indigenous response to development. Given limited negotiations between the Hydro-Electric 
Power Commission and local First Nations, Anishinabek families did not respond to industrial 
incursions with one representative voice. The process of development itself, I argue, prevented a 
unified community response. As a result, Anishinabek communities fractured in response to 
hydroelectric development. 
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Figure 1: MAP OF THE UPPER WINNIPEG RIVER DRAINAGE BASIN 
This map depicts the Upper Winnipeg River drainage basin and features the three 
(3) primary dams – Kenora Powerhouse, Norman Dam, and Whitedog Falls
Generating Station – featured in this dissertation. Dalles 38C, Grassy Narrows, Rat
Portage, Shoal Lake #39 and Whitedog Indian Reserves – the five Anishinabek
communities who contributed written resources and/or oral testimony to this
project – have also been featured. My research focuses primarily on Anishinabek
responses to hydroelectric development at Dalles 38C and Whitedog; however,
communities interacted and strategized across federal boundaries. Kenora, the
settler-colonist community discussed throughout this dissertation, is located in the
region of the Kenora Powerhouse.
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Figure 2: MAP OF THE UPPER WINNIPEG RIVER DRAINAGE BASIN IN THE 
CANADIAN CONTEXT 
This map locates the Upper Winnipeg River drainage basin in the larger Canadian 
context. The Upper Winnipeg River drainage basin crosses the Ontario/Manitoba 
border. This dissertation, however, focus on Anishinabek responses to 
environmental change east of the Manitoba border. 
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INTRODUCTION 
"ENCHANTINGLY AND SUBLIMELY GRAND": THE UPPER WINNIPEG 
RIVER DRAINAGE BASIN, ITS PEOPLES, AND ITS ECONOMIES1 
When I close my eyes, I can still see the place of my birth: Lake of the Woods. 
This place is located about 180 kilometres east of the longitudinal centre of what is now 
known as Canada. It straddles three borders, laying claim to parts of Ontario, Manitoba, 
and Minnesota. If you examine the map, you will notice a town named “Kenora” at the 
north shore of Lake of the Woods. Kenora, my natal home, is known for its jagged, 
granite shoreline. It is known for islands of varying size, memorialized in verse as “jade-
like gems.”2 “Jade” is a testament to the jack pine, birch, and poplar that somehow thrive 
on these rocky outcroppings. Kenora, however, is most famous for its waterways: Lake of 
the Woods drains into the Winnipeg River and flows northwards towards Lake Winnipeg, 
Nelson River and, eventually, Hudson Bay. Water is the lifeblood of Kenora’s economy. 
It is by water that my ancestors, the Anishinabek, inhabited this place.3 
1 A Canadian poet once mused that “[t]here is not in the whole of this great Western land a scene 
[as] enchantingly and sublimely grand as Lake of the Woods” in the Winnipeg River drainage basin. See: 
Robert Nairn, “Lake of the Woods,” Poems and Addresses (Toronto: William Briggs, 1912), 7-8. 
2 Evelyn Gunne, “The Lake of the Woods,” The Silver Trail (Boston: Richard G. Badger, The 
Gorham Press, 1906), 36. 
3 A note on terminology: Anishinabek (formerly known as Ojibwa) is used to identify the distinct 
socio-cultural and political group of Treaty #3 First Nations under study.  “Indigenous” and “First Nations” 
are used interchangeably to maintain flow and to avoid repetition. Collectively, First Nations, Inuit and 
Métis peoples constitute the Indigenous peoples of what is now known as Canada. As a term, “First 
Nations” tends to exclude persons of Inuit descent. I have adopted “Indigenous” as the preferred collective 
term, as it is acknowledges that the Anishinabek (and other Indigenous peoples) originate from and belong 
to their distinctive territories. “Indian” is still a legal term in Canada and is therefore used in reference to 
legal documents. I recognize that the term has problematic racist connotations.  
“Euro-Canadian” is commonly used as an identifier for “White people.” However, I do not believe 
that this term accurately reflects Anishinabek perceptions of non-Indigenous newcomers. “Euro-Canadian” 
normalizes Canada as the nation state. It suggests that “Euro-Canadians” are inhabitants of a legitimate 
sovereign territory (Canada) and descended from European immigrants. Anishinabek living in Treaty #3 
did not recognize (and continue to challenge) Canada’s claim to land in the Winnipeg River drainage basin. 
Much like Canada reduced the Anishinabek Nation to “Indians,” the Anishinabek did not recognize traders, 
government officials, or settler-colonists as “Canadians.” They similarly rejected non-Indigenous claims of 
sovereignty by using language to identify White political outsiders (the waiâbishkiwedig). In recognition of 
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Controversy dominates the story of our origins. Place names suggest that we, the 
Anishinabek, originated here – or at least 70 kilometres to the northwest at Manitou 
Ahbee (“Where the Creator Sits”). It is likely that Gitchie Manitou (The Great Creator) 
first envisioned man there.4 First Man, travelling, perhaps by foot, made his way to Lake 
of the Woods where he would learn to fish, to trap, and to harvest manomin (wild rice). 
Archaeological evidence suggests that Indigenous peoples occupied Lake of the Woods 
since approximately 8,500-7,000 BCE.5 Archaeologist Paddy Reid claims that the 
antecedents to the Lake of the Woods Anishinabek followed the retreat of the Wisconsin 
glacier.6 Competing oral accounts suggest that members of the Anishinabek Nation 
migrated to northwestern Ontario from “somewhere along the shores of the Great Salt 
Water [Atlantic Ocean] in the East” around 800 ACE.7 Edward Benton-Banai, an 
Anishinabek cultural educator from Wisconsin, suggests that my ancestors moved in 
the Winnipeg River drainage basin as an Anishinabek homeland, I have identified newcomers to 
Anishinabek territory accordingly: the waiâbishkiwedig.   
4 Courtney Milne claims that “Original Man was lowered by rope from the sky to become the first 
inhabitant of Turtle Island” at Manito Ahbee. She further suggests that First Man received sacred teachings 
at this site to “guide the [Anishinabek] in caring for the earth” (Courtney Milne, Spirit of the Land: Sacred 
Places in Native North America (Toronto: Penguin Books Canada Ltd., 1994), 22). Edward Benton-Banai 
does not identify Manito Ahbee as an origin site. He suggests that Gitchie Manitou used the earth to create 
First Man. Upon completion, Gitchie Manitou lowered First Man to the earth at an unidentified site. 
Benton-Banai suggests that our origins are revealed by our name, Anishinaabe. Ani means “whence.” 
Nishina means “lowered” and abe refers to “the male of the species.” Edward Benton-Banai, The Mishomis 
Book: The Voice of the Ojibway (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press with Indian Country 
Communications Inc., 1988), 3. 
5 Local literature suggests that “People have occupied the Lake of the Woods since about 8,500 
BC[E]” (Lake of the Woods Museum and Aulneau Adventure Tours, The Explorers’ Guide to Lake of the 
Woods (Kenora: Lake of the Woods Museum, 2000), 20). Archaeologist Paddy Reid claims that, “The 
oldest recorded site around Kenora is on Tunnel Island and dates back 7000 years.” He found evidence of 
Paleo-Indian activity around Rainy River, southeast of Kenora, dating back to 8,000BCE. For further 
information, see Rick Vandervliet, “Paddy Reid and Archaeology in Kenora and NW Ontario,” Lake of the 
Woods Vacation Area, accessed 1 September 2015, http://lakeofthewoods.com/stories-from-the-
lake/paddy-reid-archaeology-in-kenora-nw-ontario/. 
6 Vandervliet, “Paddy Reid and Archaeology in Kenora and NW Ontario.” 
7 Benton-Banai, The Mishomis Book, 94. 
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search of manomin.8 Manomin is a complex carbohydrate that flourished locally before 
the post-1945 infrastructure boom. However my ancestors arrived – whether by divine 
intervention, by foot as the glaciers retreated, or by canoe in search of aquatic plants – 
what is certain is that Lake of the Woods and its outflow channels provided sustenance. 
Each of these otherwise conflicting origin stories reveals that the Anishinabek lived by 
and relied on the water. By the 1820s, my ancestors – associated with what is now known 
as Dalles 38C Indian Reserve – occupied a territory that extended roughly from Rough 
Rock Lake (near present-day Minaki, Ontario) in the north and Muskeg Bay (near 
present-day Warroad, Minnesota) in the south. My dissertation explores the effects of 
hydroelectric development along this stretch of the Winnipeg River drainage basin: an 
Anishinabek territory, a homeland, whose boundaries traverse Euro-North American 
conceptions of space (Canada/United States, Ontario/Manitoba). 
Amateur historian Duane R. Lund, who composed one of the few histories of 
Lake of the Woods specifically, identified the natural resources that attracted my 
forebears to this territory. Lund writes that Lake of the Woods “with its thousands of 
miles of irregular shoreline, provides ideal spawning ground for the propagation of all 
sorts of fish.”9 For generations, these fish nourished my family. For example, I was 
always told stories about Kawitaskung (1820-1914), who netted adikameg (whitefish) in 
the fall, consumed ogaa (walleye) during the cold of winter, and ate ginoozhe (northern 
8 Ibid., 100. The Kenora Centennial Committee also argues that the Anishinabek migrated to Lake 
of the Woods, but unlike Benton-Banai, the Kenora Centennial Committee does not date this migration. 
The Committee suggests that the Anishinabek moved to Lake of the Woods “as the white man displaced 
the Indians in the East.” The Committee further argues that the Anishinabek displaced other Indigenous 
groups, becoming the primary occupants of Lake of the Woods by 1800. For further information, see Lake 
of the Woods Writers’ Group and Kenora Centennial Committee, Through the Kenora Gateway (Kenora: 
Bilko Press, 1981), 9, 55. 
9 Duane R. Lund, Lake of the Woods Yesterday and Today (Staples, MN: Nordell Graphic 
Communications, 1975), 9. 
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pike) during the spring – ginoozhe tastes best when the water is cold and its flesh is firm. 
During the summer, trader accounts suggest that Kawitaskung may have feasted on name 
(sturgeon).10 His wife, Jane Lindsay (birthdate unknown-1916), taught Ogimaamaashiik 
(my paternal great-great-grandmother, 1885-1974) how to prepare these fish. 
Ogimaamaashiik roasted egg sacs like sausages and simmered whitefish bouillon. Times 
changed, but fish remained an essential component of our family diet. By the time of my 
father’s birth (1958), fishing provided Anishinabek families with opportunities to work 
for pay. Dad, Allan Luby (Ogemah), led American tourists to prime fishing locations on 
the Winnipeg River in exchange for spending money. He would later, wearing goggles, 
plumb the depths of the river, searching for lost fishing tackle to incorporate into his own 
collection, while continuing to fish for home consumption. Despite having provided 
sustenance for generations of Anishinabek occupants, physicians working in-and-around 
Kenora recommended that Anishinabek families not consume fish caught on the 
Winnipeg River years before my birth (1984).11 Hydroelectric development on Lake of 
10 Written evidence of large-scale fishing by the Anishinabek in the region west of Lake Superior 
to Lake Winnipeg – a region that includes Lake of the Woods – extends back to 1660 when trader Pierre-
Esprit Radisson claimed to see over 1000 sturgeon being dried on the south shore of Lake Superior (Tim 
Holzkamm and Leo Waisberg, “Native American Utilization of Sturgeon,” Sturgeons and Paddlefish of 
North America, eds. William Beamish, Greg LeBreton, and Scott McKinley (New York: Springer US, 
2004), 29-30). Sturgeon formed part of the local diet at what is now Dalles 38C Indian Reserve, as evinced 
in Major Stephen H. Long’s published account. Reflecting on his traverse of the Dalles Rapids, Long 
wrote, “While we were resting on one of the islands, an Indian came up in his canoe with his family and 
supplied us with fresh sturgeon and with dried huckleberries” (Narrative of an expedition to the source of 
St. Peter’s River, Lake Winnepeek, Lake of the Woods, &c., &c (Philadelphia: H. C. Carey and I. Lea, 
1824), 106). Sturgeon was eaten fresh, but also made into a product like bison pemmican “consisting of a 
special blend of sturgeon oil and dried and pounded sturgeon meat packed into sturgeon skin bags,” making 
it a valuable resource throughout the year (Holzkamm and Waisberg, “Native American Utilization of 
Sturgeon,” 28). 
11 As early as May 1973, Dr. A. Bernstein informed Anishinabek women that “mercury [in fish] 
will cause improper growth” in developing fetuses. He advised pregnant mothers to moderate fish 
consumption and to undergo a physical examination at Winnipeg General Hospital to determine their level 
of risk. “Mercury Pollution Endangers Unborn Babies,” Treaty #3 Council Fire 2, 5 (May 1973): 3. 
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the Woods and the Winnipeg River that occurred between 1898 and 1958 contributed to 
the increased mercury content of family meals. 
Anishinabek families relied on more than fish. Lund identified other incentives to 
settle near Lake of the Woods. He noted that, “[s]heltered bays yielded thousands of acres 
of wild rice [manomin].”12 According to cultural educator Edward Benton-Banai, 
manomin is a “sacred gift” from the Creator to the Anishinabek. Anishinabek families 
defined their territorial boundaries, in part, by manomin growth. Where there was 
manomin, there were Anishinabek to harvest it.13 This was true for many generations. 
Ogimaamaashiik believed that manomin provided her people with sufficient energy to 
carry out their day-to-day activities. Manomin fuelled trappers – like her grandfather 
Kawitaskung – as they trapped for food and furs. Ogimaamaashiik taught her daughter, 
Hazel Martin-McKeever (b. 1927), that manomin was the most effective cure for 
constipation. Martin-McKeever knew to “put the wild rice, herbs, and lots of water in the 
big kettle and let it boil and simmer for a long time.” Martin-McKeever knew to strain the 
mixture and drink the remaining fluid. Experience revealed that water begat water.14 
Family records of what we ate and how we healed reveal that Lake of the Woods and the 
Winnipeg River were at the heart of Anishinabek household economies. Unfortunately, 
during my father’s growing-up years, manomin cropping on the Winnipeg River 
collapsed. The Norman Dam and Whitedog Falls Generating Station caused major water 
fluctuations that drowned hectare upon hectare of manomin. Today, I purchase manomin 
12 Lund, Lake of the Woods Yesterday and Today, 9. 
13 Benton-Banai, The Mishomis Book, 100-01. 
14 Hazel Martin-McKeever, The Chief’s Granddaughter (Charleston, SC: n.p., 2013), 23. 
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in small quantities from the grocery store. And, I know that “Shoal Lake Wild Rice,” 
packaged on Lake of the Woods, includes grains imported from distant lakes.15 
The collapse of Anishinabek household economies is also a story of 
industrialization in Ontario. The natural resources in the Winnipeg River drainage basin 
drew others. The waterways, the highways of my ancestors, were “sheltered by high 
bluffs and tall forests.”16 The waiâbishkiwedig (White people) moved inland along the 
waterways. And, given that many of these waterways were protected, travel inland was 
relatively easy. Trappers and the fur traders came first. Shortly after Kawitaskung was 
born (1820), the Hudson’s Bay Company established a post on Old Fort Island on the 
Winnipeg River.17 But, neither party competed for water access – there was more than 
enough water to share. Gold miners and loggers followed. Unlike the trappers and the 
traders, miners drew water from Lake of the Woods for industrial use. The sharing of 
water resources between invaders and Anishinabek riverine users was soon to change.18 
15 Journalist Elsie Neufeld reported that Shoal Lake Wild Rice buys grains “from as far east as 
Marathon and as far west as the Saskatchewan/Alberta border to assure a stable supply.” Neufeld quoted 
Ben Ratuski, owner-manager of Shoal Lake Wild Rice Ltd.: “We wouldn’t have a supply if we relied on 
this area.” Neufeld, “Another Wild Rice Season Draws to a Close,” Saturday Miner and News (28 October 
2000), 10. 
16 Lund, Lake of the Woods Yesterday and Today, 10. 
17 Through the Kenora Gateway claims that “[t]he first business establishment in the area that is 
now Kenora was the Hudson’s Bay Company post on Old Fort Island in 1836.” In 1861, the Hudson’s Bay 
Company relocated from Tunnel Island to Rat Portage (now Kenora) proper. The Kenora Centennial 
Committee locates the 1861 site at the northeast corner of present-day First Street South and Main (43). See 
also Lake of the Woods Museum and Aulneau Adventure Tours, The Explorers' Guide to Lake of the 
Woods, 21. 
18 According to The Explorers’ Guide to Lake of the Woods conflict surrounded the discovery of 
gold (and subsequent rise of the mining industry) on Lake of the Woods: “Some report that in 1872, during 
a preliminary survey of the Canadian Pacific Railway, workers found gold-bearing quartz in the Northwest 
Angle area. Others credit Frank Moore with the first discovery in 1873 at Yellow Girl, again while a survey 
party was running test lines westward for the railway” (22). Author John Kelly of the Treaty #3 District 
posits that resource sharing decreased sharply in the 1870s. To explain the inequitable division of 
resources, Kelly employs an analogy of a White Man and an Indian sitting on a log. The story begins when 
a White Man requests “a little place on the log so that he might rest from his awful journey.” Kelly 
proceeds “The Indian willingly shared a piece of his log with the white man. But the white man felt like 
stretching himself and asked for a little more room. The Indian let him have a little more of his log.” The 
Indian continued to share his resources “[l]ike a decent host.” As their relationship developed, “the Indian 
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In 1879, John Mather opened up the Keewatin Lumbering and Manufacturing 
Company, establishing the first sawmill on the north shore of Lake of the Woods. By 
1890 seven large sawmills operated near Kenora.19 Lumbering became the primary 
industry for settler-colonists on Lake of the Woods. And, to fuel this industry, lumber 
barons like Mather turned to water power. Between 1893 and 1895, the Keewatin Lumber 
and Power Company installed the Norman Dam on the Western Outlet of Lake of the 
Woods. According to some estimates, Norman Dam raised the levels of Lake of the 
Woods by 0.9 to 1.8 metres.20 When Mather dammed the Western Outlet, he blocked an 
artery in the Winnipeg River drainage basin. Circulatory flow changed. And, when flow 
changed, Anishinabek labour practices and household economies – based on and around 
Lake of the Woods and Winnipeg River – also changed. 
The effect of early hydroelectric development on Indigenous communities in what 
is now known as Canada is understudied.21 It is difficult to reconstruct the history of 
[became] cold and hungry and barely holding on to the end of the log.” The White Man, by contrast, took 
control over their shared resources. By the 1870s, the White Man had pushed the Indian off the log, 
suggesting “that the Indian could sit on a stump further in the bush.” John Kelly, “We Are All in the 
Ojibway Circle,” From Ink Lake: Canadian Stories, edited by Michael Ondaatje (Toronto: Lester & Orpen 
Dennys, 1990), 579-80. 
19 Lake of the Woods Museum and Aulneau Adventure Tours, The Explorers’ Guide, 23. 
20 Lund, Lake of the Woods Yesterday and Today, 95. Through the Kenora Gateway, 61, suggests 
that the Keewatin Lumbering and Manufacturing Company never constructed a powerhouse. Instead of 
using Norman Dam to generate electricity, Ontario used this property to control water levels on Lake of the 
Woods. 
21 In Northern Enterprise: Five Centuries of Canadian Business (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 
1987), Michael Bliss associates the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) in the 1880s with 
the rise of capitalism in Canada. He nodded to hydroelectric development during this early period, noting 
that Herbert Holt used his business acumen (developed with the CPR) to work with local gas and electric 
companies in later years. Similarly, Holt’s associate William Mackenzie “became interested in the street 
railway situation in Toronto and put together a syndicate to get the franchise to electrify the system” (325). 
Bliss also noted the formation of the Electric Development Company at Niagara Falls in 1903. This 
company harnessed the power of Niagara Falls “to transmit power to Toronto to supply for the light and 
streetcar companies” (333). Once again, Bliss highlights a budding interest in domestic utilities in Canada. 
His goal, however, is not to detail the development of hydroelectricity in Canada. Bliss addresses the 
replacement of private power companies by the Hydro-Electric Power Commission after 1906. The 
“world’s first large state-owned integrated electricity company” brought power from Niagara Falls to 
Toronto at a cost. The main focus of this section, however, is on the socio-political debate about public and 
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hydroelectric development in Ontario before 1906 when the Hydro-Electric Power 
Commission (the HEPC) was established by the Power Commission Act. Before the 
Ontario Legislature passed the Power Commission Act (1906), industrialists developed 
hydroelectric generating stations independent of the state. Consider that the HEPC 
initially developed transmission lines to transfer electricity generated by private 
private ownership. A similar trend is seen in Peter A. Baskerville and Graham D. Taylor, A Concise History 
of Business in Canada (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1994), 264-74. There is no sense of competing 
Indigenous interests at Niagara Falls in either text. 
In the 1990s, American historians like Richard White were also silent on the Indigenous 
experience(s) of hydroelectric development. In The Organic Machine: The Remaking of the Columbia 
River, Richard White argues that human and natural systems are intertwined, inseparable even. On page xi, 
White writes, “[t]he boundaries between the human and natural have existed only to be crossed” (New 
York: Hill and Wang, 1995). I expand on his argument by breaking down the concept of ‘human system.’ I 
feel that White’s reference to “human” is often a signpost for “Anglo-American.” This writing habit is not 
dismissive of Native Americans. It does, however, reflect White’s central interest: how Anglo-Americans 
knew and interacted with the Columbia River. I am interested in exploring the diverse approaches to 
working with water (i.e. the Winnipeg River) as determined by gender, labour, and cultural group. 
A historiographical shift away from economic and environmental analyses towards post-colonial 
analyses laid the foundation for my work. James Waldram’s 1988 study, As Long as the Rivers Run: 
Hydroelectric Development and Native Communities in Western Canada (Winnipeg: University of 
Manitoba Press), alerted the Canadian reading public that the provision of cheap power oftentimes required 
the expropriation of Indigenous lands. While the Manitoba Legislature passed the Electric Power 
Transmission Act in 1919, the earliest public project studied by Waldram was conceptualized by Manitoba 
Hydro in 1957. In 1999, Jean Manore’s work did for Ontario what Waldram had done for Manitoba and 
Saskatchewan. Her study – which begins in 1912 when the Northern Canada Power Company began 
supplying power to Hollinger Consolidated Gold Mining Company – examines how the Hydro-Electric 
Power Commission of Ontario (the HEPC) took over private power producers. The HEPC’s attempts to 
wrest power from private companies specifically led to its dismissal of Indigenous interests more generally 
(Jean Manore, Cross-Currents: Hydroelectricity and the Engineering of Northern Ontario (Waterloo, ON: 
Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1999).  
A notable exception in acknowledging Indigenous involvement in discussions over such 
developments is Christopher Armstrong and H. V. Nelles’ Wilderness and Waterpower: How Banff 
National Park Became a Hydroelectric Reservoir (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2013). In Chapter 
3, readers are introduced to the struggle between the privately owned Calgary Power Co. and Nakoda 
Indian Reserve. To meet rising electric demands, Calgary Power Co. sought permission to develop 
Kananaskis Falls in 1911. To proceed with construction, Calgary Power Co. required over 200 acres of 
Nakoda land. Band members actively rejected corporate rights of expropriation and threatened violence 
upon trespass. The Department of Indian Affairs undermined Nakoda resistance, however, when “J. D. 
McLean, the acting deputy superintendent general… agreed [that Calgary Power Co. could develop 
Kanaskis Falls], provided that an agreement to compensate the Nakoda could be worked out later” (43). 
Armstrong and Nelles here reveal the state as a “handmaiden to capitalist development” (50). The 
importance of this chapter lies in the identification of competing territorial claims and of their (potentially) 
violent defence by Indigenous peoples. There was nothing “natural” about the development of Kananaskis 
Falls; it was a contest of vision, of use. And it seems that insider dealings rather than a lack of initiative 
limited the effectiveness of Indigenous territorial claims. While the time period covered in this chapter 
follows centralization in Ontario (1906), it predates the formation of Alberta’s Public Utilities Board in 
1915. 
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companies. Evidence of the early histories of dam development is scattered among 
company, municipal, and provincial archives, as well as private collections. Anishinabek 
communities generally maintain an oral record of their histories. To reconstruct an 
Indigenous history of hydroelectric development before 1906 requires community 
engagement; experiences that have not been catalogued by the HEPC or private 
companies can be uncovered through oral testimony. In Part 1 of this dissertation, “The 
East Direction,” I examine how changed water use by settler-colonists impacted 
Anishinabek riverine users before 1900. While testimony has been removed from Chapter 
2 due to ongoing negotiations with Canada and Ontario about early hydroelectric 
flooding on Winnipeg River, Elder interviews shaped my archival search. Community 
engagement thus fostered my work, which is one of the first studies of hydroelectric 
development on Indigenous lands to offer a sustained examination of mobility and 
riverine change at the turn of the twentieth century. 
By the mid-1900s, it became increasingly important for Canada to suppress 
expressions of Anishinabek discontent about industrial water use. Lumber and 
hydroelectricity attracted more settler-colonists to Lake of the Woods. By the 1920s, pulp 
and paper replaced lumbering as the primary industry in Northwestern Ontario. In 
Kenora, property sales marked the transition from lumber to pulp: E.W. Backus 
purchased the Norman Dam from the Keewatin Lumber and Power Company in 1919.22 
In 1924, the Backus-Brooks paper mill produced its first roll of newsprint. Shortly 
thereafter, the Backus-Brooks Pulp & Paper Co. built a powerhouse at Norman Dam to 
expand operations. The paper mill quickly became the biggest employer near Kenora. 
22 Lake of the Woods Writers’ Group and Kenora Centennial Committee, Through the Kenora 
Gateway, 61. Lake of the Woods and Aulneau Adventure Tours, The Explorers’ Guide, 24. 
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The mill demanded more and more water to produce more and more electricity to meet 
growing demands for newsprint (and to sustain employment). Water, the lifeblood of 
Kenora’s economy, had become heavily linked to the survival of Kenora, a settler-
colonist community at the north shore of Lake of the Woods. 
After 1945, competition for water resources on Lake of the Woods increased 
exponentially. Leslie Frost became Premier of Ontario in 1949. Frost, much like his 
predecessor George Drew, emphasized better water resource management for Ontario. 
Frost desired provincial energy security.23 While Anishinabek families had long 
considered water vital to community health, the Hydro-Electric Power Commission now 
identified water in its Northwestern Division as vital to national growth.24 Between 1950 
and 1958, the Hydro-Electric Power Commission constructed a 68-megawatt station on 
the Winnipeg River. This station is known as Whitedog Falls Generating Station. The 
ripple effects of post-war riverine change – including mercury methylation and food 
insecurity – did not reveal themselves until the late 1960s and early 1970s. In examining 
the installation of Whitedog Falls Generating Station, this dissertation considers the 
precedent that facilitated development, negotiating strategies that produced 
environmental inequalities, and Anishinabek attempts to manage riverine change over the 
short-term (e.g. wage labour circa 1955) and over the long-term (e.g. relocation circa 
1970). This dissertation argues that Anishinabek families engaged in a continuous 
struggle to maintain the territorial integrity of their communities, despite riverine change. 
23 Edward Whitcomb, A Short History of Ontario (Dutton Crescent, ON: From Sea to Sea 
Enterprises, 2007), 59. 
24 The Kenora Miner and News described the Northwestern Division of the Hydro-Electric Power 
Commission of Ontario as an area extending “98,000 square miles [and running] from Marathon, in the 
east, to the Manitoba border in the west.” “Progress Scenes at Whitedog-Caribou Falls,” Kenora Miner and 
News (4 September 1957), 4. 
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By looking at the history of water development in the Winnipeg River drainage 
basin from 1873 to 1975, this dissertation illuminates the multivariate responses – 
adaptation, cooperation, and passive resistance – developed by Anishinabek families to 
manage riverine change (including right of access, flooding, and pollution). In so doing, it 
challenges common narratives of Indigenous experiences and resistance in twentieth-
century Canada. 
CLAIMING SPACE: A DISCUSSION OF HISTORIOGRAPHICAL CONTRIBUTIONS
CONCERNING POST-WAR CANADA 
Historical studies of Canada after 1945 tend not to be closely connected to 
historical studies of Indigenous peoples; nor have they been driven by a focus on First 
Nations territories or their economies.25 Instead, until very recently, a desire to locate and 
describe a response to the atrocities of World War II in the rise of economic 
modernization, infrastructure capacity building, and, most importantly, growth economics 
25 Two notable exceptions include John Lutz’ Makúk: A New History of Aboriginal-White 
Relations (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008) and Mary Jane Logan McCallum’s Indigenous Women, Work, 
and History 1940-1980 (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2014). Lutz examines Indigenous 
contributions to industries like fishing and logging. He suggests that paid work fuelled a “moditional 
economy.” The term moditional economy refers to a hybrid system wherein Indigenous workers combined 
subsistence activities with work for pay (and, in later years, social assistance). Lutz argues that Indigenous 
workers in the mid-twentieth century used paid work to help ensure socio-economic stability. Lutz seeks to 
revise Robin Fisher’s argument in Contact and Conflict: Indian-European Relations in British Columbia, 
2nd ed. (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1992), that Indigenous peoples became economically irrelevant after the 
gold rush (which coincided with reduced settler interest in fur trading). McCallum also takes issue with the 
historical emphasis on fur trade economics. She charges, “until recently, fur trade economics and a desire to 
locate and describe a response to capitalism in the collapse of the fur trade have been the context for the 
bulk of Aboriginal labour history” (5). Native Pathways: American Indian Culture and Economic 
Development in the Twentieth Century (Boulder, CO: University Press of Colorado, 2004), edited by Brian 
Hosmer and Colleen O’Neill, discusses American Indigenous economies in the twentieth century. In the 
introductory chapter “Rethinking Modernity and the Discourse of Development in American Indian 
History,” O’Neill argues that “American Indians transcended the rigid categories [traditional like trapping 
and modern like work for pay] and created alternative pathways of economic and cultural change that were 
not merely static renditions of some timeless past or total acceptance of U.S. capitalist culture” (3). Taken 
together, these works – American and Canadian – suggest that other historians have conflated the concepts 
of capitalism and modernity. These authors reveal that Indigenous peoples participated in (and adapted) 
Western economies in distinctively indigenous ways after World War II. 
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have been the context for the bulk of Canadian post-war studies.26 These works attempt to 
explain a decade of unprecedented economic growth and prosperity in Canada. The 
literature generally centres on the debate over whether state funding was altruistically or 
politically motivated, whether politicians funded change for the “common good” or the 
good of their respective party.27 In many ways, affluence is the topic of Canadian history 
after 1945. What is missing is a sense of how wealth distribution was shaped by 
perceptions of race.28 
26 For example, in Canada and War: A Military and Political History (Toronto: Butterworths, 
1981), Desmond Morton argues that “war has been a catalyst for every kind of political, social and 
economic change, from female suffrage in 1917 to post-1945 affluence.” In A Nation Forged in Fire: 
Canadians and the Second World War, 1939-1945 (Toronto: Lester & Orpen Dennys, 1989), J. L. 
Granatstein and Desmond Morton suggest that World War II was “worth it.” These sentiments were echoed 
in “The War Changed Everything,” a joint article published in Canada Remembers (Ottawa: Department of 
Supply and Services, Government of Canada, 1994). Granatstein and Morton suggest that wartime 
atrocities –both massive and indiscriminate – prompted Canadians to revaluate whom the state served and 
which services the state offered to its citizens. Granatstein and Morton conclude that “Canada loosened up, 
lightened up, and became a kinder, gentler place” as a result of World War II. 
27 For example, in Planners and Politicians: Liberal Politics and Social Policy, 1957-1968 
(Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1997), Penny Bryden argues that Canada’s 
welfare state was founded, in part, on political self-interest: the Liberal Party proposed Canadian welfare 
programs to compete with John Diefenbaker’s working-class appeal and to return their party to power.  
Bryden thus offers an interesting counterpoint to the works of Desmond Morton and J. L. Granatstein 
discussed above. 
28 I do not discount post-World War II studies that acknowledge the uneven distribution of wealth 
by gender, sexuality, or perceived ideological standing. In Pick One Intelligent Girl: Employability, 
Domesticity and the Gendering of Canada’s Welfare State (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), 
Jennifer Stephen argues that federal recruitment policies during World War II were not intended to boost 
female employment in the long run. In “Home Dreams: Women and the Suburban Experiment in Canada” 
Canadian Historical Review LXXII, no. 4 (1991), 471-504, Veronica Strong-Boag argues that the suburban 
experiment – commonly identified as a marker of affluence – reduced postwar opportunities for women, 
leaving them geographically isolated. In The Trouble with Normal: Postwar Youth and the Making of 
Heterosexuality (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), Mary Louise Adams argues that sexuality 
became a profound marker of social marginalization and exclusion after 1945. In Normalizing the Ideal: 
Psychology, Schooling, and the Family in Postwar Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 
Mona Gleason reveals that psychological discourse pathologized homosexuality. The exclusion of gays and 
lesbians from federal employment is discussed in Gary Kinsman’s and Patrizia Gentile’s The Canadian 
War on Queers: National Security as Sexual Regulation (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010). In Cold War 
Canada: The Making of a National Insecurity State, 1945-1957 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1994), Gary Marcuse and Reginald Whitaker revealed that Canada’s international policy after 1945 was 
both anti-Communist and pro-American. Bryan Palmer affirmed Marcuse’s and Whitaker’s findings in 
Canada’s 1960s: The Ironies of Identity in a Rebellious Era (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009). 
In Journeys: A History of Canada (Toronto: Nelson, 2006), historians R. Douglas Francis, Richard Jones, 
and Donald B. Smith argue that wealth was inequitably distributed between English-speaking Canadians, 
French-speaking Canadians, Jewish Canadians, and recent immigrants. In The Limits of Affluence: Welfare 
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Consider that affluence is presented as a nearly universal phenomenon. For 
example, J. M. Bumsted selected the title “Prospering Together, 1945-1960” for his 
discussion of the post-World War II era in his textbook A History of the Canadian 
Peoples.29 A sense of progression, an economic fluorescence, is coded into Bumsted’s 
selected gerund. More importantly, prosperity is shared; Canadians, Bumsted suggests, 
are “prospering together.” Textbooks are designed to relay standard knowledge and, 
through Bumsted, we can see that historians overwhelmingly agree that affluence 
positively impacted the lives of most Canadians after 1945. This finding is explicitly 
supported by Michael Bliss who summarized the period as follows: “The decades after 
1945 were the age of peace and prosperity” and distinguished by “steadily rising levels of 
wealth” and “levels of mass affluence unprecedented in human history.”30 J. L. 
Granatstein and Desmond Morton echoed this view in Canada Remembers: “After 1945, 
Canada was a land of both opportunity and security. Steady growth in… purchasing 
power seemed to promise that there would always be more.” 31 Reflecting on the 
American experience, journalist Robert J. Samuelson mused that “Prosperity was all they 
[baby boomers] had ever known” – a claim mirrored by Canadian historian Douglas 
in Ontario, 1920-1970 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), James Struthers reveals that wealth 
was unevenly distributed within Ontario. 
29 J. M. Bumsted, “Prospering Together, 1945-1960,” A History of the Canadian Peoples, 4th 
edition (Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press, 2011), 356-402. Note that Bumsted’s chapter title 
mirrors that of a competing textbook, Francis, Jones, and Smith’s Journeys: A History of Canada. Francis, 
Jones, and Smith address the post-World War II period in “Toward a More Affluent Society: 1945-1960.” 
“More” adds a layer of nuance unseen in Bumsted’s title. However, a sense of progression is once again 
coded into the chapter title – consider that “more” is coupled with “toward.” While Canadians do not 
“prosper together” in Journeys, readers sense that Canadians were accumulating wealth at the macro-level 
after 1945. 
30 Michael Bliss, Northern Enterprise, 481. 
31 J. L. Granatstein and Desmond Morton, “The War Changed Everything,” in Readings in 
Canadian History: Post-Confederation, 6th edition, eds. R. Douglas Francis and Donald B. Smith 
(Toronto: Nelson Thomson Learning, 2002), 327. 
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Owram.32 However, this historical consensus has been based on Canada’s statistical 
majority. In 1950, individuals of European descent formed 95 percent of Canada’s 
population. 33 Affluence was most evenly shared among this 95 percent, but this wealth 
was, in part, accumulated by extracting resources from Indigenous lands, a fact still not 
adequately represented in the historical literature on Canada’s ‘prosperous era.’ 
Indigenous experiences of Canada’s prosperous era have been underrepresented. 
Bumsted, once again, offers a sample of historiographical trends. Of the 42 pages on the 
post-World War II era in his History of the Canadian Peoples, he devotes only half a 
page (or 1.2 percent) to the topic of “Aboriginals.”34 Given that, in 1950, only 1.2 percent 
of Canada’s population were classified as “Status Indians,” this might seem to reflect 
demographic realities; however, column-counting does not tell the whole story. 
Bumsted’s treatment of affluence is not environmentally representative. The cost of 
affluence was disproportionately borne in Canada – if “status Indians” accounted for only 
1.2 percent of the population, they arguably did 95 percent of the suffering. Even less 
attention is granted to Indigenous experiences in Canada’s “more affluent society” in 
Journeys: A History of Canada. Historians R. Douglas Francis, Richard Jones, and 
Donald B. Smith note that “Many First Nations people began to flee poverty and 
unemployment on the reserves, in search of better opportunities in urban centres” without 
questioning how poverty came to be endemic on-reserve.35 The literature to date does not 
32 Robert J. Samuelson, The Good Life and Its Discontents (New York: Vintage Books, 1997), 35. 
Doug Owram, Born at the Right Time (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), particularly the 
preface. 
33 Within this statistic, individuals of British, Irish, and French descent formed the demographic 
majority. Canadian Human Rights Commission, “Population and People: 1 January 1950,” Human Rights 
in Canada: A Historical Perspective, accessed 10 August 2015, http://www.chrc-
ccdp.ca/en/getBriefed/1950/population.asp. 
34 Bumsted, A History of the Canadian Peoples, 377. 
35 Francis, Jones, and Smith, Journeys: A History of Canada, 446. 
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address how First Nations paid for, negotiated, or even resisted post-war affluence. This 
dissertation seeks to expand and to deepen our study of Indigenous history after 1945. 
How did Indigenous peoples experience, if at all, post-war affluence? 
Much as in the United States, where the affordable housing of Levittown came to 
symbolize broadly shared economic growth, housing was the most visible symbol of 
post-war prosperity in Canada.36 After 1945, the federal government encouraged 
Canadian banks to loan capital to families seeking to purchase a home. Better yet, interest 
rates were low. “A rising standard of living and easy credit,” Doug Owram suggests, 
allowed the average Canadian breadwinner to purchase a single-family detached home. 
Available credit stimulated household demand. The number of houses built in Canada 
doubled between 1945 and the mid-1950s.37 In Kenora alone, building permits “top[ped] 
the million dollar mark” in 1955 and 1956.38 Such symbols of prosperity did not exist on 
Anishinabek reservations along the Winnipeg River. Whitedog Falls Generating Station 
produced electricity to power electric stoves, refrigerators, televisions, and radios in the 
settler-colonist community of Kenora. Whitedog Falls Generating Station simultaneously 
flooded Anishinabek homes on-reserve. With their houses, tent sites, and ancestral lands 
underwater, band members of Dalles 38C and One Man Lake Indian Reserve reported an 
unprecedented increase in homelessness rates after 1955. The Canadian Human Rights 
Commission (CHRC) highlights the inequitable distribution of wealth in the post-World 
36 The Canadian Broadcasting Company (CBC) suggests that housing was the most visible symbol 
of post-war prosperity. Canada: A People’s History, “Years of Hope and Anger, 1946-64,” CBC, 12 
January 2002, directed by Marquise Lepage, 
http://www.cbc.ca/history/EPISCONTENTSE1EP15CH3PA3LE.html. 
37 Owram, Born at the Right Time, 56. 
38 The Kenora Daily Miner and News anticipated another million dollar boom in 1957 – by the 
start of the third quarter, 36 housing permits had been approved by the municipality. This was a 
pronounced shift from the first quarter of 1950. At this time, the Kenora Miner and News predicted, but did 
not report on, building construction. “Building Permits Reach Million Mark,” Kenora Daily Miner and 
News (12 October 1957), 1. 
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War II era. In a public brief, the CHRC noted that “Conditions on many Aboriginal 
reserves [in 1950] are comparable to those in third world countries.”39 Problematically, 
historians have rooted “third world” conditions in the distant past. Bryan Palmer (2009) 
links Indian poverty – “discovered” following the 1966 Hawthorn Report – to settler-
colonial acts before 1900. He writes, “Aboriginal life sagged under the weight of 
devastating change: pious religious certainties spelled out in letters of destructive 
conversion [;] infections and devastating diseases [;] the mind-altering and wildly 
intoxicating introduction of alcohol [;] and the proliferation of trade items as seemingly 
innocuous as the copper pot.”40 J. M. Bumsted too associates limited advantages on-
reserve with alcohol consumption.41 Settler-colonialism or disease is used to explain the 
limits of affluence. My dissertation complicates this narrative by showing that poverty 
on-reserve after 1945 is directly linked to federal and provincial infrastructure capacity 
programs that stimulated wealth off-reserve at the expense of reserve communities. 
Contrary to growth-oriented narratives, my research shows that reservations in the 
Winnipeg River drainage basin were economically sustainable until the post-World War 
II era when governmental interference led to poverty. 
While historians have linked affluence to an increase in federal and provincial 
spending, the direct inverse is true on reservation. Endemic poverty on-reserve in the 
Winnipeg River drainage basin correlates positively with the heyday of growth 
economics.42 Between 1950 and 1975, Canada regularly ran a deficit. Monies poured into 
39 Canadian Human Rights Commission, “Population and People: 1 January 1950.” 
40 Palmer, Canada’s 1960s, 277. 
41 Bumsted, A History of the Canadian Peoples, 377. 
42 The term “growth economics” has been selected in lieu of “Keynesian economics.” British 
economist John Maynard Keynes certainly advocated for the expansion of government spending to fight 
depression, but he did not recommend a role for the government in alleviating income inequality between 
groups of people. Instead, the political push for income parity originated with a small group of technocrats 
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infrastructure capacity building.43 One of the most well-known of these federal projects 
was the St. Lawrence Seaway, or Great Lakes Waterway, which linked the Great Lakes 
and St. Lawrence River with the Atlantic Ocean by way of its channels, locks and canals. 
Canada invested about $330 million into the $470.3 million project between 1954 and 
1959.44 Federal monies stimulated high rates of employment in Ontario and Quebec. Oral 
historian Claire Puccia Parham found that individuals who worked on the St. Lawrence 
Seaway in the 1950s “never forgot the time they spent on the job.” Labourers associated 
high wages with “college educations” or “saving for a first home.” Others remembered 
“on-the-job training, which led to future job offers on other waterway and public works 
projects.”45 Many labourers, Parham suggests, associated personal wealth with 
construction (and, by extension, the expenditure of public funds).46 Less well known, 
after World War II. These state officials argued that expansion ought to be the goal of American economic 
policy, their belief being that improvements in the general economy would benefit all Americans. See 
Robert M. Collins, More: The Politics of Economic Growth in Postwar America (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2000) and Alan Brinkley, The End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism in Recession and 
War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995), for more on this. 
43 The CBC released an interactive timeline (“Canada’s deficits and surpluses, 1963-2014”) in 
March 2014. It reveals that Lester B. Pearson ran a $1.2b deficit during his first year in office (1963-1964) 
and a $1b deficit during his last (1967-1968). He was succeeded by Pierre Elliot Trudeau who ran a $667m 
deficit during his first year in office (1968-1969) and a $10.9b during his last (1978-1979). Statistics before 
1963 are not included in this interactive timeline. Michael Pereira and Kerry Wall, “Canada’s deficits and 
surpluses, 1963-2014,” CBC News: Canada, 18 March 2014, accessed 1 September 2015, 
http://www.cbc.ca/news2/interactives/canada-deficit/.  
44 The cost of the project is outlined by the St. Lawrence Seaway Management Corporation in 
“Seaway History,” accessed 1 September 2015, http://www.greatlakes-seaway.com/en/seaway/history/ 
Victor Kaczowski and Gordon C. Shaw, “St. Lawrence Seaway,” Canadian Encyclopedia, 
accessed 1 September 2015, http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/st-lawrence-seaway/, 
identified that Canada struggled to repay accumulated debt into the 1970s. Kaczowski and Shaw reveal that 
Canadians did not universally approve of federal spending on the St Lawrence Seaway; the railways voiced 
concerns about “unfair subsidized competition.” 
45 Claire Puccia Parham, The St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project: An Oral History of the 
Greatest Construction Show on Earth (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2009), 296. 
46 Joy Parr and Daniel McFarlane have highlighted the human cost of the St. Lawrence Seaway. In 
Negotiating a River: Canada, the U.S., and the Creation of the St. Lawrence Seaway (Vancouver: UBC 
Press, 2014), Daniel Macfarlane affirms that relocation was “a disorienting experience.” To make way for 
development, McFarlane reveals, Canada partially funded the inundation of over 225 farms and over 531 
homes. Unlike Parr, McFarlane briefly acknowledges the loss of Iroquoian territory in the Kahnawake 
region. He argues that the traditional way of life at Kahnawake was disrupted by flooding. Unfortunately, 
the human cost at Kahnawake is identified, but poorly substantiated by evidence (124-26). See also Joy 
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however, is infrastructure building in the Northwestern Division of Ontario. During this 
same period (1954-1959), the Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario invested in 
the largest northern water development campaign since its inception in 1906. At its 
height, the development of Whitedog Falls Generating Station created over 1800 jobs in 
the Winnipeg River drainage basin; hundreds of Canadian families received pay during 
the construction period.47 Here is evidence of wealth generated by state-driven industrial 
expansion. However, as water levels increased, access to local resources like manomin, 
fur-bearing animals, and fish decreased on-reserve. As water levels stabilized, access to 
employment with the Hydro-Electric Power Commission decreased. With the subsistence 
economy jeopardized by flooding and jobs lost once construction was completed, the 
standard of living for members of Dalles 38C Indian Reserve, One Man Lake Indian 
Reserve, and Whitedog Indian Reserve declined. This dissertation uncovers the social 
cost of hydroelectric development in the Winnipeg River drainage basin. It reveals how 
the economic capacity of reserve communities declined exponentially during – not 
necessarily before – the 1950s. 
The suggestion that infrastructure capacity building programs – particularly 
hydroelectric development – negatively impacted Indigenous labour practices and 
household economies is not unique to this study.48 In 1974, H. V. Nelles revised 
Parr, “A Walking Village Remade: Iroquois and the St. Lawrence Seaway,” Sensing Changes: 
Technologies, Environments, and the Everyday, 1953-2003 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010), 79-101. 
47 "Electricity Now Flowing in to Hydro's N.W. Ontario System," Kenora Daily Miner and News 
(5 March 1958), 1. 
48 While historians have begun to write more extensively on hydroelectric development on 
Indigenous lands, the geographic limits of my study are unique. Little has been written to date on 
hydroelectric development in the HEPC’s Northwestern Division. Waldram first identified this gap in As 
Long as the Rivers Run in 1988. He noted that Grassy Narrows First Nation and Whitedog First Nation “are 
infamous in Canada” due to their struggle with mercury pollution. But, “[l]ittle known… is that prior to the 
mercury pollution the two communities experienced the negative effects of hydro dam construction. Other 
Native communities in the region were also affected” (10). My research uncovers those “other Native 
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celebratory narratives of the Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario as a public 
utility, arguing that “good politics” is “good business.”49 As early as 1988, James 
Waldram revealed that “good business” required access to Indigenous territories. 
Politicking was the work of colonial agents. Waldram writes, “[T]he processes by which 
people had come to be victimized by hydro dam construction [by Manitoba Hydro and 
Saskatchewan Power Corporation] were similar to the processes by which they had lost 
their lands through treaty making and script allocation.”50 Since Waldram’s publication, 
historians have continued to see hydroelectric development as a colonial process. 
Colonial analyses (whether academic or popular) often present Indigenous peoples as 
victims of hydroelectric development. Take, for example, Paul Charest’s “Hydroelectric 
communities,” Dalles 38C Indian Reserve and One Man Lake Indian Reserve, and begins to detail their 
experiences with Whitedog Dam Generating Station. Waldram’s claim that hydroelectric development in 
the HEPC’s Northwestern Division is supported, in part, by Anastasia M. Shkilnyk’s A Poison Stronger 
Than Love: The Destruction of an Ojibwa Community (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985). 
Shkilnyk argues that the Department of Indian Affair’s decision to relocate Grassy Narrows Indian Reserve 
upset traditional ways of being (e.g. economic activities, gender relationships, and family structure) and 
increased federal presence on the reserve, thus decreasing Anishianbek self-sufficiency and establishing a 
system of dependency. Shkilynk seeks to expose the human costs of industrial development (e.g. Reed 
Paper Mill and mercury poisoning) and urban growth (the establishment of a federally-designed village at 
Grassy Narrows). In an effort to highlight human costs, however, Shkilynk pathologizes her subjects. Her 
text works to uncover the root of the “Indian problem” – the origins of alcoholism, high suicide rates, etc. 
In her analysis, the people of Grassy Narrows are “sick.” Shkilnyk links this sickness to environmental 
change. A large portion of Shkilynyk’s argument centres on the loss of a trapping economy. However, the 
loss of a trapping economy cannot be attributed solely to relocation. Concurrent with the period she is 
discussing – although she does not address this issue – was the artificial increase of water levels on the 
English River. Caribou Falls Generating Station – built as a sister plant to Whitedog Falls Generating 
Station – decimated the muskrat population. Relocation cannot be blamed entirely for reduced yields; 
Caribou Falls Generating Station flooded dens and drowned the muskrat therein. Dam development must 
be recognized as a catalyst of socio-economic change. 
49 In “Revisiting the Politics of Development,” a preface to The Politics of Development: Forests, 
Mines & Hydro-Electric Power in Ontario, 1849-1941, 2nd edition (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 2005; 1st edition 1974), Nelles reflects on the research climate of the 1960s. He 
noted that “Canadian historiography had taken a distinctly biographical turn” (xv). He further observes that 
“the 100th anniversary of Confederation had drawn out the nation-building instinct among historians” (xvi). 
Published shortly after The Politics of Development (1974), James Sturgis’ children’s book, Adam Beck 
(Don Mills, ON: Fitzhenry & Whiteside Limited, 1978) helps to illuminate this celebratory trend. Adam 
Beck believed that “it was wrong to allow private interests to make a profit at the people’s expense,” 
Sturgis writes. Beck believed that water resources belonged to and should benefit the people of Ontario. 
Beck, who became the first Chairman of the Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario, championed 
“power for the people of the province at a cost” (12). The establishment of the HEPC in 1906 is presented 
as a triumph for the people – Ontario Legislature heard and responded to their needs. 
50  Waldram, As Long as the Rivers Run, xiii. 
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Dam Construction and the Foraging Activities of the Eastern Quebec Montagnais.” 
Charest argues that industrial capitalism has caused the “destruction of the old social and 
economic structures of the Montagnais” and the “sedentarianism and proletarianization of 
former… Montagnais hunters-trappers.”51 Charest later identifies an increase in wage 
labour and transfer payments as indicative of a decline in traditional life, noting that 
three-quarters of the income in the average Montagnais family was generated in a “non-
Aboriginal” environment.52 While it is impossible to deny the many changes wrought by 
industrialization to previously isolated Montagnais communities, the decision to 
participate in a new and potentially lucrative economy does not necessarily indicate a loss 
of tradition. Charest fails to separate traditional lifestyle from subsistence activities. His 
Marxist interpretation focuses too much on material circumstances, negating social 
understandings of community. Participation in a capitalist economy did not necessarily 
indicate a loss of culture; it could indicate cultural adaptation. As rational economic 
actors, or even free agents, Indigenous peoples pursued economic security in new ways to 
meet new economic environments. Choice did not necessarily mean cultural 
abandonment; Through cultural change a people could survive the modifications to their 
environment.  
Charest is not alone in his analysis. Other researchers have argued for Indigenous 
victimization by focusing on seasonal labour. In The Dispossessed: Life and Death in 
Native Canada, Geoffrey York argues that the traditional economy at Moose Lake was 
51 Paul Charest, “Hydroelectric Dam Construction and the Foraging Activities of Eastern Quebec 
Montagnais,” in Politics and History in Band Societies, eds. Eleanor Leacock and Richard B. Lee (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 424-25. 
52 Ibid., 421. 
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“shattered” by the hydro flooding at Grand Rapids Hydro Dam.53 Indigenous 
communities throughout Manitoba and Saskatchewan had been “assaulted by northern 
industrial development.”54 Indigenous peoples are presented as being entirely at odds 
with industrial development; however, York fails to develop his argument beyond 
stylized depictions of traditional life. He suggests that Indigenous peoples required land 
to live traditionally and does not acknowledge that traditional activities are an important, 
albeit singular, aspect of a dynamic culture. Desire for land, and the oft quoted idea that 
“[a]n Indian without land is a dead Indian,”55 does not mean that culture is dependent on 
localized hunting and fishing activities. While land is a prerequisite for any type of 
community, York exaggerates the relationship between Indigeneity and wilderness. 
Jean Manore also focuses her discussion of Indigenous losses on the land in 
Cross-Currents: Hydroelectricity and the Engineering of Northern Ontario. By focusing 
exclusively on Indigenous peoples as hunter-gatherers from the signing of treaty to the 
1950s and 1960s, Manore’s scope of discussion is limited to environmental impact 
assessment. The building of power generating stations is identified as having “profound 
environmental impacts on the ecosystem” and as interfering with “First Nations’ fishing 
and trapping practices.”56 Manore focuses on problems associated with development like 
inaccessible ancestral territory, fish and animal depletion, and flooded vegetation. Her 
emphasis on changed “Aboriginal subsistence activities” refuses to acknowledge Cree 
economic adaptation.57 In failing to address community change - by focusing on the loss 
53 Geoffrey York, The Dispossessed: Life and Death in Native Canada (Toronto: Lester & Orpen 
Dennys, 1989), 109. 
54 Ibid., 119. 
55 Ibid., 123. 
56 Manore, Cross-Currents, 137. 
57 Ibid., 137-41. 
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of subsistence activities - Manore denies the Cree a dynamic and distinctively Indigenous 
future. Indian land is not just about living; it is about making a living. Her failure to 
distinguish between the process and the product of hydroelectric development reinforces 
the stereotype in which socio-economic disadvantages are blamed on Indigenous peoples’ 
inability to adapt to change, instead of the HEPC’s failure to engage First Nations in 
negotiations. Poor communication and poorer compensation are not identified as potential 
causes for Indigenous reactions to hydroelectric flooding. Such analyses of hydroelectric 
development as intrusive and destructive to ‘traditional’ life and subsistence economics 
do not accurately reflect Indigenous community life. As Rolf Knight and John Lutz have 
shown, Indigenous labour practices diversified in response to industrialization. Seasonal 
rounds had been supplemented with work for pay by the late nineteenth century.58 Surely 
Anishinabek mechanics mourned the submersion of muskrat dens differently than 
Anishinabek trappers who relied on furs for income. And yet, historical analyses 
privilege the experiences of able-bodied males working in seasonal industries.  
The overrepresentation of “traditional” labourers persists despite scholarly 
recognition that Indigenous peoples did not shun, in Palmer’s words, “opportunities for 
wage labour and the new options offered by the capitalist marketplace.”59 Few scholars 
have considered how Indigenous labourers may have associated dam construction with 
economic opportunity (i.e. work for pay). In 1988, James Waldram suggested that 
Indigenous resistance to the Limestone Generating Station in Manitoba was silenced “by 
a comprehensive plan to hire Native people for the dam’s construction.”60 Here work for 
58 Rolf Knight, Indians at Work: An Informal History of Native Labour in British Columbia, 1848-
1930 (Vancouver: New Star Books, 1996), 3, 8, 18, 20; Lutz, Makúk, 38, 109, 159, 211. 
59 Palmer, Canada’s 1960s, 373. 
60 Waldram, As Long as the Rivers Run, 12. 
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pay fostered cooperation between industrialists and band members seeking industrial 
employment. Megan Stanley’s Voices from Two Rivers is the first academic treatise to 
acknowledge Indigenous labour on hydroelectric generating stations in British Columbia. 
She writes, “[w]hen construction on the reservoir began, jobs became available clearing 
the transmission lines and reservoir, transporting loggers and surveyors, and working in 
the portable sawmills…. [m]any Tsek’ene moved to Finlay Forks to take advantage of 
these opportunities.”61 And yet, Stanley’s acknowledgement of job opportunities in 
Voices from Two Rivers is undeveloped, while passing references made by Waldram are 
conspicuous for their rarity. Dam sites are most strongly associated with subjugation: 
“traditionalists,” whose hunting, trapping, and fishing grounds are flooded, become 
increasingly reliant on state welfare. Displaced peoples are forced to adapt to Western 
socio-economic practices. More recently, Caroline Desbiens has implied that Indigenous 
(Cree) labourers struggled to maintain their social position. James Bay workers, she 
claims, “were often seen as participating in the colonial appropriation of the region’s 
resources.”62 Desbiens does not develop or substantiate this passing reference to 
community exclusion. Elders in the Winnipeg River drainage basin, by contrast, 
emphasized that there are many ways to be “Native,” none of which depend entirely on 
seasonal rounds. As Elder Bert Fontaine explained to me in 2012, “Native people can 
work anywhere… It’s just like anything – painting everyone with the same brush. All 
61 Megan Stanley, Voices from Two Rivers: Harnessing the Power of the Peace and Columbia 
(Vancouver: BC Hydro Pioneers Association with Douglas & McIntyre, 2010), 110. 
62 Caroline Desbiens, Power from the North: Territory, Identity, and the Culture of 
Hydroelectricity in Quebec (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2013), 171. Desbiens circulated similar ideas in 
“Pioneers, Labourers, Water Builders… A Geography of ‘The People’ in James Bay” (paper presented at 
the ICG Conference, Taegu, South Korea, 9-13 August, 2000). This presentation paper is available for 
download at http://econgeog.misc.hit-u.ac.jp/icgg/intl_mtgs/CDesbiens.pdf (accessed 12 December 2012). 
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these [academic theories] about Natives that can’t work – that’s BS.”63 Taking Fontaine’s 
words seriously means considering work for pay as a viable and valuable Anishinabek 
response to industrial development. 
The historical focus on trapping, hunting, and fishing has also eclipsed women’s 
experiences of hydroelectric development. Surely women whose household labour was 
highly localized did not associate the loss of hunting territories with sedentary living, as 
Charest suggested. Limited attention to childcare reflects an ingrained masculinist 
perspective in the literature of hydroelectric development, and post-war Indigenous 
history more generally. Historians have bemoaned the inundation of Indigenous hunting 
grounds, spaces traversed predominately by Indigenous men.64 Some have also 
acknowledged that flooding can disrupt big game migration routes, posing significant 
threats to the intergenerational transmission of men’s hunting knowledge. Charest and 
York have mourned the losses of Indigenous men who, unable to hunt and trap, have 
come to rely on welfare and thus made critical exposés of the environmental injustices 
faced by Indigenous peoples in Canada. And yet, the overwhelming attention to food 
provision by males may result from anthropological biases dating back to the early 
twentieth century. Consider the conceptual barriers against framing a feminist 
interpretation of flood damages in Anishinabek territories: anthropologist Ruth Landes 
mused that “trapping is the chief economic activity of the Ojibwa” in her 1938 book, 
63 Elder Bert Fontaine, telephone interview with author, 16 July 2012. 
64 For example, see Paul Charest, “Hydroelectric Dam Construction,” 213-26; Manore, Cross-
Currents, 137, 139; Frank Quinn, “As Long as the Rivers Run: The Impacts of Corporate Water 
Development on Native Communities in Canada,” Canadian Journal of Native Studies 11, no. 1 (1991): 
137-54.
A notable title that helps to illuminate this point is Strangers Devour the Land: A Chronicle of the 
Assault upon the Last Coherent Hunting Culture in North America, the Cree Indians of Quebec, and Their 
Vast Primeval Homelands by Boyce Richardson (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1975).  
27 
Ojibwa Women.65 She observed Anishinabek families in the Treaty #3 District and 
concluded that “males are trained to shoulder economic responsibilities” and take primary 
responsibility for the hunt. Landes suggested that women who retrieved game for 
household use were exceptional, “pressed by economic or temperamental needs to take 
up male work.”66 Ernestine Friedl echoed Landes’ masculinist perspective in 1975 when 
she claimed that “game was the group’s most valuable resource” and downplayed 
women’s harvesting activities.67 Historically, scholarship has considered women’s 
contributions as secondary to men’s attempts to fend off hunger in Anishinabek 
territories. In this dissertation, I seek to restore Anishinabek women to their position as 
partners in family food provision, and to deepen our understanding of the effects of 
industrial development on the household economies of Indigenous peoples. We cannot 
truly understand the effects of hydroelectric development on Anishinabek communities 
without examining the unique effects of floodways on women and their infants. This 
dissertation resists homogenization along masculinist lines and uncovers diverse 
Indigenous responses to hydroelectric development. Flooding was experienced differently 
along economic and gender lines. 
Researchers like Charest, York and Manore have overrepresented hunters and 
gatherers in their analyses. While able-bodied males who engaged in subsistence 
activities may form a majority, they represent an Indigenous interest group; they do not 
represent diverse sub-groups within the community. The underrepresentation of mothers 
and general labourers, for example, prevents us from seeing multiple losses (e.g.
65 Ruth Landes, The Ojibwa Woman (New York: W. W. Norton, 1971), v. 
66 Ibid., vi. 
67 Friedl quoted in Priscilla K. Buffalohead, “Farmers, Warriors, Traders: A Fresh Look at 
Ojibway Women,” Minnesota History, 48, no. 6 (Summer 1983): 240. 
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reproductive and paid labour) and instead focuses our attention on changing habitat. This 
focus on territorial decline reinforces romantic depictions of Indians in the wilderness in 
historical and journalistic accounts of hydroelectric development. Consider Boyce 
Richardson’s Strangers Devour the Land (1991), a popular text hailed “as a stirring 
account of a minority group’s struggle to save their land and lifestyle.”68 Richardson, a 
Montreal-based journalist, provides a highly personalized account of the James Bay 
Crees’ hunting way of life and the two court cases leading up the James Bay and 
Northern Quebec Agreement (JBNQA) in 1975. Given his claim of contact with northern 
Cree communities69 and his extensive use of primary sources, Richardson had an 
uncommon opportunity to challenge stereotypes of Indigenous peoples, for instance the 
“ecological” Indian, upheld by the popular imagination. 
Unfortunately, Richardson’s literary emphasis on “Indians” roughing it in the 
bush limits audience recognition of Cree environmental modifications. Richardson claims 
that the James Bay Cree live in the “awesome wilderness of northern Quebec.”70 The 
term “wilderness,” used throughout the text, implies an uncultivated region and nullifies 
the economic potential of the land, as well as the ways in which the Cree have shaped 
their environment. Richardson thus downplays the value of Cree labour in the creation 
and operation of productive trap lines. Land must be cleared for hunting lodges. Trails 
must be cleared to lay traps and, later, to access them. Richardson’s suggestion that Cree 
hunters live in “exquisite balance” with “the herbivores and carnivores” reinforces 
68 “Strangers Devour the Land (Editorial Review),” in Publisher’s Weekly, accessed 29 July 2008, 
http://reviews.publishersweekly.com/bd.aspx?isbn=0930031407&pub=pw, 1997.  
69 Boyce Richardson, Strangers Devour the Land: A Chronicle of the Assault upon the Last 
Coherent Hunting Culture in North America, the Cree Indians of Quebec, and Their Vast Primeval 
Homelands (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1975), Acknowledgements. 
70 Ibid., 3. 
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romantic misconceptions of the ecological Indian. William Cronon – in his rejection of 
“wilderness” as a sacred space unmarred by human activity – challenges his readers to 
think of “home” instead. When we build our homes, we, by necessity, “[manipulate] and 
[work] and even [kill] some parts of nature to make our home.”71 Surely, the Cree did 
too. By unifying Indigenous peoples with the animal world, Richardson devalues the 
productive labour of Cree hunters and trappers. While he admires their assumed social 
and technological simplicity, this admiration prevents readers from recognizing Cree as 
economic players who – like Québécois developers – modified their environment to 
improve their “home life.” We must remember that lands outside of Canadian 
metropolitan centres (like Montreal) never felt “wild” to Indigenous occupants. By 
obscuring this fact for rhetorical effect, we affirm colonial configurations of space and 
privilege Euro-North American boundaries.  
Moreover, when researchers frame their studies around environmental change in 
Canada’s “wilderness,” they define Indigenous loss in Western terms that are rarely 
articulated by their subjects. This disjuncture between scholarly and Indigenous speech is 
audible in Boyce Richardson’s 1974 documentary, Cree Hunters from Mistassini. The 
narrator opens, “Northern Quebec is one of the last great wilderness areas of North 
America.” His subjects, by contrast, demarcate and claim trapping grounds north of 
Mistassini. Sam Blacksmith occupies about 3108 square kilometres referred to 
throughout the film as “Sam’s Territory.” This is no wilderness. Blacksmith emphasizes 
that land left vacant for multiple seasons does not revert to nature. He states, “We do not 
71 William Cronon, “The Trouble with Wilderness; or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature” in 
Uncommon Ground: Rethinking the Human Place in Nature, edited by William Cronon, (New York: W. 
W. Norton & Co., 1995), 89.
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give up our land. It is still ours when we are not here.”72 Historian Jennifer Brown notes 
that Cree speakers use two variations of “our” in the term “our land.” The prefix ki- in 
kituskeenow (“our land”) is inclusive and reflects shared authority over the territory. 
Nituskeenan is an exclusive term for “our land” – Cree speakers are most likely to 
employ ni- when speaking to outsiders.73 When speaking to an anonymous member of the 
film crew, Blacksmith uses the prefix ni-. This grammatical nuance suggests that 
Blacksmith affirmed his relationship to the land through speech. By using ni-, Blacksmith 
“othered” the crew member. Blacksmith simultaneously asserted his belonging and 
claimed the ability to identify outsiders. Filmmakers like Richardson, however, did not 
recognize Sam’s Territory as a Cree homeland. Richardson located Sam’s Territory in 
Quebec’s “wilderness.” Blacksmith, in turn, identified filmmakers as “outsiders,” 
suggesting that men like Richardson did not, or could not (ni-), truly grasp Cree 
territories. This conceptual gap between researcher and subject, between “wilderness” 
and “homeland,” is inaudible in text. 
Historians of hydroelectric development on Indigenous territories have used 
“wilderness” interchangeably with “hinterland” – a term that, while occasionally useful, 
nevertheless obscures important geopolitical realities. Waldram, for example, claimed 
that hydroelectric dam construction was located in the “vast hinterland areas” of 
Manitoba and Saskatchewan.74 But, to whom is northern Quebec, Manitoba, or 
Saskatchewan a “hinterland”? This descriptor – used to tell Indigenous histories – does 
72 Cree Hunters of Mistassini, directed by Tony Ianzelo and Boyce Richardson (National Film 
Board of Canada, 1974), available online at https://www.nfb.ca/film/cree_hunters.  
73 Jennifer S. H. Brown, “Rupert’s Land, Nituskeenan, Our Land: Cree and English Naming and 
Claiming around the Dirty Sea,” in New Histories for Old: Changing Perspectives on Canada’s Native 
Pasts, eds. Ted Binnema and Susan Neylan (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007), 25. 
74 For example, Waldram claimed that hydroelectric dam construction was located in the “vast 
hinterland areas” of Manitoba and Saskatchewan. Waldram, As Long as the Rivers Run, xi.  
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not accurately reflect Indigenous conceptions of space. In this dissertation, I reject 
“wilderness” as a descriptor of Indigenous territories. My research presents the north 
shore of Lake of the Woods as a bustling centre of Anishinabek activity. As such, it 
participates in the process of “visual reorientation” first proposed by Daniel Richter in 
Facing East from Indian Country.75 While Kenora was isolated from other Anglo-
Canadian centres, it was an Anishinabek homeland. In 1873, Treaty #3 was signed 
between the Crown and Anishinabek signatories at Northwest Angle on Lake of the 
Woods. Far removed from Ottawa, Anishinabek signatories considered Lake of the 
Woods to be a political centre. To the west of Lake of the Woods is Manito Ahbee, which 
translates “where the Creator sits.” Manito Ahbee is revered by Indigenous peoples across 
North America as a sacred space. Lake of the Woods and the Winnipeg River facilitated 
travel to a spiritual centre. For Anishinabek families, the north shore is not a “hinterland” 
or a “wilderness,” but rather a hotbed of economic, political, and spiritual activity. It is a 
space where women and men hunted, raised their children, and worked for pay.  
This dissertation is written looking out from Indian country. I do not see 
“hinterland” resources being extracted for central consumption. Instead, I envision a 
centre being disrupted to serve a competing settlement. In so doing, I join other 
Indigenous activists like Hidatsa/Mandan filmmaker J. Carlos Peinado in reorienting 
narratives of development.76 Readers are here challenged to consider the Winnipeg River 
75 Daniel K. Richter, Facing East from Indian Country: A Native History of Early America 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 8-9. 
76 In Waterbuster (2006), Hidatsa/Mandan filmmaker, J. Carlos Peinado, centres his analysis 
around Fort Berthold Indian Reservation in what is now known as North Dakota. Peinado does not present 
Fort Berthold as a peripheral space. Instead, neighbouring “White” settlements are presented as peripheral 
spaces that tribal members visit to shop or to further their education. Peinado makes Fort Berthold Indian 
Reservation a hotbed of cultural activity. It is at Fort Berthold that Siouan languages were spoken, that 
clans were active. It was at Fort Berthold that bumper crops were seeded, monitored, and harvested. There 
is no sense that Fort Berthold is a “peripheral” space. Indeed, the Garrison Dam is said to have displaced 
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drainage basin as an Anishinabek homeland. The geographical boundaries of this study 
reflect Anishinabek boundaries. Oral testimony reveals that Anishinabek families from 
Dalles 38C Indian Reserve, Whitedog Indian Reserve, and One Man Lake Indian Reserve 
primarily utilized a stretch of water from Rough Rock Lake in the North to Warroad, 
Minnesota, in the south. It is this stretch of the Winnipeg River drainage basin that is the 
focus of this study. While previous “wilderness” and “hinterland” studies have 
normalized Western jurisdiction, I draw attention to alternative geopolitical boundaries 
that examine the impact of hydroelectric development on the centre of a vibrant 
Anishinabek Nation. Within these boundaries, I explore how Indigenous communities 
fractured in response to hydroelectric development, responding not as “Indians,” but as 
distinct Anishinabek interest groups. 
By examining the north shore of Lake of the Woods as a centre of meaningful 
Anishinabek activity, this dissertation deepens historical analyses of Indigenous activism 
in Canada. Indigenous activism is typically understood as an organized, large-scale, and 
public rejection of state programming (be it federal or provincial). The year 1969 is often 
accepted as a “watershed moment in Native militancy,” a moment when Indigenous 
peoples united across Canada to protest the proposal of Prime Minister Pierre Elliot 
Trudeau and Minister of Indian Affairs Jean Chrétien to dissolve the Indian Act.77 
Historians have suggested that social and technological change in the mid-twentieth 
century was crucial to making Canada-wide resistance to this reform possible. For 
Peinado’s ancestors from centre. Peinado affirms Fort Berthold – its original location flooded by the 
Garrison Dam – as an imaginative centre for displaced peoples; Hidatasa/Mandan hearts still yearn for their 
ancestral home. Hidatasa/Mandan eyes still look towards their ancestral home. Waterbuster, directed by J. 
Carlos Peinado (Quechees, VT: Brave Boat Products Inc., 2006), DVD.  
77 Palmer, Canada’s 1960s, 393-408; Harold Cardinal, The Unjust Society, 2nd edition (Vancouver: 
Douglas & McIntyre, 1999), 99-107. 
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example, Arthur J. Ray and co-authors Kristin Burnett and Geoff Read have suggested 
that World War II fostered a “new political consciousness” among Indigenous peoples.78 
Military service created a new social environment; Indigenous peoples, many of whom 
had previously lived on isolated reservations, now gathered on military bases. Soldiers 
from British Columbia to Nova Scotia realized that they shared grievances against the 
Crown as a result of their shared subjugation under the Indian Act. Harold Cardinal, 
author of The Unjust Society (a text generally credited with galvanizing action in 1969), 
believed that television and radio made Canada-wide resistance possible. Indigenous 
peoples could identify a shared struggle on-screen or over the airwaves.79 Physical 
proximity – which enlistment had allowed during World War II – was no longer essential 
to knowledge exchange. Technology made it possible for Indigenous peoples to identify 
and to rally under a shared cause. 
Yet, as Kristin Burnett and Geoff Read note, “this temporal focus has 
overshadowed centuries of defiance by Aboriginal peoples,”80 which is certainly true of 
the literature on Indigenous resistance to hydroelectric development. Consider the 
historical focus on Cree and Inuit resistance to the James Bay Project (circa 1971-1975). 
According to Paul Wertman, approximately eight distinct Indigenous communities lived 
in the projected flood zone at the time Premier Robert Bourassa announced his vision of 
78 Kristin Burnett and Geoff Read, “Political Activism,” in Burnett and Read, eds. Aboriginal 
History: A Reader (Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press, 2012), 356; Similarly Arthur J. Ray claimed 
that “the White Paper… galvanized the Native nationalist movement.” Ray, I Have Lived Here since the 
World Began: An Illustrated History of Canada’s Native People: Revised Edition (Toronto: Key Porter 
Books, 2005), 335. 
79 Cardinal, Unjust Society, 90. A major benefit of Indigenous activism was the explosion of 
Indigenous peoples working in academe who paved the way for Indigenous methodologies to be employed 
in a wide variety of disciplines. In history, notable Indigenous scholars who integrated Indigenous 
methodologies are Howard Adams, Prison of Grass: Canada from a Native Point of View (Toronto: New 
Press, 1975), Maria Campbell, Halfbreed (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1973), and Vine Deloria, 
Custer Died for Your Sins: An Indian Manifesto (New York: Macmillan, 1969). 
80 Burnett and Read, “Political Activism,” 356. 
34 
the La Grande Complex in 1971. Faced with the risk of territorial loss, these eight distinct 
groups united to form the ad hoc Quebec Indian Committee. As a united front, these Cree 
and Inuit hunters organized against Quebec.81 As identified by Romuald Wera and 
Thibault Martin, collective action resulted in an interim injunction in 1972. Justice Albert 
Malouf’s decision was overturned shortly thereafter, but the public nature of Cree and 
Inuit complaints and “the obligation imposed on Quebec by a court of law to negotiate 
and to compensate Aboriginal people before appropriating their land put an end to a long 
era of colonial behaviours.”82 Successful Indigenous resistance to the James Bay Project 
was large scale, organized, and publicized – markers of success associated with the Red 
Power Movement. But what of daily affirmations of territorial rights made by families 
who never reached the courtroom or Parliament Hill? 
The emphasis on large-scale organization has limited the historical study of 
Indigenous resistance to colonial exploitation and usurpation of natural resources. Studies 
that predate the White Paper of 1969 generally focus on extraordinary political leaders 
who organized military campaigns against Western powers before 1885. Attention has 
been paid to Pontiac, an Ottawa Chief, who organized the Ottawa, Wyandot, 
Anishinabek, and Potawatami nations to expel British forces from lands previously 
claimed by the French Crown.83 Tecumseh, a Shawnee Chief, has also captured the public 
imagination. This military leader organized against American encroachment on Upper 
Canada in 1812; he hoped that a strategic alliance with the British would help him to 
81 Paul Wertman, “Planning and Development after the James Bay Agreement,” The Canadian 
Journal of Native Studies III, no. 2 (1983): 278-79. 
82 Romuald Wera and Thibault Martin, “The Way to Modern Treaties: A Review of Hydro 
Projects and Agreements in Manitoba and Quebec,” in Power Struggles: Hydro Development and First 
Nations in Manitoba and Quebec, edited by Thibault Martin and Steven H. Hoffman (Winnipeg: University 
of Manitoba Press, 2008), 65. 
83 The Pontiac Rebellion, directed by Brian McKenna (Montréal: National Film Board of Canada, 
2002), DVD. 
35 
secure a large Indian Territory in the Great Lakes Region.84 Further west, Big Bear, a 
Cree Chief, is celebrated for his attempts to resist Treaty #6 until favourable terms – 
particularly a large Indian Territory in the Cypress Hills on the border of present-day 
Saskatchewan and Alberta – was granted by the Crown.85 In 1885, after a failed attempt 
to gain Canada’s recognition of Métis rights and territories in the Northwest, Louis Riel, 
a Métis leader, was hanged for treason.86 Riel’s hanging ushered in the nadir of 
Indigenous mobilization (1885-1969). Canada’s fears of an effective Indigenous 
resistance to colonial power prompted amendments to the Indian Act of 1876. After 1885, 
Canada amended Section 114 to criminalize religious ceremonies (i.e. the Sun Dance), 
although the law was applied to eliminate large gatherings of Indigenous peoples more 
generally. Section 114 would not be lifted until 1951.87 Arthur J. Ray has suggested that 
mobilization against the state was impeded by federal policies until 1951.88  
While the criminalization of Indigenous gatherings made it difficult to organize a 
large-scale resistance, Anishinabek in the Winnipeg River drainage basin never accepted 
Canada’s or Ontario’s claim to their natural resources. This dissertation helps to fill the 
gap between 1885 and 1969, uncovering highly localized forms of everyday resistance to 
colonial power. A close look at the Winnipeg River drainage basin allows us to 
84 James Laxer, Tecumseh & Brock: the War of 1812 (Toronto: House of Anansi, 2012); John 
Sugden, Tecumseh: A Life (New York: Henry Hold and Co., 1999). 
85 John Tobias, “Canada’s Subjugation of the Plains Cree, 1879-1885,” Canadian Historical 
Review 64, no. 4 (1983): 519-48. 
86 Ray, I Have Lived Here Since the World Began, 217-20.  David Lee provides a notable 
exception to the focus on extraordinary political leaders like Louis Riel in the North-West Rebellion of 
1885. Lee explores the socio-political reasons for Métis militants to take up arms against the Dominion 
Government (“The Métis Militant Rebels of 1885,” Canadian Ethnic Studies 21, no. 3 (1989): 1-19.). 
87 Keith D. Smith, ed. “4b.I Legislation Restriction Indigenous Ceremonies, 1884-1933,” Strange 
Visitors: Documents in Indigenous-Settler Relations in Canada from 1876 (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2014), 96-7. See also Constance Backhouse, “‘Bedecked in Gaudy Feathers’: The Legal Prohibition 
of Aboriginal Dance: Wanduta’s Trial, Manitoba, 1903,” Colour-Coded: A Legal History of Racism in 
Canada, 1900-1950 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 63. 
88  Ray, I Have Lived Here Since the World Began, 315. 
36 
understand how Anishinabek peoples envisioned their rights against the oppressive 
Indian Act (and a battery of subsequent colonial laws). Further, it allows us to better 
understand how adaptation and cooperation with federal and provincial water use 
functioned as forms of resistance. Adaptation and cooperation allowed Anishinabek 
families to continually occupy their homeland despite colonial actions that threatened its 
socio-economic sustainability. 
Discussions of Anishinabek resistance are not intended to downplay the severe 
imposition that the Indian Act placed on Indigenous lives. From 1898 (when Norman 
Dam was installed) to 1958 (when Whitedog Falls Generating Station began operating at 
full capacity), Anishinabek families were disempowered by the state. Canada and Ontario 
justified both developments without actively consulting with Anishinabek occupants of 
the Winnipeg River drainage basin. However, evidence of exclusion does not rule out the 
possibility of discontent. Anishinabek families organized and found creative methods to 
assert their claim to water resources on Lake of the Woods and the Winnipeg River. For 
example, Anishinabek families participated in intra-community ceremonies that asserted 
Anishinabek guardianship over water resources claimed by Ontario. Anishinabek families 
developed investment strategies to manage environmental change and to retain the 
territorial integrity of their reserves. Anishinabek families also sought paid opportunities 
with the Hydro-Electric Power Commission. None of these activities were overt acts of 
resistance. Instead, these were private acts of resistance. 
In this dissertation, I reveal that Anishinabek activism before 1969 took three 
distinctive forms: adaptation, cooperation, and passive resistance. Adaptation refers to 
family strategies developed in response to environmental change that allowed 
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Anishinabek men, women, and children to subsist on- and off-reserve. Cooperation is 
marked by Anishinabek attempts to work with settler-colonists, despite competing 
economic goals, to ensure the socio-economic stability of Anishinabek communities. 
Passive resistance, by contrast, refers to non-violent expressions of discontent against 
federal and provincial legislation and social engineering. By uncovering private acts of 
resistance, I build on the work of Gerald Taiaiake Alfred and others who have shown that 
Indigenous peoples across what is now known as Canada engaged in “a consistent 
struggle to revitalize various Indigenous cultural and political institutions in the hope of 
restoring the integrity of national communities.”89 Alfred maintains that Indigenous 
opposition to colonization has been continuous. This dissertation offers proof of that 
claim. 
MAKING SENSE OF ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE: A DISCUSSION OF HISTORICAL
RESEARCH METHODS AND RESEARCH FINDINGS 
In researching this dissertation, I collected evidence of private acts of resistance 
(adaptation, cooperation, and passive resistance) in oral testimony. At Dalles 38C Indian 
Reserve, I worked closely with Chief Lorraine Cobiness and her advisory council to 
contact individual families. Each resident family was mailed a letter requesting them to 
(1) identify a reliable narrator, and (2) participate in my research study. By asking each
family to nominate their narrator, I hoped to avoid Western misunderstandings of 
“Elder.” In Anishinabek society, the term “Elder” reflects an accumulation of experience 
that may not reflect biological age. Equally, age may not make a reliable narrator. 
Members of Dalles 38C Indian Reserve nominated the following interviewees to 
participate in my study: 
89 Gerald R. Alfred, Heeding the Voice of Our Ancestors: Kahnawake Mohawk Politics and the 
Rise of Native Nationalism (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1995), 9. 
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1. Alice Kelly (b. 1946)
2. Roberta Jameson (b. unknown)
3. Archie Wagamese (b. 1944)
4. David Wagamese (b.1948)
5. Moses Henry (b.1941)
6. Joe Nabish (b.1933)
7. Marjorie Nabish (1932-2015)
8. Larry Kabestra (b. 1948)
These eight interviewees have been have been vetted by their communities. I liken the 
selection process to peer review. Community members gauged accuracy and skill before 
referring individuals to me. These eight interviews, conducted in 2012, were 
supplemented by transcript summaries produced by Cuyler Cotton after a series of 
interviews with Dalles’ band members in the 1990s. Transcript summaries are not yet 
publicly available, but researchers may request to access information through Dalles’ 
band office. An additional nine interviewees were identified off-reserve using the 
snowball technique. I believed that these individuals could teach me about life in the 
Treaty #3 District more generally. Interviewees also drew my attention to written sources 
produced by Anishinabek culture carriers. Autobiographical writings and policy 
proposals that originated from Dalles 38C Indian Reserve, Shoal Lake #40 Indian 
Reserve, and One Man Lake Indian Reserve were also incorporated into this study. 
My personal location – as direct descendant of Kawitaskung and daughter of 
former Chief Allan Luby (Ogemah) – eased my access to elder knowledge. Although I 
am, by law, a non-status Indian, I am in-practice a peripheral community member. Raised 
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off-reservation and ineligible for voting privileges at Dalles 38C Indian Reserve, I was 
identified as a potential history keeper by Chief Lorraine Cobiness and her advisory 
committee. Why me? I had been brought to the reserve sporadically during my youth to 
attend pow-wows or to visit my father at the band office. I had also explored lands 
unrecognized by the Department of Indian Affairs, but claimed by my community 
through practice. For me, Lake of the Woods and the Winnipeg River overflow with 
stories. My mother, Sheila McRae, reflects on my informal training: 
You had a lot of pressure being first family, pressure with your Dad being 
Chief, pressure with your Dad trying to tell oral stories. I always felt that you 
were under a lot of pressure. I always felt trying to keep my history straight 
and walking with your Dad in his world, it became a lot – you became very 
aware that you had to keep the history.90 
Cobiness knew that I had childhood memories of Dalles 38C Indian Reserve. Cobiness 
also knew that I carried stories specific to my family – how my many great-grandmothers 
prepared adikameg and why my grandmother, Carol Kipling, did not. Cobiness also knew 
that I had a post-secondary education in history. It was hoped that my education would 
allow me to communicate our shared history of environmental change with the broader 
public – a history that displaced my family from Dalles 38C Indian Reserve and made me 
a visitor to that place. Through my education, I had learned how to speak and how to 
write like an outsider. And so, it was my bloodline that facilitated initial access to 
community history. I had inherited a right to stories – a right to know where I came from 
and how my family came to live in town. My education, by contrast, encouraged band 
members outside of my kin network to share their stories with me. This dissertation is my 
homecoming. 
90 Sheila McRae, telephone interview with author, 9 September 2007. 
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My homecoming was not without conflict. One female Elder, for example, argued 
that urban living had jeopardized my ability to carry reserve history. What did I know 
about living at Dalles 38C Indian Reserve? To ease these concerns, my research process 
included ceremony. I had to prepare my spirit for listening. My preparation was guided 
by Elder-mentor Alice Kelly. Participation in ceremony created a unique set of challenges 
during the research process. Ethical conduct as defined by the Social Sciences and 
Human Research Council of Canada required Elders to sign a Consent Form. This raised 
questions about whether I valued the consent form (or Western ceremony) over the 
exchange of tobacco (or Anishinabek ceremony). My use of consent forms raised 
questions about whether I truly honoured Anishinabek ceremonies. Further, my use of 
consent forms conflicted with local understandings of history. Many Elders argued that 
information was being shared, being transferred – but, it could not be released. 
Interviews sometimes collapsed because of these semantic differences. One male Elder, 
for example, told me that “I knew better” than to ask for a statement of release. When I 
explained that I was honouring a Western ceremony, I was accused of “acting like an 
ass.” My community research process was thus defined by ceremony, exchange, and a 
struggle to balance two worlds.  
I used archival sources to corroborate oral testimony wherever possible. The 
complete collection of the Kenora Daily Miner and News held by the Kenora Public 
Library proved invaluable in building a general timeline of development – demographic 
and economic – in the Winnipeg River drainage basin. I mined newspapers for details 
about the Norman Dam, the hearings of the International Joint Commission, and the 
Whitedog Falls Generating Station. Newspaper records were paired with texts (like town 
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minutes, resident diaries and photographs) and artefacts (like clothing and household 
items) held by the Lake of the Woods Museum (Kenora). Three archives proved 
foundational to my success. The Treaty #3 and Aboriginal Rights Research Centre 
(TARR) in Kenora, Ontario, opened their document collection to me, which helped me to 
manage the cost of research as TARR held facsimiles of the RG-10 records housed by 
Library and Archives Canada (Ottawa). The Archives of Ontario (Toronto) provided key 
information about how the province understood and (re)valued water during the period 
understudy. Particular attention was paid to the records of Ontario Tourism and the 
Ontario Water Resources Commission. Lastly, this project would have been impossible 
without the support of Ontario Power Generation (OPG, formerly the Hydro-Electric 
Power Commission of Ontario). I am thankful to OPG for providing open access to 
corporate records for Whitedog Falls Generating Station and Caribou Falls Generating 
Station in July 2007. 
I have structured my dissertation with inspiration from the medicine wheel, an 
Indigenous symbol that is circular in design. The medicine wheel represents Earth. On 
Earth all living things – plants, animals, and Anishinabek (human beings) – are sustained 
in relationship with each other. The Anishinabek eat waawaashkeshi (deer) who eat 
giizhik (cedar). And, when an Anishinaabe (wo)man transitions, her/his body returns to 
Earth to nourish giizhik to feed waawaashkeshi. The medicine wheel thus symbolizes the 
interconnectedness of all things. My research uncovered critical intersections between 
food insecurity, Whitedog Falls Generating Station, and Norman Dam. To highlight these 
interconnections, my research findings have been divided into four directions: 
EAST DIRECTION: WHERE THE SUN RISES 
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According to the teachings of the medicine wheel, the East is the direction of new 
beginnings. It is the direction whence the sun rises.91 Here, we will explore how federal 
and provincial governments justified hydroelectric power generation on Anishinabek 
watercourses. We will determine how settler-colonists claimed Lake of the Woods and 
the Winnipeg River from its custodians (Anishinabek) to encourage the expansion of the 
pulp and paper industry in what is now known as Northwestern Ontario. 
In 1873, Anishinabek representatives from the Winnipeg River drainage basin 
signed Treaty #3 with Her Majesty the Queen. While the treaty carefully detailed the 
lands that both parties would soon share, little reference was made to water resources and 
their use. Indeed, the waters began where treaty discussions seemed to end: rivers and 
lakes became boundary markers. Treaty #3 commenced “at a point on the Pigeon River 
route” where “the height of the land [separates] the waters running to Lake Superior from 
those flowing to Lake Winnipeg.” Subsequent reference points include Lake Nipigon, 
Winnipeg River, Albany River, English River, White Mouth River, and “the forty-ninth 
parallel of north latitude to Lake of the Woods.” Her Majesty requested access to a “tract 
[of land] comprised within the lines above, embracing an area of fifty-five thousand 
square miles.”92 Having forged a land-sharing agreement with the Crown, Anishinabek 
families continued to use Lake of the Woods and the Winnipeg River as in years past – to 
fish, to manoominike (harvest wild rice), and to travel. 
Technological change, however, raised provincial alarm over Anishinabek water 
use. With the development of transmission lines, Anishinabek access to, and use of, Lake 
91 Phil Lane, Jr., et al., The Sacred Tree: Reflections on Native American Spirituality (Twin Lakes, 
WI: Lotus Press, 2004), 53. 
92 “Treaty #3 Between Her Majesty the Queen and the Saulteaux Tribe of the Ojibbeway Indians 
at Northwest Angle on the Lake of the Woods with Adhesions,” accessed 2 October 2015, 
https://gct3.net/grand-chiefs-office/gct3-info-and-history/government-of-canada-document/.  
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of the Woods and the Winnipeg River seemed to jeopardize industrial growth in Ontario. 
In response, as Chapter 1 argues, the Ontario government redefined its control over water 
use in 1915 to exclude Anishinabek from control over watercourses. Anishinabek were 
excluded from any role in decision-making concerning hydro-electrical developments. 
The Ontario government asserted this control without the approval of the federal 
government in this area of mixed jurisdiction. The Ontario government’s actions were 
illegitimate and were rejected by Anishinabek through acts of passive resistance: 
Anishinabek families continued to conduct water ceremonies that asserted their custodial 
relationship with Lake of the Woods and the Winnipeg River. 
Long before Ontario illegitimately claimed control over Anishinabek water 
courses, industrialists in Ontario developed hydroelectric generating stations on the north 
shore of Lake of the Woods. Unilateral action in the 1890s prompted an international 
outcry: American residents living along the south shore of Lake of the Woods claimed 
that Norman Dam flooded acres of arable land. In 1912, the International Joint 
Commission on the Lake of the Woods Reference was formed to conduct a cost/benefit 
analysis of the Norman Dam. The International Joint Commission disallowed 
Anishinabek participation, and thus, the International Joint Commission’s final 
recommendations did not consider Anishinabek descriptions of environmental change. 
Chapter 2 reveals how Canadian industrialists gained preferential access to water 
resources in the Winnipeg River drainage basin. It also marks a state precedent for water 
development: watercourses could (and would) be modified in Ontario without 
consultation with Anishinabek riverine users. At this point, Anishinabek riverine users 
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resorted to adaptation. Denied a public voice, Anishinabek riverine users modified their 
seasonal rounds to ensure continuous occupation of treaty lands. 
SOUTH DIRECTION: A PLACE OF STRENGTH AND VIGOUR 
The International Joint Commission favoured industry in its final report, released 
in 1917. And yet, water north of the outlets of Lake of the Woods continued to flow, 
uninterrupted, down the Winnipeg River towards the Manitoba border. Favourable 
conditions perhaps encouraged the Backus-Brooks Company to build the Norman 
Powerhouse at the western outlet of the Winnipeg River in the 1920s. It was the last 
hydroelectric development in the Winnipeg River drainage basin for many years.  The 
Great Depression followed the Norman’s completion and stymied additional industrial 
interest in the region.   
In 1939, however, Canada rebooted its pulp and paper industries to support the 
war effort. Sleepy mills in the Winnipeg River drainage basin resumed production. As 
armistice approached, Canada considered how best to ensure employment for returning 
soldiers. The federal government decided to help Canadian industrialists expand their 
operations by financing peacetime production. Industrial expansion in northwestern 
Ontario, however, would not be possible without electricity. 
It was in this environment that provincial officials viewed Lake of the Woods 
with renewed interest. Here was water that could be turned into hydroelectricity. 
Hydroelectric power would fuel industry. Industry would create jobs. Indeed, the socio-
economic benefits of water development in the Winnipeg River drainage basin seemed 
unlimited. 
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In this section of the dissertation, we move in the south direction. According to 
the teachings of the medicine wheel, the south represents physical strength and vigour.93 
Here we will explore how the Hydro-Electric Power Commission physically transformed 
the Winnipeg River. Our goal in Chapter 3 is to understand the communication strategies 
that the HEPC used to claim and to remake the riverine environment. In 1966, journalist 
Heather Robertson wrote that “Indian poverty is neither a mistake nor an omission [it is 
neither incidental nor accidental].  It is a deliberate and inevitable product of Canadian 
attitudes and social structures.”94 In this chapter, I echo her claim and show that the 
HEPC’s communication strategies resulted in the inequitable distribution of benefits: 
indeed, the HEPC developed preferential compensation programs that guaranteed the 
economic recovery of non-Indigenous riverine users. 
The south direction is also “the great place of testing for the physical body.”95 
And so, we also explore the physical labour of unskilled Anishinabek labourers in 
Chapter 4. Our goal is to understand the conditions of their labour. More importantly, we 
will explore the rewards – social and financial – that Anishinabek labourers expected to 
gain from testing their bodies felling trees, driving trucks, or installing transmission lines 
for the Hydro-Electric Power Commission. I argue that Anishinabek men sought work for 
pay to reinforce the boundaries of their reservation by financially providing for the 
families therein. 
93 Lane, Jr., et al., Sacred Tree, 48. 
94 Heather Robertson, Reservations are for Indians (Toronto: James Lorimer & Company Ltd., 
1991), 10. 
95 Lane, Jr., et al., Sacred Tree, 49. 
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WEST DIRECTION: WHENCE DARKNESS COMES 
The Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario began operating Whitedog 
Falls Generating Station at full capacity in June 1958.96 The HEPC envisioned a future 
where it could meet Ontario’s ever increasing energy demands. The Northwestern 
Division, the HEPC believed, would provide energy security. 
Anishinabek families living between Norman Dam and Whitedog Falls 
Generating Station faced an uncertain future. Some Anishinabek families, those who had 
worked for the Hydro-Electric Power Commission, had hoped for job security. But, as the 
HEPC began to dismantle its labour camps near Whitedog Falls, Anishinabek visions of 
continuous employment faded. However, Anishinabek families could see clearly that the 
Winnipeg River had changed. Dalles 38C Indian Reserve was now located between two 
hydroelectric generating stations. It sat on the downstream side of Norman Dam, making 
it prone to flash flooding. It also sat on the upstream (reservoir) side of Whitedog Falls 
Generating Station. The Winnipeg River had a new upper limit of about 320 metres above
sea level between Old Fort Island, near Kenora, and Dalles 38C Indian Reserve.97 
In June 1958, the long-term consequences of these riverine changes were 
unknown. In this section of the dissertation, we move in the West direction. According to 
the teachings of the medicine wheel, the West is the direction of the unknown. It is the 
direction whence darkness comes.98 Here, we will explore how hydroelectric power 
generation influenced the next generation of Anishinabek water users. In Chapter 5, I 
96 Whitedog Falls Generating Station consists of three units. Unit 1 went into operation on 17 
February 1958. Unit 2 went into operation on 25 March 1958. Unit 3 went into operation on 16 June 
1958. At this time, Whitedog Falls Generating Station became fully operational. “Whitedog Falls 
Generating Station,” Ontario Power Generation Inc., accessed 26 July 2015, http://www.opg.com/
generating-power/hydro/northwest-ontario/Pages/whitedog-falls-station.aspx.  
97 “Winnipeg River (Ontario) Level Statistics,” Lake of the Woods Control Board, accessed 26 
July 2015, http://www.lwcb.ca/reg-guide/rgp-PT2-WPGRVRON.html. 
98 Lane, Jr., et al., Sacred Tree, 53. 
47 
argue that hydroelectric development contributed directly to the collapse of the fishing 
economy on the Winnipeg River: rising water levels on Winnipeg River increased levels 
of food and economic insecurity at Dalles 38C Indian Reserve. The 1970s are generally 
accepted as a “dark time” in the community – families went hungry and bank accounts sat 
empty. 
The West is also “the place of testing, where the will is stretched to its outer 
limits.”99 In this section, we will explore the long-term complications of riverine change. 
In Chapter 6, I argue that food insecurity caused by mercury contamination upset 
Anishinabek household economies, leading many Anishinabek families to rely on federal 
services to ensure their survival. In this section of the dissertation, we focus on 
Anishinabek mothers and their unique struggles to provide for the next generation of 
Anishinabek youth. 
NORTH DIRECTION: A PLACE OF REFLECTION 
The North is acknowledged as a place of reflection. In this section of the 
dissertation, I distill my research findings. I ask, “What have I learned by travelling 
through all four directions?” From each direction – East, South, and West –Anishinabek 
families responded creatively to riverine development by settler-colonists. In the East, I 
found evidence of adaptation; Anishinabek families opened bank accounts, replacing 
caches with cash. Money could be used to purchase supplies – like flour and canned 
goods – if Norman Dam destroyed ice roads needed to move across trapping grounds. In 
the South, I found evidence of cooperation. Some Anishinabek men saw the Whitedog 
Falls Generating Station as an opportunity to earn sufficient income to occupy the 
99 Ibid., 53. 
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reservation year-round. Work for pay promised, at least temporarily, to secure reservation 
lands. And, in the West, I found evidence of passive resistance. Anishinabek men who 
could no longer fish walked away from Dalles 38C Indian Reserve and attempted to 
integrate into neighbouring reservations. If Dalles 38C Indian Reserve could not survive 
economically, it would survive in the memory of its people. 
Taken together, these chapters provide an image of Indigenous, particularly 
Anishinabek, experiences of the post-World War II era. Generally accepted as a golden 
age of prosperity through state-led capitalist expansion, my research shows that 
infrastructure capacity building program decreased economic stability on-reservation 
after 1945. Improved standards of living among the waiâbishkiwedig in the post-war 
period correlate positively with decreased standards of living on reserve. Endemic 
poverty was not discovered in 1969; it was structured by Canada, Ontario, and the 
Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario. 
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EAST DIRECTION 
WHERE THE SUN RISES 
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CHAPTER 1 
“IT… NEVER WAS INTENDED THAT LANDS UNDER A RIVER SHOULD 
BELONG TO THE INDIANS”: ANISHINABEK AND PROVINCIAL WATER 
USES AND RIGHTS IN THE WINNIPEG RIVER DRAINAGE BASIN, 1873-
1915 
Imagine it is 1915. You are a settler of British origin standing on a road named 
Main Street in a town called Kenora in a province known as Ontario. 1 You have been 
lured to Kenora by the promise of steady employment. Municipal circulars have long 
suggested “the bulk of the milling and manufacturing of [Canada’s] great west will be 
done [on the north shore of Lake of the Woods].”2 These circulars have also attracted 
the attention of 6000 others: settlers of British origin, Scandinavian lumber workers, 
Ukrainian and Polish navvies, Métis trappers and, of course, the local Anishinabek.3 
Some of your neighbours have proudly identified Kenora as a boom town. And, 
rightly so. In 1871, the population of the Canadian North was approximately 60,000. 
British men tended to pass through Kenora, collecting furs from the local Hudson’s 
Bay Company trading post before paddling southeast towards Fort Frances. Then, in 
1876, Frank Gardner, the first permanent White settler, established himself in Kenora. 
Others, like you, followed. By 1901, the Canadian North housed over 100,000 souls.4 
Looking out over Lake of the Woods, Kenora’s industrial future seemed to be 
guaranteed by Mother Nature herself. Here lay a body of fresh water said to stretch 
over 4,349 square kilometres. You saw the promise of hydroelectric power 
1 Rat Portage officially joined Ontario in 1884 when the boundary dispute between Manitoba 
and Ontario was settled in favour of Ontario. Lake of the Woods Museum (LOWM), “Historical 
Timeline,” Lake of the Woods History (2006), accessed 19 March 2009, 
http://www.lakeofthewoodsmuseum.ca. 
2 “A Triune City,” Rat Portage Weekly Record, 9 January 1892, 1. 
3 Town Planning Consultants Limited, “Chart I: Population, Town of Kenora,” Chapter 2: 
Assumptions, in Report on Existing Conditions Prepared as Based Material for Planning (Kenora, 
Ontario, September 1947), 25.  
4 Robert M. Bone, The Canadian North: Issues and Challenges III, 3rd edition (Don Mills, 
ON: Oxford University Press, 2009), 99-100. See also LOWM, “Historical Timeline.” 
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generation. The Ontario Legislature had recently revoked An Act for the Settlement of 
Questions between the Governments of Canada and Ontario Respecting Indian Lands 
(assented to 4 May 1891), which gave the Anishinabek control over waterways 
running through or around reserve.5 A new piece of provincial legislation, An Act to 
Confirm the Title for the Government of Canada to Certain Lands and Indian Lands 
(1915), deemed that waterways “shall not […] form part of such reserve.”6 Yes, this 
Act gave you hope of a prosperous, industrial future in Kenora. Water, you knew, was 
power. 
At pivotal moments between 1873 and 1915, water on Lake of the Woods and 
the Winnipeg River became synonymous with hope for a prosperous economic 
future.7 In 1873, Treaty #3 was concluded between “Her Majesty the Queen of Great 
                                            
5 In 1891, Canada and Ontario passed “basically identical laws” (Treaty #3 and Aboriginal 
Rights Research Centre (TARR), Kenora, ON. Don Colborne, Leo Waisberg, Tim Holzkamm and 
Diane Adams, “A Briefing of the Treaty#3 Chiefs-in-Assembly on the Headlands Issue,” Prepared for 
the Treaty 3 Chiefs-in-Assembly, 16 May 2008). These laws deemed “waters within the laid out 
[reserve] or to be laid out as Indian reserves… form part of such reserve” (Ontario Legislature, An Act 
for the Settlement of Questions between the Governments of Canada and Ontario Respecting Indian 
Lands, 1891. See Ontario, Statutes of the Province of Ontario Passed in the Session Held in the Fifty-
Fourth Year of the Reign of Her Majesty Queen Victoria, Being the First Session of the Seventh 
Legislature of Ontario (Toronto: Warwick & Sons, 1891), 7-9. On 16 April 1894, Canada and Ontario 
came to a statutory agreement known as the 1894 Joint Agreement of the 1891 Legislative Acts. It 
affirmed that “the land covered with water lying between the projecting headlands of any lake or sheets 
of water not wholly surrounded by an Indian Reserve or Reserves shall be deemed to form part of such 
reserve” (Canada and Ontario quoted in David McNab, “The Administration of Treaty 3: The Location 
of the Boundaries of Treaty 3 Indian Reserves in Ontario, 1873-1915, in As Long as the Sun Shines and 
Water Flows: A Reader in Canadian Native Studies, edited by Ian Getty and Antoine Lussier 
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2011), 149). In 1915, Ontario revoked clause 4 of 
the 1894 agreement and claimed that Indian reserves shall not include water lying between the 
projecting headlands (TARR, Mark L. Berlin to Shirley T. Parks, “Headland to Headland Boundary, 
Grand Council Treaty 3,” 27 January 1981). 
6 Claudia Notzke, “Fisheries,” Aboriginal Peoples and Natural Resources in Canada 
(Concord, ON: Captus Press Inc., 1994), 68-9. 
7 In Cross-Currents, Jean Manore explores how riverine claims mirrored political power in the 
Moose River Basin. She reveals the Crown interpreted Canadian treaties, particularly Treaty #9, to 
subjugate First Nations: “Rather than protecting Aboriginal rights and lands, they [treaties] served as 
vehicles for surrender and compensation, thereby clearing the way for development” (30). While no 
direct reference to water is made, documentary filmmaker Alanis Obomsawin suggests that Canada 
robbed First Nations of their resources with Treaty #9 (Trick or Treaty, directed by Alanis Obomsawin, 
Montreal: National Film Board of Canada, 2014). This argument reinforces Manore’s claim that 
Canada interpreted Treaty #9 to both subjugate First Nations and to lay claim to natural resources, 
likely including water. Unlike Treaty #3, which does not clearly address Indigenous water rights, 
Treaty #9 “included a clause that no site suitable for hydroelectric development exceeding 500 
horsepower would be included within the boundaries of any reserve” (Manore, Cross-Currents, 26). 
This clause – which separates Cree and Anishinabek peoples from valuable waterways – resulted from 
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Britain” and the “Saulteaux Tribe of Ojibbeway Indians.” In return for sharing their 
land, the “Ojibbeway,” also known as the Anishinabek, received Crown-sanctioned 
rights and benefits, including, but not limited to reserve lands, cash, an allowance for 
hunting and fishing tools, and farming assistance. The Anishinabek agreed to share 
approximately 14,245,000 hectares of territory through Treaty #3. Neither Crown nor 
Anishinabek negotiators clearly defined how water resources were to be shared. 
Instead, shorelines functioned as boundary limits in written records of their 
agreement. Crown agents seem to have been primarily concerned with guaranteeing 
safe access to a “tract of country” (read: land).8  
After treaty, Anishinabek inhabitants and provincial officials debated how 
water ought to be used and who ought to be using it; their decisions, made over 100 
years ago, determine how water on Lake of the Woods is used today. During the 
Treaty #3 negotiations Anishinabek chiefs and leaders demanded their right to 
                                                                                                                             
pre-treaty negotiations between Ontario and the Department of Indian Affairs. Thus, Treaty #9 is an apt 
demonstration of how colonial/legal claims to water reflect the growing power of settler-colonists. 
Both Canada (and Ontario) designed the treaty to ease industrial developments. 
Control over water also mirrored political standing within Ontario (not just between Canada 
and First Nations). H. V. Nelles has written that The Politics of Development illuminates “failures in 
democratic practice” (xxi). Readers learn how business elites (or men of capital) influenced the 
provincial regulation of Ontario’s resources. For example, in 1903, Premier George William Ross 
appears to have drafted “An Act to Provide for the Construction of Municipal Power Works and the 
Transmission, Distribution and Supply of Electrical and Other Power Energy” through “close 
consultation” with E. W. B. Snider (244). Snider was “a miller, a farm implement manufacturer, 
lumberman, and former politician” with a vested interest in wresting power away from Toronto. He 
organized a group of manufacturers into an effective pressure group that demanded a cooperative 
approach to the distribution of hydroelectric energy. Snider’s goal was to ensure favorable electricity 
rates on the outskirts of Toronto (237-38). The establishment of the 1903 Act revealed Snider and his 
delegation had sufficient political clout to demand change (albeit moderate) from the Ross government. 
Adam Beck, “as a mayor of an aspiring manufacturing city… sincerely felt the need for cheap, Niagara 
power” (247). When the Conservative government rose to power, Beck replaced Snider as leader of the 
public power movement.  The relationship between water control and political standing is again 
evident: Snider’s influence declined as Ross’ power declined. Beck’s influence increased as Whitney’s 
power increased. Beck pushed the Whitney government to create the Hydro-Electric Commission of 
Inquiry in 1905. Beck was appointed as its chairman (258). The establishment of the Hydro-Electric 
Power Commission in 1906 resulted, in part, from Beck’s ability to acquire mass support for public 
ownership. Beck “pitted the haute against the petite bourgeoisie of Ontario” while working on the 
Commission (304). Beck thus pushed Whitney’s hand towards public ownership (despite moderate 
alternatives), using the public interest to, ultimately, reinforce “a progressive businessmen’s crusade” 
(304).  
8 “Treaty #3 between Her Majesty the Queen and the Saulteaux Tribe.”  
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continue using water for long-established fisheries.9 The government of Ontario 
initially supported Anishinabek demands, as Indian use did not interfere with the 
provincial goal of promoting water access to draw settlers into Northern Ontario. The 
1891 Act seemed to recognize Anishinabek fishing concerns: it protected Indian 
ownership of the waterbed and rescinded “the public common right of the fishery” in 
Indian waters.10 In April 1894, Canada and Ontario came to a statutory agreement 
known as the 1894 Joint Agreement of the 1891 Legislative Acts. Claudia Notzke 
argues that “[t]he intergovernmental Agreement of 1894… committed the provincial 
government to the headland-to-headland principle,” meaning that waters running 
through or around reserves belonged to the Indians.11 The advent of hydroelectricity, 
however, led the Ontario Legislature to redefine provincial water use by 1915. 
Anishinabek water use was now seen as incompatible with provincial development 
goals. Conflicts over water were shaped by the unequal distribution of social power 
and reinforced that inequality. As this chapter reveals, the Ontario government 
constitutionally needed the federal government’s consent to repeal the 1894 Joint 
Agreement and to redefine reservation boundaries. Confident that the Department of 
Indian Affairs would support Ontario’s development goals, provincial legislators 
changed the map of Treaty #3 reservations without negotiating with the Anishinabek, 
who would be, in years to come, strongly affected by hydroelectric development. 
Changing definitions of water rights therefore provide a lens through which to view 
                                            
9 Garden islands and access to water for gardening were also a central concern of the 
Anishinabek during this time period, but are outside the scope of this study. For further information on 
Anishinabek gardening practices, see: Wayne Moodie, “Manomin: Historical-Geographical 
Perspectives on the Ojibwa Production of Wild Rice,” in Aboriginal Resource Use in Canada, edited 
by Kerry Abel and Jean Friesen (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 1991), 71-80; Tim 
Holzkamm, Leo Waisberg, and Jean Lovisek, “Ojibwa Reserves as ‘An Incubus Upon the Territory’: 
The Removal Policy in Ontario, 1874-1982,” in Papers of the 27th Algonquian Conference, edited by 
David H. Pentland (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 1997), 337-52.  
10 Ontario Legislature, An Act for the Settlement of Questions. See Ontario, Statutes of the 
Province of Ontario, 7-9. 
11 Notzke, Aboriginal Peoples and Natural Resources, 68. 
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changing power relationships between Anishinabek residents and settler arrivals in 
northwestern Ontario.12 
Water has also been used to explore power dynamics between First Nations 
and the settler state in post-World War II Canada. Tina Loo suggests members of the 
Tsay Kay Dene First Nation were disproportionately affected by the Bennett Dam 
along the Peace River. Many Indigenous peoples, Loo claims, “lost their autonomy” 
as BC Hydro flooded their communities to create the Williston Reservoir (circa 
1968). 13 The unequal distribution of environmental impacts and benefits in British 
Columbia becomes evident in Loo’s analysis of the Peace-Athabasca Delta Project 
Group, an intergovernmental task force designed to restore the delta (circa 1971). 
Tsay Kay Dene recommendations to “make the Delta even better” were dismissed by 
the Project Group which separated the Bennett Dam from the larger history of 
                                            
12 This chapter complements Nelles’ The Politics of Development. His chapter “Hydro as 
Myth” examines the socio-political push for public power in southern Ontario. Readers learn that 
changing definitions of water rights (private versus public) provide a lens through which to view 
changing power relationships between Toronto (an industrial centre) and peripheral manufacturers. 
Nelles writes, “The socially and politically influential manufacturers turned readily to public ownership 
primarily because the private electric companies at Niagara refused to guarantee them an immediate, 
inexpensive supply of a commodity on which they believed their future prosperity rested” (249). The 
Berlin Board of Trade organized against the Electric Development Company in Toronto. Members of 
the Berlin Board of Trade required a steady supply of cheap electrical power. They used the language 
of “public interest” to rally support for public – initially, municipal – ownership in the early 1900s. 
While the language of “public interest” garnered large-scale support, ultimately upsetting the power of 
the Electric Development Company, members of the Berlin Board of Trade were primarily concerned 
with cost management. Water became public in response to the mobilization, and growing political 
power, of London, Brantford, Hamilton, Stratford, Waterloo and Berlin (now Kitchener). Similarly, in 
northwestern Ontario, manufacturers struggled to overturn “private” – that is reserved First Nations 
right – to water resources to secure electricity at a cost.  
I am not the first to argue that non-Indigenous industrial interests compromised Indigenous 
water rights. Using Treaty #9 as an example, Jean Manore argues that treaty negotiations were used to 
separate Cree and Anishinabek peoples from their waterways. Once Treaty #9 was signed, Canada 
claimed “paramount power over land use” (Cross Currents, 30). In Manore’s analysis, Canada 
claimed, by extension, control over water. Manore argues the word “subject” (as it appears in Treaty 
#9) provides governing authority to the Crown: “The Aboriginal people were to have the right to 
‘pursue their usual vocations’… subject to ‘such regulations as may from time to time be made by the 
government of the country’” (30). Thus, through Treaty #9, the Crown claimed the right to govern the 
Cree and Anishinabek and their political prowess (and power to generate electricity) declined. Despite 
this loss of power – both political and hydroelectric – Manore suggests that the Cree and Anishinabek 
“continued to persist and subsist according to their traditional ways” (37). This chapter builds on 
Manore’s research by revealing how the Anishinabek continued to persist. More importantly, it reveals 
how the Anishinabek resisted colonial attempts to unilaterally determine water use. 
13 Tina Loo, “Disturbing the Peace: Environmental Change and the Scales of Justice on a 
Northern River,” Environmental History 12 (October 2007): 905. 
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colonialism that required redress to improve lives in the region. Loo claims that even 
in its attempts to redress environmental problems, the settler state dictated how loss 
could be framed and discussed.14 Ardith Walkem has echoed such claims, and 
criticizes the Canadian court system (rather than preliminary investigations) for 
upholding settler power. In Walkem’s estimation, the “socioeconomic interests of 
newcomer society” have prevented Indigenous peoples from (re)claiming jurisdiction 
over “Canadian” waterways. While Canadian court decisions have protected 
Indigenous water use, they have failed to enforce co-management over lakes, rivers, 
and oceans; Indigenous water interests remain secondary to provincial water 
management systems. Court decisions thus reinforce the line between colonizer 
(Canada) and the colonized (Indigenous nations).15 
                                            
14 I have opted to use “claims” and “suggests” as Loo lacks sufficient evidence to formulate an 
argumentative stance. For example, Loo suggests “The Bennett Dam might have contributed to [Tsay 
Kay Dene] problems… but from bands’ standpoint, the damage caused by the dam merged almost 
seamlessly into the larger impacts of centuries of colonization and structural changes in the economy 
that rendered many northern communities poor” (910). Intergovernmental task groups failed to accept 
Tsay Kay Dene timelines for environmental dysfunction in the Peace-Athabasca Delta. However, Loo 
is unable to link this observation to any Tsay Kay Dene First Nation. Instead, she claims this 
“perspective is shared by indigenous peoples in the United States and around the world” (919, footnote 
88). She proceeds to cite American and Australian historians. While it is likely that the Tsay Kay Dene 
understand environmental change (and its origins) differently than the state, Tsay Kay Dene 
experiences of colonialism cannot be defined by Indigenous groups to the south. Ibid., 910.  
15 Ardith Walkem, “The Land is Dry: Indigenous Peoples, Water, and Environmental Justice,” 
in Eau Canada: The Future of Canada’s Water, edited by Karen Bakker (Vancouver: University of 
British Columbia Press, 2007), 307-09. Manore similarly argues that “court rulings denigrated 
Aboriginal title” (Cross Currents, 32).  In “Estimating Historical Sturgeon Harvests on the Nelson 
River, Manitoba,” in Fishing Places, Fishing People: Traditions and Issue in Canadian Small-Scale 
Fisheries, edited by Dianne Newell and Rosemary E. Ommer (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1999), Peter J. Usher and Frank J. Tough also identify “the unwillingness of the courts to characterize 
harvesting rights as a form of property right that provides for defences against and remedies for, 
nuisance, trespass, or expropriation” (193). Usher and Tough do not focus their analysis on water 
rights; however, jurisdictional dispute – between Manitoba (provincial) and Cross Lake (Cree) – 
undergirds their analysis. Cross Lake Indian Band maintains that Jenpeg Generating Station, operated 
by Manitoba Hydro, has diminished the Nelson River’s sturgeon population since the 1970s. In the 
1990s, Cross Lake Indian Band sought compensation through arbitration. Usher and Tough composed 
their article in response to Manitoba Hydro’s allegation that “because the estimate made by the 
provincial Department of Natural Resources of the maximum sustainable yield (MSY) on the Nelson 
River sturgeon fishery was lower than Symbion’s consumption estimate [Symbion was hired by Cross 
Lake Indian Band], that estimate, and hence the band’s claim for harvest loss, were excessive” (196). 
Usher and Tough do not indicate the court’s decision. And yet, their article reveals how state power 
and social inequity relate: Manitoba Hydro dismissed Cross Lake Indian Band’s submission, 
downplaying environmental losses on reserve. Speaking back to power required Cross Lake Indian 
Band to retain Peter Usher and submit a Westernized counter-argument. 
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Donald Fixico, writing about the Warm Springs Confederated Tribes of the 
United States, offers an interesting counter narrative (albeit in brief). While Fixico 
agrees that water power and social power are intimately linked, he suggests Native 
American tribes can maintain their autonomy by developing their own hydroelectric 
generating systems (like Pelton Reregulating Dam). Although the Warm Springs 
Confederated Tribes are a unique case – they have the only Indian-owned 
hydroelectric project in the United States – Fixico successfully dissociates 
hydroelectric development with colonial subjugation.16 He demonstrates instead that 
hydroelectric power can be a tool for healing; hydroelectric projects can empower 
Native Americans and help them to rebuild self-supporting reservation economies. 
This chapter does not present hydroelectric power as a tool for healing; however, it 
aims to dissociate hydroelectric development with colonial subjugation. Even as 
Ontario redrew reservation boundaries, Anishinabek families reinforced their spiritual 
duty to manage water resources in the Winnipeg River drainage basin. Where the 
province drew boundary lines (visible on paper), the Grand Medicine Society made 
audible alternative conceptions of space through song. 
Competing definitions of water use will be examined from Anishinabek and 
settler perspectives using both Indigenous and non-Indigenous sources. Indigenous 
sources include the Paypom Treaty, as written by Joseph Nolin. Nolin was a Red 
River Métis hired by Lake of the Woods District Chiefs to record the 1873 
negotiations. Paypom consists of notes from his personal diary.17 Paypom has long 
                                            
16 Donald Fixico, The Invasion of Indian Country in the Twentieth Century: American 
Capitalism and Tribal Natural Resources, 2nd edition (Boulder, CO: University of Colorado Press, 
2012), 199. 
17 Ojibwa Chiefs of Treaty #3, 4 October 1873, Paypom Treaty. “Paypom Treaty,” Grand 
Council Treaty #3, accessed 19 November 2014, https://gct3.net/grand-chiefs-office/gct3-info-and-
history/paypom-treaty/.  
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been absent from historical analyses of treaty-making in Canada.18 I offer one 
possible explanation for its absence from the literature. Paypom was not made 
available for public viewing until the 1990s. Around 1906, Treaty #3 signatory Chief 
Powassan of Shoal Lake First Nation entrusted Paypom to Carl Linde, “a 
photographer and a friend to the Indian People.”19 Some years later, Elder Paypom, of 
Shoal Lake First Nation, purchased the document from Linde in an effort to protect 
Anishinabek history from settler bids. Paypom was subsequently treated like 
wiigwaasabakoon (birch bark scroll), a sacred object. Elder Paypom regulated now 
ceremonial viewings of the document. Public access to Paypom was thus limited until 
his death in 1990, whereupon his successor donated the text to Grand Council Treaty 
#3.20 Paypom has only been readily available for analysis for twenty-five years. This 
chapter actively incorporates Paypom using it as corroborative evidence with more 
familiar non-Indigenous documents (federal legislation and historical records created 
by the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and its predecessors). 
                                            
18 For example, Paypom Treaty is absent from Sarah Carter’s Aboriginal People and 
Colonizers of Western Canada to 1900 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007). Carter identifies 
that “[t]here were unique features to each of the agreements, and different understandings of these 
agreements emerged” (121) without exploring written Indigenous sources. Jill St. Germain’s Indian 
Treaty Making Policy in the United States and Canada, 1867-1877 (Lincoln, NE: University of 
Nebraska Press, 2001) acknowledges the Anishinabek engaged Joseph Nolin during the negotiations, 
but Paypom is not referenced in her analysis (64). Germain appears to be more interested in the 
presence of competent interpreters during negotiations than the content of Nolin’s notes. 
Out of the academic texts examined for this chapter, only David McNab mentions the 
existence of Paypom in “Hearty Co-operation and Efficient Aid, the Métis and Treaty #3,” in The 
Canadian Journal of Native Studies 3, no. 1 (1983). However, McNab does not quote Paypom within 
the body of his essay. Instead, he notes potential complications associated with using it: “The copies of 
these three documents [oral histories, Nolin’s notes, Paypom] were not signed either by representatives 
of the Indian people or by the Federal Government, as was the Treaty #3 document” (5). 
Ethnohistorians Tim Holzkamm and Leo Waisberg are the only experts to quote Paypom in their 
analysis of Treaty #3. Much of their work, however, is not widely circulated and is considered the 
property of Grand Council Treaty #3. Holzkamm and Waisberg, We Have Kept Our Part of the Treaty: 
The Anishinaabe Understanding of Treaty #3, (Kenora: Grand Council Treaty #3, 3 October 1998). 
19 Ojibwa Chiefs of Treaty #3, 4 October 1873, Paypom Treaty. 
20 Former Chief Allan Luby (Ogemah), telephone interview with author, 9 November 2014. 
Sara Mainville, affirms that Paypom Treaty was purchased by Chief Paypom from Charles Linde. 
Mainville does not address access limitations. Brian Walmark includes Elder Paypom’s description of 
the treaty purchase in Appendix C of his analysis of Treaty #3. As in Mainville’s text, Walmark makes 
no reference to document restrictions. See Mainville, “Treaty Councils and Mutual Reconciliation 
Under Section 35,” Indigenous Law Journal 6, no. 1 (fall 2007): 153, footnote 59; Brian Walmark, 
“Alexander Morris and the Saulteaux: The Context and Making of Treaty 3,” (M.A. thesis, Lakehead 
University, 1993). 
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Ultimately, this chapter focuses on the bureaucratic processes that restricted 
Anishinabek access to water resources. In so doing, it contributes to the literature on 
jurisdictional disputes in northwestern Ontario – disputes that are historically rooted 
in the Constitution Act of 1867. In 1870, the Dominion government acquired Rupert’s 
Land from the Hudson’s Bay Company. This purchase forced the Province of Ontario 
to delineate its boundaries, sparking conflict over which government could rightfully 
claim the resource-rich lands northwest of Lake Superior. In 1884, the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC) ruled in favour of Ontario: the province’s 
western boundary was drawn at “the meridian of the most north-westerly angle of the 
Lake of the Woods.”21 Considerable research has been conducted on the St. 
Catherine’s Milling case, or Indian Titles case, borne out of the Ontario-Manitoba 
Boundary dispute in 1888.22 In this case, the Dominion government argued that 
“Indians” owned the land and that ownership rights were passed to the Dominion 
                                            
21 Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, Ontario-Manitoba Boundary Case, 11 August 
1884, accessed 19 November 2014, http://www.heritage.nf.ca/law/lab5/labvol5_2148.html. 
22 St. Catherine’s Milling and Lumber Co. v the Queen [1888] features in diverse analyses of 
Indian title in Canada – from academic texts to informational pamphlets. Focused analyses include S.B. 
Cottam’s “Indian title as a ‘celestial institution’: David Mills and the St. Catherine’s Milling Case” in 
Aboriginal Resource Use in Canada: Historical and Legal Aspects, edited by Kerry Abel and Jean 
Friesen (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba, 1991, 247-52). Cottam reveals that the extinguishment of 
Indian title by settlers shifted from general practice to court-sanctioned policy after 1888. Given that St. 
Catherine’s Milling dealt with Indian title in Canada, it also features in general academic analyses of 
Indian title like Kent McNeil’s “The Meaning of Aboriginal Title” (Aboriginal and Treaty Rights in 
Canada: Essays on Law, Equality, and Respect for Difference (Vancouver: University of British 
Columbia Press, 1997), 135-54. Informational pamphlets summarize critical findings for a non-
academic audience. For example, the Canadian Race Relations Foundation (CRRF) released “Facts 
about Leading Aboriginal Rights Cases,” accessed 10 December 2014, 
http://www.crr.ca/images/stories/pdf/ePubFaShLeadAboRight.pdf. The CRRF explains that “the Privy 
Council conceived of Aboriginal title as a mere right to occupy and use the land, rather than as a legal 
right of ownership (3).” The Privy Council’s ethnocentric viewpoint was first problematized by 
Cottam. In 2007, the Union of BC Indian Chiefs (UBCIC) commissioned a research paper on 
Aboriginal Title and Rights: Union of BC Indian Chiefs, Union of B.C. Indian Chiefs Aboriginal Title 
Curriculum Project, 2007, accessed 10 December 2014, 
http://www.ubcic.bc.ca/Resources/Educators/Two_World_Views.htm#axzz3LX9pP7KY. UBCIC 
summarized the material consequences of this decision as follows: “91(24) jurisdiction only extended 
to lands set aside as Indian reserves after treaty. While Indigenous Nations may have had a continued 
interest in the lands before the treaty, once Aboriginal Title had been extinguished the lands fell 
entirely to the province” (14-5). This statement reflects the 2006 findings of Kent McNeil who argued 
that “[t]he nature of the underlying title the provincial Crown has by virtue of s. 109 is therefore 
determined negatively: it amounts to whatever interest remains after the Aboriginal title that burdens it 
has been subtracted.” Kent McNeil, “Aboriginal Title and the Supreme Court: What’s Happening,” 
Saskatchewan Law Review 69, no. 2 (2006): 295. 
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through treaty. The Dominion government claimed ownership of “Indian” resources 
within Ontario’s boundaries through this transfer agreement. Ontario counter-argued 
that “Indians” had a “mere right to occupancy”; “Indian” title was based solely on use 
and could be extinguished by the Crown (hence, resources reverted to the Province of 
Ontario through treaty). So far scholars have tended to focus on issues related to land 
use (or control, or ownership). 23 
The historical focus on land use may be linked to the ongoing debate over 
Indigenous water rights in Canada. Indeed, jurisdictional disputes (re: water 
                                            
23 In Native Peoples and Water Rights: Irrigation, Dams, and the Law in Western Canada 
(Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2009), Kenichi Matsui made a similar 
suggestion. He claimed that “no historian [in 2009] has tackled these [federal] records [re: ‘securing 
water for the Native peoples’] and unveiled the importance of Native water rights issue in western 
Canada” (6). He indicates that “the question” of Indigenous water rights “has become politically 
muddled because of increasing business and ‘public’ interest in, and industrial demand for, the limited 
water resources” – a question being debated by “Native peoples, legal experts, and policymakers” at 
the time of his publication (6). Matsui offers a series of case studies to illuminate how British 
Columbia wrested water from reservation lands in interior British Columbia and parts of Alberta. Yet, 
he cautiously notes that “this chapter is to place these jurisdictional issues [First Nations versus federal 
government versus provincial government] within a historical context rather than to determine the 
extent to which the Native peoples, the federal government, or the provincial government had 
jurisdictional power over water” (41). This is an interesting disclaimer. Matsui draws readers’ attention 
to the political nature of doing water research: he knows that his research may be used by “Native 
peoples, legal experts, and policymakers” to determine settler claims. With this sentence, Matsui 
provides a frame for his research and reinforces that Native Peoples and Water Rights is a historical 
(exploratory) rather than legal (judgmental) exercise. Matsui finds that “both provincial and federal 
officials shared the belief that whatever rights Natives had, they were held at the ‘pleasure of the 
Crown’” (63). He found that Indigenous assertions of right were rejected by both provincial and federal 
officials (64). 
Dispute is not unique to Ontario, Alberta, or the interior British Columbia. In “The Land is 
Dry,” Walkem also makes reference to similar disputes along the Pacific Coast. For example, “[t]he 
Haida Nation, for example, is currently involved in litigation claiming Haida title to all of Haida 
Gwaii… including the deep sea and ocean bed surrounding the islands” (307). Douglas Harris’ 
Landing Native Fisheries: Indian Reserves & Fishing Rights in British Columbia, 1849-1925 
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2008) draws attention to the origins of water 
disputes in British Columbia. He argued that Canada set aside smaller reserves in British Columbia 
because Indian Affairs believed coastal First Nations could support themselves through fishing (thus 
large tracts of land were not required for agriculture). In the early twentieth century, however, Canada 
began to limit Indigenous access to fisheries. What is in question is the right of coastal First Nations to 
use water to make beneficial use of reservation lands. 
While Ardith Walkem highlights ongoing debates over Indigenous water rights, she also 
advocates for Indigenous jurisdiction. Walkem suggests that Aboriginal title (as defined in the 
Delgamuuk case) ought to protect Indigenous water rights, at least by providing them a voice “in all 
land and water use decisions that affect their territories” (306). Treaty is also associated with 
Indigenous water rights. Walkem argues that “Many treaties contain the provision that Indigenous 
peoples will be able to continue to sustain themselves on the lands reserved to them, and this provision 
implies the full protection of the water necessary to fulfill the terms of the treaty” (308). Claudia 
Notzke also addresses Aboriginal title and treaty in “Water Resources,” Aboriginal Peoples and 
Natural Resources in Canada, 7-32. 
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allocations on reserve lands) remain active in northwestern Ontario. As Alison 
Norman, research advisor for the Ministry of Aboriginal Affairs, noted in an email to 
the author on 1 September 2015, “there are some [claims] currently that deal with the 
area that you are talking about [Treaty #3].”24 In 2007, Ardith Walkem noted that 
Anishinabek groups in the Great Lakes “are claiming title to areas of the waterbed” 
through the Canadian court system. She also made reference to “‘water walks’ along 
the shores of the Great Lakes both to uphold their [Anishinabe women’s] 
responsibility to give voice to the water and to raise awareness.” 25 Implicit in this 
statement is a long-standing jurisdictional dispute: Anishinabek women are 
demonstrating their responsibility to manage water and, in so doing, peaceably 
demonstrating against (failed) provincial management. Further attention must be paid 
to jurisdictional disputes over “Indian” waterways. By discussing Anishinabek access 
to and use of water in the Winnipeg River drainage basin, this chapter contributes to 
the scholarship on federal/provincial disputes over natural resources in Ontario. While 
this chapter aims to place these jurisdictional issues within their historical context, it 
does not seek to determine who has (or who ought to have) jurisdictional control over 
waterways in the Winnipeg River drainage basin. 
Furthermore, this chapter considers how local Anishinabek responded to 
settler disputes. The existing literature, particularly texts on the Indians Title Case, 
emphasizes Anishinabek exclusion from the deliberations of the JCPC. The Canadian 
Race Relations Foundation (CRRF) explains that “Aboriginal peoples were not 
represented when the case was argued.”26 The Union of BC Indian Chiefs (UBCIC) 
similarly claims that “the Indigenous Nations interpretation of Treaty #3 was not 
                                            
24 Alison Norman, email message to author, 1 September 2015. 
25 Walkem, “The Land is Dry,” 307, 312. 
26 Canadian Race Relations Foundation, “Leading Aboriginal Rights Cases,” 3. 
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considered in this dispute [Indian Titles Case].”27 These public announcements reveal 
that current understandings of Indian title were borne of Eurocentric thinking. CRRF 
shows that “the Privy Council ended up interpreting the Royal Proclamation of 1763 
on the basis of European ways of thinking.”28 UBCIC supports CRRF’s contention: 
“the arguments formulated by Canada and the province of Ontario…ignored the spirit 
and intent of the treaty.”29 Strictly speaking, as a final court of appeal, the JCPC never 
listened to the proponents, only the legal arguments that came from the lower courts. 
What is missing is a sense of how Indigenous nations may have responded through 
internal systems of governance and related spiritual practices. This chapter builds on 
the existing literature, revealing that Anishinabek families expressed conflicting 
understandings of territorial rights (and resource management) outside of Western 
institutions. While it is true that the Ontario Legislature did not solicit Anishinabek 
opinion while revising the 1894 Joint Agreement (an exclusionary tactic reflective of 
the concept of Indian Title), Anishinabek families relied on spiritual regulatory bodies 
like the Grand Medicine Society and responded to Ontario outside of Western 
institutions. It appears Anishinabek residents of the Winnipeg River drainage basin 
rejected Ontario’s 1915 amendments. Ontario claimed to have eliminated 
Anishinabek water rights through the unconstitutional imposition of foreign 
legislation (the 1915 Act). After 1915, however, Anishinabek families (re)affirmed 
jurisdiction over “the water lying between the projecting headlands of any lake or 
sheets of water” through drumming ceremonies.30 Spiritual practice in the Winnipeg 
River drainage basin provides evidence of continuous Anishinabek belief in (and 
exercise of) Anishinabek right to and management of water resources. As a result, 
                                            
27 UBCIC, “Aboriginal Title Curriculum Project,” 15. 
28 Canadian Race Relations Foundation, “Leading Aboriginal Rights Cases,” 3.  
29 UBCIC, “Aboriginal Title and Rights,” 15. 
30 Notzke, Aboriginal Peoples and Natural Resources, 69. 
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spiritual practice also reveals the existence of a mental map, carried by Anishinabek 
families, that conflicts with provincial (re)definitions of Indian space. 
 
ANISHINABEK WATER USE: “FROM WHICH THEY DERIVE THEIR CHIEF MEANS OF 
SUSTENANCE” 
 
Approximately 3,000 Anishinabek lived on Lake of the Woods when Crown 
officials penetrated their territory in the mid-19th century.31 At this time, the 
Anishinabek subsistence economy consisted primarily, though not exclusively, of 
hunting, trapping, fishing, and manomin (wild rice) harvesting.32 Written evidence of 
large fish populations in Anishinabek territories west of Lake Huron extends back to 
1660 when trader Pierre Esprit Radisson compared Lake Superior to a “terrestriall 
[sic] paradise.” The region was resource rich; Radisson identified bear, beaver and 
enough “[a]ssickmack” or whitefish to “make good cheare.”33 Other historians have 
used Radisson’s travelogue to provide evidence of largescale sturgeon fisheries in 
Anishinabek territories, locating Radisson’s claim to have “dryed up above a [mille] 
sturgeons” on the south shore of Lake Superior.34 By the end of the eighteenth 
century, fur traders noted that Anishinabek in the Winnipeg River drainage basin were 
difficult trading partners, “content to live upon sturgeon and other native foods rather 
                                            
31 Lake of the Woods Writers’ Group and Kenora Centennial Committee, Through the 
Kenora Gateway, 10. This population estimate may have been pulled from Simon J. Dawson’s Report 
on the Line of Route between Lake Superior and the Red River Settlement. Dawson writes that “The 
only localities where the Indians are at all numerous are at the Lake of the Woods and Rainy River, but 
the entire population does not greatly exceed three thousand.” Simon J. Dawson, “The Indian 
Element,” Report on the Line of Route between Lake Superior and the Red River Settlement (Ottawa: 
Hunter, Rose & Co., 1868), 27. 
32 David McNab, “The Administration of Treaty 3,” 145. 
33 Germaine Warkentin, ed, Pierre-Esprit Radisson: The Collected Writings, Volume 1, The 
Voyages (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2012), 256.  
34 Tim Holzkamm, Victor Lytwyn, Leo Waisberg, “Rainy River Sturgeon: An Ojibway 
Resource in the Fur Trade Economy,” Canadian Geographer 32, no. 3 (1988): 195. In his 1868 
publication, Simon J. Dawson noted that hundreds of Anishinabek gathered at Rainy River to harvest 
large quantities of sturgeon. Dawson wrote, “I have seen as many as five or six hundreds of them 
collected at one time, at the rapids on Rainy River, engaged in catching sturgeon, the flesh of which 
they preserve by drying like Pemmican. Please see Simon J. Dawson, Report on the Line of Route, 27. 
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than engage in trade.”35 An unidentified official, writing after 1857, associated 
Anishinabek refusal to participate consistently in trade with the Hudson’s Bay 
Company with an “abundance of sturgeon.” Indeed, large-scale fisheries and a steady 
supply of food led the waiâbishkiwedig to criticize Anishinabek as “independent; 
sometimes even a little saucy” from contact until treaty.36 
Non-written sources like totemic symbols suggest fishing was important to the 
Anishinabek since “time immemorial.” Anthropologist Basil Johnston identified five 
fish clans north of Lake Superior.37 Anishinabek used totemic symbols like family 
names; they functioned as, in the words of Theresa Schenck, the “genealogical chain 
by which bands are held together.”38 It is important to note that Anishinabek families 
living in the Winnipeg River drainage basin continue to define themselves (and their 
relations) by clan. Elder Alice Kelly of Dalles 38C Indian Reserve, for example, 
identified as a sturgeon in 2012.39 Anishinabek men and women also tried to emulate 
the character of their totemic animal. Maanameg (catfish) symbolized breadth and 
scope (likely intellectual); ginoozhe (pike) symbolized swiftness and elegance; 
namebin (sucker) represented calmness and grace; name (sturgeon) evoked depth and 
strength; and adikameg (whitefish) symbolized abundance.40 Totems informed human 
behaviour. Kelly acted like a sturgeon in 2012 when she shared her community’s 
                                            
35 Tim Holzkamm and Leo Waisberg, “Native American Utilization of Sturgeon,” 29. 
36 Unidentified official quoted in ibid., 30. 
37 Basil Johnston identified the six clans as catfish, pike, sucker, sturgeon, whitefish, and 
mermaid. In 1885, historian William Warren identified the same six clans. However, Warren specified 
that sucker, sturgeon, and whitefish “are only known on the remotest northern boundaries of Ojibway 
country.” For further reading, please see: William Warren, History of the Ojibway People (St. Paul: 
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Chippewa Customs (St. Paul: Minnesota Historical Society Press, 1979), 10. Basil Johnston, Ojibway 
Heritage (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2003), 53, 60. 
38 Theresa Schenck, “William W. Warren’s History of the Ojibway People: Tradition, History, 
and Context,” in Reading Beyond Words: Contexts for Native History, edited by Jennifer S. H. Brown 
and Elizabeth Vibert (Toronto: Broadview Press, 2003), 199. 
39 Elder Alice Kelly, “Living with ‘Dirty Water’: Personal Recollections from On and Off 
Dalles 38C Indian Reserve” (paper presented at the Native American and Indigenous Studies 
Association, Uncasville, Connecticut, 3 June, 2012). 
40 Basil Johnston, Ojibway Heritage, 53.  
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struggle to access potable water at the Native American and Indigenous Studies 
Association Conference in Ledyard, Connecticut. She had the strength to 
communicate Dalles 38C’s intergenerational pain with a public audience.41 In the late 
1800s, much like today, Anishinabek men and women incorporated their clan fish 
into how they understood their world. The existence and significance of the fish clans 
reflect the social (and spiritual) as well as economic importance of fishing in the 
Winnipeg River drainage basin. Through totemic symbols, fishing was part of daily 
life – fish were social markers, behavioural guides, and dinner. 
Totemic symbols indicate a relationship with water resources that extends 
beyond the material. Elder Alex Skead, of Rat Portage Indian Reserve, explained that 
"There is a word older than manomin and that is manitou gitigenan, the ‘Great Spirit's 
Garden.’"42 As Treaty and Aboriginal Rights Research Director Andy Sky suggests, 
the concept of manitou gitigenan necessitates an understanding of land and water 
resources as a living gift from the Great Spirit and, as a garden, tending this gift 
requires eco-literacy. Sky proceeds to outline three land use directives handed down 
by the Great Sprit: (1) maanci chi' ga'win, the duty to ensure the health of resources 
and to mitigate against exploitation; (2) assemma ka'iwn, the duty to offer ritual 
tobacco in honour of what has been taken from the land; and (3) wii'kaadown, the 
duty to make seasonal offerings in gratitude to land, water, air, and all living things. 
Maintaining such a gift requires recognition of the land as a shared resource: 
Anishinabek resource managers offered thanks to all creatures who shared the Great 
Spirit's garden. Chiefs and leaders thus entered into treaty negotiations with the clear 
goal of maintaining access to manitou gitigenan. Land and water resources were not 
to be ceded; instead, Anishinabek sought to uphold their sacred duty to manage 
                                            
41 Elder Kelly, “Living with ‘Dirty Water’”. 
42 TARR, Alex Skead quoted in Andy Sky, “Limitations of Existing SCB Process and Bill C-
30 Action Redress of Me’Ozhaa Taa’Wa’Ning” (September 2010).  
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resources and to accommodate newcomers through the extended practice of maanci 
chi' ga'win. 
Anishinabek treaty demands illustrate the extraordinary value they placed on 
water for fishing in the Winnipeg River drainage basin and a clear sense of what 
future relationships between Anishinabek occupants and the waiâbishkiwedig should 
look like. During the failed treaty negotiations of 1869, Anishinabek negotiators 
presented thirteen conditions under which they would consent to make a treaty. 
Condition 13 reads, “[t]hat every married woman gets fishing terine [sic] and cord 
line to make four nets every year.”43 Condition 13 was designed to ensure that waters 
could continue to be fished according to long-standing practice. In her 
anthropological report Chippewa Customs, Frances Densmore noted that “the use of 
seines was the general method of obtaining fish” and that “fishing… was the work of 
women who placed nets in the water.”44 By demanding that Anishinabek women 
receive fishing implements, negotiators worked towards retaining their fishing rights. 
They wanted tools to continue Anishinabek patterns of water use in the Winnipeg 
River drainage basin.  
Access to water and fishing rights were so important to the Anishinabek that 
they refused to take treaty until their demands in this regard were satisfied. From the 
perspective of Commissioner Wemyss M. Simpson in 1871, the Anishinabek chiefs 
were making “new and extravagant demands” of the Crown.45 Federal records 
indicate Anishinabek chiefs and leaders may have tempered their demands before 
1869: presents were exacted from Hudson’s Bay Company traders and federal 
                                            
43 The 13 conditions, dated 22 January 1869, were attached to Alexander Morris’ report of the 
1873 negotiations. Library and Archives Canada (LAC), “Alexander Morris, Report to Government 
House, 14 October 1873,” RG-10, Vol. 1918, fol. F2790B. 
44 Densmore, Chippewa Customs, 125. 
45 Wemyss M. Simpson quoted in Bryan Phelan, “First Nations Denied Economic Promise of 
Treaty #3: Historians’ Perspective,” Kenora Enterprise, 31 September 2001, 7.  
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surveyors for passage through the country. There is no evidence to suggest 
Anishinabek chiefs negotiated a payment schedule that would allow continuous settler 
access to the territory. Indeed, in 1857 John Palliser attributed his “friendly parley” 
with the unnamed chief at Fort Frances to the latter’s regular “dealings [with] the 
Hudson’s Bay Company.” Like waves of non-Indigenous traders, Palliser could 
continue his journey unmolested, so long as he moved out of Anishinabek 
territories.46 Two years later, Anishinabek chiefs and leaders granted surveyor Simon 
J. Dawson “full permission to explore the country.” Confusion about Anishinabek 
demands may have arisen from Dawson’s 1859 report. Dawson suggested to the 
Chiefs (and reported to the Crown) that “payments should be made in the shape of 
yearly presents such as articles that might be useful to them.”47 In this quotation, 
Dawson does not suggest a cash allowance; he suggests payment-in-kind. His 
recommendation grants the Crown the power to manipulate access fees: goods are not 
specified. Thus, the value of gifts could vary on an annual basis. Given this historical 
context, Anishinabek chiefs and leaders appeared to strike a hard bargain when treaty 
negotiations began in 1869. In July 1872, frustrated Indian Commissioners Simpson, 
Dawson, and Robert Pither reported to Joseph Howe, Secretary of State for the 
Provinces, that because of their concerns over water rights “[t]he Indians could not be 
                                            
46 In Bounty and Benevolence: A History of Saskatchewan Treaties (Montreal & Kingston: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2000), 3-21), historians Arthur J. Ray, Jim Miller, and Frank Tough 
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Hudson’s Bay Company adopted similar practices in what would become Treaty #3. See also John 
Palliser, “Exploration of British North America,” in The Papers of the Palliser Expedition 1857-1860, 
eds. Irene M. Spry (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1968), 76-8.  
47 Simon J. Dawson, “General Report on the Progress of the Red River Expedition,” Report on 
the Exploration of the Country between Lake Superior and the Red River Settlement and Between the 
Latter Place and the Assiniboine and Saskatchewan, facsimile of Canada, Legislature of Canada, 
Sessional Papers No. 36 (Appendix), A. Toronto: n.p, 1859. 
 67 
induced to go into the discussion.”48 From the Anishinabek perspective, fishing rights 
were no extravagance. As E. B. Borron put it in “Report on Indian Claims Arising at 
North-West Angle,” Anishinabek negotiators were afraid “the settlers would interfere 
with the fisheries from which they derive their chief means of sustenance.”49 
Elaborating on Indian refusals to enter treaty, Dawson noted that fishing rights were 
“strongly insisted upon and [they] had great weight with the Indians.”50 Chiefs and 
leaders refused to make a treaty that required the surrender of their fisheries or 
challenged their relationship to water. 
The treaty that was finally concluded in 1873 granted the Anishinabek the 
protection they sought. Treaty Commissioner Dawson recalled the commissioners 
promised Anishinabek “would forever have the use of their fisheries.”51 
Commissioners well understood that without such a guarantee no agreement would 
have been reached. In this quotation, Dawson asserted that Anishinabek retained 
usage rights over local fisheries; fishing territories were explicitly identified as theirs. 
Additionally, Anishinabek did not surrender their use of fishing territories. There is 
no indication that fisheries were to be located on reserve; rather Anishinabek appear 
to have continued proprietary interest over fishing territories regardless of location. 
Indeed, Treaty #3, as published by the Government of Canada, expressly provides for 
the right of the Indians to “pursue their avocations of hunting and fishing throughout 
the tract surrendered.”52  In addition to unaffected water use, Paypom Treaty 
guarantees the Anishinabek “fifteen hundred dollars every year in twine” for the 
                                            
48 It is important to note that mineral rights also featured in the 1871 negotiations.  LAC, 
“Simon Dawson, Robert Pither, Wemyss Simpson, Report to Joseph Howe, Secretary of State, 17 July 
1872,” RG 10, Vol. 1868 F577. 
49 TARR, “E. B. Borron, Report on Indian Claims Arising at North-West Angle, 30 December 
1893,” Document 371, Phase 1: Headlands to Headlands.  
50 Holzkamm and Waisberg, “Native American Utilization of Sturgeon,” 32. 
51 Simon Dawson quoted in Holzkamm and Waisberg, We Have Kept Our Part of the Treaty: 
The Anishinaabe Understanding of Treaty #3, 6.  
52 “Treaty #3 between Her Majesty the Queen and the Saulteaux Tribe.  
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making of nets.53 Both Anishinabek and Dominion sources demonstrate that hard, 
realistic bargaining by First Nations took place. The Anishinabek position was 
designed to guarantee the material and cultural survival of Indigenous people, as 
demonstrated by Anishinabek attempts to retain their fisheries and to maintain long-
standing water use. 
Once Treaty #3 was signed, the Department of Indian Affairs and the 
Department of the Interior surveyed Anishinabek territories and assigned reserves. 
The location of reserves recognized Anishinabek water use. In a memorandum for the 
Department of the Interior in Ottawa dated 24 June 1874, Minister David Laird 
determined reserves “should be confined generally to localities heretofore cultivated 
by the Indians and occupied by them as camping and fishing grounds.”54 Early 
officials attempted to keep treaty. In an unsigned letter dated 1886 to George Foster, 
Minister of Mines and Fisheries, Commissioner Simon J. Dawson was said to oppose 
non-Indigenous fishing on Lake of the Woods. The author supported Dawson’s 
position, arguing that “the Indians of this country are a fish-eating people; they live 
almost entirely on that food.”55 By 17 December 1890, Commissioner Dawson 
garnered the support of E. Dewdney, Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, who 
determined that fisheries on Lake of the Woods “should be reserved for the common 
use of the Indians of Treaty #3, as from this Lake they have always been in the habit 
of deriving their principal sustenance.”56 The Dominion recognized Anishinabek 
water use and protected the fisheries accordingly. This protection culminated with An 
Act for the Settlement of Questions between the Governments of Canada and Ontario 
                                            
53 Ojibwa Chiefs of Treaty #3, 4 October 1873, Paypom Treaty.  
54 LAC, “Minister of the Interior David Laird to Department of the Interior, 24 June 1874,” 
RG 2, Series 1, PCOC 841(a). 
55 LAC, “Unidentified to Honourable Geo Foster, Minister of Mines and Fisheries, 27 
December 1886,” RG10, Vol. 3800, File 48-542. 
56 LAC, “E.W. Dewdney, Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, to the Department of 
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Respecting Indian Lands (1891), which confirmed Anishinabek propriety rights over 
water running through or around reserve. The 1891 Act held that “the waters within 
the lands laid out or to be laid out as Indian reserves in said territory… shall be 
deemed to form part of such reserve.”57 As legal scholar Richard Bartlett notes, the 
Dominion derived Indian territories from Treaty #3.58 By confirming Anishinabek 
ownership of waterbeds adjacent to reserve in the 1894 Joint Agreement, the 
governments of Canada and Ontario protected ancestral fishing grounds and thus 
upheld the treaty right to fish.59 
            Federal recognition and protection of water rights manifested itself in local 
geographies. Writing on the allocation of reserves in British Columbia, legal historian 
Douglas Harris argues that the Department of Indian Affairs consciously located 
Indian communities in British Columbia near the water to reduce settler conflict over 
arable lands and the cost of guardianship (First Nations were guaranteed independent 
access to a stable food supply). Harris rejects the academic tendency to centre rights 
analysis on written records of treaty negotiations (or, in the case of British Columbia, 
a lack thereof). He argues that scholars must look beyond textual sources to visual 
records of the past. Harris contends that federal maps prove that Dominion officials 
intended to provide fisheries to First Nations. Simply put: the division of space 
reflects federal understandings of Indian rights.60 Following in Harris' footsteps, a 
look at a modern map of the Winnipeg River drainage basin shows that Indian agents 
similarly approved reserves to provide water access.61 Superintendent Dewdney was 
57 Ontario Legislature, An Act for the Settlement of Questions. 
58 Richard H. Bartlett, Aboriginal Water Rights in Canada: A Study of Aboriginal Title to 
Water and Indian Water Rights (Calgary: University of Calgary, 1986), 107. 
59 LAC, “Simon Dawson, Robert Pither, Wemyss Simpson, Report to Honourable Joseph 
Howe, Secretary of State, 11 July 1871,” RG 10, Vol. 1864, fol. 375. 
60 Harris, Landing Native Fisheries, 187, 196, 198. 
61 Refer to Figure 1 for a map depicting select Anishinabek reserves in the Winnipeg River 
drainage basin. 
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not all talk: he approved reserves that maintained the attachment of Anishinabek to 
their fisheries. Promoters recognized that Indian reserves dotted the waterscape, 
musing that “more fairy-land beauty, more real isolation from the bustle of life, more 
roaming over nature in her primitive beauty, untouched by the hand” could be found 
at Lake of the Woods – with the exception of Anishinabek peoples who “live around 
this lake” and traverse the waters in birch bark canoes.62 Some of the earliest reserve 
maps (produced by federal surveyors) in the Winnipeg River drainage basin clearly 
extend reservation boundaries across adjacent waterways. Consider A.W. Ponton’s 
1890 survey of Dalles 38C Indian Reserve (Figure 3). Ponton allotted Chief 
Kawitaskung and his band the waters below the northernmost rapids to the “high 
rocky country” distinguished by its “timberwood [sic] with jack pine.” Approximately 
one year later, Ponton’s map was approved by J. Nelson, the federal agent “in charge 
[of] I.R. surveys.”63 Elder testimony has subsequently revealed that the allotted 
stretch of water included long-established fishing grounds.64 That local Anishinabek 
occupied riverbeds and built communities along the shore was common knowledge 
among the waiâbishkiwedig and a certifiable fact by the Department of Indian Affairs 
in the immediate aftermath of treaty. 
Even while Indian water rights were governmentally recognized, the 
Anishinabek realized that the waiâbishkiwedig understood water differently. Even in 
these early days of government agreement to protect fishing and water rights, the 
seeds of encroachment were sown: Treaty #3 guaranteed non-Indigenous access to 
resources. The Anishinabek recognized that resource access could lead to misuse. 
62 “Rat Portage, Keewatin and the Canadian Lake of the Woods,” Special Supplementary 
Number of the Colonist, September 1893, 3-4. 
63 A. W. Ponton, D. L. S., Treaty No. 3 Ontario: Survey of Indian Reserve No. 38C at ‘The 
Dalles’ Winnipeg River. [Map] 20 chains: 1 inch. Ottawa: Dominion Land Survey, 1890. 
64 Sheldon Ratuski, “Gathering Traditional Knowledge and Perspectives of Sturgeon on the 
Winnipeg River from Dalles Community Members” (unpublished report, Lake of the Woods Museum, 
2005), unpaginated. 
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And so, they took steps to ensure they would be compensated if the waiâbishkiwedig 
broke treaty and infringed on Anishinabek water rights. During the 1873 treaty 
negotiations, Chief Powassan, from Lake of the Woods, demanded that Commissioner 
Dawson “Look to where the waters separate,” rhetorically using water as a symbol of 
difference. Powassan recognized that Anishinabek and non-Indigenous lifestyles and 
water usages differed; it was essential to establish a relationship based on mutual 
respect – where separation demanded negotiation or compensation. The Anishinabek 
recognized that the waiâbishkiwedig used water for dams, canals, and other public 
works. Should non-Indigenous water use predominate, the Anishinabek demanded 
compensation for the loss of resource use. On 1 October 1875, Lake of the Woods 
District Chiefs signed for waterfront reserves. Chiefs agreed to the following clause: 
“It is also understood that the Government shall have the right to construct canal locks 
or other public works… should they so desire. In such case, the Indians to be duly 
notified and if the Fisheries should be destroyed thereby the Indians to be fairly dealt 
with in consequence.”65 The Anishinabek thus guarded against having their interests 
damaged by future public works. If they lost some of their water resources they would 
receive new fiscal resources in exchange. Anishinabek water use (fisheries) 
dominated in the immediate post-treaty period in the Winnipeg River drainage basin. 
 
THE RED HURDLE: CHANGED WATER USE IN ONTARIO AND THE PURPOSIVE 
REDEFINITION OF ANISHINABEK WATER RIGHTS  
 
Despite the federal treaty provisions, however, the government of Ontario 
always saw water as a riparian (not specifically Indigenous) right. In 1859, 
Chasemore vs. Richards determined riparian rights in Ontario, assigning “the right 
to the enjoyment of a natural stream of water on the surface, ex jure naturae, [to] 
                                            
65 TARR, “J. S. Dennis, Surveyor General, to David Laird, Superintendent General of Indian 
Affairs, 1 November 1875,” Document 29, Phase 1: Headlands to Headlands. 
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the proprietor of adjoining lands, as a natural incident to the right to the soil 
itself.”66 Land owners were entitled to use adjacent waters as they wanted, without 
needing special permission. Dominion maps – like A.W. Ponton’s 1890 survey of 
Dalles 38C Indian Reserve – extended similar rights to Anishinabek living in the 
Winnipeg River drainage basin. 
Before 1900, Ontario envisioned water as the key to provincial growth and 
prosperity because water attracted settlers and industry. In an attempt to draw 
settlers to the Winnipeg River drainage basin, for example, the province exclaimed, 
“the Wabigoon River [a tributary of the English River] flows north and west, a 
broad navigable stream with abundant water-power at intervals” that the hard-
working man could use to his profit.67 The settler could benefit from domestic 
consumption, irrigation, or power from water wheels. Ontario’s promotional 
literature linked a seemingly inexhaustible water supply to visions of individual 
success.  Promoters reminded settlers there was “no water rate to meet” at Lake of 
the Woods and that “good spring water” abounded there. They pronounced that 
“[t]here is no good reason a thrifty man cannot make a living here.”68 Ontario 
valued water instrumentally as a way to lure settlers to the northwest. Provincial 
definitions of water as a resource over which no property rights were recognized 
(until claimed by the adjacent property owner) mirrored this value system. 
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Provincial officials also visualized local hydroelectric generation as a 
“symbol of anxiously awaited industrialism.”69 Government pamphlets actively 
encouraged its local industrial use. Targeting prospective investors, literature on the 
Rat Portage and Rainy River District claimed that “[t]he chief resources of the 
country lie in the rich quality and large extent of mineral deposits.”70 Ontario touted 
mining operations in gold, silver, iron, mica, asbestos, talc, and quartz as prime 
candidates for hydroelectric development. It was believed that “possibilities are 
only beginning to be made known” and that “the future will witness here the 
upbuilding of extensive mining.”71 According to the province, future success in 
northwestern Ontario also depended on the establishment of the lumbering industry. 
Ontario promised that “[t]he various streams are richly lined with timber of the 
finest quality in great quantities.”72 All the Northwest needed was private 
investment. Provincial emphasis on water as a riparian right amounted to a de facto 
protection of Indigenous rights, as Ontario’s promotional campaign met with little 
success.  
There was also little threat from hydroelectric development during the 
nineteenth century. Firstly, few people lived in-and-around Kenora, whose 
population hovered around 1,800 souls in 1891 and peaked near 6,000 souls in 
1911; power demands remained low.73 Secondly, Anishinabek occupants of the 
Winnipeg River drainage basin enjoyed provincial protection of their water rights 
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because of technological limitations: direct current could only be efficiently 
transferred over a short distance, which mitigated against hydroelectric dams. As 
Merrill Denison notes  “Without the turbine, generator, and high-voltage 
transmission line, Ontario’s splendid hydraulic resources would continue to pour 
almost unused.” He reminds readers that the water wheel was not an efficient power 
convertor; its use was limited to a few strategic and highly localized sites.74 While 
water wheels could power production at an industrial scale, development was highly 
unfeasible on isolated rapids in the Winnipeg River drainage basin – finished 
products could not be easily transferred to markets. North Americans made little 
advance in long-distance energy transmission until November 1896, when a 
generating station in Niagara Falls successfully powered the city of Buffalo over a 
32-kilometre-long transmission circuit. According to Robert Hay, 32 kilometres 
“was the longest electricity had been transmitted for commercial purposes up to that 
time.”75 When transmission technology changed, so too did Ontario’s willingness to 
recognize Anishinabek treaty rights to water. After the Niagara-Buffalo event, 
Ontario business and municipal elites (re)conceptualized water as a solution to 
Ontario’s energy (i.e. coal) shortage.76  
In “The Way to Modern Treaties: A Review of Hydro Projects and 
Agreements in Manitoba and Quebec,” Romauld Wera and Thibault Martin 
similarly observed that technological advances stimulated Canadian interest in 
hydroelectric power. Wera and Martin write, “At the 1878 Universal Exhibition of 
Paris, the world discovered a new reality: electric lighting. The following year, 
Quebec became the first Canadian city to take advantage of this wondrous new 
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possibility.” They continue, “A new era began in Quebec and Manitoba when 
several companies, specializing in producing and distributing electricity 
appeared.”77 This chapter builds on this observation, forging links not only between 
technology and hydroelectric power production, but technology and Indigenous 
dispossession. In so doing, it reinforces James Waldram’s claim that “Native 
inhabitants became a non-issue” for provincial bureaucrats until “a new source of 
wealth [water] was targeted” as a result of “changes in [hydroelectric] 
technology.”78 My sources reveal that the link Waldram identified between 
technology and Indigenous dispossession is not unique to the Prairie Provinces. It 
draws our attention to what appears to be a national trend in Indigenous 
dispossessions: technological change reduced reservation holdings in Ontario, 
Manitoba and Saskatchewan. Under considerable political pressure, Ontario simply 
upheld treaty rights until inconvenient to do so, at which point Ontario claimed 
priority in allocating water resources, ignoring and supplanting federal 
responsibility for the protection of reserve lands. 
Early twentieth-century announcements made by Ontario emphasized that 
water was available to determined settlers and industrialists, often in response to 
public pressure for the government of Ontario to fund hydroelectric initiatives. 
Beginning in 1902, manufacturers and municipal leaders from Waterloo County 
hounded Premier William Ross to de-privatize water. They argued that Ontario had 
been largely dependent on Great Britain and the United States because it lacked coal. 
Ontario relied on international imports to produce energy in the steam era. 
Hydroelectric power combined with Ontario’s abundant water resources promised 
economic independence. The Berlin Board of Trade claimed that hydroelectric 
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development was akin to national defence; de-privatization would benefit all 
Canadians.79 Conservatives supported such views and pressured the Laurier 
government to prevent all exports to New York and devote energy resources to 
Ontario.80  
And yet, as H. V. Nelles has argued, “Premier Ross found it impossible to 
identify the public interest and the manufacturers’ interests as closely as had the 
municipalities.”81 In the spring of 1903, Premier Ross announced, “We are willing to 
allow municipalities, Toronto, and the rest, to develop energy there and they will not 
be curtailed. But Ontario must not get into debt because of it.”82 Ontario did not 
consider hydroelectric generation a profitable enterprise, supporting privatization for 
fear that provincial investment would benefit few residents. Premier Ross emphasized 
that the government of Ontario would not fund projects unless for the “substantial 
benefit of all.”83 He maintained that provincial coffers could not be drained to benefit 
manufacturers specifically. At the time, Ontario understood water, or hydraulic 
potential, as a private or municipal concern. It is important to note that Ontario’s 
attitude reflected a fairly standard approach to fiscal prudence as well as technological 
limitations. Any large projects were going to incur debt at a time when Ontario had 
yet to establish a substantial tax base. From the moment of this announcement, 
however, Premier Ross faced opposition from organized municipalities and 
manufacturers. Interest in Ontario’s waterways burgeoned as acceptance of individual 
ownership and use declined. 
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The year 1905 was a pivotal moment in which water became a public utility. 
The Conservatives, known to support public power initiatives, were voted into 
office.84 Following his election, Premier James Pliny Whitney redefined water as a 
provincial resource, when he announced: 
 
I say on behalf of the government that the water powers 
all over the country shall not in future be made the sport 
and prey of capitalists and shall not be treated as 
anything else but a valuable asset of the people of 
Ontario, whose trustees the government of this people 
are.85  
 
Water was no longer to be claimed by individual property owners; it became a 
provincial asset. Whitney’s government would not allow individuals to monopolize 
water resources (an action condoned by Liberals), but would ensure regulated use 
for electricity production. Water needed to be controlled by Ontario and protected 
by Ontario for the benefit of Ontario residents generally.86  The Ontario Legislature 
created the Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario, an administrative body, 
through An Act to Provide for the Transmission of Electric Power to the 
Municipalities (1906).  The 1906 Act gave the HEPC powers “to distribute electric 
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power to the municipalities, but also to regulate private utilities.”87 According to 
Robert Hay, the 1906 act was repealed in 1907 and recast as The Power 
Commission Act (1907). The 1907 act established a “wholesaler” and “retailer” 
system between the Commission and the municipalities, making electricity available 
at favourable contracted rates.88 Ontario thus normalized understandings of water as 
a hydroelectric resource and, perhaps more importantly, a provincial resource. 
It was only when the province adopted a general policy denying private 
ownership of the waterbed in 1906 that Ontario sought to redefine and then deny 
Anishinabek water rights. All Anishinabek reserves on Lake of the Woods were set 
along the shoreline.89 In 1906, water rights on reserve could be derived from two 
sources: Treaty #3 and riparian ownership. As previously noted, Treaty #3 protected 
Indian rights to fisheries. In accordance with Treaty #3, the 1891 Act and the 1894 
Joint Agreement extended reserve boundaries from shoreline to shoreline, or headland 
to headland, greatly increasing the territory under Indian control. Legal scholar 
Richard Bartlett argues that the Indian Act guaranteed riparian rights to waterways 
running through reserve. He writes, “[a] Band has possession of all reserve land, 
including riparian land, subject to its allotment to an individual member or 
appropriation for Band purposes.”90 Furthermore, the Indian Act expressly sets land 
apart for the “use or benefit” of the bands.91 This is not to suggest that the Indian Act 
purposefully guaranteed riparian rights; indeed, it was touted as a tool of directed 
civilization – “beneficial entitlement” as understood by the Department of Indian 
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Affairs referred to agricultural development, not seasonal rounds.92 Nevertheless, 
legal apparatuses that guaranteed Indians’ “beneficial entitlement” to, or use of, 
reserve lands directly challenged the government of Ontario’s hydroelectric 
development goals; rapids that needed to generate electricity for “the people of 
Ontario” fell under Anishinabek jurisdiction.  
In recognition of the obstacle posed by Anishinabek water rights, the Attorney 
General of Ontario hoped to amass information with regard “to the character of each 
reserve as to which water powers existed.”93 Waterways in northwestern Ontario now 
mattered to the Ontario Legislature; the Attorney General of Ontario needed to define 
newly acquired access. As early as March 1906, E. L. Newcombe, the Deputy 
Minister of Justice, determined that no known reason existed “why the title to a 
reserve may not be subject to a right on part of the province.”94 Newcombe believed 
Ontario could reserve water for its own use regardless of reserve boundaries. His 
interpretation hinged on shared constitutional powers over water between the federal 
and provincial governments. Despite the fact that reserve lands were federal creations 
(under section 91 (24) of the Constitution Act of 1867), Ontario had primary 
responsibility for making water use and allocation decisions.  
By December 1914, Deputy Minister Aubrey White of the Department of 
Lands, Forests, and Mines anticipated “future trouble” over Indigenous water rights. 
Indigenous claims to water could slow industrial development off-reserve, which 
depended, in part, on a stable supply of electricity. White anxiously noted that “there 
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are some water powers lying in the boundaries of reserves.”95 Concerns over the 
implications of Anishinabek control of water resources ran through the 
correspondence between government officials at the provincial and federal levels. As 
White wrote to Duncan Campbell Scott, Deputy Superintendent General of Indian 
Affairs, “I find there are rivers of considerable size running through them and it surely 
never was intended that lands under a river should belong to the Indians.”96 Scott 
proposed the repeal of the 1894 Joint Agreement to White as a solution to Ontario’s 
water access problems. Scott wrote, “If the reserves are confirmed as surveyed, we 
would [be] require[d] to repeal the statute of 1894 and substitute therefor an 
enactment which would cover the settlement of the reserve question.” Settlement 
involved “say[ing] nothing about waters or fisheries.” 97 By removing the headland-
to-headland clause, Ontario could access Anishinabek water resources as its repeal 
would effectively limit the reserve to land. To manage the burden of loss, Scott 
proposed that White allow the Anishinabek water powers “not exceeding 500 horse 
powers.” Scott appears to have sought some form of financial compensation for his 
wards, suggesting that “a percentage of the gross earnings of water powers when 
developed” be provided to the Indians. 98 Despite this limited attempt to secure a 
95 TARR, “W. R. White, Deputy Minister of Lands, Forests, and Mines, to Duncan Campbell 
Scott, Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, 20 December 1913,” Document 570, Phase 1: 
Headlands to Headlands. 
96 LAC, “W. R. White, Deputy Minister of Lands, Forests, and Mines, to Duncan Campbell 
Scott, Deputy Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, 15 December 1915,” RG 10, Vol. 2314, fol. 
62509-5, pt. 1. 
97 LAC, “Duncan Campbell Scott, Deputy Superintendent of Indian Affairs, to W. R. White, 
Deputy Minister of Lands, Forests, and Mines, 30 December 1914,” RG 10, Vol. 2314, fol. 62509-5, 
pt. 1.  
98 In her analysis of the Moose River Basin, Jean Manore found that “the federal government 
would not defend Aboriginal peoples’ right and title against hydroelectric exploitation, insisting only 
on compensation for those individuals and bands harmed by the loss of possessions or land “(Cross-
Currents, 8). Scott’s recommendation to provide dispossessed bands with a “percentage of the gross 
earnings” aligns with this claim. However, Scott did not insist on compensation. In later exchanges, 
Scott “trust[ed]” that White would adhere to the compensatory scheme proposed by the Department of 
Indian Affairs. The subsequent failure of the Department of Indian Affairs to comment on the 1915 Act 
suggests that Scott (a federal agent) did not insist on behalf of his wards. The federal government did 
not overtly challenge provincial breaches of power, in part (as Manore suggests) because “the federal 
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revenue stream for his wards, Scott placed Anishinabek interests after settler goals to 
open up Treaty #3 to the waiâbishkiwedig.  
Three months after the issue was initially raised by Ontario, the Departments 
of Lands and Forests and the Department of Indian Affairs were ready to discuss a 
draft of the proposed repeal. In March 1915, Scott submitted his comments to White 
for consideration. Scott highlighted basic typographical errors in the proposed repeal 
(e.g. replace 1884 with 1894). He also demanded that islands remain part of existing 
reservations, writing “I wish to make clear…that we shall get the islands which are 
shown on the plans as part of the reserves.”99 While it is difficult to confirm without a 
copy of White’s draft, Scott may have attempted to again secure a revenue stream for 
his wards. Scott “trust[ed] that you [White] will make it 50% as I suggested.”100 Did 
Scott envision equal profit-sharing between developers and the Indians? Had Scott 
hoped to mitigate the very loss he facilitated? Whatever his intention, Scott’s 
suggestions were never incorporated by the Ontario legislation. The Dominion was 
consulted as to the form of the 1915 act (and federal officials helped to erode 
Anishinabek water rights) – however, Ontario discarded the limited protections 
sought by the Department of Indian Affairs. 
In April 1915, the government of Ontario infringed upon the federal 
government’s jurisdiction and repealed Indian water rights granted by the 1891 Act 
and affirmed by the 1894 Joint Agreement. An Act to Confirm the Title of the 
Government of Canada to Certain Lands and Indian Lands, passed in 1915, was 
almost identical to the 1891 Act, except for the following provision: waterways “shall 
                                                                                                                             
government too supported the idea of development” (8). Kenichi Matsui came to a similar conclusion 
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not be deemed to form any part of such reserve.”101 Once passed, the 1915 act 
effectively denied Indian water rights derived from Treaty #3, and local Anishinabek 
lost control over waterways adjacent to their reservations; unlike Ponton’s 1890 
survey of Dalles 38C Indian Reserve, cartographic depictions of Dalles 38C Indian 
Reserve after 1915 curbed Anishinabek jurisdiction at the shoreline. Despite limited 
provincial authority over reserve lands, the government of Ontario suppressed 
Anishinabek interest and asserted its right over Anishinabek territories. Ontario 
mistakenly believed – given protracted negotiations – that the Dominion would pass 
legislation agreeing to exclude First Nations from access to water courses thus 
validating Ontario’s repeal. The Dominion did not validate Ontario’s repeal; it also 
failed to challenge the provincial government. Scott “trusted” White. While the 
Dominion should have legally protested against Ontario, it made little sense to 
demand a retraction of a repeal that originated from the Department of Indian Affairs.  
While the Hydro-Electric Power Commission – established by the Ontario 
Legislature in 1906 – would proceed to develop over 200,000 brake horsepower to the 
detriment of Indigenous territories after 1915, Anishinabek living in the Winnipeg 
River drainage basin rejected provincial (re)definitions of their reservation lands. 
Anishinabek families living in the Winnipeg River drainage basin continued to host 
ceremonies to manage waters running “between the projecting headlands of any lake 
or sheets of water not wholly surrounded by an Indian Reserve” years after An Act to 
Confirm the Title of the Government of Canada to Certain Lands and Indian Lands 
had been passed. Consider, for example, continued use of mitigwakik, a ceremonial 
instrument also known as the water drum, as an act of resistance. The mitigwakik is 
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handcrafted exclusively by members of the Grand Medicine Society.102 Standing 40 
to 50 centimetres high, its frame is made of basswood or cedar. A pine insert, sealed 
with pitch, forms the drum base. Tanned deer hide is used to create a drumhead. 103 
Mitigwakik earned its English name, however, for the water that partially fills its 
frame. Upon completion, mitigwakik is “audible at great distances” when played.104 
Given its birth at the hands of a medicine man, the sounding of mitigwakik “informed 
one instantly that a medicine ceremony was in place.”105 Through these ceremonies 
Anishinabek participants asserted a continued relationship to water, and to all 
Creation. 
When heard, mitigwakik reminded Anishinabek listeners of their connection to 
Creation. Derrick Bresette, an Anishinabek drummer active with Morningstar River 
Singers in Toronto, Ontario, suggests that the shape of the drum symbolizes the shape 
of Earth. The circular shape of mitigwakik prompts Anishinabek viewers to reflect on 
their relationship to Creation. He explains, “So when the singers are sounding the 
drum and the dancers are coming around that drum…. They are thinking about those 
things that Mother Earth provides for us.”106 Ceremony is the product of their – 
(Wo)Man’s and Earth’s – cooperation.107 Members of the Grand Medicine Society 
use these visual cues to teach Anishinabek participants that they are united with 
Creation. As such, mitigwakik become an “inherently political” technology. In “Do 
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Artifacts Have Politics?” Langdon Winner argues that an artifact is “inherently 
political” if its creation and operation require a specific social arrangement.108 For 
mitigwakik to sound, a recognized spiritual authority must stand behind the drum. 
Audibility depends on the operation of a social system that competes with Western 
(Christian) worldviews, particularly, hierarchies of nature. 
Consider that unity between the Anishinabek and Creation is further 
symbolized by the material construction of mitigwakik. These drums are built entirely 
of local, natural resources. They sound when members of the plant world (basswood, 
cedar, and pine), the animal world (deer), the water world (H2O), and the human 
world (drummer) work in unison. According to Paul Nadjiwan, an Anishinaabe 
drummer from Manitoulin Island, the drum is used “to communicate with the powers 
of relationship.”109 Relationships reinforced through ceremonial play counter Western 
understandings of the natural world. Cherokee author Thomas King argues that 
Christian origin stories, particularly the fall of Adam and Eve in Genesis, encouraged 
Westerners to position themselves in competition with nature. He explains that “the 
post-garden world we inherit is decidedly material in nature, a world at war – God vs. 
the Devil, humans vs. the elements.”110 Members of the Ontario Legislature had likely 
been socialized to believe that water – an element and not a partner-spirit – could be 
separated from the Anishinabek. Boundary lines could be drawn between the 
reservation and the river. And thus, the 1915 act could be written and approved by 
provincial officials. Members of the Grand Medicine Society rejected Western 
divisions of the natural world when they drummed; they sounded their sacred bonds 
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to the waters flowing through the Winnipeg River drainage basin. Anishinabek poet 
Al Hunter of Manitou Rapids, Ontario, explains: “The earth is water. We are 
water.”111 Sometimes compared to blood in Anishinabek writings, the drum suggested 
that water could not be pulled from Anishinabek bodies or from Anishinabek 
communities.112 Its politicized message is that mitigwakik reinforced Anishinabek 
connections to the Winnipeg River drainage basin; it encouraged a mental map that 
conflicted with Western (re)definitions of Anishinabek space. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Anishinabek medicine men used the drum to actively 
reinforce Anishinabek connections to waterways in the Winnipeg River drainage 
basin prior to 1915. Written evidence of mitigwakik use prior to 1915 can be found in 
Lake of the Woods Museum. Evidence often takes the form of complaint. The 
waiâbishkiwedig living in Kenora (and likely Anishinabek converts to Christianity) 
considered drum use a form of noise pollution. In July 1893, a complainant noted that 
Anishinabek families had gathered “on the outskirts of Rat Portage” to collect their 
treaty monies. It was on this “vacant common” that Anishinabek men, women, and 
children engaged in ceremonies “incomprehensible to the white onlooker.”113 
Approximately one year later, a complainant suggested that Anishinabek drumming 
“rent the air asunder” as sound travelled “down the [Winnipeg] river” towards 
town.114 Neither record directly identifies mitigwakik or the water drum. However, 
complaints of sound audible at great distances reflect anthropological descriptions of 
the water drum.115 Anishinabek peoples played an “enormous variety” of 
membranophones (drums); alternative instruments would have been available for 
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localized use.116 Rat Portage and “down the river,” although vague, are also 
suggestive territorial markers. During the 1890s, Chief Kawitaskung oversaw both 
Rat Portage Indian Reserve and Dalles 38C Indian Reserve.117 Despite his Christian 
conversion, Chief Kawitaskung lived on a “medicine reserve.”118 Dalles 38C Indian 
Reserve (and off-reserve territories claimed by band members) remained a hotbed of 
activity for the Grand Medicine Society. It is likely that band members – united under 
Chief Kawitaskung – met on shared territories to drum. 
Summertime complaints further imply mitigwakik use. Distinctions between 
membranophones determined who played them, where they were played, and when 
they were played. Grand Medicine Society ceremonies, which might require 
mitigwakik use, frequently occurred during the summer months as kin groups 
throughout the Winnipeg River drainage basin left their familial trap lines and hunting 
grounds to meet at shared harvesting sites (i.e. blueberry and manomin grounds). 
Anthropologist Ruth Landes suggested that ceremonial activities included “puberty 
rights, marriages, dances, [and] religious performance.” These activities peaked from 
June to August – at the same time which Kenora residents complained about 
Anishinabek drumming. 119  
Written records of mitigwakik use decline in the early 1900s, likely in 
response to 1895 amendments to the Indian Act. Federal modifications to Section 114 
criminalized all dances and ceremonies that involved giving away goods (e.g. 
clothing, foodstuffs, and tobacco) or money. Section 114 also “proclaimed it an 
indictable offence for ‘Indians’ or ‘other persons’ to engage in, or assist in 
celebrating, or encourage anyone else to celebrate” banned Indigenous dances and 
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ceremonies.120 Participants were to be charged with a mandatory two-month sentence 
by their Indian Agent. Federal authorities, however, could impose a sentence up to six 
months.121 Bans appear to have been motivated by federal anxieties about Indigenous 
territorial use. One Indian Agent claimed dancing “unsettled” Indigenous 
participants.122 Dancing was feared to upset reservation boundaries. In 1905, R.S. 
McKenzie, Indian Agent in Kenora, Ontario, recommended removing Powassan’s 
chieftainship as a penalty “urging the Indians to hold these Feasts and dances” in-and-
around Shoal Lake Indian Reserve. McKenzie further suggested that Powassan be 
“sent to jail for a time at hard labour” – all in an attempt to establish “lines” of 
acceptable conduct.123 By July 1911 at least one chief had been incarcerated for 
ceremonial dancing in territories covered by Treaty #3.124 Yet, imprisonment did not 
seem to dissuade Anishinabek from affirming their unique relationship to all Creation. 
In 1921, the Deputy Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, Duncan Campbell 
Scott, hinted that dances upset federal map-making initiatives, particularly Indian 
confinement to reservation lands. In a circular to Indian Agents at Kenora and Fort 
Frances, Scott wrote: “You should… prevent them from leaving their reserves for the 
purposes of attending fairs, exhibitions, etc.” He further advised that “You should 
suppress any dances which… unsettle them from serious work.”125 Federal agents 
imprisoned ceremonial participants in an attempt to solidify reservation boundaries, to 
ensure the settlement of reservation lands. Had federal tactics succeeded, one might 
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argue that local Anishinabek accepted (however unwittingly) Western (re)definitions 
of Anishinabek space – but, mitigwakik use continued “way out on the lake.”126 
Oral testimony and biography reveal that local Anishinabek maintained 
competing definitions of space – particularly interconnectedness with water – by 
holding ceremonies on Lake of the Woods and the Winnipeg River. While ceremonial 
sites on reserve fell into disuse after 1895, cultural practice flourished away from the 
watchful eye of the Indian agent after 1915. Hazel Martin-McKeever (b. 1928), for 
example, remembers that “[t]here were a lot of pow-wows in the distant islands.”127 
Born to a Christian family, Hazel’s mother, Ogimaamaashiik, never allowed her to 
attend: “it was a no-no.”128 While Hazel never witnessed mitigwakik use, she “hear[d] 
the drums at night” during berry-picking season. Her family feared that drum use was 
“evil.” Medicine songs, it was (and is) still believed, connected local Anishinabek to 
the spirit world. And, this connection to all Creation, strong in Anishinabek territory 
at large, blurred the lines between (wo)man and water, between reserve and water. 
Ongoing ceremonial practice suggests that the Anishinabek did not believe that the 
1915 Act disconnected them from their water resources. 
It is important to note that relocation, as a strategy for cultural survival, is 
encoded in Anishinabek, Cree, and Oji-Cree oral testimony. Lake of the Woods is 
believed to have been created by a water spirit, a Manitou. This Manitou so loved Its 
creation that It transformed into a rock, an unmoveable island. But, It also sought to 
protect the people of Lake of the Woods, the Anishinabek. Manitou said, “I’ll make a 
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maze of this lake… to compound those who might try to drive my people from it.”129 
In this quotation, the islands guarantee Anishinabek protection from harm. 
Ceremonial practice “way out the lake” not only reaffirms Anishinabek relationships 
to water, it is a strategy derived from an alliance between Anishinabek peoples and 
the water world. Provincial authority and surveyor’s boundaries were not heeded on 
Lake of the Woods after 1915. Instead, local Anishinabek continually reinforced their 
connection to water through song. Local Anishinabek did not abide by provincial 
map-making projects, but as mitigwakik use reveals, lived their lives in defiance of 
them. 
CONCLUSION 
 
A detailed review of pivotal moments between 1873 and 1915 illustrates how 
provincial recognition of Anishinabek water rights depended on Ontario’s 
understanding of water as linked to the adjacent property (and hence subject to private 
ownership) or a provincial asset (subject to government control). In 1873, Ontario 
supported long-established Anishinabek water use for fisheries, legislating 
Anishinabek water rights with the 1891 Act. Legislation mirrored larger definitions of 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous riparian water rights, established by the 1859 
Chasemore vs. Richards case. In 1906, however, Ontario redefined riparian water 
rights to exclude water power; water became a provincial asset and Anishinabek 
water use suddenly challenged Ontario’s access to it. Nine years later, Ontario passed 
legislation confirming title of the government of Canada to reserve lands generally, 
but rescinded clause 4 of the 1894 Joint Agreement (i.e. Anishinabek rights to waters 
running along or through reserve). Ontario claimed that the shorelines on reserve were 
boundaries and therefore the province owned all the land underwater adjacent to 
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reserve. The 1915 Act breached Treaty #3 as published by Canada and Paypom 
Treaty as understood by Anishinabek, ultimately denying Anishinabek rights to 
control their waterways. Given that neither the federal government nor Anishinabek 
occupants formally approved an agreement affecting Indian waterways, the 1915 
action is invalid. Titled An Act to Confirm the Title of the Government of Canada to 
Certain Lands and Indian Lands (1915), Ontario cannot enact legislation in relation to 
Indians without federal approval. The jurisdiction of this area is still technically 
governed by the fourth clause of the 1894 Joint Agreement between the province of 
Ontario and the federal government. And so, Anishinabek families continue to 
recognize clause 4 of the 1894 Joint Agreement. Anishinabek families continue to 
ritually affirm their relationship to waters running through or around reserve through 
drum use. One hundred years later, the Ontario Legislature has yet to listen to 
mitigawkik. 
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Figure 3: A. W. PONTON’S 1890 SURVEY OF DALLES 38C INDIAN 
RESERVE  
 
Federal surveyor A. W. Ponton allotted Chief Kawitaskung (Thomas Lindsay) 
and his band the waters below the northernmost rapids to the “high rocky 
country” in the Winnipeg River drainage basin. A boundary line is visible 
between “I” and “V” in “RIVER.” A second boundary line connects the 
northwestern tip of the peninsula to the southernmost tip of the island (bottom 
left). These lines bound waters running between the mainland reserve and the 
reserve island to Dalles 38C. 130 
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Figure 4: ANISHINABEK WATER OFFERING (C. 1890)131 
Offering of household and fashion items suggests that Anishinabek actively 
practiced wii'kaadown (the duty to make seasonal offerings in gratitude to land, 
water, air and all living things) in the aftermath of Treaty #3 thus maintaining 
their sacred role as caretakers of manitou gitigenan (the Great Spirit’s Garden). 
131 LOWM, Photographer unknown. “Water Offering, c. 1890,” [photograph]. 
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Figure 5: AGOKWE AND ANISHINAABE-KWE DRYING FISH (1912)132 
This image depicts an elderly Anishinabek woman (Agokwe) drying fish with a 
younger Anishinabek woman (Anishinaabe-Kwe), suggesting that after 1873 
Anishinabek women affirmed their fishing rights through practice. The practice 
crossed generational lines, and young women were schooled in resource 
stewardship by their elders. 
132 LOWM, Carl Linde, “Anishinaabe-Kwe Drying Fish, 1912,” [photograph], 1984.40.33. 
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Figure 6: A WATER-BASED COMMUNITY (C. 1900)133 
While the photographer is unknown, Indian enthusiasts of the early 1900s 
recognized water-based Anishinabek communities and documented their 
existence with the camera. It is important to note that this community may not 
have been formerly designated as reservation land by the Department of Indian 
Affairs. 
133 LOWM, Photographer unknown, “Native Community, c. 1900,” [photograph], 1970.30.1 
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CHAPTER 2 
“ALMOST DESTITUTE IN THE WINTER”: FEDERAL RESPONSES TO 
EARLY FLOOD DAMAGES AND ANISHINABEK ADAPTATION TO 
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE IN THE WINNIPEG RIVER DRAINAGE BASIN, 
1893-19501 
 
Years before Canadian industrialists introduced long distance transmission 
technology to the Winnipeg River drainage basin, before Ontario repealed An Act for the 
Settlement of Questions between the Governments of Canada and Ontario Respecting 
Indian Lands (1894), damming along the north shore of Lake of the Woods stimulated 
both economic and population growth in the towns of Rat Portage and Keewatin (now 
joined and known as Kenora). John Mather erected Keewatin’s first dam in 1879 where 
Lake of the Woods flowed from Portage Bay into Mink Bay, which enabled him to power 
the Keewatin Lumber Company.2 Mather benefited greatly from railway growth, 
producing lumber for the Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR).3 Requiring hands to meet the 
CPR’s lumber demand, Mather recruited skilled and unskilled labourers, hiring workers 
from as far away as Scotland to populate the mill site.4 This flurry of activity was not 
unique to Keewatin. As historians Graham Taylor and Peter Baskerville have noted, 
                                            
1 “The Peoples’ Forum,” Kenora Miner and News, 18 October 1922, 2. This chapter begins with 
the erection of the Norman Dam by the Keewatin Lumber and Power Company in 1893. It ends with the 
blasting of the Dalles Channel on the Winnipeg River – the next major environmental modification that 
would change flow – in 1950. While my discussion of Anishinabek adaptation focuses on the immediate 
aftermath of the International Joint Commission’s recommendations in 1917, the challenges of 
development – particularly lake control by the Norman Dam -- would remain relatively constant until 1950. 
2 Lake of the Woods Writers’ Group and Kenora Centennial Committee, Through the Kenora 
Gateway, 55. 
3 The Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) began construction in the Winnipeg River drainage basin 
in 1877. By 1882, the CPR had completed its Western Line. This line connected Rat Portage to Winnipeg. 
In 1883, the Eastern Line, connecting Rat Portage to Thunder Bay, was completed by the CPR. “Historical 
Timeline,” Lake of the Woods Museum, accessed 1 January 2015, 
http://www.lakeofthewoodsmuseum.ca/collectionsandresearch/HistoricalTimeline.aspx. 
4 Ronald Wolf, “Things That Go Bump in a Canadian Night: Mather-Walls House, Keewatin, 
Ont.,” The Algoma News, 9 December 2009, accessed 1 January 2015, 
http://www.thealgomanews.ca/columns/other-columns/things-that-go-bump-in-a-canadian-night-3/.  
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“railways were a catalyst for industrial growth.”5 Within twenty years, an additional five 
dams were built within a few kilometres of Mather’s original site to power his saw mill, 
flour production, and to improve navigation on Lake of the Woods. 
Inspired, perhaps, by Mather’s profitable use of local waters, the Lake of the 
Woods Milling Company erected a dam (known as Mill A) west of Mather’s site in 1887. 
Two 1.5-metre water wheels powered flour production. The Milling Company initially 
produced 1250 barrels of flour per day, which was a booming business. By 1898, 
production had increased to 3500 barrels per day.6 According to Ernest Ingersoll, a 
naturalist and travel writer, the towns of Rat Portage and Keewatin sprouted up around 
these successful dam sites: “[Keewatin] is clustered about several great lumbering and 
flowering mills… These are all run by water power brought through a rock-flume.”7 
Ingersoll further argued that water power allowed Canadians to “interrupt the 
wilderness.”8 Looking back, historians discover that hydroelectricity “interrupted the 
wilderness” by fuelling wage-paying jobs at the northern extremity of Lake of the 
Woods. It is no small wonder that historian Michael Bliss observed that “[f]actories gave 
communities so much employment that they seemed as beneficial as railways.”9 Indeed, 
few Canadians bemoaned, at least in print, the transformation of the north shore. Travel 
writers instead waxed poetic about environmental transformation: one “wonders whether 
the smoke of saw-mills drifts across the sky as it used to do from campfires that are no 
                                            
5 Baskerville and Taylor, Concise History of Business in Canada, 180. 
6 Lake of the Woods Writers’ Group and Kenora Centennial Committee, Through the Kenora 
Gateway, 59. 
7 Ernest Ingersoll, The Canadian Guide-Book Part II: Western Canada (London, UK: William 
Heinemann, 1892), 96. 
8 Ibid., 93. 
9 Bliss, Northern Enterprise, 252. 
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more.”10 Ontario had long envisioned this transformation. Able-bodied men sought 
employment at mills powered by water wheels and thus populated Canada’s resource-rich 
northlands. 
And yet, damming was not immune to critique. In 1887, the Canadian federal 
government constructed the Rollerway Dam, which raised the low level of Lake of the 
Woods by 0.91 metres.11 The Dominion government argued that the shipping industry 
required a minimum 0.91-metre increase in water levels to improve navigation.12 
Steamships had become increasingly busy with freight, lumber, and passengers (i.e. 
labourers) – secure shipments and safe travel required the submersion of rocky shoals 
with water. American citizens living along the south shore of Lake of the Woods, 
however, were outraged by Canadian operations. The Rollerway Dam submerged 
valuable agricultural lands in Minnesota. International tensions heightened between 1893 
and 1895 when the Keewatin Lumber and Power Company expanded their operations, 
building the Norman Dam and rendering the Rollerway Dam obsolete. The Norman, run 
by a Canadian industrialist, determined the water level of Lake of the Woods.13 Canadian 
industrial needs now had a direct impact on American agricultural production. According 
to one account, irate Minnesotans responded by attempting to blow up the Norman Dam 
                                            
10 Ingersoll, The Canadian Guide-Book Part II, 94. 
11 Lake of the Woods Writers’ Group and Kenora Centennial Committee, Through the Kenora 
Gateway, 61. 
12 Ibid. Section 91(10) of The Constitution Act (1867) gave the Dominion government “exclusive 
Legislative Authority” over “Navigation and Shipping.” Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, 
reprinted in RSC 1985, App II, No 5.  
13 Despite plans to produce hydroelectric power at the western outlet, the Keewatin Lumber and 
Power Company did not construct a powerhouse in the 1890s. E. W. Backus purchased the Norman Dam in 
1919. Powerhouse construction began under Backus’ ownership in 1924. Lake of the Woods Writers’ 
Group and Kenora Centennial Committee, Through the Kenora Gateway, 61. 
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with dynamite.14 The International Joint Commission (IJC) intervened by hosting an 
inquiry into Lake of the Woods water levels. Their goal was to maintain peace between 
Canada and the United States. Between 1912 and 1917, the IJC collected data on northern 
dam operations, industrial water fluctuations, and property damages to determine whether 
(and, perhaps, to recommend how) the Norman ought to continue operations. The IJC’s 
data offer the first comprehensive record of industrial flood damages on Lake of the 
Woods. 
Policy analysts and historians alike have examined the IJC’s data collection and 
decision-making processes to produce a history of international non-violent conflict 
resolution.15 The metanarrative suggests that a shared sentiment of industry – or, the 
privileging of capitalist development – facilitated the peaceable co-management of Lake 
of the Woods between Canada and the United States. Co-management, many scholars 
have argued, protected economic interests on both sides of the border:  Ontario could 
                                            
14 Manton M. Wyvell, “Peace between Canada and the United States,” Advocate for Peace 
through Justice, 83, no. 7 (July 1921): 256. 
15 The International Joint Commission enjoyed general recognition as a successful model for 
international governance – a position reflected by contemporary encyclopedia entries. N. F. Dreisziger, 
writing for the Canadian Encyclopedia, suggests that the IJC “has been highly successful.” Its success is 
further implied by Dreisziger’s claim that the IJC model “be applied to other problem areas,” presumably 
of international concern. The IJC also appears as a successful model for international governance in 
Encyclopedia Britannica’s entry on “Canals and Inland Waterways.” The author (unknown) notes that the 
IJC has “functioned since 1909 with general authority over boundary waters.” The IJC sits in stark contrast 
to European attempts to manage international waterways. Unlike Canada and the United States, European 
governments do not share a history of peaceable cooperation: “War and political considerations from time 
to time interrupted the freedom of navigation [between countries].” Further, European governments failed 
to independently achieve relative stability along international waterways. Instead, peaceable cooperation 
was achieved in the post-war era through the operation of the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Europe. These encyclopedia entries condense and reflect larger scholarly trends. It is important to note, 
however, the work of dissenters such as Daniel MacFarlane who argues that an asymmetrical relationship 
existed between cooperating parties during the Cold War. “Canals and inland waterways,” Encyclopedia 
Britannica Online, accessed February 23, 2015, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/92049/canals-
and-inland-waterways/72511/Inclined-planes; N. F. Dreisziger, “International Joint Commission,” The 
Canadian Encyclopedia, 15 December 2013, accessed 23 February 2015, 
http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/international-joint-commission/; Daniel Macfarlane, 
“Rapid Changes: Canada and the St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project,” University of Toronto Program 
on Water Issues, accessed 23 February 2015, http://powi.ca/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/Rapid-Changes-
Canada-and-the-St.Lawrence-Seaway-and-Power-Project.pdf.      
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maintain the Norman Dam as long as flooding did not negatively impact American 
commercial interests. 16 The metanarrative assumes that there were only two vested 
international parties: Canadian and American. It ignores the presence of the Anishinabek 
Nation on Lake of the Woods. The occlusion is not surprising – the International Joint 
Commission did not call on Anishinabek informants to report flood damages directly. 
This chapter complicates narratives of international co-operation and mutual benefit by 
reconstructing Anishinabek flood damages caused by the Norman Dam. My goal is to 
expand on the initial findings of the IJC and to illuminate under-documented losses in the 
Winnipeg River drainage basin. Damages to Anishinabek transport routes on the frozen 
surfaces of the Winnipeg River and Lake of the Woods (henceforth ice roads) will centre 
our discussion of loss.17 Damage analysis affirms political scientist Peter Clancy’s 
                                            
16 Little scholarly attention has been paid to the particular case of the Norman Dam. However, 
historical analyses of the St. Lawrence Seaway have emphasized the economic benefits of international co-
management. Take, for example, Daniel Macfarlane’s write-up on the St. Lawrence Seaway. Macfarlane 
paraphrases Gordon T. Stewart, author of “America’s Canada Policy” (1989), noting that the navigation 
works “accelerated the economic, trade, defense integration of the two North American countries” (1). 
D’arcy Jenish further argues that the St. Lawrence Seaway was “a vital commercial artery” (29). In 1959 
alone – its first year of operation – the St. Lawrence Seaway doubled the tonnage handled along the river. 
Canadians recognized its economic value (and ties to the 1909 Boundary Waters Agreement) as early as 
1954 when the CBC announced that “a fifty year old international agreement [was] exploding into reality.” 
Macfarlane, “Rapid Changes,” 1; D’arcy Jenish, The St. Lawrence Seaway: Fifty Years and Counting 
(Manotick, ON: Penumbra Press, 2007); “St. Lawrence Seaway: Let the Flooding Begin,” CBC Television, 
15 August 1954, http://www.cbc.ca/player/play/1826349772.  
17 My focus on the relationship between dam development and Indigenous mobility is novel. 
Boyce Richardson (Cree Hunters of Mistassini, 1974) researched and scripted a feature length documentary 
that followed three Cree families – associated with Sam Blacksmith, Ronnie Jolly, and Abraham Voyageur 
– to Blacksmith’s winter trapping grounds in what is now known as Quebec. Richardson identifies the 
importance of both air and water travel for Cree trappers. Richardson mentions air and water transportation 
in passing – his primary interest is in Cree trapping practices. Richardson does not connect travel (e.g. 
canoe routes) to Cree trapping practices even though the canoe is presented as the primary form of 
transportation between trapping grounds. Richardson appears to be primarily concerned with the flooding 
of valuable trapping lands (and animal habitat). In Richardson’s view, the James Bay Project puts trapping, 
not transportation, activities at risk. In his analysis of hydroelectric development in Manitoba and 
Saskatchewan, James Waldram (As Long as the Rivers Run, 1988) claimed that waterways “service as 
transportation corridors was evident; but perhaps less evident was the interrelationship among the 
waterways, the Natives, and the animals they hunted” (5). In his discussion of Treaty #5, Waldram 
identifies conflict between Crown and First Nations interpretations about settler access and use of treaty 
lands in Manitoba. Treaty #5 provided (contested) legal rationale for development by Manitoba Hydro – 
development that inundated hunting territories and thus threatened treaty hunting rights. Territorial loss 
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contention that the organization of fresh water “is more often than not uneven and 
dysfunctional, with a discernible tilt toward partial and vested interests” – here, the 
interests of Western industrializing nations.18 
Perhaps more importantly, this chapter considers the historical impact of 
Anishinabek exclusion from the IJC hearings. The IJC hearings not only mark a turning 
point in Canadian-American relations, but also reflect Canada’s systematic eradication of 
Indigenous rights. Anishinabek exclusion stemmed from Ontario’s decision to repeal An 
Act for the Settlement of Questions between the Governments of Canada and Ontario 
Respecting Indian Lands (1891) discussed in Chapter 1; Anishinabek silence mirrored 
provincial claims that “Indians” had no claim to waters running through or around 
reserve. Anishinabek exclusion also aligned with subsequent revisions to the Indian Act: 
in the 1920s, the federal government added Section 141 to bar First Nations from hiring a 
lawyer to pursue land claims.19 In short, the IJC hearings established a precedent for 
                                                                                                                                  
(and habitat loss) rather than the ability to safely access lands is suggested as the cause for decreased 
hunting activities and increased reliance on wage labour or government transfers by the Rocky Cree. Jean 
Manore (Cross-Currents, 1999) also comments on the extensive use of waterways for trade purposes 
during the early twentieth century in northeastern Ontario. Citing the 1901 report of J. M. Bell’s survey 
party, Manore notes that “the Mattagami River was a busy waterway” (circa 1901). Water transportation 
appears linked to trade: “Numerous people travelled that route to and from the Hudson Bay post of Fort 
Mattagami and the Canadian Pacific Railway” (21). She argues that increased transportation along the 
Mattagami River was a low-impact activity. Indeed, Manore suggests that the establishment of trading 
posts along the waterways did little to disrupt the environment.  Exceptions include increased trapping 
activities to serve HBC posts that depleted certain species (e.g. beaver) (21). Readers, however, are 
provided with little sense of how water transportation may have been affected by high impact activities 
(e.g. water regulation) as the fur trade declined. In the grassroots magazine Briarpatch (2012), Peter 
Kulchyski noted that “What was once a highway for hunters [the Nelson River] is now dangerous to travel 
in winter, as the location of ice pockets created by flooding and retreating water cannot be predicted.” Like 
his predecessors, Kulchyski identifies the river as a “highway.” Unlike his predecessors, Kulchyski 
identifies that “road use” was impacted by hydroelectric development. While Kulchyski acknowledges 
reduced mobility due to water control, he does not explore this issue in detail. Peter Kulchyski, “Flooded 
and forgotten: Hydro development makes a battleground of northern Manitoba,” Briarpatch, 28 February 
2012, accessed 1 July 2015, http://briarpatchmagazine.com/articles/view/flooded-and-forgotten. My 
dissertation chapter offers one of the few sustained engagements with mobility issues. 
18 Peter Clancy, Fresh Water Politics in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014), xii. 
19 Erin Hanson argues that Section 141 prevented “Aboriginal peoples from fighting for their 
rights through the legal system.” Coupled with Section 114, which restricted “virtually any gathering” at 
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water development in the Winnipeg River drainage basin. The IJC created a closed 
system of negotiation wherein dam development privileged non-Indigenous industrial 
concerns (the United States and Canada) by barring participation of the Anishinabek 
Nation and Anishinabek water-users. These findings expand on Clancy’s ground-
breaking attempt to build a model of the “freshwater state” in Canada by revealing the 
flow of power (and of water) between competing nations: the Dominion of Canada, the 
United States, and the Anishinabek Nation.20 Anishinabek silence about early dam 
development reflects Western exclusionary tactics that denied Indigenous water-users a 
public voice and forced Anishinabek to respond creatively to loss. Surviving industrial 
flood damages required internal change rather than external recognition. Indeed, 
Anishinabek silence allows us to better imagine how the nascent “freshwater state” of 
Canada diverted decision-making power away from non-industrial, primarily Indigenous, 
users. 
 
THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION (IJC), A DECISION-MAKING FRAMEWORK 
 
Before we can study Anishinabek exclusion from the “freshwater state,” we must 
better understand the role of the International Joint Commission on the Lake of the 
Woods Question, a federally-appointed committee responsible for determining the ideal 
flow of Lake of the Woods. The concept of the International Joint Commission dates 
back to the Boundary Water Treaty of 1909, an agreement between the Dominion of 
Canada and the United States intended to “prevent disputes regarding the use of boundary 
                                                                                                                                  
risk of imprisonment until 1951, Canadian law made it difficult for Anishinabek in the Winnipeg River 
drainage basin to organize collectively against Canada and Ontario. Erin Hanson, “The Indian Act,” 
Indigenous Foundations: First Nations Studies Program at the University of British Columbia, accessed 1 
January 2015, http://indigenousfoundations.arts.ubc.ca/home/government-policy/the-indian-
act.html#potlatch.  
20 Clancy, Fresh Water Politics in Canada, xii. 
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waters.”21 Both governments envisaged the IJC as an organization capable of moderating 
international conflict over shared natural resources. Specifically, the International Joint 
Commission was “to settle all questions which are now pending between the United 
States and the Dominion of Canada, involving the rights, obligations or interest of either 
in relation to the other.”22 As this quotation reveals, the original script of the Boundary 
Waters Treaty of 1909 excluded Indigenous nations whose boundaries overlapped the 
49th parallel. Only the interests of Canada and the United States – both with historical ties 
to British colonialism – were protected by the treaty.23 Each treaty partner had a historical 
legacy of eliminating Indigenous access to natural resources (such as land) to encourage 
the settlement of predominately Anglo-Protestant settlers. It seemed unlikely that the 
Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 would protect competing Anishinabek claims to 
international waterways. 
Indeed, the successful operation of the International Joint Commission depended, 
in part, on perceived mutual interest between Western nations. Trans-boundary 
cooperation ensured that both the Dominion of Canada and the United States could 
achieve their goals of territorial and industrial expansion. Attempts at trans-boundary 
cooperation were not unique to 1909. The Reciprocity Treaty of 1854 had eliminated 
protective colonial tariffs to allow for freer trade across borders. Reciprocity brought 
                                            
21 The United States and Canada, International Joint Commission, Final Report of the 
International Joint Commission on the Lake of the Woods Reference: Washington-Ottawa. Washington, 
DC, 1917, 11.  
22 Boundary Waters Treaty quoted by the International Joint Commission, Final Report, 11.  
23 In the anthology Lines Drawn upon the Water: First Nations and the Great Lakes Borders and 
Borderlands (Kitchener, ON: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 2008), editor Karl Hele asks Indigenous 
historians to adopt a hybrid framework of land ethics. He calls on Indigenous historians to recognize the 
Canadian/American border as a contested space. Hele’s anthology reveals that the border created distinct 
economic challenges for Anishinabek families. For example, in Sault Ste. Marie, Anishinabek families – 
defined as wards of the Canadian state – were denied access to their seasonal fishing grounds in the United 
States. Federal regulations (and penalties) threatened Anishinabek expressions of cross-border sovereignty. 
This chapter contributes to the growing body of literature that considers the Canadian/American border as 
an economic handicap. 
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prosperity to Canadian producers until it was abrogated by the United States in 1865.24 
Despite its abrogation, the Reciprocity Treaty of 1854 revealed that international 
cooperation could facilitate joint economic growth.25 And yet, the International Joint 
Commission (whose blueprint was laid in 1909) did not take shape on Lake of the Woods 
until the 1910s. American complaints about industrial flooding predated the Boundary 
Waters Treaty. Minnesotans mailed a series of affidavits to the United States government 
to draw attention to the artificial flooding of the south shore in 1907.26 Limited action 
was taken by the United States at this time – American officials wrongly assumed that 
high water levels fell within their natural limit.27 It was not until 1912 that formal letters 
of reference were submitted by both the governments of the United States and the 
Dominion of Canada to call for a formal investigation of Lake of the Woods water levels. 
Both parties demanded that the International Joint Commission determine whether 
artificial flow was desirable on the Lake of the Woods. And, if so, which artificial level 
would “best serv[e] industry’s interest”?28 
In response to these demands, the first International Joint Commission – its 
parameters defined under Article IX of the Boundary Waters Treaty – was furnished in 
                                            
24 LAC, “The Reciprocity Treaty,” accessed 1 February 2015, 
http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/confederation/023001-3010.42-e.html. 
25 Michael Bliss reminds us that the Reciprocity Treaty of 1854 allowed Canadians to profit 
considerably from freer trade during the American Civil War. With American industries interrupted by 
violence, Canadians found increased demand for their manufactured goods (e.g. Americans purchased more 
Canadian woolen products as American cotton production declined). A protectionist backlash, however, led 
many Canadian manufacturers to argue against freer trade in the 1870s. “Severe trade retrenchment, falling 
prices, and increased international competition” increased Canadian demands for protective tariffs and, by 
extension, an increasingly captive domestic market. John A. MacDonald responded with his 1879 National 
Policy, which created a system of high protective tariffs designed to stimulate domestic demand for 
Canada’s manufactured goods. His policy benefited manufacturers more than “[o]rdinary Canadians [who] 
would have probably preferred a wide amount of reciprocity with the United States, leading to low prices.” 
The Boundary Waters Treaty thus marks a return to earlier cooperative treaties, a swing in the pendulum. 
See Bliss, Northern Enterprise, 248-51. 
26 International Joint Commission, Final Report, 19. 
27 Ibid., 21. 
28 Ibid., 8. 
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1912. Washington and Ottawa sought out trusted federal agents to represent their 
respective national interests. Washington called on Obadiah Gardener to act as the IJC’s 
American Chairman, who was then joined by James A. Tawney and R. B. Glenn. Ottawa 
asked Charles Alexander Magrath to be the Canadian Chairman, and appointed additional 
committee members Henry Absalom Powell and Pierre-Basile Mignault. Equal 
representation by the United States and the Dominion did not accurately reflect the 
geography of the Lake of the Woods. Seventy percent of the drainage area fell within 
Canadian boundaries.29 American and Canadian members, however, hoped to share in the 
economic advantages of hydroelectric development along the north shore. In their final 
report, Commissioners Gardener, Tawney, Glenn, Magrath, Powell, and Mignault 
advocated that any judgement ought to depend on “not only all practicable uses to which 
these waters can be put on their own watershed [i.e. agricultural, fishing, transportation], 
but also all beneficial uses which the energy developed thereon may serve in the adjacent 
territory.”30 Implicit here is the belief that hydroelectric power stations could serve both 
nations regardless of their exact boundary location. From the beginning, the IJC deemed 
“basic practical uses” secondary to innovative uses of water by industry (such as the 
Keewatin Lumber and Power Company). 
Canadian industrial interests – those in favour of the Norman Dam – may have 
further coalesced against other “practicable use[s]” such as Anishinabek transportation. 
While the Dominion representatives came from different parts of Canada, they shared the 
belief that technological innovation (i.e. power or rail) could strengthen the Dominion – 
its territorial grasp and its economic potential. Consider that Chairman Charles Alexander 
                                            
29 Ibid., 14. 
30 Ibid., 11. 
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Magrath (1860-1943) was recruited from his home in Lethbridge, Alberta. Magrath had 
firmly established himself as an advocate of capitalist development, becoming 
Lethbridge’s first President of the Board of Trade in 1899.31 Magrath’s interest in energy-
related industries is evidenced by his employment with the North Western Coal and 
Navigation Company as well as his position as Fuel Controller during World War I 
(1914-1918).32 Years after the Lake of the Woods question was settled, Magrath became 
Chairman of the Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario – a position he held from 
1925 to 1931.33 His life history reveals a keen desire to fuel national growth with coal 
and, later, water – an ideological position that made him a likely advocate for artificial 
regulation of Lake of the Woods by the Norman Dam. 
Ottawa partnered Magrath with Henry Absalom Powell (1855-1930). Powell was 
a Conservative member of parliament from New Brunswick from 1895 to 1900. In 1896, 
Powell sat on the Standing Committee of Agriculture and Colonization in the House of 
Commons. His position may have predisposed him towards the Keewatin Lumber and 
Power Company – and their operation of the Norman Dam – as milling operations had 
significantly increased the population of northwestern Ontario. Between 1885 and 1900 
alone Kenora’s population more than quadrupled from 750 to 3500 souls. This 
demographic influx reflected the expansion of mill operations.34 Powell also served on 
the Select Standing Committee on Railways, Canals, and Telegraph Lines in the House of 
Commons. Once again, Powell’s occupation suggests a personal commitment to national 
                                            
31 Galt Museum and Archives, Lethbridge, AB, Record Detail, Charles Alexander Magrath (1860-
1949).  
32 Ibid. 
33 Keith Robson Fleming, Power at a Cost: Ontario Hydro and Rural Electrification, 1911-1958 
(Montréal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1992), 14. 
34 “Historical Timeline,” Lake of the Woods Museum. 
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– be it economic or demographic – growth. Curtailing the operation of the Norman Dam 
would have weakened the rail link between Thunder Bay and Winnipeg. The rail 
industry, for which Powell advocated, depended in part on the processing of raw material 
(be it flour or wood) on the north shore of Lake of the Woods. It seems unlikely that 
Powell would assume a contrary position as an active member of the IJC. 
Pierre-Basile Mignault (1854-1945) appears as an outlier on the International 
Joint Commission. Ottawa appointed Mignault, a lawyer based out of Montréal, to the 
committee in 1914, and he served until 1918. What connects Mignault to Powell and 
Magrath is the geographic distance and physical disconnect between Lake of the Woods 
and his home. Ottawa called Magrath to the Commission from Alberta and Powell from 
New Brunswick. We see that the Dominion’s decision-making body had no clear tie to 
Lake of the Woods residents or Lake of the Woods geography. Distance is not 
necessarily akin to neutrality. Two of these federally-appointed representatives displayed 
a strong affiliation with local Lake of the Woods industry. Decisions made by these three 
men – Magrath, Powell, Mignault – depended largely on evidence submitted during 
public hearings (sometimes by federal officials). From the outset, Magrath, Powell, and 
Mignault lacked sufficient familiarity with the Winnipeg River drainage basin to 
anticipate Anishinabek territorial, predominately extra-market, use. Damages recorded in 
the Final Report of the International Joint Commission on the Lake of the Woods 
Reference reflect the commissioners’ geographic and pro-industry biases. That Ottawa 
would furnish the International Joint Commission with pro-industrialists reflects larger 
trends in Canada’s resource sector. As historian H. V. Nelles has revealed, good politics 
was good business: Ontario was, in part, a “client of the business community” and 
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facilitated mining, forestry, and hydroelectric development.35 Collusion facilitated water 
development across Canada – not just Ontario. In later works, Nelles collaborated with 
Christopher Armstrong to uncover how the state “act[ed] as a handmaiden to capitalist 
development” as far west as Kananaskis Falls in Alberta (circa 1910-1917).36 Ottawa’s 
selection of renowned Canadian capitalists affirms this trend at the Norman Dam on the 
north shore of Lake of the Woods. The challenge is now to reconstruct Anishinabek 
presence along the north shore from local, non-governmental sources. 
 
ANISHINABEK WATER USE ALONG THE NORTH SHORE OF LAKE OF THE WOODS 
 
Anishinabek families who settled along the Winnipeg River, which drains Lake of 
the Woods, created and maintained ice roads along central corridors for winter travel. 
Allan Luby (Ogemah), former Chief of Dalles 38C Indian Reserve, suggests that ice 
roads were critical to regional Anishinabek transportation at the turn of the twentieth 
century. Transportation across frozen rivers and lakes made geographic sense: “There 
were no hills. It was very easy to get from Point A to Point B,” which makes sense 
because Lake of the Woods is in the Precambrian Shield, famed for granite outcroppings, 
muskeg, and difficult overland travel. Allan Luby goes on to say “all the main 
communities were always on the water.” Travel across frozen waterways thus offered the 
shortest, most direct route to family and/or trade; intergenerational transportation routes 
followed “straight lines.”37 
                                            
35 Nelles, Politics of Development, xix.  
36 Armstrong and Nelles, Wilderness and Waterpower, 50. 
37 Former Chief Allan Luby (Ogemah), interview with author, Kenora, Ontario, 28 December 
2014. Revisit Chapter 1 for a detailed analysis of how Ontario re-evaluated Anishinabek water rights and 
redrew reserve boundaries in response to technological change. 
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Band members of Dalles 38C certainly relied heavily on ice roads for travel 
between the reserve and town (Kenora). Elder Matilda Martin said that “We used that 
road all winter [circa 1885-1908], all the Indian families did. There were fifteen families 
there one time in that reserve. They used the same road.”38 Martin did not make reference 
to an alternative winter route. Like some of the other families, Martin travelled the ice 
road on foot. According to her memoirs, the ice road facilitated an exchange of 
Anishinabek furs and handicrafts for store merchandise. Beginning in 1902, Martin 
became solely responsible within her domestic family for walking to town to secure 
pantry fare.39 On a regular trip, Martin collected “a quarter bag of flour, ten pounds of 
sugar, some tea, and a few other necessities.” To secure capital for her purchases, Martin 
would leave her toboggan behind the Hudson’s Bay Company store and sell moccasins 
near the front of the shop.40 The exchange she described was a standard occurrence in the 
vicinity of Kenora at the turn of the twentieth century. According to the Rat Portage 
                                            
38 In 1908, Matilda married Edward Martin, a non-Indigenous fisher and trapper from the Sand 
Lake area. Shortly after their marriage, Matilda took up residence north of Dalles 38C with her husband. 
Up until that point, Matilda had lived primarily with her maternal grandparents at Dalles 38C. For more 
information see Martin-McKeever, The Chief’s Granddaughter, 44, 48. See also LOWM, Elder Matilda 
Martin, interview with Jillian Torrie, 30 June 1972.  
N.B. George Beatty was a journalist for the Kenora Daily Miner and News who coordinated 
interviews with Matilda Martin during the summer of 1972 to produce a series of articles on Anishinabek 
life in the Kenora area.  He worked with a female assistant who is believed to be Jillian Torrie. Dorothy 
Lavergne McLay explains, “George Beatty did the question and answer manuscripts. When I found [out 
that] they were in existence – I found [out] when he was still living. And, I contacted him: ‘I heard you 
have this information.’ And, I asked ‘Is it free for everyone? Will you let me have it?’ He said [that] it was 
free for everyone. So, I made copies for everyone.” Dorothy Lavergne McLay, telephone interview with 
author, 2 October 2011. 
39 Writing on Anishinabek families in the Treaty #3 District (particularly, Manitou Reserve near 
Emo, Ontario) in the early twentieth century, Ruth Landes described the domestic family as a biological 
grouping wherein “the young are biologically related to the married pair” (53). However, orphaned 
children’s family unit was subject to change. Orphaned children were often cared for by the grandparents 
(as in Matilda Martin’s case) or by siblings of the parents (16). See Ruth Landes, Ojibwa Sociology (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1969).  
40 “Old Time Resident Fondly Recalls Walk from Dalles,” Kenora Miner and News, page and date 
not listed. This undated document can also be found in an unpublished memoir at the Lake of the Woods 
Museum. See file compiled by Lucille Burton at LOWM, “Memoirs of Matilda Josephine Lavergne 
Kipling Martin,” 1987.  
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Miner, “the Indian,” generally, utilized the ice road to “[bring] in his furs and [take] out 
flour.”41 Specific references to in-town exchanges with local Anishinabek were most 
commonly noted by the press when specialty trades occurred. For example, when Mr. 
Hook secured three highly valuable silver fox skins, the Rat Portage and Miner revealed 
that “the Indian… came up from Whitedog [Wabaseemoong]” to trade.42 General use of 
the ice road and daily trade, however, received no such coverage; ice travel and the trade 
it facilitated between riverine communities were considered standard occurrences.  
Ice roads not only facilitated economic exchange between band members and 
town entrepreneurs, but improved Anishinabek access to Western medical care. In 1893, 
Dr. Thomas Hanson, an employee of the Department of Indian Affairs, travelled from 
Kenora to Dalles 38C “very quickly by dog train” to examine band members.43 Hanson’s 
use of the ice road for medical visits received more frequent media attention than 
Anishinabek travel. Within the year, local newspapers reported again that Hanson “made 
a trip down to the Dalles 38C by dog train” to help treat the grippe.44 Hanson’s use of the 
ice road remained a popular news item in 1906 when he travelled down the Winnipeg 
River to investigate “a little sickness,” likely at Dalles 38C.45 Within a week of his 
investigation, Martin used the ice road to bring her husband’s body (John Kipling) to 
town for the funeral.46 While newspaper reports allow us to confirm the relationship 
between ice roads and health care for three months (December to February), it is likely 
that ice roads provided an essential service route for up to five months per annum. Local 
                                            
41 “Local Items,” Rat Portage Miner and Semi-Weekly News, 15 December 1905, 4. 
42 "Local Items," Rat Portage Miner and Semi-Weekly News, 26 December 1905, 4. 
43 “Town Topics,” Rat Portage Weekly Record, 10 February 1893, 2.  
44 “Town Topics,” Rat Portage Weekly Record, 8 December 1893, 2.  
45 “Local Items,” Kenora Miner and News, 2 February 1906, 4.  
46 Ibid.  
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knowledge keepers maintain that ice on Lake of the Woods can come in as early as 
November. Spring break-up generally occurs between 29 April and 5 May, although a 
variance of four to six weeks is common.47 And so, as the temperature dipped below 0o 
Celsius, ice roads along the Winnipeg River improved Anishinabek access to Western 
medicinal practitioners and their remedies. Ice roads provided many Anishinabek 
families with critical access to Western health care services as the Department of Indian 
Affairs did not provide reserves such as Dalles 38C with full-time medical care (nor did 
their federally-funded school house include a nursing station – John Kipling, a lay 
missionary from Selkirk, MB, was its only full-time employee).48 Of course Anishinabek 
medicines continued to be widely and effectively used throughout this time as well. 
Today, Elder Alice Kelly teaches Anishinabek youth that Dalles 38C was and remains a 
medicine reserve.49 And yet, when members of Dalles 38C sought additional or 
alternative (read: Western) care, the ice road functioned as the access key.  
The importance of ice travel to Anishinabek families is further evidenced by large 
populations of sled dogs at Anishinabek settlements. Dogs provided the muscle needed to 
pull Anishinabek sleds across the ice. When John George Edward Henry Douglas 
Sutherland Campbell, the Marquis of Lorne, travelled through Lake of the Woods in 
1881, his chronicler, W. H. Williams, disparaged the camp conditions of Anishinabek 
living near Rat Portage (Kenora). Williams was particularly disturbed by the number of 
unpenned dogs allowed to roam the summer settlement. He wrote, sarcastically, “the very 
                                            
47 Nancy Miller, “Ice In, Ice Out,” Lake of the Woods Vacation Area, accessed 14 November 
2013, http://www.lakeofthewoods.com/stories-from-the-lake/ice-in-ice-out/. Former Chief Luby further 
explained that “Usually it didn’t take long [to establish an ice road] once the weather got cold – it would 
only take a few weeks and you could travel to a certain extent.” Former Chief Luby (Ogemah), interview 
with author, 28 December 2014. 
48 Martin-McKeever, The Chief’s Granddaughter, 8-11, 43-4. 
49 Elder Kelly, interview with author, 30 July 2012. 
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extensive canine population sent out a strong delegation to take up their quarters among 
the Indians.”50 He insulted local Anishinabek by classing Anishinabek families with their 
dogs. Williams suggested that they (Anishinabek families and local canine) socialized 
and shared accommodation – a union that interfered with Lorne’s official progress across 
the North-West towards the Rocky Mountains. But, Williams’ insult also provides us 
with important insight into Anishinabek water use. Local Anishinabek, it seems, 
considered sled dogs sufficiently valuable to relocate them during the summer months. 
While Williams saw the dogs as unmanaged and unrestrained – he suggested that they 
were masters unto themselves, capable of organizing their own “delegation” – when they 
were, in fact, being kept and cared for by the families to which they belonged. Dogs had 
sufficient value to be provided with regular supervision and care. Only in rare 
circumstances did Anishinabek families leave their sled dogs behind. For example, 
according to some media reports, dogs were left on reserve for up to two weeks during 
treaty celebrations on Treaty Island, Lake of the Woods. In a 1905 treaty report, the Rat 
Portage Miner noted that “[t]he dog is conspicuous by his absence, the trip being a little 
too far away from the reserve for him” as families from down the Winnipeg River 
travelled south-east through Rat Portage towards Northwest Angle.51 It is possible that 
traveling families delegated a friend or relative to watch over their sled team. 
Anthropologist Ruth Landes observed that women in the Treaty #3 District occasionally 
took turns guarding “one another’s home and livestock when these [were] deserted for 
brief periods.”52 While Landes limited her observation to the berry and manomin 
                                            
50 W. H. Williams, Manitoba and the North-West; Journal of a Trip from Toronto to the Rocky 
Mountains (Toronto: Hunter, Rose & Company, 1882), 32. 
51 “Treaty Items,” Rat Portage Miner and Semi-Weekly News, 15 July 1905, 1.  
52 Landes, Ojibwa Sociology, 14. 
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harvests, it is likely that the practice of animal guardianship was extended to cover 
ceremonial absences. 
Given the importance of ice roads, a series of Anishinabek teachings developed to 
manage the critical interspecies relationship between human and dog.  For example, 
Anishinabek families took material precautions to manage large dog populations. Writing 
in 1909, J. M. Bentley complained that “sleep for transients [was] well nigh impossible” 
at Dalles 38C given the nuisance dogs created. It is unclear whether Bentley attributed 
the animal nuisance to noise (e.g. howling) or simple presence.53 Bentley, however, may 
have made his campsite a target for work animals. It seems that “transients,” like Bentley, 
failed to adopt community protocols surrounding food and, by extension, animal 
management. Anishinabek living near the Treaty #3 District were “told to burn [elk and 
moose bones] so dogs don’t get them.”54 During the winter months, Anishinabek women 
constructed small huts to freeze fish for household consumption. Winter huts were 
designed to store fish above ground “so [that] the dogs won’t reach them.” Another 
canine deterrent included layering “some kind of brush on the top” of the fish supply.55 
Anishinabek families not only treated their catch (and its bones) with care, but removed 
waste from their campsites.56 Whenever possible, food scraps with strong odours were 
burned or removed to reduce the attractiveness of one’s living and sleeping quarters to 
dogs. Such precautions were necessary: Anishinabek mobility during the winter months 
depended on animal, particularly dog, control. Bentley, however, appears to have placed 
                                            
53 J. M. Bentley, “Visiting the Indian Reserves: An Interesting Canoe Trip,” Rod and Gun in 
Canada 11, no. 6 (1909): 484. 
54 Marilyn Peckett, “Anishnabe Homeland History: Traditional Land and Resource Use of Riding 
Mountain, Manitoba” (research report, Bagida’an Aboriginal Research & Partnership Services, 1998), 45. 
55 Elder Martin, interview with Torrie, 30 June 1972.  
56 Peckett, “Anishnabe Homeland History,” 45. 
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little effort into (re)organizing items “unloaded by the Indians.”57 According to his 
travelogue, Bentley pulled his canoe onto the landing at Dalles 38C and pitched his tent 
nearby.  By failing to (re)organize unloaded foodstuffs, Bentley may have unwittingly 
attracted dogs to his campsite and compromised his ability to rest on reserve.  
While records exist to suggest the importance of ice roads to Anishinabek 
mobility, few surviving textual records describe ice road quality and maintenance along 
the Winnipeg River, hindering our ability to reconstruct an image of these critical transit 
routes. We can, however, garner a sense of local standards. Residents of the Kenora 
District expected that ice roads would be “bushed out as soon as the first solid ice 
appeared.”58 “Bushing out” likely refers to the practice of staking bushes at wide intervals 
along the transit route. These bushes point out the safest path along or across the ice 
during periods of low visibility (i.e. blizzard). If we assume that contemporary practice 
can be used to reconstruct historical methods of road maintenance – a practice known 
amongst ethnohistorians as upstreaming – we can speculate that Anishinabek families 
used jack pine to “bush out” transit routes. In December 2014, ice roads southeast of the 
Norman Dam (remember that current flows strongest in a northwesterly direction) were 
“bushed out” using jack pine.59 This practice mirrors local forest composition. Jack pine 
grows along thin soils over the granites of the Precambrian Shield, making it one of the 
most common pine species in the Winnipeg River drainage basin. Furthermore, jack pine 
retains its needle-like leaves beyond one growing season. When asked to describe how 
Anishinabek families selected road markers, Allan Luby explained that “anything green 
                                            
57 Bentley, “Visiting the Indian Reserves,” 482. 
58 “Winter Trails on the Lake,” Rat Portage Miner and Semi-Weekly News, 19 December 1905, 1.  
59 See Figure 7 at the end of the chapter. Photograph by author, “An Active Ice Road in Kenora, 
Ontario (2014).”  
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will do.”60 Travellers needed to be able to distinguish road markers from a winter 
landscape of whites and greys. Jack pine worked best because it was readily available and 
evergreen.  
The Office of the Minister of Agriculture (circa 1870) further outlined effective 
maintenance activities for ice roads. To eliminate drift heaps, George H. Henshaw 
recommended that northern communities “encourage the growth of a close belt of trees 
along the sides of the road, or [undertake] the more difficult task of planting hedges and 
keeping them in order.”61 Hedges functioned as a windbreak. Henshaw further 
recommended the maintenance (or planting) of coniferous trees because the leaf loss of 
deciduous trees would reduce the effectiveness of any improvements. The written record 
does not indicate whether Anishinabek families encouraged the growth of coniferous 
trees along the ice road. Given that the technology of making ice roads appears to have 
originated in both Anishinabek and non-Indigenous communities, treeline analysis along 
known ice routes may reveal Anishinabek development of windbreaks.62 Henshaw 
further recommended “breaking the road,” or running a sled across fresh snow to flatten 
the route. Regular Anishinabek use of ice routes would create comparable improvements 
to the road. Along Lake of the Woods, winter trails (so named by the Rat Portage Miner 
                                            
60 Former Chief Luby, email correspondence with author, 31 January 2015. 
61 George H. Henshaw, On the Construction of Common Roads to Which is Appended Some 
Remarks on the Preservation of Winter Roads (Montréal: John Lovell for the Office of the Minister of 
Agriculture, 1871), 31. 
62 The technology of making ice roads appears to have originated in both Anishinabek and non-
Indigenous communities in response to their shared environment. Both communities – Anishinabek and 
non-Indigenous – were active along the Canadian Shield. During the summer, canoe transport was used to 
avoid trekking across rocky outcroppings and muskeg: rivers provided the smoothest and most direct line 
of transit. Overland travel remained challenging during the winter. Snow did not eliminate the rocky and 
uneven terrain of the Shield. And thus, the development of ice roads (or, the cross-over of canoe routes) 
provided the most effective means of winter travel. 
Treeline analysis may help future researchers to identify the planting of coniferous windbreaks by 
Anishinabek road users. A study of Anishinabek burning patterns may also help to determine the 
maintenance of wind breaks – shoreline burns may have helped to “crack open” the pine cone. While not a 
recognizable form of planting, it would have spurned new growth along the shorelines. 
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and Semi-Weekly News) were maintained by the Crown Timber Agent until winter 1905. 
Residents appear to have adopted Crown Timber standards as their own. They bemoaned 
the loss of federal funding in 1905 and the transfer of responsibilities for road care from 
the Crown to lumberman.  Labourers now had to “mark out their own roads on the 
lake.”63 Similar complaints were not voiced against ice road conditions along the 
Winnipeg River – along routes both actively claimed and utilized by Anishinabek from 
Dalles 38C, Whitedog, and Grassy Narrows reserves. Did Anishinabek families continue 
the practice of “bushing out” or “breaking the road” through their lands? Kenora 
residents said little about ice roads on Winnipeg River. Their silence suggests that 
Anishinabek territories remained well-maintained by an alternative source. 
Anishinabek transportation routes demanded year-long maintenance of portages. 
Travellers used these short land bridges to transfer goods and canoes (or sleds) across 
turbulent waters. Portages were also used to move goods and canoes (or sleds) from one 
water route to another.64 These passages were often less than two metres wide. Elder 
testimony from the Lake of the Woods Watershed records dozens of portage routes. Elder 
Matilda Martin, for example, revealed that members of Dalles 38C may have avoided 
                                            
63 “Winter Trails on the Lake,” Rat Portage Miner and Semi-Weekly News, 19 December 1905, 1.  
64 Elder Martin recounted that her grandfather, Chief Kawitaskung (Thomas Lindsay) “was 
employed as a boatman by the Hudson Bay [sic] Company.” The Kenora Daily Miner and News 
paraphrased Matilda’s recollection of Kawitaskung’s portage use: “He was away for months at a time and 
on his return would tell of these journeys in the York boats, describing the contests at the portages when the 
doughty oarsmen would vie to take the biggest load and make the swiftest trip.” The Kenora Daily Miner 
and News suggested that Chief Kawitaskung was active between Rat Portage (Kenora) and York Factory. 
Chief Kawitaskung died in 1914 at the approximate age of 94. He was active during the Treaty #3 
negotiations at Northwest Angle in 1873 (aged 53). It is likely that he worked for the Hudson’s Bay 
Company sometime between 1836, when an HBC post was opened on Old Fort Island on the Winnipeg 
River, and 1869, the year Treaty #3 negotiations began. Please see “Many Skilled Tasks Performed at 
Dalles,” Kenora Daily Miner and News, page and date not listed. This undated document can also be found 
in an unpublished memoir at the Lake of the Woods Museum. See Burton, “Memoirs of Matilda Josephine 
Lavergne Kipling Martin.” 
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Miller’s Rapids by cutting up and over Barski’s Hill.65 Much of the literature describing 
portages (and their use) is found in summer literature. This seasonal focus mirrors 
portage use in the fur trade. Historian Harold Adams Innis noted that “[f]urs had to be 
collected, stored, packed and carried for long distances in the spring and summer to the 
trader.”66 But, Martin was required to use Miller’s Rapids portage long after the furs had 
been shipped and canoe routes had frozen. Anishinabek families converted canoe routes 
into ice roads during winter months. As ice would be weak where current was strong, 
Anishinabek families packed snow along the original footpaths to ease travel. Allan Luby 
explains, “Wherever there was bad current [,] you would normally have a portage in the 
summer time. So, you would… portage around those areas in the same way – except you 
would walk over [instead of paddle to the portage] in the winter time.”67 Families 
depended on their knowledge of the Winnipeg River – of strong currents and local 
portages – to move efficiently between communities for trade, medical aid, or to maintain 
kin connections. These ice roads, and an understanding of the water that formed them, 
were thus critical to maintaining Anishinabek economic, physical, and social health at 
reservations such as Dalles 38C, Whitedog, and Grassy Narrows. 
Hydroelectric development at the western outlet of Lake of the Woods affected 
the stability (and hence reliability) of Anishinabek ice roads along the Winnipeg River. 
                                            
65 Elder Martin suggested that she used to travel from Dalles 38C Indian Reserve to Rat Portage to 
sell moccasins after her grandfather, Kawitaskung, went blind (circa 1902). She moved off the water “over 
by the top of the hill, by Barskis… we would then change into our good shoes at the top of the hill and put 
our old shoes in a bag.” Matilda Martin, interview by the Kenora Daily Miner and News, Kenora, Ontario, 
summer 1972. 
Elder Martin referenced another portage three to five kilometres away from the reservation. 
Matilda Martin, interview by the Kenora Daily Miner and News, 30 June 1972. 
66 Harold A. Innis, The Fur Trade in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), 20. 
During the winter months, Indigenous hunters and trappers journeyed into the interior. Anishinabek 
families generally shifted their economic focus from active trade to trapping animals and processing winter 
coats for future sale. As cross-cultural interactions declined, written records of winter portage use also 
declined.  
67 Former Chief Luby (Ogemah), interview with author, 28 December 2014. 
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Intergenerational knowledge that had allowed Anishinabek families to travel safely along 
the ice was compromised by industrial operations. Currents increased randomly and 
artificially if stop logs were removed to power production at one of the mills.68 Which 
sections of the river froze (and to which extent) now depended more on electrical 
demands than nature’s course. Drastic environmental change, particularly in freezing 
patterns, has been captured by local prose.  Prior to the establishment of the Rat Portage 
Dam (1892) one Rat Portage resident claimed that Hebe’s Falls would freeze during the 
winter months. He wrote:  
[T]he walls of the narrow gorge through which pass the seething, 
foaming waters of the Winnipeg or ‘River of Rapids’ were of ice, 
carved into facades of columns and fluted stalactites….Below, where 
all was dark shade, a partially formed ice bridge appeared.69  
 
Ice depicted below Hebe’s Falls was “dark” and presumably unstable. As a general rule, 
“dark” ice is low density and therefore unable to support additional weight. Given natural 
flow patterns, ice was likely being eroded from the bottom up. And yet, the western outlet 
appeared immobile. Natural flow allowed freezing. Stability increased as one moved 
north of the outlet.70 We know, for example, that Martin walked the across the ice north 
                                            
68 The U.S. Department of the Interior, “Putting a Stop to Stop Logs,” Reclamation: Managing 
Water in the West, accessed 25 January 2015, 
http://www.usbr.gov/pn/video/transcript/minidokastoplogs.pdf explains that the use of “wooden stop logs is 
a very traditional way of controlling the elevation of a river or reservoir.” They further explain that “[t]hey 
are actually a series of logs that are stacked horizontally” and that these logs can “[hold] the water back.” 
Managing lake levels by stop log is a labour intensive process as “all… stop logs would be manually 
changed, by hand.” 
69 “Hebe’s Falls,” Rat Portage Weekly Record, 5 December 1891, 2.  
70 Ice strength is never uniform – even on the same body of water. Stability is affected by a 
number of factors including flow. For example, rapids and springs can erode ice from below. While ice 
stability would have increased north of Hebe’s Falls (as current decreased), ice was not reliable for the 
entire thirteen kilometre stretch between Rideout Bay and Dalles 38C Indian Reserve. It seems that Miller’s 
Rapids (near Old Fort Island, ON), created a second notable weak spot. A break in the ice road developed 
near Miller’s Rapids causing members of Dalles 38C to move off the ice and rest (or change) near present-
day Barski’s Hill, ON, before continuing into Rat Portage, ON, for trade. Elder Martin, interview by the 
Kenora Daily Miner and News, summer 1972. 
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of Miller’s Rapids – just a short distance from the western outlet. In 1924 the Kenora 
Miner and News substantiated poetic renderings by publishing accounts that Kenora Bay, 
near the outlet of Lake of the Woods, had frozen over by November in 1876.71 Before 
dam development, the north shore of Lake of the Woods and large sections of the 
Winnipeg River froze during winter months. 
Printed warnings about ice stability do not seem to have appeared in Rat Portage 
until the erection of the Norman Dam in 1893. Following hydroelectric development, 
local journalists advised skaters to avoid short-cuts from Norman to Rat Portage across 
Kenora Bay – a short-cut likely taken by members of Dalles 38C (such as Martin) from 
Tunnel Island to town hubs (such as the Hudson’s Bay Company store). An anonymous 
journalist at Rat Portage Weekly Record explained that current was “apt to wear away the 
ice from below and spots may become so thin as to be dangerous” that same year.72 
Continuous water flow, caused by dam operations, meant that former ice routes became 
unreliable. After American inquiries into the effects of the Norman Dam, however, 
journalists rarely acknowledged changing current as the cause of poor ice conditions. 
Some attempt was made to blame heavy snowfall for unreliable ice routes shortly after an 
IJC hearing in September 1915. In January 1916, the Kenora Miner and News suggested 
that “mild weather in the early part of the season, and subsequent snow falls” jeopardized 
ice quality.73 Snow, reporters suggested, prohibited the discerning user from reading the 
ice; weak spots were covered by a thick white blanket. Ice users, it was feared, would 
thus “very easily walk into almost open water before they would realize it.”74 True, 
                                            
71 “Local Items,” Kenora Miner and News, 12 November 1924, unpaginated. 
72 “Town Topics,” Rat Portage Weekly Record, 24 November 1893, 2.  
73 “Local Items, Kenora Miner and News, 12 January 1916, 3.  
74 Ibid. 
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water-saturated snow (once frozen) makes porous and weak ice. But, no reference was 
made to changing current patterns – another critical determinant of ice stability – caused 
by dam operations. When R. P. Murphy of Murphy Bros., a shipping agency, travelled 
from Whitefish Bay, ON (southeast of Rat Portage) to town, he complained that “the ice 
in places which in ordinary years was absolutely safe was this year found to be very 
thin.”75 Heavy snowfall was again blamed for unreliable transit routes: “the heavy mantle 
of snow on the lake…prevents the frost from forming ice of sufficient thickness.”76 
Unlike the November report, he made a passing reference to current: ice weakened 
“where there is even only a slight current.”77 No attempt was made to address the severity 
of changing water patterns; slight current changes were suggested where fluctuations of 
roughly one metre were known to occur. Local journalists utilized modifying adjectives 
to downplay ice erosion, to make nature (i.e. snowfall) accountable for artificial 
modifications to winter routes. 
Later in 1916, the Kenora Miner and News published conflicting evidence in a 
human interest piece. The tale of a drowning hound implies that water fluctuations may 
have had a greater effect on ice stability than heavy snowfall. A local journalist reported 
that an unfortunate dog broke through the ice “to the rear of the town office” in Kenora 
Bay. Another pup stood near the hole, barking incessantly until a passerby pulled up the 
hound. The journalist attributed the hound’s accident to poor ice conditions caused, most 
likely, by dam operations: “As the lake has gone down some, the water in the hole was 
not up to the top of the ice.”78 Ice instability in Kenora Bay most likely resulted from the 
                                            
75 “Ice on the Lake is Still Unsafe,” Kenora Miner and News, 19 January 1916, 1.  
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid. 
78 “Dog Saved His Chum,” Kenora Miner and News, 26 February 1916, 1.  
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gap between surface ice and the water below, probably caused by the removal of stop 
logs from the Norman Dam. Limited documentary evidence about air pockets between 
the ice and the water exists as Public Works failed to issue notices until 1918. Up until 
that point, as a local journalist explained, “stop logs were removed or replaced, and local 
interests would not be aware of any change till there was a noticeable rise or lowering in 
the level of the Winnipeg River” – or, perhaps, until a hound broke through the ice.79  
What was happening to the ice? Ice on the south side of the dam (i.e. Kenora Bay) 
would fracture along the shore as the Norman Dam drew water from the reservoir. Ice 
approximately one metre from the shore would eventually drop. If any ice formed along 
Kenora Bay, it would freeze in a bowl shape. Fissures and cracks created structural 
weaknesses that even the harshest winters could not overcome. Downstream of the dam – 
where we would find ice connecting reservations such as Dalles 38C, Whitedog, and 
grassy Narrows to town – also weakened in response to changing levels. Water released 
by the Norman Dam into the Winnipeg River lifted ice from the shore. Ice downstream of 
the dam was thus separated from the shore. A frozen river could quickly become open 
water. Should levels stabilize, a new thin layer of ice may form over open water. New ice 
would be more unreliable (and, likely, too thin for safe travel). Ice stability thus depended 
primarily on how the waiâbishkiwedig operated the Norman Dam.  
Industrial operations compromised the stability of Anishinabek transit routes. Pine 
markers no longer guaranteed safe(r) passage along the Winnipeg River towards the 
western outlet of Lake of the Woods. Poor ice conditions effectively landlocked 
Anishinabek communities during the winter months. Prior to the Rollerway and Norman 
dams, Anishinabek families limited winter travel during winter freeze-up and spring 
                                            
79 “Notify Board of Trade Re Stop Logs,” Kenora Miner and News, 13 April 1918, 1. 
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thaw. Allan Luby explains, “You’d set up camp and you’d wait” for the water to 
transform.80 Anishinabek families exchanged stories, socio-cultural directives, during 
these transitional periods. Periodic isolation from family and trade was short-lived. After 
a few weeks of deep cold, short trips became possible. Within a month, families could 
cover greater distances – from Dalles 38C to Rat Portage – by foot or sled. After 1887, 
the transitional period never clearly ended. Knowledge keepers lost the ability to estimate 
whether ice had formed north of the western outlet. Elder testimony suggests that 
Anishinabek men from Dalles 38C limited winter treks towards Rat Portage due to 
perceived travel risks. Urgencies – like food shortages – led Anishinabek men towards 
the western outlet. For example, Elder Alice Kelly attributes her grandfather’s death to 
dietary need and unstable ice. Kelly’s nokomis fell through the ice and drowned en route 
to Rat Portage.81 Her grandmother survived the season, presumably through intra-
community resource exchange. 
It is difficult to enumerate the cost of damages that the Province of Ontario and 
the Keewatin Lumber and Power Company, operating in tandem, caused to Anishinabek 
ice roads. Scientific research may allow us to gauge the number of pine markers lost to 
industrial water fluctuations. But, how do we calculate the loss of potential trade? 
Reduced medical access? How can we, historians, enumerate family loss? Let us turn our 
attention instead to demonstrable phenomena. The next section asks: whose interests did 
the International Joint Commission hearings protect? How did the IJC limit Anishinabek 
participation in public hearings? 
ANISHINABEK EXCLUSION FROM IJC HEARINGS 
                                            
80 Former Chief Luby (Ogemah), interview with author, 28 December 2014. 
81 Elder Kelly, interview with author, 30 July 2012. 
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The Dominion of Canada and the United States wrote Anishinabek participants 
out of the IJC by employing the language of nationhood and citizenship during its 
formation; the International Joint Commission did, after all, originate from an 
international agreement designed to protect the interests of Canadian and American 
citizens who shared waters. The public appears to have adopted federal terms - or 
frameworks - in its evaluation of IJC proceedings. Consider that the editorial team of The 
American Journal of International Law identified the IJC as symbol of “comity between 
nations.”82 Years later, Manton M. Wyvell argued that both parties hoped to curb “strong 
feelings and even hatreds” by building a “peace machine” between equal adversaries: 
Canada and the United States.83 Canadian law had long (re)defined Anishinabek interests 
as subject to the Dominion – not as independent of the state. Consider that, as historian 
John Milloy explains: 
Under the authority of section 91 subsection 24 of the British North America 
Act, the Canadian federal government in the first comprehensive Indian Act, 
that of 1876, took extensive control of reserves and tribal nations. Traditional 
Indian government was dismissed and replaced by Indian-agent-controlled 
models of white government…. Governmental powers left with the tribes 
placed them, in the multi-layered Confederation, well below the position of a 
respectable municipality.84 
 
This (re)definition of Anishinabek nationhood is critical to understanding Indigenous 
exclusion from the International Joint Commission. While there was no explicit bar 
against Indigenous participation in the IJC hearings, there was also no clause for 
inclusion. As members of an unrecognized nation, on-reserve Anishinabek men and 
                                            
82 American Society of International Law, “Boundary Waters between the United States and 
Canada,” The American Journal of International Law 4, no. 3 (1910): 669. 
83 Wyvell, “Peace between Canada and the United States,” 254. 
84 John S. Milloy, “The Early Indian Act: Developmental Strategy and Constitutional Change,” in 
As Long as the Sun Shines and Water Flows: A Reader in Canadian Native Studies, edited by Ian Getty and 
Antoine Lussier (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1983), 57. 
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women discovered that their interests were deemed secondary to the Dominion. As 
members of an unrecognized nation, Anishinabek men and women were to function as 
supporting – rather than foundational – members of national plans for economic growth. 
During the IJC hearings, federal organizations – considered representative of the 
public interest – submitted data to the International Joint Commission. The Dominion 
Water Power Branch, the Department of Public Works of Canada, and the Department of 
Indian Affairs rendered “valuable services” to Magrath, Powell, and Migneault. The IJC 
also thanked “individuals in both countries” for sharing their knowledge of the lake. 85 
Here again we find implicit barriers to Anishinabek inclusion. The IJC relied on local 
communications (like the Kenora Miner and News) to recruit “any person” to submit 
information about lake levels.86 The IJC also called on “interested parties.”87 According 
to the Indian Act of 1876, however, Anishinabek (wo)men were wards of the state. 
Historian Arthur J. Ray explains that “all ‘legal’ Indians were to be treated as minors 
without the full privileges of citizenship.”88 The Department of Indian Affairs was to 
protect and to represent Indigenous interests; federal law disqualified Anishinabek 
(wo)men from the IJC’s call. Exclusion is not a necessary end result of this legal reality, 
                                            
85 International Joint Commission, Final Report, 18. 
86 On 11 September 1913, the International Joint Commission announced that “any person having 
information or evidence bearing upon the question [of water levels on Lake of the Woods will be] granted 
permission to be heard.” The IJC called on persons capable of speaking to “agricultural interests, fishing 
interests, harbor and navigation interests an opportunity of being heard.” This call was made public through 
the Kenora Miner and News. As wards of the Dominion, the Anishinabek did not qualify as persons in 
matters of rights. Under the Indian Act, reservation lands were federal lands. Thus Indigenous peoples 
affected by flooding or changed flow patterns may not have been considered citizens of Ontario with 
agricultural, fishing, or navigation interests. “Joint Commission Here Monday,” Kenora Miner and News, 
11 September 1913, 1. For more information on the legal definition of person under the British North 
America Act (circa 1867-1929), see Tabitha Marshall and David A. Cruickshank, “Persons Case,” The 
Canadian Encyclopedia, last edited October 16, 2015, accessed 1 May 2015, 
http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/persons-case/. 
87 International Joint Commission, Final Report, 18. See also “International Joint Commission 
Will Hold Sessions Here,” Kenora Miner and News, 11 September 1915, 1. 
88 Ray, I Have Lived Here Since the World Began, 203. 
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but it did not stimulate public demand for Anishinabek participation. Indeed, Canadians 
following the Kenora Miner and News might have wrongly assumed that the 
waiâbishkiwedig accurately represented Anishinabek interests. In October 1915, the 
Kenora Miner and News noted that G. G. McEwen of the Department of Indian Affairs in 
Ottawa and Constable Hans Hansen of Kenora left town “to make an inspection and 
report on the lands owned by the Indian Department in this district.”89 McEwen and 
Hansen were to estimate whether reservation lands “would be affected by any permanent 
change in levels of the Lake of the Woods.”90 There was no subsequent report on their 
findings. Recent research has shown that federal agents – like McEwen – rarely 
prioritized Indigenous interests. Instead, the Department of Indian Affairs was linked to 
the ministries responsible for natural resources and western development.91 The 
Dominion government favoured industrial interventions that fuelled national economic 
growth and not Anishinabek environmental uses that maintained an extra-market 
economy.92 It is unlikely that McEwen reported changes to ice roads in the Winnipeg 
River drainage basin – not only were these roads off reserve (and thus outside of his 
assignment), they did not directly contribute to industrial resource (read: capital) 
development in the Winnipeg River drainage basin. 
                                            
89 “Local Items,” Kenora Miner and News, 30 October 1915, unpaginated.  
90 Ibid. 
91 Ray, I Have Lived Here Since the World Began, 205. 
92 This claim echoes Thibault Martin who argued that “the state, when it negotiates agreements 
with First Nations, behaves as though it represents only the non-Aboriginal portion of the population” (30). 
Martin subsequently quoted Roméo Saganash who claimed, “Canada acts as though the national interest of 
the State largely excludes the interest of the Indigenous peoples from whom the parliament of Canada has a 
direct constitutional responsibility” (Martin, 30). Both authors base their critique on Hydro-Québec’s 
interactions with Innu and Cree Nations on the James Bay Project. See Martin, “Hydro Development in 
Quebec and Manitoba: Old Relationships or New Social Contract,” in Power Struggles: Hydro 
Development and First Nations in Manitoba and Quebec, edited by Thibault Martin and Stephen H. 
Hoffman (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2008): 19-37. 
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Not only were Anishinabek participants excluded from the IJC hearings as wards 
of the state, evidentiary norms further limited Anishinabek ability to submit data to the 
International Joint Commission. The IJC based their decision on “extensive field surveys 
and the collection, analysis, and coordination of a vast amount of physical data.”93 Let us 
examine a piece of accepted testimony. The IJC appointed Arthur V. White of Toronto 
and Adolph F. Meyer of Minneapolis as consulting engineers on the Lake of the Woods 
question.94 White and Meyer produced an atlas together. Sheet No. 4 of Arthur V. White 
and Adolph F. Meyer’s Atlas (1915) depicts Garden Island, Lake of the Woods. Sheet 
No. 4 was part of large map collection that showcased “low lands bordering on the 
American and Canadian sides of the lake.”95 The map adhered to non-Indigenous 
cartographic traditions. Scale was clearly marked. Anishinabek maps, by contrast, 
unfolded like stories; they were not topographic representations of the Winnipeg River 
drainage basin. Working with Anishinabek informant Mrs. Wawiekumig 
(Nawajibgokwe), anthropologist Frances Densmore found that map-makers prioritized 
“the intersection of streams and the presence of lakes” – critical details for individuals 
travelling by canoe.96 These visual cues did not require Anishinabek maps to conform to 
non-Indigenous standards of scale. Densmore found that Wawiekumig’s map conformed 
to the piece of paper on which it was drawn. Available materials dictated the scale of the 
map. Anishinabek map-makers used long lines to represent hard paddling. The difficulty 
                                            
93 International Joint Commission, Final Report, 12. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Arthur V. White and Adolph F. Meyer, “Southerly Shore: Lake of the Woods from Northwest 
Angle Inlet to Big Grassy River, 1913-1914,” in Atlas to accompany Report to International Joint 
Commission Relation to Official Reference re. Lake of the Woods Question (Ottawa: Government Printing 
Department, 1915). 
96 Frances Densmore found that her informant, Mrs. Wawiekumig (Nawajibgokwe), “conformed 
to the shape of the piece of paper on which it (a map) was drawn, so that relative distances and points of the 
compass were not strictly maintained” (Chippewa Customs, 180). 
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of the route determined the distance between key points on a map. Patterns of line use 
appear to have originated centuries earlier, an observation based on pictorial writing 
(pictographs) in the Precambrian Shield. Working with Anishinabek informant Mrs. 
Seymour, archeologist Grace Rajnovich analyzed a pictograph from Annie Island, Lake 
of the Woods, that reveals that someone journeyed for approximately one month to reach 
the site. Rajnovich notes that “The arduousness of the journey is in the long, crooked 
line.”97 While not a map, this picture story uses line to indicate the difficulty – rather than 
the exact mileage – of the journey. The difficulty of a route could be used to extrapolate 
travel time: a difficult journey takes longer. Thus, map users could gauge distance by line 
shape and length. 
In addition, map users required local knowledge to trace and evaluate 
Anishinabek authorship. Anishinabek map-makers may not have signed their work by 
name; authorship could be inferred from totemic symbol. Densmore claimed that low 
population density allowed Anishinabek readers to identify authorship by birth and 
marriage patterns (or totemic groupings) etched onto records of land use. 98 The 
cartographers who produced Sheet No. 4, by contrast, are clearly identified: “Adolph F. 
Meyer and Arthur V. White.” Further, Meyer and White made their credentials visible – 
“Consulting Engineers” is scrolled across the top of the map. Magrath, Powell, and 
Migneault could read and evaluate this submission. Given the cartographers’ printed 
accreditation, Magrath, Powell, and Migneault could assume that what was legible was 
also accurate. An alternative mapping tradition meant that Anishinabek (wo)men faced 
material – in addition to legal – barriers to participation in IJC hearings. Federal 
                                            
97 Grace Rajnovich, Reading Rock Art: Interpreting the Indian Rock Paintings of the Canadian 
Shield (Toronto: Natural Heritage/Natural History Inc., 2002), 92.  
98 Densmore, Chippewa Customs, 176. 
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representatives lacked the knowledge to read and evaluate Anishinabek representations of 
space. Limited recognition of alternative forms of mapping are evident in the IJC’s claim 
that “[p]rior to the reference, the only surveys in the Lake of the Woods watershed were 
the ordinary public-land surveys, and they did not extend over the entire area.”99 The 
absence of evidence here suggests the disparity between Anishinabek and non-Indigenous 
standards made it difficult to communicate spatial knowledge across cultures – historians 
know that Anishinabek maps of the Winnipeg River drainage basin exist(ed). Records 
kept by the waiâbishkiwedig reveal that Anishinabek maps were unrecognized during the 
IJC’s decision-making process. 
Non-Indigenous men occasionally filtered Anishinabek knowledge for submission 
to the International Joint Commission. Captain J. T. Hooper of Kenora, for example, 
attributed his ability to judge water fluctuations on local environmental knowledge. 
Hooper developed his “standard” high water mark through conversations with “the 
Indians.” Anishinabek informants told Hooper that Lake of the Woods reached “extreme 
high water” levels in 1876. Hooper made reference to this “Indian” standard in a letter to 
Arthur White.  He also suggested that representatives of the Commission could assess the 
standard themselves by travelling along Lake of the Woods. Nature had recorded the high 
water mark: water had stained cliff faces along the lakeshore. Many of the 14,000 islands 
on Lake of the Woods, it seems, recorded the same details that local Anishinabek passed 
on orally.100 Alternatively, Hooper suggested that representatives of the Commission 
                                            
99 International Joint Commission, Final Report, 12. 
100 LOWM, “Arthur White to Captain J. T. Hooper, 14 April 1913,” Lake of the Woods – Levels.  
Captain Hooper also appears to have referenced local rock during the oral hearings. According to the 
Kenora Miner and News, “Hooper stated with particular reference to the high water mark on the rocks that 
he had seen the water higher before the construction of these dams than it has even been since.” No 
indication of the regularity of such high water levels is provided. “High Water Levels a Necessity,” Kenora 
Miner and News, 15 September 1915, 1.  
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could turn to Hudson’s Bay Company records: “The Indians and the Hudson’s Bay Co. 
claimed it was higher than it had been for some years in 1876.”101 Text could be and was 
privileged over alternative forms of evidence (material and oral) that would have 
facilitated Anishinabek participation. Hooper’s submission thus allows us to better 
imagine exclusionary evidentiary norms. There is no known record of White 
corroborating multisensory evidence with textual records along the north shore, or of 
recognizing Anishinabek ways of knowing. Anishinabek evidence of water fluctuations, 
if presented, was indirect. 
Not all witnesses included Anishinabek findings in their testimony as did Hooper. 
White and Meyer deepened Anishinabek exclusion by obscuring Anishinabek patterns of 
land use from submitted maps. For example, White and Meyer assessed soil grade by 
non-Indigenous standards. They did not account for distinct patterns of environmental 
use, specifically the adaptive planting and harvesting techniques that allowed 
Anishinabek families to grow in soil labelled unusable by federal agents. To ensure 
production in such harsh environs, Anishinabek families planted on islands or along the 
lakeshore. Here, the moderating effects of the water attenuated frost.102 In 1819, the 
Hudson’s Bay Company factor at Fort Lac la Pluie found that it fell on the women “to do 
all the laborous work” along the shore. He watched them “busily employed gathering and 
drying corn” amidst a garden of potatoes, pumpkins, onions, and carrots.103 And yet, 
White and Meyer suggested that Garden Island had no agricultural value.104 This finding 
                                            
101 LOWM, “Arthur White to Captain J. T. Hooper.”  
102 D. W. Moodie and Barry Kaye, “The Northern Limit of Indian Agriculture in North America,” 
Geographical Review 59 (1969), 528. 
103 Unidentified Hudson’s Bay Company factor quoted in Moodie and Kaye, “The Northern Limit 
of Indian Agriculture in North America,” 518. 
104 White and Meyer, Atlas to accompany Report to International Joint Commission, Sheet No. 4. 
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conflicts with the local place name – Garden Island – that emphasized soil 
productivity.105 Seeds planted on Garden Island may have been more resistant than 
southern varieties. Corn planted in Lake of the Woods, for example, appeared “so stunted 
that [it is] more like [a shrub] than the plant which is common to more southerly 
latitudes.”106 Its strange shape is tied to genetic modifications. “Indian corn” planted and 
consumed by Anishinabek families originated in southern Mexico. To allow the crop to 
spread north, tribes to the north (including the Anishinabek) had to develop frost-resistant 
strains through careful seed selection. No known attempt was made to understand 
Anishinabek seed and garden management or to consider the science behind Anishinabek 
harvests on otherwise unusable lands. No known attempt was made to reconcile local 
place names (borne of Anishinabek land use) with Western science. An opportunity to 
assess potential damages to Anishinabek land users thus went unnoticed. 
                                            
105 Anthropologist Keith Basso, in Wisdom Sits in Places: Landscape and Language among the 
Western Apache (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 1996), argued that the landscape is 
not simply a backdrop for cultural activities. Instead, the landscape functions as a sort of living history 
project. Apache place names oftentimes encapsulated the cultural activities that happened there. According 
to Basso, “[p]lace-based thoughts about the self lead commonly to thoughts of other things – other places, 
other people, other times, whole networks of associates that ramify unaccountably within the expanding 
spheres of awareness that they themselves engender” (107).  
Charles E. Cleland has similarly argued that “the entire essence of their cultures [Anishinabek] is 
based upon the notion of geographic place which embodies their human origin, historical identity, and the 
way they conceive their cultural reality” (quoted in Great Lakes Indian Fish & Wildlife Commission, 
Gidakiiminaan (Our Earth): An Anishinaabe Atlas of the 1836 (Upper Michigan), 1837, and 1842 Treaty 
Ceded Territories (Odanah, WI: Great Lakes Indian Fish & Wildlife Commission Press, 2007), 1.). 
Missing from the IJC Hearings was a sense of how Anishinabek peoples constituted their 
landscape. In this formulation, the name “Garden Island” reflected and defined Anishinabek socio-
economic activity in that space.  In the United States, the Great Lakes Indian Fish & Wildlife Commission 
is attempting to reconstruct how the Anishinabek of Lake Superior lived by collecting local place names 
and circulating them in the Gidakiiminaan (Our Earth): An Anishinaabe Atlas of the 1836 (Upper 
Michigan), 1837, and 1842 Treaty Ceded Territories. 
106 “Frost-Proof Corn Grown by Indians,” Kenora Miner and News, 25 October 1924, 2. 
According to Lake of the Woods and Aulneau Adventure Tours, The Explorers’ Guide, Garden 
Island was previously known as “Cornfield.” Presumably, this name appears “[o]n maps that pre-date 
1900.” It is known that a “five acre cornfield and three acres of potatoes, squash and pumpkin” covered the 
interior when the Dawson and Hind survey party passed through Lake of the Woods in 1858 (98). 
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In sum, the International Joint Commission thrice silenced Anishinabek voices. 
Firstly, Anishinabek (wo)men faced legal barriers to self-representation at the IJC 
hearings. The Indian Act defined Anishinabek (wo)men as legal wards of the state – there 
was no legal imperative for their inclusion. Secondly, Anishinabek (wo)men held an 
alternative mapping tradition. Individuals who knew the territory may have been unable 
to relate their knowledge to the waiâbishkiwedig. Lastly, accepted maps evaluated 
(contested) Anishinabek lands by non-Indigenous standards. Consulting engineers do not 
appear to have considered local place names and Indigenous land use in their 
assessments. Expert findings thus favoured the waiâbishkiwedig and their patterns of 
economic growth. Land along the north shore was believed to have little economic value 
in its “natural state.” Lumber and flour mills, however, produced a marked profit. With 
skewed data, the International Joint Commission conducted a cost-benefit analysis of the 
Norman Dam. The Commissioners ruled overwhelming in favour of Canadian 
operations; the IJC valued the continued development of the Norman Dam over the 
abortive potential of its removal.107 
 
THE RESULTS OF DE FACTO EXCLUSION: ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND 
ANISHINABEK ADAPTATIONS TO THE CASH ECONOMY 
 
                                            
107 Ray has written a detailed critique of “expert witnesses” and Canadian misrepresentations of 
Indigenous histories focusing on the contemporary courtroom. Comparisons can be drawn with the 
hearings of the International Joint Commission on the Lake of the Woods question. Ray notes that “judges 
typically have little or no previous experience with Aboriginal rights litigation” (281). Commissioners, by 
contrast, had little experience with Anishinabek peoples or territorial claims; they travelled to Lake of the 
Woods from across Canada. Ray further claims that “facts” are introduced in an arena (courtroom) that has 
long disrupted Indigenous access to resources. Similarly, Commissioners had little interest in 
acknowledging competing Anishinabek interests in water resources in the Winnipeg River drainage basin; 
instead, they were to determine whether the operation of the Norman Dam negatively impacted competing 
industries. Ray further notes that court officials are not required to stay up-to-date with historical trends 
(282). As Captain J. T. Hooper’s testimony reveals, Commissioners were not required to engage with 
alternative history-keeping methods. Arthur J. Ray, “‘History Wars’ and Treaty Rights in Canada: A 
Canadian Case Study,” The Power of Promises: Rethinking Indian Treaties in the Pacific Northwest, edited 
by Alexandra Harmon (Washington: University of Washington Press, 2008), 279-96. 
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The International Joint Commission recommended that an elevation of 1061.25 
feet (323.47 metres) above sea-level, be set as the maximum water level on Lake of the 
Woods.108 Canadian industry benefited from this recommendation, gaining considerable 
flexibility in its operations. The IJC concluded that “water may be drawn from the lake 
by the appropriate authority in Canada for the benefit of Canadian interest [between 1056 
and 1061 feet or 321.87 and 323.39 metres].”109 Only if Canadian industry raised the lake 
to 1061 feet (323.39 metres) was international – that is, American and Canadian – 
consultation required. A new governing body, the Lake of the Woods Control Board, was 
to determine how much water to “waste” or to “conserve” at either extreme. Fluctuations 
of up to five feet (1.52 metres), however, were deemed acceptable by Commissioners. 
How did this decision change the watershed? It was not until the 1920s – with the IJC’s 
Final Report (1917) already submitted – that media reports directly linked compromised 
ice travel to dam operations at the north shore. Damage to Anishinabek transit routes only 
became visible once Canadian industry was protected. 
In December 1924, Mayor John Brenchley of Kenora issued a warning to Kenora 
residents through the Kenora Miner and News. The article acknowledged that “prior to 
the enlarging of the east branch of the Winnipeg River, the current was not so strong 
towards the Tunnel Island shore.”110 The article further identified that changing ice 
patterns may confuse regular ice travellers. The popular “short cut” across Kenora Bay, 
from Tunnel Island to town, had posed “little danger” in years past.111 The reliability of 
                                            
108 International Joint Commission, Final Report, 27. 
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110 “Don’t Risk Crossing Ice to Tunnel Island,” Kenora Miner and News, 27 December 1924, 5. 
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ice travel across the bay informed the “local habit of crossing the ice.”112 Brenchley’s 
public announcement was designed to revise local understandings of Lake of the Woods 
and surrounding area. He stated that “since the capacity of the power plant is more than 
three times what it was, more water of course goes through the east channel [which 
causes] a stronger current and thin ice.”113 In this quotation, Brenchley attributes changes 
in ice quality to the Kenora Power Dam, a facility that was constructed in 1902 and 
enlarged by Kenora in 1906.114 It is strange that the Norman Dam is not identified by 
Brenchley’s quotation – the Norman Dam is located on the west side of Tunnel Island 
while the Kenora Power Dam is located on the east. Both systems draw water from 
Kenora Bay. Despite this occlusion in Brenchley’s public warning, it is clear that dam 
operations jeopardized local ice travel along the north shore of Lake of the Woods and 
down the Winnipeg River. 
By 1925, public warnings against “short-cuts” hardened. The Kenora Miner and 
News published absolutist warnings against ice travel near the Norman Dam – not 
recommendations for alternative use: “The ice towards the Tunnel Island shore is never 
safe, at any period of the winter, because of the strong current which runs underneath 
[caused by releasing water into the Winnipeg River] to the eastern outlet of Lake of the 
Woods.”115 Dam operations, as Mayor Brenchley’s announcement first revealed, 
compromised the structural integrity of ice roads near town. The Kenora Dam (and, 
although never explicitly identified, the Norman Dam) made dangerous the final leg of 
Anishinabek travel from reserve into town; the dams not only compromised ice stability, 
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they damaged Anishinabek improvements to their roads. Pine markers, for example, may 
have sunk as rising water levels opened packed routes. 
The Norman Dam caused more than environmental change. By compromising 
Anishinabek ice roads, the Rollerway and later the Norman dams jeopardized 
Anishinabek access to capital (through trade) and public services. Reserves were 
effectively land-locked by industrial operations. Remember that Anishinabek families 
managed large dog populations because alternative methods of transit (aside from foot) 
were unavailable to riverine communities such as Dalles 38C, Whitedog, and Grassy 
Narrow reserves. In Riding Mountain, MB, east of Dalles 38C, Anishinabek families 
replaced dogs after horses were introduced, presumably by the waiâbishkiwedig in the 
1870s.116 According to Marilyn Peckett, wagon travel became the most popular form of 
transit and the sled fell into disuse.117 No such change occurred at Dalles 38C. Elder 
Matilda Martin maintained that “Not many Indians will keep a horse, you know.”118 She 
recalled only one man with a horse during her youth on reserve (1885-1908). Given that 
no road connected Dalles 38C to town until the 1980s, there was no practical incentive to 
replace dogs with horses. Water travel remained the best transit option in the often rocky 
and sometimes boggy Precambrian Shield. 
Train service was also largely inaccessible to Anishinabek residents of Dalles 
38C. During the Treaty #3 negotiations (1873), Anishinabek leaders attempted to secure 
                                            
116 Marilyn Peckett claimed that the Anishinabek occupied Riding Mountain since the early 
nineteenth century, although evidence of early Indigenous occupation exists. Peckett suggests that settler-
colonial presence increased in the 1870s, shortly after Manitoba was surveyed (8-9). While horses may 
have been traded before this time, the waiâbishkiwedig brought domesticated work animals (like horses) 
with them into Riding Mountain. Between 1870 and 1901, Peckett claims that colonial land pressures 
increased as “[c]olonists settling in the area required lumber for houses, barns, fences and firewood” (10). 
Peckett does not provide a date for the arrival of horses (or their origin point); however, it seems likely that 
Anishinabek horse use would increase with availability. Peckett, “Anishinabe Homeland History.” 
117 Ibid., 41. 
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free and unlimited travel on the Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) in exchange for shared 
access to their territories. Commissioner Alexander Morris denied their request, 
indicating that he represented the Queen, not the corporation.119 Train stations were 
eventually built around, rather than on, reserve. Chief Kawitaskung (Thomas Lindsay), 
who was escorted to Winnipeg, MB by the Indian Agent at Kenora, relied on the ice road 
to access more “modern” transit services. He was taken by dog sled to the agent’s house 
in town.120 While locomotives may have connected important cities in the North-West 
and Manitoba, reservations remained off the track. Ice roads retained their importance as 
thoroughfares to Anishinabek families. After the Rollerway Dam and Norman Dam, 
however, the risk of winter travel increased. 
Winter had always proved difficult for Anishinabek families. During the winter 
months, families faced the greatest risk of rabbit starvation. Rabbit starvation refers to an 
acute form of malnutrition caused by an overreliance on lean proteins.121 These proteins 
                                            
119 Alexander Morris, The Treaties of Canada with the Indians of Manitoba and the North-West 
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game such as caribou (83). Deer and moose, however, were more plentiful in Anishinabek territory. Ray 
also notes that the Cree prized beaver meat (83). Oral testimony introduced in Chapter 6 suggests that 
beaver was also prized in the Winnipeg River drainage basin. Indigenous peoples in the central subarctic 
culture area ate, as Ray identifies, a wide variety of fish throughout the year such as sturgeon, whitefish, 
northern pike and sucker (83). Oral testimony from the Winnipeg River drainage basin suggests that name 
(sturgeon) was perceived as a “rich fish” instead of a lean fish (Ratuski, “Gathering Traditional 
Knowledge,” 3). An anonymous Elder explained that “Sturgeon was mostly eaten in the summer but would 
also be stored for winter by digging deep holes... in the ground.... Ice stored in ice houses was sometimes 
used to help preserve the raw sturgeon” (3). Testimonies indicate that Anishinabek families ate this “rich 
fish” in small portions (3, 5). Others suggest that Anishinabek families used this “rich fish” medicinally (8, 
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need to be coupled with carbohydrates (or fat) to stave off hunger. To help facilitate 
survival as resources dwindled during the winter months, Anishinabek families broke into 
smaller groups. The ushering in of the modern era and modern machinery (i.e. Norman 
Dam) did little to ease the winter burden for Anishinabek families. In October 1922, 
Indian Agent Captain Frank Edwards reminded Kenora residents that local Anishinabek 
were “almost destitute in the winter” and “suffer[ed] very greatly from the cold.”122 The 
first wave of hydroelectric development on Lake of the Woods exacerbated seasonal 
difficulties. From December to February, Anishinabek families relied on trapping and big 
game hunting. Unreliable ice, however, meant that trap lines established before the 
Rollerway or the Norman may not have been accessible for the duration of the season. 
Male providers who relied on ice roads to reach their lands took substantial risks to check 
the lines. As found in Elder Alice Kelly’s testimony, male providers occasionally 
drowned trying to provide for their families.123 
Male providers who reached their trap lines, however, were more likely to face 
disappointment than their predecessors. In spring 1925, the Norman Dam released large 
amounts of water, killing thousands of muskrats on Lake of the Woods. Indeed, low lake 
levels nearly “deplet[ed] the lake;” it caused “their houses [to freeze] up and thousands of 
                                                                                                                                  
14, 17) or on special occasions (9, 11). Name preserved for winter use would allow Anishinabek families to 
couple an oily fish with garden produce or stored manomin to help prevent rabbit starvation. 
122 “The Peoples’ Forum,” Kenora Miner and News, 18 October 1922, 2.  
123 The Kenora Miner and News recorded drownings and near-drownings in areas of the Winnipeg 
River drainage basin used by Anishinabek families. For example, in December 1923, “a couple of people 
broke through, but fortunately they were able to get out” near Tunnel Island. In November 1925, a 
drowning occurred on the Winnipeg River near Minaki, Ontario. The Kenora Miner and News noted that 
“the drowned man broke through the thin ice while walking across the river, as the current is quite rapid in 
spots at that point.”  “Don’t Risk Crossing Ice to Tunnel Island,” 5; “Body Found at Minaki,” Kenora 
Miner and News, 25 November 1925, 1; Elder Kelly, interview with author, 30 July 2012. 
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rats were frozen to death along the shore and shallow inlets.”124 By May 1925, the 
Kenora Miner and News announced that winter 1924 wrought economic disaster: “Many 
of the Indians of the district are experiencing a period of hard times… as there has been 
very little doing in their line.”125 While the correlation between the operation of Norman 
Dam and low muskrat populations was first discussed in the local newspaper in 1925, 
Anishinabek families had likely experienced shortages since at least 1895. Hungry 
Anishinabek families recognized the fragility of their harvesting economy in the face of 
environmental change – especially after fluctuations of up to 1.5 metres (between 1056 
and 1061 feet above sea level) were recommended by International Joint Commission in 
1917. Economic adaptation resulted: the increase in Anishinabek saving activities after 
blueberry season may have been a direct response to the instability of fall and winter food 
supplies (or income generating activities such as trapping).  
By 1917, when the International Joint Commission submitted its Final Report… 
on the Lake of the Woods Reference, Anishinabek (wo)men living in the Winnipeg River 
drainage basin knew that their interests had been – and, would likely continue to be – 
underrepresented by federal agents. Flood damages likely influenced local Anishinabek 
families’ decisions to open personal saving accounts – a pattern of saving that emerged 
within five years of the IJC’s pro-industry recommendations. In 1921, “Indians Starting 
Bank Accounts” headlined the Kenora Miner and News.126 This article noted that “[n]o 
less than forty-six [Indians] have started savings bank accounts.” Initial deposits, 
particularly investments made by individuals from Dalles 38C, Rat Portage 38B Indian 
                                            
124 “Low Water in Lake Kills Thousands of Muskrats,” Kenora Miner and News, 22 April 1925, 
unpaginated. 
125 “Local Items: Indians Out of Work,” Kenora Miner and News, 23 May 1925, unpaginated. 
126 “Indians Start Bank Accounts,” Kenora Miner and News, 5 October 1921, 1.  
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Reserve, and Big Island Indian Reserve came from on-reserve timber sales. These 
individuals decided to bank the $25 per head that Indian Agent Captain Frank Edwards 
distributed for the loss of wood resources.127 Given historian Robin Jarvis Brownlie’s 
findings in A Fatherly Eye, it is tempting to interpret bank use as evidence of 
departmental interference. Indian agents determined whether and how to distribute funds 
to “deserving” band members. The Kenora Miner and News suggested that Captain Frank 
Edwards encouraged saving to shield families from seasonal shortages or “the recurrent 
dull period.”128 Did Edwards threaten to withhold payment pending the establishment of 
bank accounts? It is difficult to determine. Could Anishinabek families have benefited 
from building on the initial deposit that Edwards’ recommended? Absolutely – Edwards 
had the power to distribute band monies, but Anishinabek investors may have exercised 
some control over their cash deposits. 
Early saving (circa 1921) also followed a “prosperous blueberry year.”129 As 
Elders Alice Kelly and Marjorie Nabish have explained, blueberry crops have been 
relatively protected from flood damages.130 Early newspaper reports affirm these claims. 
In 1899, for example, shortly after Ontario paid the Keewatin Lumber and Power 
Company to install stop logs at Norman Dam, the Rat Portage Railroad Station managed 
to ship “from 4 to 10 tons of blueberries every day” out of the district.131 Given that 
blueberry plants have a lifespan of twenty to fifty years, crops unaffected by lake 
fluctuations of roughly one metre would have been protected (albeit unintentionally) by 
                                            
127 Ibid. 
128 Ibid. 
129 Ibid. 
130 Elder Kelly, interview with author, 30 July 2012. Elder Marjorie Nabish, interview with author, 
Dalles 38C Indian Reserve, 9 August 2012.  
131 “Profitable Blue Berries,” The Rat Portage Miner and Rainy Lake Journal, 10 July 1899, 3. 
See also International Joint Commission, Final Report, 17. 
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IJC recommendations. Blueberries thus became a reliable source of income in the face of 
environmental change. Elder Matilda Martin remembered picking berries at Ena Lake (or 
nearby Corn Lake) for over forty years. Her first reference to berry-picking dated to 
approximately 1906, a time when her son, John Kipling Jr., was still in his tikenagan 
(cradleboard). Her last berry-picking season occurred around 1955. At age seventy, 
Martin reported that she “was getting old” and that her “feet were tired walkin[g] up the 
hill.”132 The same elevation that prevented Martin from picking in her seventies protected 
the crop from water fluctuations during her picking career. 
It is difficult to estimate the size of investment berry sales would have allowed. 
Few official records of berry sales exist in the Winnipeg River drainage basin as 
individuals purchasing harvested goods directly from “status Indians” risked persecution 
under the Indian Act. And yet, throughout Martin’s lifetime, individuals like Ben Ratuski 
and Homer Duggan took the risk of dealing directly with local Anishinabek. In 1915, the 
Kenora Miner and News estimated that these transactions earned local Anishinabek 
“thousands of dollars.”133 Ten years later, it was anticipated that the blueberry business in 
Kenora produced a net profit of $50,000 to $75,000.134 Reflecting on her individual 
earnings, Martin claimed less than $200 for her baskets as an active picker in the 
1920s.135 According to Abdul Rashid, however, the average annual wage in 1920 was 
approximately $124.88. The average Canadian woman earned less than her male 
counterpart – approximately $75 per annum. Rashid suggested that the average annual 
                                            
132 Elder Martin, interview by the Kenora Daily Miner and News, 11 July 1972. 
133 “Local Items,” Kenora Miner and News, 6 July 1915, 3. Elder Martin identified blueberry 
purchasers in an oral interview. Elder Martin, interview by the Kenora Daily Miner and News, 11 July 
1972. 
134 “Blueberry Crop Above Average,” Kenora Miner and News, 29 July 1925, 1.  
135 Elder Martin, interview by the Kenora Daily Miner and News, 11 July 1972. 
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wage (for Canadians at large) decreased by 11 percent in 1930 and remained depressed 
until 1940.136 Few families thrived on these annual wages; the cost of living outpaced 
average earnings across Canada. And yet, compared to her non-Indigenous counterparts, 
Martin earned a sizeable income as a married woman. Saving these cash earnings must be 
seen as an adaptive strategy as Anishinabek families saw fit to “prepar[e] for the 
inevitable raining day.”137 Bank savings supplemented seasonal rounds. 
But, how can this be seen as adaptation? It marks a cultural shift in temporal 
thinking. According to anthropologist A. Irving Hallowell (1955): 
[T]emporal orientation [for the Saulteaux Ojibway] depends upon the 
recurrence and succession of concrete events in their qualitative aspects – 
event, moreover, which are indications, preparatory symbols, and guides for 
those extremely vital activities through which the Saulteaux obtain a living 
from the country which they inhibit.138 
 
Environmental cues, argues Hallowell, allowed the Anishinabek to “keep time,” to 
transition between economic activities and/or seasonal grounds. Heavy reliance on 
environmental cues meant that temporal orientation was local. Hallowell suggests that 
Anishinabek reacted to present cues – as such, Anishinabek functioned in relation to the 
immediate future or recent past. Anishinabek communities did not save or reserve time 
for daily tasks. Hallowell writes, “Their rhythm is elastic.” Only hunger or necessity, he 
believed, induced Anishinabek to function on a set schedule.139 The opening of bank 
accounts thus suggests that necessity motivated Anishinabek living in Winnipeg River 
drainage basin to think in relation to the distant future. This action suggests that 
                                            
136 Note: the Inflation Calculator, a program available through the Bank of Canada, was used to 
estimate the average annual income in 1920 as Abdul Rashid used “current dollars [1993]” in his estimates.  
Abdul Rashid, “Seven Decades of Wage Changes,” Perspectives on Labour and Income, 5, no. 2 (Summer 
1993).  
137 “Indians Start Bank Accounts,” 1. 
138 A. Irving Hallowell, Culture and Experience (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1955), 233-34.  
139 Ibid., 234. 
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Anishinabek economic expectations had changed by the early 1900s. Anishinabek 
(wo)men seemed to anticipate lower yields with industrial water fluctuations.  
And yet, there was no identifiable shift in labour. Trapping and foraging 
continued to have greater significance to local Anishinabek than wage employment. 
While Anishinabek families sold their berries for money, survival between 1893 and 
1950 did not yet demand seasonal employment in industries operated by the 
waiâbishkiwedig.140 Instead, Anishinabek families continued trying to eke out a living 
from the land. Saving activities reveal that local Anishinabek were proactive; they “[got] 
away from their general practice of spending their money as soon as it [was] received” 
and sought new strategies for winter survival.141 Saving allowed for the continued use of 
ancestral territories. It simultaneously marked the beginning of an in-between life for 
many Anishinabek – life between water fluctuations of 1056 and 1061 feet (321.87 and 
323.39 metres), between subsistence and cash economies, between town and reserve. 
Income produced during the berry harvest could be banked in town to shield Anishinabek 
families from winter scarcity. Cash could be withdrawn and flour, tea, and canned goods 
could be purchased in town. The risk of travelling along unstable ice to withdraw cash 
and to shop remained. Ironically, environmental change increased Anishinabek reliance 
on saving accounts while increasing the risk of accessing them. 
 
CONCLUSION 
                                            
140 Alternatively, it could be argued that the Norman Dam prompted Anishinabek families in the 
Winnipeg River drainage basin to adopt a moditional economy. While Anishinabek berry-pickers were 
never formerly employed by Ratuski and Homer Duggan, they relied increasingly on Ratuski’s and 
Duggan’s purchases for capital. One’s interpretation depends, perhaps, on whether annual berry sales are 
identified as a form of independent trade or informal contract labour.  
141 “Indians Start Bank Accounts,” 1. 
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What can we conclude from an examination of the International Joint 
Commission’s Hearings on the Lake of the Woods question? We discover that definitions 
of “nation” and “citizenship” conceptually barred Anishinabek participation both on the 
committee and in the hearings themselves. The Department of Indian Affairs was to 
represent Anishinabek interests, although limited textual evidence is found in the Final 
Report of the International Joint Commission (or related media coverage) to suggest an 
active or sustained address of Indigenous concerns. We also learn that Anishinabek 
participants faced material challenges. The International Joint Commission demanded a 
non-Indigenous standard of evidence – Anishinabek forms of mapping and oral 
testimonies were not assessed. Captain J. T. Hooper poignantly reveals the IJC’s heavy 
reliance on textual sources when he encouraged Arthur V. White, a consulting engineer, 
to travel along the water and to scan cliffs for the high water mark – but, Hooper then 
provided a substitute for Anishinabek ways of knowing: the Hudson’s Bay Company 
records. Federally-appointed commissioners, however, may not have been cognizant of 
these exclusionary norms. Alexander Magrath, Henry Absalom Powell, and Pierre-Basile 
Mignault lived outside of the Winnipeg River drainage basin. They lacked local 
knowledge about the waterways, about who used them and how. Instead, they brought to 
the Lake of the Woods question an ideological investment in Canadian industrial 
development. 
These exclusionary norms matter to the history of hydroelectric development in 
the Winnipeg River drainage basin. The International Joint Commission set a precedent 
for industrial water development on Indigenous lands (here, Anishinabek lands). It 
clearly favoured industry over extra-market, primarily Anishinabek, use. There is little 
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evidence that ice roads – critical to the economic, biological, and social functioning of 
Anishinabek communities – were evaluated by the International Joint Commission. 
Subsequent cost/benefit analyses, like those conducted by the Hydro-Electric Power 
Commission in the 1950s, would continue to ignore Anishinabek land use. As in 1917, 
developers in the post-1945 era devalued extra-market land use and framed their 
cost/benefit analyses in relationship to non-Indigenous economic uses. The Hydro-
Electric Power Commission would base their decision to build Whitedog Dam on “not 
only all practicable uses to which these waters can be put on their own watershed [i.e. 
agricultural, fishing, transportation], but also all beneficial uses which the energy 
developed thereon may serve in the adjacent territory.”142 The International Joint 
Commission effectively established a framework through which to evaluate industrial 
incursions in the Winnipeg River drainage basin. 
Further, the International Joint Commission did not create an inclusive space – a 
place where Anishinabek voices could be heard. Anishinabek families did not react 
passively to the IJC’s recommendations. As water levels changed, so too did Anishinabek 
spending habits. Perhaps at the behest of Captain Frank Edwards, Anishinabek families 
banked timber (and likely berry) monies to “[provide] for a Rainy Day.”143 This 
adaptation allowed Anishinabek families to continue their seasonal rounds for another 
generation. Then, in the 1950s, hydroelectric developers, particularly the Hydro-Electric 
Power Commission of Ontario, would silence Anishinabek voices once again. The HEPC 
would follow a pattern of development facilitated by the International Joint Commission, 
relying heavily on federal representation of the state’s “Indian wards.” The earliest 
                                            
142 International Joint Commission, Final Report, 11. 
143 Indians Start Bank Accounts,” 1. 
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assessment of flooding damages on Lake of the Woods did not call for an evaluation of 
Anishinabek lands, a hearing of Anishinabek interests. Moving forward, future 
developers did not develop a system for listening to bands. What resulted was a pattern of 
consultation that tilted in favour of developers to the obvious exclusion of Anishinabek 
interests. 
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Figure 7: AN ACTIVE ICE ROAD IN KENORA (2014)144 
Note the use of jack pine, a coniferous tree, to mark the edge of the transit route. 
Please also note the high density of jack pine in the forest visible in the background 
of each photograph. 
144 Photographs by author, “An Active Ice Road in Kenora, Ontario (2014).” Note the use of jack 
pine, a coniferous tree, to mark the edge of the transit route. Also note the high density of jack pine in the 
forest visible in the background of each photograph. This ice road was constructed south (upstream) of the 
Norman Dam. 
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Figure 8: GROUP OF NATIVE BLUEBERRY PICKERS (C. 1897)145 
Blueberry picking is a critical part of the Anishinabek economy. This photograph of 
Anishinabek harvesters – captured before 1897 – suggests that it was of vital 
importance to Anishinabek communities: women and children across age groups 
are featured, suggesting widespread practice. 
145 Image from Hugh Hughes, Souvenir, Diamond Jubilee Guide: Rat Portage and Lake-of-the-
Woods (Martel & Tilley, 1897), 55, https://archive.org/details/cihm_04839. The Diamond Jubilee Guide 
had to be in circulation by June 1897. Unless this image was staged, the latest the photograph could have 
been taken was summer 1896. Blueberries generally ripen in the upper Winnipeg drainage basin between 
July and August.  
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Figure 9: NORTH AND EAST GATES OF DAM, WINNIPEG RIVER – ONE OF 
THE GREATEST WATER POWERS ON THE CONTINENT (C. 1897 )146  
In 1897, this image was labelled as “One of the Greatest Water Powers on the 
Continent” in the Diamond Jubilee Guide. According to the International Joint 
Commission, between 1899 and 1913, the Norman Dam increased natural water 
levels on Lake of the Woods between 0.9-6.3 feet or approximately 0.2-2.0 metres.147 
Its continental effects were known as early as 1895 when American officials like 
Colonel Naff of the General Land Office actively investigated Minnesotan 
complaints that the Norman Dam had inundated valuable agricultural lands in the 
United States. 
146 Image from Hughes, Souvenir, Diamond Jubilee Guide, 39. 
147 International Joint Commission, Final Report, 17-8. 
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Figure 10: NORMAN DAM (DATE UNKNOWN)148 
H.A. Langley captured this image between 1898 (when the Norman Dam was 
constructed) and 1926 (when the Backus-Brooks Company built the powerhouse). 
Since the 1890s, water management at the Norman Dam has compromised 
Anishinabek ice roads. Poor ice quality has, in turn, limited Anishinabek mobility in 
the Winnipeg River drainage basin during the winter months. 
148 H. A. Langley, “Norman Damn, Kenora, Ontario (date unknown),” from Andrew Cunningham, 
September 25, 2014, http://www.ipernity.com/doc/wintorbos/35175107.  
 
 
148 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SOUTH DIRECTION 
A PLACE OF STRENGTH AND VIGOUR  
 
 
149 
CHAPTER 3 
“THE LAW [IS SUCH THAT] INDIANS TAKE CONDITIONS AS THEY FIND 
THEM”: CORPORATE COMMUNICATIONS AS A PREDICTOR OF 
ECONOMIC RECOVERY IN THE WINNIPEG RIVER DRAINAGE BASIN, 
1950-1965 
 
In 1917, environmental policies that facilitated electrical production at the 
northern outlet of Lake of the Woods were recommended by Canada and the United 
States in the Final Report of the International Joint Commission on the Lake of the 
Woods Reference. Employees of the Keewatin Lumber and Power Company might have 
felt relieved. The Final Report seemingly guaranteed prosperity in and around Kenora – 
or, at least, its economic stability. Add to this Ontario’s claim to have freed waterways 
from Anishinabek occupants (circa 1915), and we find that New Ontario was open for 
business.1 
By 1919, water availability had attracted more industrialists to the north shore. 
That same year the Province of Ontario granted Edward Wellington Backus and William 
F. Brooks, two American financiers, timber rights on the English River. Backus and 
Brooks also won permission to develop a hydroelectric generating station at White Dog 
Rapids on the Winnipeg River.2 Instead, Backus and Brooks purchased Norman Dam 
from the Keewatin Lumber and Power Company and constructed a power station at the 
western outlet of Lake of the Woods. These two American financiers also purchased the 
                                            
1 “New Ontario” is another name for “Northwestern Ontario.” “New Ontario” received popular 
usage in the early twentieth century, perhaps in response to the Ontario Boundary Dispute. In 1884, the 
Privy Council in Great Britain confirmed Ontario’s western boundary “along the western shores of Lake 
Superior, thence westerly along the said boundary to the north-west angle of the Lake of the Woods.” The 
Privy Council also set Ontario’s northern boundary at the Albany River. In 1912, Ontario’s borders were 
pushed north to Hudson Bay. Conceptual understandings of “New Ontario” expanded accordingly. See: 
United Kingdom. Canada (Ontario Boundary) Act, 1889, 52-53, Vict, c. 28; and Ontario, Ministry of 
Government and Consumer Services, “The Changing Shape of Ontario,” 28 December 2011, accessed 1 
September 2015, http://www.archives.gov.on.ca/en/maps/ontario-boundaries.aspx.  
2 Lake of the Woods Writers’ Group and Kenora Centennial Committee, Through the Kenora 
Gateway, 63. 
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Kenora Power Dam from the Town of Kenora. With provincially sanctioned access to 
wood and water, Backus and Brooks began construction of a pulp and paper mill in 1922. 
Almost 2000 able-bodied men poured into Kenora seeking employment.3 Forests in the 
Winnipeg River drainage basin filled with song. Lumberjacks felled trees to the tune of 
“Once More A-Lumbering Go.” The Winnipeg River filled with sawn logs and echoed 
their “thud.” But, it was not to last. Provincial grants did not protect Backus and Brooks 
from the stock market crash of 1929. After only seven years of operation, their Kenora 
mill fell into receivership.4 
The Great Depression stymied industrial development in the Winnipeg River 
drainage basin. Mill operations slowed as the demand for newsprint fell in the 1930s. 
Industrial demands for electricity declined in turn. Ken Collins, employed by a plant in 
Dryden, ON, recalled that “Within a few short weeks of the stock market crash of 
October 1929, many of the orders for paper products cancelled.” There was no need to 
develop White Dog Rapids when, as Collins explained, “every square foot of space at the 
mill became storage areas filled with unsold paper products.”5 Mill operators could meet 
Kenora’s energy demands with electricity generated by the Norman Dam and the Kenora 
Power Dam alone. Canadian energy demands did not increase for almost a decade. Then, 
in 1939, Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King’s Liberals determined that paper 
                                            
3 Figures 11-12 depict the Kenora Powerhouse under the control of the Ontario-Minnesota Pulp 
and Paper Company. Lake of the Woods Writers’ Group and Kenora Centennial Committee, Through the 
Kenora Gateway, 61, 63. See also “Historical Timeline,” 
http://www.lakeofthewoodsmuseum.ca/collectionsandresearch/HistoricalTimeline.aspx. 
4 Lake of the Woods Writers’ Group and Kenora Centennial Committee, Through the Kenora 
Gateway, 63. See also Graeme Rodden, “Boise Paper – 100 Years of Paper Making,” PPI Mills and 
Technology, 24 March 2011, accessed 1 April 2015, http://ppimagazine.com/mills/north-america/boise-
paper-100-years-papermaking. 
5 Interview with Ken Collins, Kenora Patricia District School Board, “A Brief History of Dryden 
during the Depression,” accessed 1 April 2015, 
http://dhseagles.kpdsb.on.ca/about/theGreatDepression/TheGreatDepression.html. 
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production was critical to Canada’s war effort. The Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper 
Company, a Canadian “outgrowth of the reorganization of [MANDO]” took over mill 
operations shortly thereafter.6 Machinery switched on. Electrical demand increased. And, 
once again, Ontario took notice of “underdeveloped” water resources in the Winnipeg 
River drainage basin. Thomas Henry Hogg, Chairman and Chief Engineer of Hydro-
Electric Power Commission (1937-1947), envisaged major post-war expansion and 
planned to invest in new generating facilities. The HEPC eyed White Dog Rapids 
accordingly. Ontario had already compromised Anishinabek claims to water resources in 
the Winnipeg River drainage basin. After World War II, the HEPC worked to eliminate 
non-Indigenous competition for water resources in northwestern Ontario. 
This chapter explores how the Hydro-Electric Power Commission communicated 
with competing water users in the Winnipeg River drainage basin during the development 
process (1950-1958). Prior to the construction of Whitedog Falls Generating Station, the 
HEPC conducted considerable research on the Winnipeg River (which drains Lake of the 
Woods). The goals of this research were (1) to determine peak operating levels for a head 
pond, or reservoir, that would stretch from Whitedog Falls Generating Station to the 
Norman Dam; (2) to estimate the damages that established water users might incur as the 
HEPC raised the Winnipeg River to peak operating levels; and, (3) to identify who had a 
right to compensation – and, if so, of which type of compensation they deserved 
(equivalent energy returns, subsidized relocation, or cash settlement) – for flood 
damages. As a result of this research, the Hydro-Electric Power Commission identified at 
least two competing interest groups: the Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company and 
                                            
6 “Reorganization of Local Paper Mill is Announced: Will be Known as Ontario and Minnesota 
Paper Company; Kenora and Fort Frances Plants are in the New Company,” Fort Frances Times and Rainy 
Lake Herald, 1 May 1941, 1. 
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the Anishinabek Nation (particularly families living at Dalles 38C Indian Reserve, One 
Man Lake Indian Reserve, and Whitedog Indian Reserve). The HEPC would not treat 
these competitors equally. The Commission orchestrated two distinctive communication 
strategies. The HEPC sought to pacify the Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company, 
the largest employer in Kenora, through negotiations. By contrast, the Hydro-Electric 
Power Commission actively ignored Anishinabek families to streamline dam construction 
and operation. 
What enabled the Hydro-Electric Power Commission to negotiate with the 
Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company but refuse to consult with First Nations? 
The socio-political climate of the 1950s allowed the HEPC to adopt two distinctive 
communication strategies – one for industry and another for ‘Indians’ – without fear of 
public censure. After World War II, as historian Michael Bliss illuminated, the Canadian 
federal government “committed to unprecedented levels of state involvement in the 
economic order.”7 According to Bliss, Canadians believed that “state involvement in the 
economic order” would curb economic recession. King’s Liberals responded to public 
demand by incentivizing economic growth with federal loans to small businesses and 
export credit insurance. They also sought to improve employment opportunities in 
Canada by extending their support to unions.8 In this socio-political climate, the HEPC 
could not ignore grievances from the mill: federal policy had primed the Ontario-
Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company for expansion. If the mill perceived the HEPC as a 
                                            
7 Bliss, Northern Enterprise, 454. 
8 Ibid., 454. Ontario also supported industrial expansion in the northwest. The Ontario-Minnesota 
Pulp and Paper Company received approximately $300,000 from the province to finance expansion. 
Provincial monies allowed the Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company to install “4 new 3A Bird 
screens, Bauer stock cleaning equipment, new Valley head box and slice and a new mixing pump, plus 
related equipment.” “O&M Production Will Increase,” Kenora-Keewatin Daily Miner and News, 11 March 
1955, 7. 
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threat to its operations, to the steady employment of hundreds of unionized men, the 
HEPC – a publicly owned utility – would be pressured to establish equilibrium. This 
chapter explores how the HEPC managed its communications with the Ontario-
Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company to neutralize the mill as a political threat. Two 
notable strategies to be discussed include (1) the redirection of rights-related questions 
from mill officials to provincial authorities with the right to extend or veto resource use. 
Whenever possible, the HEPC did not allow the Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper 
Company to clarify its position on contested waterways like White Dog Rapids. Instead, 
the HEPC asked regulatory bodies like the Department of Lands and Forests to settle land 
questions. This strategy prevented mill officials from jockeying for position. And (2), the 
HEPC withheld critical information like damage estimates that might have allowed mill 
officials to put an embargo on dam construction. This strategy forced the Ontario-
Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company into a cooperative position: once the HEPC reduced 
head (the difference in height between the reservoir and the tailwater) at Norman Dam by 
raising levels on the Winnipeg River, the mill depended on energy purchases to continue 
operations. Through redirection and secrecy, the HEPC guaranteed operational support 
from the Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company. 
First Nations did not pose the same political threat as the Ontario-Minnesota Pulp 
and Paper Company. Band members living at Dalles 38C, One Man Lake, and Whitedog 
reserves were political non-entities: band members were denied the right to vote until 
1960. Anishinabek voices were also suppressed at the local level. Band members had 
limited control over governance on reserve. In 1966, journalist Heather Robertson 
observed that, “The [federal] government… sets down how band meetings are to be 
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conducted, makes regulations about who shall preside at meetings… and the number of 
persons constituting a quorum. The agent can, and frequently does, rule that a quorum 
consists of himself and the chief."9 Little existed in law to pressure the HEPC into direct 
consultation with band members. And so, the HEPC frequently (and legally) directed 
land questions to the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Indian Affairs 
Branch.10 Historical practice also eliminated the incentive to consult with band members. 
In 1915, the Ontario Legislature claimed that First Nations did not have a right to waters 
running through reserve through consultation with Duncan Campbell Scott, Deputy 
Superintendent of the Department of Indian Affairs. Two years later, the International 
Joint Commission conducted a cost-benefit analysis of Norman Dam without direct 
Anishinabek input on the Canadian side. The local business culture did nothing to 
pressure the HEPC to negotiate with First Nations. Patterns of development in the 
Winnipeg River drainage basin had normalized industrial incursions onto Anishinabek 
territories since the early 1900s. 
Additionally, federal Indian policy in the 1950s was not necessarily at odds with 
industrial damages to reserve lands. Active assimilatory programmes included urban 
                                            
9 Robertson, Reservations are for Indians, 120. 
10 The Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development was established in 1966. From 
1950 to 1965, the Department of Citizenship and Immigration was responsible for Indian Affairs. In 1951, 
Canada approved substantive amendments to the Indian Act. While First Nations now had the right to bring 
a land claim against Canada, oral testimony suggests that the Indian Affairs Branch did not actively 
communicate this change to band members living in the Winnipeg River drainage basin. Furthermore, 
many Anishinabek communities in the Winnipeg River drainage basin lacked the monies to hire legal aide. 
In theory, the 1951 amendments allowed First Nations to pursue land claims against the government. In 
practice, however, material hardship (and a lack of information) prevented immediate action. Luby, 
“Regulating Capital, Creating Christians,” e-lecture, 29 September 2015. 
Olive Patricia Dickason, A Concise History of Canada’s First Nations, Second Edition (Don 
Mills, ON: Oxford University Press, 2010), 248-49, similarly notes that “the revised [Indian] Act of 1951 
can hardly be called revolutionary,” explaining that an Indian “band could now spend its monies as it 
wished, unless the Governor-in-Council expressed reservation.” While Indian bands could theoretically 
fund lawsuits against Canada or Ontario after 1951, they would not gain “complete control over their 
funds” until 1958. Dickason’s findings confirm that material hardship prevented immediate action against 
settler-colonists. 
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relocation. Anishinabek Elder Lewis Debassige of M’Chigeeng First Nation remembers 
being offered off-reserve housing prior to the 1969 White Paper.11 It was, however, Prime 
Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau’s 1969 White Paper that made visible federal attempts to 
vacate reserve lands. In this document, Trudeau proposed the conversion of reserve land 
to private property that could be sold by the band or its members.12 It is unlikely that the 
Hydro-Electric Power Commission feared government censure for destroying lands 
whose exclusive use by Anishinabek families was to be phased out. Public censure may 
have been further limited by Canadians’ overwhelming optimism for federal 
programming. According to historian Michael Bliss, Canadians in the post-war era truly 
believed that government could and would protect them from “the worst consequences of 
the old free market system.”13 Logic dictated that the HEPC, as a publicly owned utility, 
would not abuse those who it was designed to serve. Freed from the socio-political 
pressure to consult with band members, the Hydro-Electric Power Commission adopted 
two communication strategies to limit its contact with First Nations. Firstly, oral 
testimony indicates that the HEPC grossly exaggerated (and misused) permissions to 
access reserve territories that may have been granted by Chief and Council. For example, 
the HEPC appears to have stretched permission to build an access road to Whitedog 
Indian Reserve to include flooding both Whitedog and One Man Lake reserves. 
                                            
11 Elder Lewis Debassige, “Linking the Academy with the Community” (comments, 
Anishinaabewin Eko-Ngodwaaching VI, Sudbury, ON, 14 May 2015). Lewis Debassige’s claim aligns with 
circulars approved by Guy Favreau, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, in the early 1960s.  In a 
ministry-approved circular, William Dunstan noted that “An Indian employment placement program was 
inaugurated in 1957 with the appointment of regional specialists at Toronto, Winnipeg, Edmonton and 
Vancouver. Its primary object [was] to establish carefully-selected individuals in permanent urban 
employment.” By 1963, placement officers were “employed by the Indian Affairs Branch in all nine 
regional offices” in Canada. William Dunstan, “Canadian Indians Today” (Ottawa, ON: The Royal 
Canadian Geographical Society, 1963), 11. 
12 “The White Paper 1969,” Indigenous Foundations, 2009, accessed 1 May 2015, 
http://indigenousfoundations.arts.ubc.ca/home/government-policy/the-white-paper-1969.html.  
13 Bliss, Northern Enterprise, 454. 
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Secondly, the HEPC modified its “normal operating procedure” to establish 
environmental barriers between employees and band members: Whitedog Falls 
Generating Station was to be remotely controlled.14 After 1958, when Whitedog Falls 
Generating Station was completed, automated control would make it increasingly 
difficult for band members to interact with Hydro employees. By comparing the HEPC’s 
treatment of Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company to that of First Nations, I argue 
that strategic communication activities reflected and reinforced social and environmental 
inequities in the Winnipeg River drainage basin. 
This chapter allows us to challenge historical tropes about the geographic 
distribution of the impact benefits of hydroelectric development. It has been widely 
assumed to date that “southern-based industries and consumers reap the benefits of the 
development of relatively inexpensive power.”15 By contrast, Indigenous peoples “bear 
the brunt of the impact” in Canada’s sparsely populated northlands.16 James B. Waldram 
examined twentieth-century land grabs in Manitoba and Saskatchewan, arguing that the 
doctrine of the “common good” justified shoddy negotiations between hydro operators 
and Indigenous competitors. Manitoba Hydro, for example, withheld information from 
residents of South Indian Lake to ensure the completion of the Churchill-Nelson River 
                                            
14 Archives of Ontario Power Generation (OPG), Toronto, ON, Memorandum, “Whitedog Falls 
Generating Station: Operations Access Road, Kenora T. S. to Minaki, 9 March 1956,”  
Whitedog Falls Generating Station, OHSC – Central Records 8-6-242, FP3-10726, Item 153. 
15 Notzke, Aboriginal Peoples and Natural Resources, 17. 
16 Summative statement made by Ibid. Recent works by Joy Parr and Tina Loo have also shown 
that non-Indigenous inhabitants of low density regions have shared the burden of southern energy demands. 
Parr explores the inundation of valuable farming lands in Nakusp, British Columbia, caused by the 
damming of the Columbia River. Loo suggests that non-Indigenous residents objected to the damming of 
the Columbia River and were willing to forgo “a greater range of goods and services” to maintain small-
scale agriculture (associated with economic independence). In addition to increased dependence on the 
continental food system, Loo reveals that non-Indigenous residents also lost recreational spaces. Joy Parr, 
“A River Becomes a Reservoir: The Arrow Lakes and the Damming of the Columbia,” Sensing Changes: 
Technologies, Environment, and the Everyday, 1953-2003 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia 
Press, 2010), 103-35; and Tina Loo, “People in the Way: Modernity, Environment, and Society on the 
Arrow Lakes,” BC Studies 142 (Summer/Autumn 2004): 161-96. 
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Hydro Project in 1974.17 Over 10,500 Indigenous and Métis peoples were affected by the 
flooding of about 40,470 hectares of land in service of southern Manitoba’s anticipated 
electrical demands.18 Impact benefits reaped by southern-based industries and consumers 
included “a vital source of cheap, renewable energy” and thus “higher export bills” and 
“affordable electricity bills.”19 More recently, Caroline Desbiens argued that Quebecers 
living in the Saint Lawrence Valley laid claim to James Bay, a provincial northland 
inhabited predominately by Cree families, by visualizing La Grande Dam. Cree hunters 
and trappers would bear the brunt of development as “[s]cientific representations of the 
North made it difficult for southern Quebecers to see and understand the area as its 
indigenous inhabitants did.”20 James F. Hornig’s edited collection, Social and 
Environmental Impacts of the James Bay Hydroelectric Project, introduces the diverse 
losses – dietary, economic, environmental, and socio-cultural – alluded to by Desbiens.21 
                                            
17 For a brief summary, see Notzke, Aboriginal Peoples and Natural Resources, 19. For more 
detailed analysis, see Waldram, “South Indian Lake and the Churchill River Diversion Project,” As Long as 
the Rivers Run, 115-67. 
18 Notzke, Aboriginal Peoples and Natural Resources, 17. 
19 In As Long as the River Runs, Waldram charges that the benefits like “cheap, renewable energy” 
were not directed at First Nations in Manitoba and Saskatchewan. He writes, “Hydro projects designed to 
serve southern provincial interests, and even to provide power for export, have largely failed to serve the 
interests of the northern Native people, the promises and ‘benefits’ notwithstanding. For them, there has 
been, and remains, nothing common about the ‘common good’” (173). The supposedly “common” benefits 
of hydroelectric development are summarized by “The Nelson River Hydroelectric Project: A History of 
Lake Winnipeg Regulation,” Know History Inc., 2015, accessed 28 May 2015, 
http://www.cecmanitoba.ca/resource/hearings/33/The%20Nelson%20River%20Hydroelectric%20Project.p
df. 
20 Caroline Desbiens narrowed the parameters of her research to how Quebecers constructed and 
perceived of the James Bay Project. She clearly indicates that Power from the North is not designed to 
illuminate Cree experiences of or responses to development, writing “this is not an ethnography” (10). 
Despite these claims, Desbiens makes recurrent references to the unequal division of impact benefits along 
geographic lines: benefits accrue in the south (non-Indigenous majority) and damages accrue in the north 
(Cree majority). Graeme Wynn, foreword to Power from the North: Territory, Identity, and the Culture of 
Hydroelectricity in Quebec, by Caroline Desbiens (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2013), xviii. 
21 Dietary changes are discussed, in brief, by B. D. Roebuck who identifies the methyl mercury 
contamination of predatory fish species (75, 89). Economic losses are explored by Stanley Warner who 
details losses in fur income and the parallel decline of subsistence food production (97). Environmental 
losses include habitat destruction and the consequent reduction of the region’s bio-productivity covered by 
Raymond Coppinger and Will Ryan (69). Lastly, socio-cultural losses include, but are not limited to, the 
inundation of “special places” which are also discussed by Warner (105). Roebuck, Warner, Coppinger and 
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The geographic division of impact benefits illuminated by Waldram and Desbiens raises 
the question of how impact benefits are divided within the north. 
My comparative analysis studies a place where Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
economies operated in close proximity. In the case of Whitedog Falls Generating Station, 
we find that the “brunt of the impact” is shared by Anishinabek communities within 
forty-eight kilometres of non-Indigenous industries and consumers. This finding 
complicates our understanding that geographic distance and the failure to identify local 
realities have shaped environmental inequalities. We find instead that socio-economic 
definitions of “deserving” and “undeserving” labourers, of “valuable” and “undervalued” 
industries, determined who benefited from hydroelectric development on the Winnipeg 
River.  
This comparative analysis is based on the HEPC’s internal records, which are 
archived by Ontario Power Generation (OPG) in Toronto. Public access to these records 
is currently limited by OPG. In summer 2008, I was granted access to business records 
shortly after OPG settled with Dalles 38C Indian Reserve. While the terms of the 
settlement between Ontario Power Generation and Dalles 38C were never made public, 
OPG agreed to provide educational support to band members.22 As the daughter of Allan 
Luby (Ogemah), a registered band member and former chief, I was granted educational 
support in the form of document access. Since that time OPG has continued to uphold its 
education promise to Dalles 38C and to interpret this promise broadly. In 2010, OPG 
supported the erection of a memorial on reserve to teach future generations about “the 
                                                                                                                                  
Ryan published their findings in James F. Hornig, eds. Social and Environmental Impacts of the James Bay 
Hydroelectric Project (Montréal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1999). 
22 Lloyd Mack, “Utility Chairman Apologizes to Dalles Members,” Kenora Daily Miner and 
News, 4 July 2008, accessed 1 October 2015, 
http://www.kenoradailyminerandnews.com/2008/07/04/utility-chairman-apologizes-to-dalles-members. 
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suffering” of band members whose lands were first flooded by Whitedog Falls 
Generating Station in the 1950s.23 My research is made possible by OPG’s commitment 
to resolving the grievances described in this dissertation. My ability to tell this story, to 
access archival material, is the outcome of historical trauma experienced by my paternal 
ancestors. I derived the Hydro-Electric Power Commission’s communication strategies 
from a sample of memoranda, reports, and letters produced by the Hydraulic Generation 
Division and General Counsel between 1950 and 1965. The Hydraulic Generation 
Division devoted human and financial resources to designing Whitedog Falls Generating 
Station and to producing damage estimates. General Counsel reviewed proposals 
submitted by hydraulic engineers and other planners and advised planners on their 
communications in the pursuit of their development goals. My research is limited by an 
incomplete archival data set. Internal correspondence allowed me to identify the Hydro-
Electric Power Commission’s objectives for Whitedog Falls Generating Station and to 
determine how communication was orchestrated to ensure project completion. Oftentimes 
missing, however, were records of complaint issued by the Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and 
Paper Company and band members. Complaints had to be reconstructed from records of 
the HEPC’s response to them. Thus, at times, this chapter reads between the lines, 
speculating on the nature of mill and Anishinabek complaints through the solutions 
proposed (or rejected) by the Hydro-Electric Power Commission. 
REDIRECTION AND SECRECY: HOW THE HEPC ORCHESTRATED COMMUNICATIONS 
WITH THE ONTARIO-MINNESOTA PULP AND PAPER COMPANY 
 
                                            
23 Mike Aiken, “Flood Memorial at Dalles,” 19 October 2010, accessed 1 October 2015, 
http://www.kenoradailyminerandnews.com/2010/10/19/flood-memorial-at-dalles. 
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Long before negotiations with the Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Mill began, 
the Hydro-Electric Power Commission orchestrated site development through creative 
communications with permission-granting authorities like the Department of Lands and 
Forests and the Department of Public Works. In particular, the HEPC worked with the 
Department of Lands and Forests (a provincial body) to pressure the Department of 
Public Works (a federal body) into approving site plans for Whitedog Falls Generating 
Station. As early as August 1955, the HEPC envisioned “a powerhouse, housing four 
18,500bhp units at a rated head of 50 feet, a main dam, headworks, sluiceways, block 
dams, channel improvements and… approximately 17 miles of access road.”24 To 
achieve this end, the HEPC reached out to the Department of Lands and Forests. The 
HEPC gained permission to build an access road on lands leased from Ontario. However, 
the HEPC’s decision to seek provincial permissions for land use before site approval 
from the Minister of Public Works ran counter to Lorne McDonald’s legal counsel. In 
September 1955, McDonald wrote to J. R. Montague, Director of Engineering, to inform 
his division of revisions to the Navigable Waters Protection Act. McDonald explained 
that “The Provisions of the Act preclude the Governor in Council from approving the site 
and plan of work after construction had commenced.” He advised Montague to wait for 
the Minister of Public Works to review plans for Whitedog Falls Generating Station 
before approving site plans internally.25 The Department of Hydraulic Engineers 
disregarded McDonald’s counsel. The HEPC approved site plans for “three 27,000bhp 
                                            
24 OPG, N. A. Brooks, “Summary of Estimate: Generating Station, 5 August 1955,”  
Whitedog Falls Generating Station, Folder No. 1 [FP3?] 10-1-228, Item #1042. 
25 OPG, Lorne McDonald, Counsel, to J. R. Montague, Director of Engineering, “Application 
under the Navigable Waters Protection Act, 16 September 1955,” Whitedog Falls Generating Station, 
“Navigable Waters Protection Act,” FP3-10-9-312, Item 165, Return to OHSC – Central Records 8-3-243. 
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units with a total capacity of 81,000bhp” in summer 1955.26 By September 1955, the 
HEPC had started clearing an access road.27 This moment is the first known instance of 
‘redirection’ in the Winnipeg River drainage basin. The HEPC only contacted the 
Department of Public Works once the Department of Land and Forests had a vested 
interest (i.e. income) in Whitedog Falls Generating Station. 
N. E. Tregaskes, Generation Engineer, asked B. C. Howard of the Generation 
Department to submit an application for Whitedog Falls Generating Station and block 
dam to the Department of Public Works in fall 1955. Tregaskes emphasized the HEPC’s 
working relationship with the Department of Lands and Forests in his request. He wrote, 
“These sites [i.e. Whitedog Falls] are on Crown land and the Department of Lands and 
Forests has indicated its willingness to lease the necessary land to the Commission.”28 At 
this juncture, the cost of disapproval had increased for both Ontario and the HEPC. If the 
Minister of Public Works, James Hartley, rejected site plans for Whitedog Falls 
Generating Station, the Department of Lands and Forests would lose projected revenue in 
the form of lease payments. The HEPC, by contrast, stood to lose capital already invested 
in the Winnipeg River drainage basin. The HEPC could not recover wages paid for roads 
already cleared. Further, men hired to clear the access road faced unemployment before 
the completion of the proposed dam. When public policy on a national scale emphasized 
economic growth and full employment, Hartley’s team had few options outside of site 
                                            
26 OPG, “M. War, System Planning Engineer, to F. Grovesnor, re. “System Planning 
Development: Notification of Approval and Request for Preparation of Work Orders,” 25 July 1955,” 
Whitedog Falls Generating Station, Folder No. 1 [FP3] 10-1-228, Item #1042. 
27 OPG, Memorandum, “Whitedog Falls Generating Station: General Description and Design 
Requirements, 13 September 1955,” Whitedog Falls Generating Station, Folder No. 1 [FP3?] 10-1-228, 
Item #1042. 
28 OPG, “N. E. Tregaskes to B. C. Howard Legger, re: Whitedog Fall GS Application for 
Approval under the Navigable Waters Protection Act, 14 October 1955,” Whitedog Falls Generating 
Station, “Navigable Waters Protection Act,” FP3-10-9-312, Item 165, Return to OHSC – Central Records 
8-3-243. 
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approval. The HEPC’s application to the Department of Public Works highlighted 
Ontario’s economic interest in development. The application concluded with reference to 
Ontario’s “willingness to lease” required lands to the Hydro-Electric Power Commission. 
The HEPC reminded the Minister of Public Works that Ontario hoped to generate money 
and hydroelectricity at Whitedog Falls.29 
Subsequent communications between the Department of Public Works and the 
HEPC masked violations of the Navigable Waters Protection Act. Both parties presented 
their actions in alignment with federal procedure, writing as if a breach of the 1955 
revisions had not occurred. For example, the Hydro-Electric Power Commission filed for 
site approval on 8 November 1955. The Crown Corporation cited an outdated version of 
the act – particularly the Navigable Waters Protection Act, R.S.C. 1952, Chapter 193 – in 
its application.30 G. B. Anderson, District Engineer of the Department of Public Works, 
did not formally acknowledge this application error. Anderson appears to have taken the 
HEPC’s application into consideration despite clear limits on the grandfather clause in 
the revised Navigable Waters Protection Act: projects commenced before 1 June 1938 
were not subject to penalty.31 Anderson also glanced over physical violations of the 
Navigable Waters Protection Act when it became clear that the Hydro-Electric Power 
Commission had started construction. For example, Anderson indicated that Department 
approval might be granted for site development in a letter to W. G. Baggs, the HEPC’s 
resident engineer. Manchul, a member of Anderson’s staff at Fort William (present-day 
                                            
29 OPG, “E. G. Easson to Secretary, Department of Public Works, Ottawa, ON, “RE: Whitedog 
Falls GS, Winnipeg River, District of Kenora, Navigable Waters Protection Act,” 8 November 1955,” 
Whitedog Falls Generating Station, “Navigable Waters Protection Act,” FP3-10-9-312, Item 165, Return to 
OHSC – Central Records 8-3-243. 
30 Ibid. 
31 OPG, “Lorne McDonald to J. R. Montague, 16 September 1955.”  
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Thunder Bay) was to consider Easson’s request by visiting Whitedog Island.32 This ruse 
of the HEPC’s participation in the state’s regulatory framework became absurd in 
December 1955. Baggs, the HEPC’s Resident Engineer, offered to facilitate Manchul’s 
travel to the ‘proposed’ site for Whitedog Falls Generating Station. Baggs wrote, “[I]t is 
now possible to land a plane at our camp on Roughrock Lake and drive by Jeep the five 
miles from there to the dam site at Whitedog Falls.”33 While the camp was land-based 
(and thus dependent on provincial leasing arrangements), Manchul’s letter reveals 
substantive environmental modifications without approval from the Department of Public 
Works. Further, “the site” is referred to as a physical rather than imaginative space. 
Manchul is not being asked to approve a plan; Manchul is being asked to approve a 
working site. These violations are not mentioned by either party. Instead, the federal 
cabinet, using an Order-in-Council, approved the ‘site plan’ without penalty on 12 April 
1956 on the recommendation of the Minister of Public Works.34 From the start, the HEPC 
relied on the Department of Lands and Forests to limit the negotiating potential of 
‘outsiders’ (here the Department of Public Works) to help ensure the construction of 
Whitedog Falls Generating Station. 
The Department of Public Works, however, did not pose a serious political threat 
to hydro operations. Both Canada and Ontario were committed to economic growth. The 
                                            
32 OPG, “G. B. Anderson, District Engineer, Department of Public Works to W. G. Baggs, 
Resident Engineer, Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario, 1 December 1955,” Whitedog Falls 
Generating Station, “Navigable Waters Protection Act,” FP3-10-9-312, Item 165, Return to OHSC – 
Central Records 8-3-243. 
33 OPG, “W. G. Baggs, Resident Engineer, Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario, to G. B. 
Anderson, District Engineer, Department of Public Works, 5 December 1955,” Whitedog Falls Generating 
Station, “Navigable Waters Protection Act,” FP3-10-9-312, Item 165, Return to OHSC – Central Records 
8-3-243. 
34 OPG, “Copy: P. C. 1956-756 Privy Council, 12 April 1956,” Whitedog Falls Generating 
Station, “Navigable Waters Protection Act,” FP3-10-9-312, Item 165, Return to OHSC – Central Records 
8-3-243. 
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Hydro-Electric Power Commission had to protect itself from industrialists who might 
launch competing, policy-oriented claims to Winnipeg River. In spring 1955, the 
Generation Department requested that W. S. Campbell, Assistant Solicitor, “investigate 
land rights or other land interests that might be affected by the development of Whitedog 
Falls power site.”35 Research was the first step in identifying competitors in the Winnipeg 
River drainage basin. In response to Ireson’s request, Campbell launched a fact-finding 
mission, tracing Crown leases and patented lands. The first two pages of Campbell’s 
memorandum appear to be a simple status notification on lease and license types in the 
immediate area. Indeed, the report is formatted as a numbered list. Point (6), however, 
breaks the mold. Point (6) is not a status notification, but a nuanced interpretation of 
Edward Wellington Backus’ Whitedog Rapids lease. During the summer of 1920, 
Ontario Premier Ernest Charles Drury had made a hotly contested deal with E. W. 
Backus. On 30 September 1920, as per Drury’s recommendation, the Minister of Lands 
and Forests granted Backus “a lease of White Dog Rapids, together with all water power 
privileges” as well as “the right to flood crown lands.”36 Backus’ lease – over 30 years 
old – made the Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company a competitor in the 
Winnipeg River drainage basin; the paper mill could launch a claim to Whitedog Falls if 
the HEPC failed to question its leasehold. 
Aware of this threat, counsel drafted a legal argument for the nullification of 
Backus’ lease in Point (6). Assistant Solicitor Campbell suggested that the water power 
                                            
35 OPG, “[E. T. Ireson], Generation Engineer, to W. S. Campbell, re. Winnipeg River: Whitedog 
Power Site, 29 April 1955,” Whitedog Falls Generating Station, FP3-10101-8, V. 1, OHSC Central records 
8-3-242.  
36 OPG, “Assistant Solicitor (illegible, presumably W. S. Campbell) to E. T. Ireson, re. Winnipeg 
River – White Dog Power Site, 6 May 1955,” Whitedog Falls Generating Station, FP#-110101-8 V. 1, Item 
#114, Return to OHSC – Central Records 8-3-242. 
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lease was tacked onto the Lake of the Woods and English River Pulpwood Limits: water 
rights were never, counsel implied, one of Backus’ genuine interests. Campbell argued 
that “the White Dog Power Site becomes enormously tangled up with the much greater 
controversies over… timber limits.”37 Such conclusions were drawn without consulting 
with Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company. A close reading thus reveals that 
‘investigative’ work was deeply intertwined with the HEPC’s larger goal of establishing 
positional power (or, authority) in the Winnipeg River drainage basin. Internal 
correspondence labelled the Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company an uninterested 
party. Ireson appears to have circulated Campbell’s memorandum within the Generation 
Department, ensuring that the HEPC employees understood Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and 
Paper Company as a mill with timber (not water) interests. When this position was 
adopted, the Hydro-Electric Power Commission had yet to receive approval for Whitedog 
Falls Generating Station from the Department of Public Works. By presenting the mill as 
having secondary interest in Whitedog Rapids, the HEPC positioned itself as the most 
deserving recipient of “water power privileges.” The HEPC claimed primary interest in 
the site. Employees were versed in counsel’s language of primary and secondary interest. 
This hierarchy of rights was then linked to public demand: province-wide consumption 
had increased from 4,000 kW to 1,558,500 kW between 1910 and 1939 alone.38 Of the 
two companies, the Hydro-Electric Power Commission claimed the greatest need for and 
genuine interest in Whitedog Rapids. 
The HEPC’s hierarchy of interest was used to rationalize the redirection of rights-
related questions away from the Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company. Internal 
                                            
37 Ibid. 
38 Ontario Hydro, Ontario Hydro a Proud Tradition 1906-1999 (Toronto: Ontario Hydro, 1999), 
26. 
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correspondence emphasized that Backus failed to develop Whitedog Rapids during his 
leasehold. Counsel presented this failure as evidence of Backus’ supposedly limited 
interest in water. While Backus’ agreement with Ontario (circa 1920) did not specify an 
expiration date, Assistant Solicitor Campbell argued that “Backus would have lost any 
rights in the power site through a possible default in carrying out his…obligations.”39 
Campbell urged the Generation Department to confirm default through the Department of 
Lands and Forests. Campbell suggested that the HEPC had no legal or ethical 
responsibility to contact the Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company: “it seems to 
me [Counsel], that it would be primarily the obligation of the Dept. of Lands and Forests 
to inform the Commission whether or not there still existed any commitments to the 
Backus interest with regard to this power site.” Conveniently, the Crown as represented 
by Beniah Bowman, Minister of Lands and Forests, retained the right to nullify the 1920 
agreement.40 E. T. Ireson was instructed to contact the minister “and specifically ask for 
his assurance that there is no outstanding obligation to the Backus interests or any 
successors of them [e.g. Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company].” While both the 
HEPC and the Department of Lands and Forests served provincial interests, Campbell 
emphasized that “[t]he Government should give a ruling on this point rather than the 
Commission’s Legal Department.”41 Access to Whitedog Rapids was orchestrated by 
counsel. Firstly, the HEPC’s legal team identified the Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper 
Company as a competitor. Campbell then emphasized Backus’ timber interests to 
neutralize the mill as a political threat. He advised the Generation Department to 
                                            
39 OPG, “Assistant Solicitor W. S. Campbell to E. T. Ireson, re. Winnipeg River – Whitedog 
Power Site, 6 May 1955,” Whitedog Falls Generating Station, FP#-110101-8 V. 1, Item #114, Return to 
OHSC – Central Records 8-3-242. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid.  
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communicate with Ontario instead of the paper mill. Campbell emphasized Backus’ 
seemingly limited interest in Whitedog Rapids to rationalize this exclusionary approach. 
By writing the Minister directly, the HEPC evaded negotiations about water rights with 
the mill. Ontario revoked Backus’ lease and gave the HEPC “water power privileges.” 
With no further right to Whitedog Rapids, the paper mill could only demand 
compensation from the HEPC for flooding damages and capital losses. The HEPC thus 
ensured site access through legal, non-confrontational routes. During the early stages of 
development, the HEPC improved its positional authority by establishing itself as the 
rightful leaseholder of Whitedog Rapids. 
Research not only allowed the Hydro-Electric Power Commission to identify 
competitors and to establish a hierarchy of interest at Whitedog Rapids, it normalized the 
HEPC’s claim to them. General descriptions of Whitedog Falls Generating Station – 
circulated as early as 1955 – included a brief history of dam development in the 
Winnipeg River drainage basin, particularly at the northern outlets. This historical 
synopsis encouraged a particular way of viewing water resources, which in Lake of the 
Woods had changed hands as community needs changed. Consider that the historical 
synopsis begins with reference to the “natural discharge” of Lake of the Woods into 
Darlington and Rideout bays on the lower Winnipeg River. Nature was the first to control 
water resources. But, control changed hands in 1879 when John Mather, unnamed by the 
HEPC, developed water power for his sawmill. The anonymous corporate author 
emphasized that water flowed between users – from Nature to Mather to Backus – 
writing, “Various power plants were progressively built, abandoned and rebuilt by 
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various agencies.”42 Change was presented as the only constant in the Winnipeg River 
drainage basin. The anonymous author inserted the Hydro-Electric Power Commission 
into this ‘progressive’ pattern. Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company was also part 
of this ‘progressive’ pattern – but, its interests were fading. Backus had (likely) defaulted 
on his lease of Whitedog Rapids. Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company’s 
hydroelectric presence on the north shore (e.g. at Norman Dam and the Kenora 
Powerhouse) was presented as impermanent. The corporate author explained that, “The 
two main presently operating plants… are now the property of the Ontario-Minnesota 
Pulp and Paper Company Limited.”43 His (or her) use of “presently” and “now” 
downplays the paper mill’s right to water resources. History dictated change. History 
became a tool through which to rationalize losses incurred by the Ontario-Minnesota Pulp 
and Paper Company: ‘progress’ had long-demanded that upstarts in the Winnipeg River 
drainage basin wrest water resources from established users. Water ought to flow from 
Backus. 
Such rationale was critical to dam development – the Hydro-Electric Power 
Commission anticipated that the Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company would 
suffer damages once Whitedog Falls Generating Station began operations. As early as 
August 1955, N. E. Tregaskes, Generation Engineer, demanded a supplementary study of 
“lands bordering the Winnipeg [R]iver upstream from Whitedog Island to Norman [D]am 
at Kenora.”44 Research conducted by the legal department in 1954 had been limited to 
                                            
42 OPG, Memorandum, “Whitedog Falls Generating Station: General Description and Design 
Requirements, 13 September 1955.” 
43 Ibid. 
44 OPG, “N. E. Tresgaskes, Generation Engineer, to W. S. Campbell, re. Whitedog Falls 
Generating Station: Property, 25 August 1955,” Whitedog Falls Generating Station, FP3-10101-8, V. 1, 
Item #114, OHSC-Central Records 8-3-242. 
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lands in the vicinity of Whitedog Island. Tregaskes assumed that raised tail water would 
“reduce the head of the hydro plants at Kenora by one foot and the Commission will 
probably have to make compensation in some form for the power so lost.”  The use of the 
phrase “have to” is of particular interest. It suggests that the HEPC had an obligation to 
pay for environmental change.45Although Backus may have defaulted on his lease and 
the HEPC’s legal department used history to justify the Commission’s claim to Whitedog 
Rapids, hydro employees knew that it could not jeopardize mill operations. Damages 
could be rationalized – political threats could be neutralized – if the Ontario-Minnesota 
Pulp and Paper Company accepted the HEPC’s compensatory scheme. “Energy returns” 
were presented as one possible form of compensation. Although the modifier “probably” 
suggests a top-down exchange of hydro services (i.e. energy in recognition of loss), 
Tregaskes’ proposal reveals that the HEPC was swayed by industry. The mill, it seems, 
retained the right to question hydro’s operations and had the political clout to demand 
change in hydro’s operations. Secrecy would help to manage industrial outcry before 
Whitedog Falls Generating Station began operations. 
When the Hydro-Electric Power Commission entered into conversation with the 
Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Mill it withheld damage estimates. Internally, hydro 
employees detailed how the reservoir for Whitedog Falls Generating Station would 
reduce the power potential at Norman Dam and Kenora Dam, two generating stations 
owned by the paper mill. By September 1955, internal reports confirmed Tregaskes’ 
                                            
45 Ibid. 
In 1957, O. E. Johnston, Generating Engineer, confirmed that “The water level upstream from The 
[sic] Dalles to Kenora will… be about one foot [0.30 metres] higher than the natural high water.” OPG, “O. 
E. Johnston, Generation Engineer to Mr. A. E. Huddleston, re: Whitedog Falls G.S. Property Damages, 9 
May 1957,” Whitedog Falls Generating Station, FP3-10101-8, V. 1, Item #114, OHSC-Central Records 8-
3-242. 
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belief that operations at Whitedog Falls Generating Station would raise tail waters at 
Norman Dam. Design plans indicated that water would back up through Dalles Channel – 
at Dalles 38C Indian Reserve – and into Darlington and Rideout Bay at the northern 
outlets of Lake of the Woods.46 How would this increase in water levels impact the 
Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company? The paper mill’s hydroelectric generators 
depended on the kinetic energy of water dropped from Lake of the Woods into the 
Winnipeg River.  The United States Corps of Engineers explains that “[a] hydraulic 
turbine converts the energy of flowing water [kinetic energy] into mechanical energy. A 
hydroelectric generator converts this mechanical energy into electricity.”47 The bigger the 
drop between Lake of the Woods and Winnipeg River, the greater the amount of kinetic 
energy captured by the hydraulic turbine. The higher the levels of kinetic energy, the 
greater the levels of electricity converted by the hydroelectric generator. By raising tail 
waters (or “reducing head”) at the Norman Dam, the Hydro-Electric Power Commission 
jeopardized the paper mill’s ability to independently power pulp and paper production. In 
September 1955, hydro employees knew that the operation of Whitedog Falls Generating 
Station would stymie paper production or make the Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper 
Company dependent on energy purchases. The HEPC predicted a complete reversal in 
the division of economic power in the Winnipeg River drainage basin. Five years prior, 
the HEPC purchased power from the Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company to 
service Dryden.48 The paper mill also serviced residents in Kenora. Whitedog Falls 
                                            
46 OPG, Memorandum, “Whitedog Falls Generating Station: General Description and Design 
Requirements, 13 September 1955.”  
47 U.S. Geological Survey, “Hydroelectric Power: How It Works,” The USGS Water Science 
School, accessed 12 May 2015, http://water.usgs.gov/edu/hyhowworks.html. 
48 “Hydro Power Turned to Monday – Customers Served,” Kenora Miner and News, 7 February 
1950, 1. See also “Council Will Sign 2-Year Power Agreement with MANDO,” Kenora Miner and News, 
11 January 1955, 1. 
 
 
171 
Generating Station, however, would make the paper mill dependent on its former 
customer. 
To reduce the impact of Whitedog Falls Generating Station on mill operations, 
hydro employees imagined how they might provide equivalent energy returns to the 
Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company. Commission Approval 7273 authorized the 
construction of Whitedog Falls Generating Station and a circuit breaker at the Kenora 
Service Station to incorporate Whitedog Falls into the Northwestern Division. Plans also 
included “a three-breaker 115kv station for the supply of the Ontario-Minnesota Paper 
Co.”49 The Hydro-Electric Power Commission approved these plans without informing 
the Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company of anticipated damages. When the 
HEPC entered into negotiations with the paper mill in spring 1956, hydro employees 
failed to detail upcoming changes to water levels at Rideout and Darlington Bay. Instead, 
hydro employees negotiated additional power sales with mill officials. The Ontario-
Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company agreed to purchase energy from the HEPC as early 
as 1958.50 The HEPC connected the paper mill to their electric grid and expected future 
dependency. The paper mill, by contrast, agreed to purchase additional power to expand 
                                            
49 OPG, “Facilities at Kenora SS and for the Incorporation of Whitedog Falls GS into the 
Northwestern Division, 4 November 1955,” Whitedog Falls Generating Station, Folder No. 1, 10-1-228, 
Item #1042. 
50 The Kenora Miner and News reported on energy purchases, confirming that the HEPC had 
taken over some of the load by December 1958. The focus of the article was price inflation. An 
unidentified reporter feared that “The Paper Company buys power from Hydro, and re-sells it to the Town 
at a profit.” There was no indication that the Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company had lost the 
ability to produce sufficient hydroelectricity at Norman Dam to service Kenora and mill operations. “Why 
You Should Vote ‘Yes’ for Power Changeover,” Kenora Daily Miner and News, unpaginated. 
In 1960, F. C. Lawson, Assistant Director of Operations, confirmed that the Ontario-Minnesota 
Pulp and Paper Company was an active energy consumer: “The Company’s mill at Kenora is already 
connected to Hydro’s Northwestern Region system for the purpose of supplying the Company, as a paying 
customer, with the power and energy needed beyond the capabilities of their Norman Dam and Kenora 
powerhouses.” OPG, “F. C. Lawson, Assistant Director of Operations, to L. R. McDonald, General 
Counsel, re: Preparation of Agreement with the Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company, 26 
September 1960,” Whitedog Falls Generating Station, FP3E V.1, O.H.S.C. 8-3-242, VC 9, Item 108. 
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operations. Secrecy ensured that the HEPC had the paper mill’s support for Whitedog 
Falls Generating Station. Only once locked into a service agreement would the Ontario-
Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company realize that its continued operation depended on 
energy purchased from the Hydro-Electric Power Commission. The HEPC reduced mill 
functionality, leaving the Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company with few options 
other than cooperation. 
The HEPC continued to withhold information from the Ontario-Minnesota Pulp 
and Paper Company after the service agreement (1956) was signed. Secrecy may have 
been rooted in the HEPC’s definition of the Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company 
as a political threat. In January 1957, S. Crowley asked the Generation Department to 
predict “gain in power at Whitedog” and “loss in power at Kenora” at varying water 
levels. H. M. McFarlane responded. He began his calculations at 1034 feet (315.16 
metres) above sea level – the “natural” level of Winnipeg River, which is the level at 
which Norman Dam was designed to operate. McFarlane appears to have selected 1038 
feet (316.38 metres) above sea level for experimental purposes. The HEPC’s License of 
Occupation, granted by the Department of Lands and Forests, only gave clearance up to 
1036 feet (315.77 metres) above sea level (the “natural high water mark”).51 “Gain in 
Power” implied a benefit for the Hydro-Electric Power Commission. It referred to 
improved functionality. “Loss of Power” referred to reduced functionality in Kenora, 
which would have negatively impacted power production by the Ontario-Minnesota Pulp 
and Paper Company. Table 1 shows McFarlane’s results: 
                                            
51 OPG, “J. B. Bryce, Hydraulic Engineer, to J. S. Crerar, Senior Design Engineer, “Whitedog 
Falls Generating Station: Effects of Regulated Water Levels at Minaki on Power Output at Whitedog Falls 
Generating Station and on Power Plants at Kenora,” 8 March 1957,” Whitedog Falls Generating Station, 
FP3-10901, 65, 21-117, OHSC – Central Records 8-2-240. 
 
 
173 
 
TABLE 1: Gain in Power at Whitedog, Loss of Power at Kenora and Net Gain in 
Power for Various Regulated Water Levels at Minaki [Sample at 10,000 CFS] 
 
This study presents the Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company as an 
adversary, not a business partner. McFarlane discovered that the HEPC would experience 
improved operational functionality if the paper mill experienced reduced operational 
functionality. This adversarial frame made open negotiations (or information-sharing) a 
high-risk activity. The HEPC stood to lose power (electrical) if the Ontario-Minnesota 
Pulp and Paper Company pressured the Department of Lands and Forests to maintain 
clearance levels. McFarlane maintained that “natural” levels (1034-1036 feet or 315.16-
315.77 metres above sea level) would result in “undesirably low forebay levels at 
Whitedog Falls Generating Station.”52 To ensure optimal functionality, the Hydro-
Electric Power Commission needed the Department of Lands and Forests to change 
clearance levels. It would be easiest to gain clearances from Ontario without competing 
                                            
52 OPG, “H. M. McFarlane, Memorandum: Whitedog Falls Generating Station: Effects of 
Regulated Water Levels at Minaki on Power Output at Whitedog Falls Generating Station and on Power 
Plants at Kenora, 5 March 1957,” Whitedog Falls Generating Station, FP3-10901,  65, 21-117, OHSC – 
Central Records 8-2-240. 
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[IN 
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DIVISION] 
1038 10,000 10,000 5.51 5312 2.40 2314 2998 
1037 10,000 10,000 4.46 4300 1.75 1687 2613 
1036 10,000 10,000 3.38 3258 1.20 1157 2101 
1035 10,000 10,000 2.26 2179 0.75 723 1456 
1034 10,000 10,000 1.08 1041 0.36 347 694 
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industrial demands. McFarlane’s study presented new clearance levels (1037-1038 feet or 
316.08-316.38 metres above sea level) as an optimal solution for industry in general. 
Consider that McFarlane devoted a column to “net gain.” At 1036 feet (315.77 metres) 
above sea level, for example, generating stations in Kenora would lose 1157 horsepower; 
however, the Northwestern District would make a net gain of 2101 horsepower. Using 
McFarlane’s calculations, the Hydro-Electric Power Commission argued that it could 
offset the losses at Kenora. This argument was strongest in isolation – where the Ontario-
Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company could not highlight the cost of equipment or the risk 
of economic dependency. It was easiest to argue for the ‘greater good’ of the Winnipeg 
River drainage basin (think “net gains”) when the greatest losers were silent. 
In February 1958, the Whitedog Reservoir (or head pond) reached an operating 
elevation of 1036-1037 feet (315.77-316.08 metres) above sea level.53 As Tregaskes and 
McFarlane predicted, hydroelectric generation at the Norman Dam and the Kenora 
Powerhouse – the Ontario Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company’s power plants – 
declined. The paper mill tried to adapt to riverine change by increasing the amount of 
water drawn from Lake of the Woods. Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company 
operated at 100 percent turbine gate opening.54 But, a 1.24-foot (0.38-metre) reduction in 
head decreased the commercial efficiency of Norman Dam and Kenora Powerhouse. 
Elevated tail water levels meant that turbines collected insufficient kinetic energy to meet 
the Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company’s electrical needs. The paper mill then 
                                            
53 OPG, “H. M. McFarlane, Hydraulic Design Engineer, to J. B. Bryce, Hydraulic Engineer, re: 
Winnipeg River: Effect of Operation of Whitedog Falls Headpond on Tailwater Elevations at the Lake of 
the Woods Outlets, 15 January 1960,” Whitedog Falls Generating Station, FP3E V.1, O.H.S.C. 8-3-242, 
VC 9, Item 108. 
54 OPG, “A. K. Aeberli, Turbine and Governor Engineer, Filing Memorandum: Kenora and 
Norman Dam Generating Stations, 4 April 1960,” Whitedog Falls Generating Station, FP3E V.1, O.H.S.C. 
8-3-242, VC 9, Item 108. 
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purchased additional electricity to supplement power produced by corporate dams. But, 
Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company’s solution did not restore operational 
efficiency. In 1960, the Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company finally approached 
the Hydro-Electric Power Commission to demand compensation for recurring losses. 
Despite predicting these losses, the HEPC responded with a call for research. The HEPC 
suggested that engineers had “computed increased tail water elevations,” but that further 
research was necessary to “investigate the actual conditions…since the Whitedog 
headpond was raised to its operating levels.”55 Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper 
Company’s damage claim required substantiation. Throughout the investigative process, 
the HEPC downplayed the causal relationship between Whitedog Reservoir and reduced 
functionality at the Norman Dam and Kenora Powerhouse. For example, McFarlane 
suggested that “water levels at the Lake of the Woods plants increased co-incidentally 
[sic] with the increase in Minaki elevations.”56 Language is a slippery thing. The use of 
“co-incidentally” implies an unexpected meeting of two entities (here Whitedog 
Reservoir and the paper mill’s hydroelectric generators). The HEPC wrote chance into its 
reports, weakening the connection between its operations and the threat that they posed to 
cost-efficient paper production. It is under the guise of happenstance that representatives 
from both companies agreed to meet in March 1960. J. Hamer, the HEPC Area Manager, 
consented to visit the mill site in Kenora, Ontario, and to tour the Norman Dam and 
Kenora Powerhouse with W. Leyder. Both Hamer and Leyder sought “a mutually 
                                            
55 OPG, “H. M. McFarlane, Hydraulic Design Engineer to J. B. Bryce, Hydraulic Engineer, 
Internal Record re: Winnipeg River: Effect of Operation of Whitedog Falls Headpond, 15 January 1960,” 
Whitedog Falls Generating Station, FP3E V.1, O.H.S.C. 8-3-242, VC 9, Item 108. 
56 Ibid. 
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acceptable method of providing replacement power.”57 And yet, Hamer had positional 
authority during these friendly discussions. The HEPC’s use of redirection and secrecy in 
earlier communications put mill employees (like Leyder) in a position of seeking remedy 
for incurred damages instead of preventing operational loss. 
By June 1960 both the Hydro-Electric Power Commission and the Ontario-
Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company were prepared to enter a remedial contract. The 
HEPC “conceded that the tailwater elevation” was “raised to some extent” by Whitedog 
Falls Generating Station shortly after Hamer’s site visit. Both parties agreed that 
“replacement power would be acceptable… in lieu of lost head.”58 The HEPC entered 
into preliminary engineering discussions with mill officials to ‘draft’ a recommendation 
for replacement power. While the language of possibility – could and may – is laced 
throughout the HEPC’s recommendation, the plan itself is eerily similar to the 1958 
design for an 115 kv circuit.59 F. C. Lawson, Assistant Director of Operations, suggested 
that replacement power could be supplied to the paper mill through a tie-line. The HEPC 
later deemed an extra tie-line unnecessary: the existing breaker (at the Kenora Station) 
could carry the compensatory load. By keeping the 1958 designs (and McFarlane’s 
earlier calculations) secret, the HEPC forced the mill into a dependent position – but, the 
HEPC spun this dependency as a sign of cooperation. The Hydro-Electric Power 
Commission framed dated designs as creative concessions to the outside world. There 
                                            
57 OPG, O. E. Johnston, Hydraulic Generation Engineer, “Filing Memorandum: The Effect of 
Regulation of Whitedog Falls Generating Station Forebay on Operation of Lake of the Woods Outlet 
Plants, 26 April 1960,” Whitedog Falls Generating Station, FP3E V.1, O.H.S.C. 8-3-242, VC 9, Item 108. 
58 OPG, “H. P. Cadario, Director of Engineering, to H. A. Smith, Assistant General Engineer, re: 
Negotiations with Ontario and Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company and with Lake of the Woods Milling 
Company Regarding Loss of Generating Capacity at their Lake of the Woods Plants, 20 June 1960,” 
Whitedog Falls Generating Station, FP3E V.1, O.H.S.C. 8-3-242, VC 9, Item 108. 
59 OPG, “F. C. Lawson to L. R. McDonald re: Preparation of Agreement with the Ontario-
Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company, 20 June 1960,” Whitedog Falls Generating Station, FP3E V.1, 
O.H.S.C. 8-3-242, VC 9, Item 108. 
 
 
177 
was no coincidence here. As early as 1957, McFarlane had submitted a cost-benefit 
analysis that confirmed commercially feasible power production at Kenora would cost 
the HEPC approximately 2000 horsepower at Whitedog Falls Generating Station.60 The 
HEPC raised water levels knowing that remediation would be more lucrative than 
damage prevention. It is hardly surprising the Hydraulic Generation Department 
“recommend[ed] that this Commission and the Companies enter into a formal contract to 
put this agreement [115 kv breaker and free energy returns] into effect.”61 The HEPC had 
been waiting for the opportune time to implement its 1958 design. The Ontario-
Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company negotiated with the HEPC from a weak position. 
Ontario had revoked the mill’s right to generate power at Whitedog Rapids. The HEPC 
then raised tailwater levels on the Winnipeg River and reduced the amount of power 
generated at the Norman Dam. Yet, federal policies guaranteed that the Ontario-
Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company had a position at the negotiating table. The HEPC 
could not jeopardize mill functionality when federal policy dictated business expansion 
and full employment.  
Now, the Hydro-Electric Power Commission designed this 115 kv breaker to 
move electrical energy. But, how much “additional power” was Ontario-Minnesota Pulp 
and Paper Company entitled to? In June 1960, the HEPC suggested that energy returns be 
determined using a simple physics computation: “Since this company already 
continuously purchases from Ontario Hydro at Kenora an amount of power which is in 
excess of their own generating capacity there, the question of replacing peak power is…a 
                                            
60 Refer to Table 1 for a detailed record of these calculations. Note that Norman Dam at Kenora 
operated effectively at 1034 feet (315.16 metres) above sea-level at Minaki. At the time of these estimates, 
the HEPC had permission to operate at 1036 feet (315.77) above sea-level at Minaki.  
61 OPG, “H. P. Cadario to H. A. Smith, re: Negotiations with the Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and 
Paper Company, 20 June 1960.”  
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minor consideration.”62 The “energy return” was to be calculated as follows: E2 = (E1) 
(H2) / (H1). The HEPC based its computation – to be detailed shortly – on the following 
environmental truths: Whitedog Falls Generating Station, being very well located, now 
controlled the water level of the downstream basin (up to and potentially including Lake 
of the Woods). Ontario Pulp and Paper Company, located at the northern outlet of Lake 
of the Woods, only diverted a bit of that water. Power production at the Norman Dam and 
Kenora Powerhouse (owned by the paper mill) depended on tail water elevation. Given 
its massive influence on the Winnipeg River drainage basin, Whitedog Falls Generating 
Station raised tail water elevation in Kenora. Tail water elevation impacted the amount of 
head available to Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company and thus the amount of 
kinetic energy collected (and converted) at the mill. Whitedog Falls Generating Station 
thus limited electrical power generation at Norman Dam and Kenora Powerhouse. And 
so, the proposed compensation scheme went as follows: 
1. H1 refers to the “head” at the northern outlet now that Whitedog Falls Generating 
Station exists. 
2. H2 refers to the “head” at the northern outlet “before” Whitedog Falls Generating 
Station existed. Note that this is a rough estimate.  
3. Given environmental modifications, H2 is larger than H1. The difference between 
H2 and H1 is the measurable impact that Whitedog Falls Generating Station had 
on Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company.  
                                            
62 OPG, Hydraulic Generation Department, Report on the Loss of Power Output Plants due to 
Regulation of the Whitedog Falls Generating Station Headpond and Suggested Method for Replacement of 
Power, Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario, 13 June 1960, Whitedog Falls Generating Station, 
FP3E V.1, O.H.S.C. 8-3-242, VC 9, Item 108. 
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4. Compute H2/H1 (a simple ratio). Use that ratio to infer the potential energy that 
could have been produced.  
So, for example, if H2 is 30 percent more than H1 (let us imagine that H2 = 130 and H1 
= 100), then you would say that E2 would be 30 percent more than E1. E2 – E1 is the 
“loss in energy” that needs to be compensated. This computation scheme makes physical 
sense. Theoretically, energy output is linear to head. Whitedog Falls Generating Station 
impacts the energy output in Kenora by raising the tailwater elevation which linearly 
reduces head and, by extension, energy output. This calculation accounted for Ontario-
Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company’s dependence on the HEPC and ensured that mill 
operations continued. 
A few months after the Hydro-Electric Power Commission proposed the breaker 
and computation, F. C. Lawson, Assistant Direct of Operations, contacted solicitor Lorne 
McDonald to prepare a draft agreement for the Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper 
Company. Lawson explained that “the purpose of the agreement is to provide that Hydro 
recompense the Ontario-Minnesota Company for the reduced generation at their Norman 
Dam and Kenora powerhouse due to raised [tailwater] elevations.” While the Ontario-
Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company had long purchased power from the HEPC, the 
revised contract was to guarantee “[f]ree power and energy is to be the means of 
recompense.” Lawson suggested that “free power” be determined monthly. More 
specifically, Lawson recommended that losses at the paper mill “be calculated at the end 
of [each] month and provided free during the following month.”63 This program for 
“energy recompense” guaranteed regular communication between hydro and the paper 
                                            
63 OPG, “F. C. Lawson to L. R. McDonald re: Preparation of Agreement with the Ontario-
Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company, 26 September 1960.”  
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mill, a competing riverine user. Monthly contact resulted in a mutually beneficial 
relationship between riverine users: both the paper mill and hydro could operate and 
generate income. Further, this “energy return” system protected future employees in both 
industries. Consider that Clause 7 of the agreement bound the Hydroelectric Power 
Commission to “the parties hereto and their successors.” The Hydro-Electric Power 
Commission was contractually obliged to compensate the mill until “the Company, its 
successors or assigns ceases permanently to operate it Kenora and Norman 
powerhouses.”64 The contractual bond, however, did not prompt an acknowledgment of 
earlier wrongdoing. Ontario Hydro refused to provide retroactive compensation – this 
agreement was to assure future operations, not to compensate for past damages. The 
HEPC carefully orchestrated communication activities to force the paper mill into this 
dependent position. And yet, protracted negotiations did allow the Ontario-Minnesota 
Pulp and Paper Company to recover economically. Monthly communications allowed the 
Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company to make demands of Ontario Hydro. The 
Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company ‘won’ energy returns and regained 
functionality – even after the HEPC claimed industrial control over water resources in the 
Winnipeg River drainage basin. Both industries could (and did) operate for many years to 
come. 
EXAGGERATED PERMISSIONS AND GEOGRAPHIC DISTANCE: HOW THE HEPC LIMITED 
COMMUNICATIONS WITH FIRST NATIONS ALONG THE WINNIPEG RIVER 
 
 By contrast, the Hydro-Electric Power Commission invested little human capital 
into establishing regular patterns of communication with Anishinabek river users. This 
                                            
64 OPG, “Agreement between the Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company Limited and the 
Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario, 27 February 1961,” Whitedog Falls Generating Station, 
folder: Legal Department-General OHSC 8-3-242, FP3-10931, Item 162. 
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part of the chapter focuses specifically on instances where the HEPC exaggerated 
permissions to access reserve lands and avoided communication with band members at 
One Man Lake, Whitedog, and Dalles 38C reserves. As demonstrated in the Ontario-
Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company example, the HEPC relied on the Department of 
Lands and Forests, a provincial body, to frame its discussions with the paper mill. The 
HEPC similarly evaded direct conversation with competing Anishinabek river users and 
sought permissions from their governing body: the Department of Citizenship and 
Immigration, Indian Affairs Branch. The HEPC’s records of written and verbal 
correspondence with Indian Agents create the impression that the Commission fulfilled 
its obligation to negotiate access to reserve lands. However, a closer examination of the 
written record suggests that concerned band members rejected federal (re)definitions of 
Anishinabek space which aimed at the benefiting the Hydro-Electric Power Commission 
of Ontario. It is important to note that reserve boundaries remained fluid in the 1950s as 
band members married and engaged in resource-sharing activities across federal borders. 
Historian Jean Manore has also argued that reserve boundaries remained fluid in Cree 
and Anishinabek territories, particularly in northeastern Ontario. She demonstrates that 
northern First Nations continued to harvest resources off reserve, using lands and waters 
claimed by the Crown under Treaty #9. Manore identifies a “profound dissonance 
between Native and non-Native perceptions of what constitutes Indian lands” that also 
applies in the Winnipeg River drainage basin.65 The waiâbishkiwedig longed to segregate 
First Nations from the general population: reserves, set aside by the Crown, were to 
become the exclusive domain of Canada’s registered Indian population. However, First 
                                            
65 Jean Manore, “Indian Reserves v. Indian Lands: Reserves, Crown Lands, and Natural Resources 
Use in Northeastern Ontario,” in Ontario Since Confederation: A Reader, edited by Edgar-André Montigny 
and Lori Chambers (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), 195.  
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Nations – like the Cree and Anishinabek of Treaty #9 and the Anishinabek of Treaty #3 – 
believed that their exclusive use of reserve lands did not exclude them from off-reserve 
territories. Off-reserve territories were to be shared by the waiâbishkiwedig and First 
Nations – Charlie Fisher (b. 1926, d. unknown), for example, an Elder from One Man 
Lake Indian Reserve, exercised his treaty right to move across survey lines during the 
planning and construction phase of Whitedog Falls Generating Station. Fisher’s 
movements further prove Manore’s claim that “reserves are in essence non-Native 
constructions superimposed over landscapes of more ancient custom and usage.”66 As a 
result, the HEPC’s critics like Elder Charlie Fisher may have voiced concerns about 
hydroelectric development at Whitedog Indian Reserve, but been registered at One Man 
Lake Indian Reserve. Anishinabek discontent was not necessarily or exclusively 
expressed by band members on their reserve. 
Let us consider how the Hydro-Electric Power Commission used a Band Council 
Resolution (BCR) – acquired from Whitedog Indian Reserve in June 1956 – against 
Anishinabek understandings of reserve lands. A band council resolution is a written 
decision made by a band council during a council meeting and must have the support of 
the majority of the council members. Given the power of the Indian Agents, Gordon 
                                            
66 Manore, “Indian Reserves v. Indian Lands,” 196. Terry Tobias, Chief Kerry’s Moose: A 
Guidebook to Land Use and Occupancy Mapping, Research Design and Data Collection (Vancouver: 
Union of BC Indian Chiefs and Ecotrust Canada, 2000), further breaks down Indigenous land use, locating 
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Man Lake Indian Reserve, he was active off reserve. Anishinabek expressions of discontent must be taken 
seriously throughout active lands. If we limit our scope to reserve lands, we risk defining and quantifying 
damages by standards set by the waiâbishkiwedig. 
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Cooper held determining authority during the council meeting (over which he presided). 
The Hydro-Electric Power Commission requested a meeting with the Indian Affairs 
Branch to seek permissions to clear an access road six miles long by 100 feet wide 
(approximately ten kilometres by 30 metres) through Whitedog Indian Reserve. The 
HEPC also asked for permission to modify the access road according to ground 
conditions.67 The Band Council Resolution was worded so that the HEPC could regulate 
the movement of band members from One Man Lake through their off-reserve lands. The 
HEPC extended permissions to clear an access road through Whitedog Indian Reserve to 
general clearing for the reservoir at both Whitedog and One Man Lake reserves. Fisher 
considered permissions flawed. He testified that ten families occupied One Man Lake 
Indian Reserve in 1956. These families considered themselves independent from 
Whitedog Indian Reserve – but, they lacked an elected chief to represent band interests in 
June 1956. Fisher implied that the HEPC required an additional BCR from One Man 
Lake Indian Reserve to clarify land use. And yet, the Hydro-Electric Power Commission 
could not acquire a BCR under the Indian Act: One Man Lake Indian Reserve did not 
have an elected council and thus could not achieve a council majority. Cooper, however, 
was considered the final arbiter of reserve lands. 68 He appears to have fixed Ontario 
Hydro’s categorical problem by allowing Whitedog’s Band Council to speak on behalf of 
One Man Lake. 
                                            
67 It is unclear why Gordon Cooper from the Indian Affairs Branch at Fort Frances presided over 
this meeting. Eric Law is known to be the active agent at Kenora circa 1960. OPG, “Band Council 
Resolution, Islington Band of Indians, Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Indian Affairs Brach, 
27 June 1956,” Whitedog Falls Generating Station, FP3-10726, Item 153, OHSC 8-3-242. 
68 Robertson, Reservations are for Indians, 112. 
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Indeed, Cooper – responsible for “set[ting] down how band meetings are to be 
conducted [and] what notice shall be given”69 – does not appear to have alerted the ten 
families living at One Man Lake Indian Reserve of Ontario Hydro’s call. Nor do records 
exist to suggest that the HEPC independently sought their attendance. In June 1956, band 
members living at One Man Lake Indian Reserve were unaware of the meeting scheduled 
by the Indian Affairs Branch and the Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario. 
Representation was accidental. Fisher explained to attorney Andrew Chapeskie that “I 
just happen to be there. I didn’t specifically went to hear… I just happened to drop in 
there.”70 Fisher’s exclusion from the negotiating table – and that of the community he 
represented – aggravated social tensions between Whitedog Indian Reserve and One Man 
Lake Indian Reserve. Fisher accused Whitedog’s chief and councillors of becoming ‘Yes 
Men’: “We [band members of One Man Lake Indian Reserve] had no dealing with 
anybody, other than the deal they made at Whitedog, that, to give ‘em okay’s.”71 
However, Whitedog’s Chief and Council may have been un(der)informed about the 
                                            
69 Ibid., 120 
70 Elder Charlie Fisher, interview with Andrew Chapeskie, Kenora, Ontario, 22 March 1995. 
71 Ibid. In A Poison Stronger than Love: the Destruction of an Ojibwa Community (New Haven, 
CT: Yale University, 1985), Anastasia Shkilnyk identified a parallel critique of band leadership in the post-
World War II era at Grassy Narrows Indian Reserve. After 1945, Chief and Councillors were accused of 
being “‘government people, just like white people’” by band members (99). Shkilnyk suggested that 
traditional leaders had actively engaged and communicated openly with community members. She also 
claimed that traditional leaders placed great emphasis on maintaining a minimum standard of living among 
community members (100). Interference by the Indian Affairs Branch, however, changed leadership 
dynamics in the mid-twentieth century. By the 1960s, “new chiefs were all relatively young men, 
distinguished… by their ability to speak English and relate to the Department of Indian Affairs” (102). 
Shkilnyk charges that “they became, in practice, an extension of the bureaucracy of Indian Affairs” (102). 
In Strong Hearts, Native Lands Anti-Clearcutting Activism at Grassy Narrows First Nation 
(Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2012), Anna J. Willow suggests that band members at Grassy 
Narrows Indian Reserve continue to question whether Chief and Council represent community interests at 
large. Grassy Narrows Environmental Group (GNEG), for example, claimed that “the Chief and Council’s 
externally imposed Indian Act foundations render the elected leaders’ claims to legitimate representation 
contestable” (160).  Analysis of the 1956 Band Council Resolution passed by Whitedog Chief and Council 
reveals that a lack of information – rather than political and ideological alignment with the Indian Affairs 
Branch – may have prevented elected leaders from protecting community interests along the Winnipeg 
River – just a few kilometres away from Grassy Narrows Indian Reserve. 
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specific content of the BCR. Consider that Fisher claims that the Indian Affairs Branch 
and the HEPC coordinated a single meeting with local Anishinabek. Council believed 
that the HEPC wanted a road. Council believed that a road “might help us [Whitedog 
Indian Reserve] with our transportation to go and get our groceries in town.”72 They did 
not anticipate flood damages. The HEPC did not invest substantial energy into 
developing a rapport with Chief and Council. Fisher testifies that this consultation 
meeting lasted approximately 60-90 minutes.73 Given Council’s focus on town access and 
groceries, it seems unlikely that anticipated environmental changes were explained in 
full. Internally, the Hydro-Electric Power Commission deemed prolonged conversations 
with local Anishinabek unnecessary. As early as 1955, the Hydraulic Generation 
Department “[did] not anticipate any trouble in so far as Crown land was concerned” – 
the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, who held Crown lands “in trust for the 
Indians” supported provincial expansion goals.74 
The HEPC relied heavily enough on federal support to begin construction at 
Whitedog Indian Reserve and One Man Lake Indian Reserve without obtaining 
signatures from Chief and Council. This oversight went unnoticed until February 1967 
when O.E. Johnston, Hydraulic Development Engineer, noted: “we do not believe any 
                                            
72 Elder Fisher, interview with Chapeskie, 22 March 1995. 
73 Ibid. Unfortunately, a lack of consultation is not unique to One Man Lake and Whitedog Indian 
Reserves. Myrle Ballard and Shirley Thompson have revealed that the Fairford Water Control Structure, 
installed in 1961, was built without consultation with Lake St. Martin First Nation. Citing their previous 
research, Ballard and Thompson claim that “The construction and operation of the water control structure 
were carried out by the Province of Manitoba without FN [First Nations] communities being warned, 
consulted, or compensated.” Ballard and Thompson reveal that Manitoba Hydro, much like the Hydro-
Electric Power Commission of Ontario, failed to consult with band members about their plans to regulate 
water levels in active Anishinabek territories. See Myrle Ballard and Shirley Thompson, “Flooding Hope 
and Livelihoods: Lake St. Martin First Nation,” Canadian Journal of Nonprofit and Social Economy 
Research 1, no. 1 (spring 2013): 48. 
74 OPG, “E. T. Ireson, Generation Engineer, to Mr. H. Hustler, re: Whitedog Falls Generating 
Station: Property Damage, 12 September 1955,” Whitedog Fall Generating Station, OHSC-Central Records 
8-3-242, FP3-10101-8, Item 114. 
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agreement was signed.”75 Despite engaging – for approximately one hour – in the Band 
Council Resolution process, the HEPC employees did not ensure its completion. The 
HEPC found an acceptable method to minimalize direct engagement with competing 
Anishinabek river users; it appears that the HEPC depended on the Indian Agent, a 
functionary vested with “total authority over reserve land” to ignore (or tacitly allow) 
development on reserve lands.76 In 1967, the HEPC appears to have shifted responsibility 
for road permissions to the Department of Public Works: the Department of Indian 
Affairs was to negotiate a solution to the unapproved road to Whitedog Falls Generating 
Station with the Department of Public Works. Such tactics were not unique to the 
Winnipeg River drainage basin. An unidentified Indian quoted by Heather Robertson 
complained that “[a]ny plans or policies formulated by the department are not revealed to 
the Indians… we question the need to be kept in the dark.”77 The written record suggests 
that Chief and Council did not function as ‘Yes Men’ in June 1956. Band members at 
Whitedog Indian Reserve and One Man Lake Indian Reserve were un(der)informed of 
major environmental modifications to their territories.  
                                            
75 OPG, “O. E. Johnston, Hydraulic Development Engineer, to W.G. Wigle, Department of 
Highways, re: Caribou Falls Generating Station, Whitedog Falls Generating Station Access Road from 
Minaki, 9 February 1967,” Whitedog Falls G.S. FP3-10726 Item 153 OHSC 8-3-242. 
76 Robertson, Reservations are for Indians, 112. 
77 Ibid., 107. Research by Rhonda Telford on Wikwemikong First Nation suggests that the 
Department of Indian Affairs manipulated Council process to facilitate development by non-Natives on 
reserve lands in Ontario as early as 1865. Indeed, the use of unsigned Band Council Resolutions by 
resource developers (and, perhaps more importantly, the failure of the Department of Indian Affairs to 
challenge their use) is not unique to Treaty #3. Telford reveals that Charles T. Dupont, Indian agent at 
Manitowaning, authorized non-Native development of unrelinquished petroleum products by licencing 
William Baby without a council vote. As the Telford article shows, what is peculiar about the Hydro-
Electric Power Commission example is the date (circa 1956) rather than the style of federal 
mismanagement. For more details, please see Rhonda Telford, “The Wikwemikong First Nation and the 
Department of Indian Affairs’ Mismanagement of Petroleum Development,” in Ontario Since 
Confederation: A Reader, edited by Edgar-Andre Montigny and Lori Chambers (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2000), 40-54. 
 
 
187 
Much like their dealings with the Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company, 
the Hydro-Electric Power Commission sought permission to access lands from 
governmental authorities who were invested with the power to represent, or speak on 
behalf of, potential competitors. Unlike the Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company 
case, however, the HEPC did not anticipate long-term dealings with Anishinabek in the 
Winnipeg River drainage basin. Indeed, the HEPC established physical barriers between 
Anishinabek river users and hydro employees that limited dialogue about contested land 
use. This strategy was adopted at One Man Lake Indian Reserve (where the HEPC 
ineffectually launched the band council resolution process) and at Dalles 38C Indian 
Reserve (where there was no recorded attempt to seek access permissions).  
Let us turn to the example of Dalles 38C Indian Reserve and off-reserve lands 
occupied by band members, particularly the Kelly family. In September 1955, Ontario 
Hydro applied for “right-of-way 100 feet wide located in the District of Kenora running 
northerly from a point on the Canadian National Railway some two miles west of Minaki 
to Whitedog Falls, a distance of 14 miles.”78 The Department of Lands and Forests 
responded with a License of Occupation. Granted to the HEPC in 1955, this License of 
Occupation included policing rights. Minister of Lands and Forests, Clare E. Mapledorm, 
had to modify the standard form to grant policing rights to the Hydro-Electric Power 
Commission of Ontario (see Figure 14). The modified license allowed the HEPC to 
police “all unalienated Crown Lands lying within a strip of land 2 miles in width, being 
one mile measure perpendicularly from and on opposite side of an Access Road 
extending from Minaki on the Canadian National railways to a point in the vicinity of the 
                                            
78 OPG, Province of Ontario, Department of Lands and Forests, Application for Land Permit Use, 
September 28, 1955, Toronto, Ontario. Whitedog Falls Generating Station, ITEM 106, FP3-B, OHSC 
Central Records 8-3-242. 
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most south-westerly bay of Rough Rock Lake.”79 Oral testimony reveals that the Kelly 
family built and occupied a few trapping cabins therein. Elder Roberta Jameson testifies 
that these cabins were active in the 1950s, but had been active at least three generations 
prior – Jameson’s great-grandmother had buried her children near Minaki, ON.80 Band 
members at Dalles 38C refer to an island long occupied by Jameson’s relatives as “Kelly 
Town.” Although Jameson’s relatives were displaced by the HEPC, ancestral use remains 
visible on Google Maps: “Kelly Town” appears as “Kelly’s Island” today.81 Before 1955, 
it is believed that the Kelly family used “Kelly Town” as a base for winter and spring 
trapping activities. Jameson did not map her relatives’ trapping grounds during the 
interview process, but indicated that her family moved seasonally, joining other band 
members for summer activities like berry-picking. 
Conflict over territorial use and the rights of access erupted between competing 
river users – e.g. the Kelly family and the Hydro-Electric Power Commission – shortly 
thereafter. The Kelly family, representative of Dalles 38C Indian Reserve, understood 
that Treaty #3 granted Anishinabek participants and their descendants the right to 
continue harvesting activities on unoccupied Crown Lands.82 The “right to pursue their 
                                            
79 OPG, Province of Ontario, Department of Lands and Forests, Licenses of Occupation, No. 7194, 
January 25, 1956, Toronto, Ontario. Whitedog Falls Generating Station, Item 106, FP3-B, OHSC Central 
Records 8-3-242. 
As early as December 1955, A. S. Bray, Chief of the Division of Lands, agreed to license “the area 
adjacent to the White Dog [sic] Falls Generating Station, containing 27 miles… to the Commission for 
policing purposes.” He requested that E. T. Ireson “favour the Department [of Lands and Forests] with a 
cheque for $150.00” so that a Licence of Occupation could be prepared. OPG, “A. S. Bray, Chief, Division 
of Lands, Department of Lands and Forests, to Mr. E. T. Ireson, 9 December 1955.”  
80 Elder Roberta Jameson, interview with author, Dalles 38C Indian Reserve, Ontario, 27 August 
2012. 
81 Google Maps (2015), Kelly’s Island, Ontario, retrieved from 
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82 Manore, “Indian Reserves v. Indian Lands,” identified “cognitive dissonance” between “Native 
and non-Native societies” in northeastern Ontario. She found that Cree and Anishinabek families living in 
the Treaty #9 district considered it their right to continue harvesting activities in surrendered lands. 
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avocations of hunting and fishing throughout the tract surrendered” as specified in Treaty 
#3 was believed to preserve generational use of “Kelly Town.”83 “All unalienated Crown 
Lands” referenced in the License of Occupation must be seen active off-reserve lands; 
“unalienated” did not mean unoccupied. Before 1955, the Kelly family maintained 
trapping cabins in accordance with Anishinabek understandings of Treaty #3. When the 
Department of Lands and Forests granted policing power to the Hydro-Electric Power 
Commission, they gave the HEPC the right to displace Anishinabek families from lands 
protected by Treaty #3. Anishinabek families living in accordance with Treaty #3 became 
“trespassers” on their ancestral lands. As early as 1 January 1956, the HEPC had legal 
authority to remove “trespassers” (here Anishinabek families) from the protected zone.84 
Removal allowed the HEPC to construct Whitedog Falls Generating Station without 
engaging in meaningful conversations about Anishinabek treaty rights or land use. The 
Hydro-Electric Power Commission could curtail negotiations by physically removing 
Anishinabek competitors from the permit zone. The policing permit also limited the 
ability of Anishinabek families to file complaints against the Hydro-Electric Power 
Commission: any damages to trap lines or trapping equipment within the licensed area 
were ‘unlawfully’ placed (by provincial rather than Crown definition). While 
amendments to the Indian Act in 1951 granted status Indians the right to contest the 
expropriation of reserve lands, it did not grant status Indians the right to contest the 
expropriation of off-reserve lands. As journalist Heather Robertson observed in 1966,  
                                                                                                                                  
Traditional land use was not to be curtailed unless the state required “such tracts… for settlement, mining, 
lumbering, trading or other purposes” (Treaty #9 qtd. 199). The Crown, however, routinely dismissed Cree 
and Anishinabek rights to off-reserve lands. Despite attempts by settlers-colonists to segregate First 
Nations on reserve, Anishinabek and Cree families of Treaty #9 – like the Kelly family in Treaty #3 – 
continually exercised harvesting rights off reserve (200). 
83 “Treaty 3 between Her Majesty the Queen and the Saulteaux Tribe of the Ojibbeway Indians.” 
84 OPG, Licenses of Occupation, No. 7194, January 25, 1956. 
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“By removing legal handicaps, the government cannot remove Indian poverty; it cannot 
make white people erase their prejudices.”85 The Hydro-Electric Power Commission did 
not challenge its prejudice. The HEPC did not engage with Anishinabek land questions. 
Instead, the HEPC chose removal, a silencing strategy, over participation in post-war 
debates about minority rights in Canada. 
The targeted exclusion of Anishinabek families from the licensed area is made 
evident in the HEPC’s internal correspondence about how to best exercise its policing 
permit. The Hydro-Electric Power Commission did not want to prevent Canadian and 
American cottagers from accessing their seasonal properties; indeed, the cottage industry 
generated substantial revenues in the Winnipeg River drainage basin. The local economy 
depended on cottagers who spent their dollars in Ontario during the summer, which 
created a challenge: how could the HEPC limit Anishinabek use of the Winnipeg River, 
but continue to attract revenue-generating cottagers? The HEPC explained, “[the road] 
was never intended to exclude the owners or licensees from use as far as their 
property.”86 The key word in this quotation is property. While there is no explicit racial 
bar, property owners were most often Anglo-Canadian or Anglo-American. Members of 
the Kelly family, for example, lacked ownership papers for their trapping cabins in 
“Kelly Town.” Homes had been constructed according to Anishinabek definitions of 
Treaty #3.  
The Hydro-Electric Power Commission categorized individuals without 
ownership papers – like Anishinabek river users – as “public.” All members of the public 
                                            
85 Robertson, Reservations are for Indians, 9. 
86 OPG, “O. E. Johnston, Hydraulic Generation Engineer, to J. L. Alexander, Operations Division, 
re: Whitedog Falls Generating Station – Public Use of Pistol Lake Road, 12 March 1959,” Whitedog Falls 
Generating Station, FP3-10726, Item 153, OHSC Central Records 8-3-242. 
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had to apply for “special permission” to enter the HEPC’s policed zone.87 The permission 
process designed by the HEPC made it difficult for Anishinabek river users to qualify for 
entry. The Hydro-Electric Power Commission required that all members of the public 
have insurance. Under the Indian Act, individual band members could not own land on 
reserve. All property was held in trust by the Crown. Without property, individual band 
members struggled to register for home and contents insurance. Given that foot and boat 
travel were most common from reserve to town, neighbouring communities, or 
harvesting areas, it is unlikely that the Anishinabek public would hold vehicle insurance. 
Should an Anishinaabe person qualify for insurance, s/he would have struggled to harvest 
fur-bearing animals from ancestral grounds: clause 6 of the HEPC’s application form 
read, “I undertake that I shall not transport… firearms… in my vehicle when using said 
road.” More problematically, individuals may have been barred from walking the trap 
line. Clause 6 further specified, “nor shall I drive into any camp area but shall restrict my 
operations to the road system proper.”88 It makes little sense to establish a trap line along 
“the road system proper.” According to Elder Nancy Jones, fur-bearing animals tend to 
avoid access roads. The clearing process – here, a strip sixteen miles in length – tends to 
destroy nests and borrows, forcing the animals to move further inland.89 The permission 
process thus de-incentivized Anishinabek use of the policed zone. If a permit was 
granted, economic use was complicated.  
Adaptive Anishinabek responses were curtailed by how the Hydro-Electric Power 
Commission defined ‘proprietorship.’ Owners or licensees, individuals whom the HEPC 
                                            
87 Ibid. 
88 OPG, The Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario, Application (1956), clause 6. 
Whitedog Falls Generating Station, FP3-10726, Item 153, OHSC Central Records 8-3-242. 
89 Nancy Jones, interview with author, Fort Frances, Ontario, 1 August 2012. 
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“never intended to exclude,” had to have purchased their lands before September 1956. 
More specifically, qualifying proprietors had purchased their lands within approximately 
six months of the HEPC’s License of Occupation. Construction manager A. J. G. 
Leighton explained, “We are allowing bona-fide residents to use our access road under 
certain conditions [i.e. fully insured and without transporting firearms]. We do not 
propose however, to permit the use of the road to any individuals who have secured 
property in this area subsequent to September 26, 1956.”90 While there is no recorded 
attempt to purchase Crown land on Kelly’s Island (or near familial trap lines), 
Anishinabek families were unlikely to qualify as “bona fide residents.” Anishinabek 
families secured the bulk of their income during the summer months. Able-bodied 
Anishinabek men acted as fishing guides for tourists. Able-bodied Anishinabek women 
worked as cleaners at local resorts or harvested blueberries for commercial sale. Families 
who engaged in traditional harvesting activities were most likely to be berry-picking or 
ricing away from their trapping grounds. Indeed, few families would have used their 
trapping cabins in the licensed area before October or November. Families who planned 
to move to their trapping cabins during the fall of 1956 would have discovered (1) that 
they could be legally barred from their seasonal homes by the Hydro-Electric Power 
Commission, and (2) that they no longer qualified for road access should they attempt to 
purchase them. Many Anishinabek families would have simply lacked the financial 
means to purchase their lands before September 1956. The tourist season slowed between 
August and September, leaving Anishinabek wage earners seasonally underemployed at 
the same time that they became ineligible to purchase blocks of land leased by the HEPC 
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from the Department of Lands and Forests. In 1959, the Hydro-Electric Power 
Commission revealed that policing rights were secured “in order to keep unauthorized 
and undesirable persons away from the road and station during the construction.”91 Given 
the association of “desirable” with property, this quotation is heavily racialized. The 
HEPC acquired policing rights to keep “undesirable” – uninsured, un-propertied, 
predominately Anishinabek – “persons away from the road.” Spatial barriers reduced 
Anishinabek opportunities for on-the-ground negotiations with the HEPC. It became 
difficult for Anishinabek families to discuss land use as “trespassers” who could be 
forcibly removed from off-reserve lands. 
Why was land access critical to Anishinabek negotiations with the Hydro-Electric 
Power Commission of Ontario? Land access allowed Anishinabek men and women to 
engage in face-to-face conversations with hydro employees. Elders have described these 
encounters as critical to knowledge development in a legal environment that allowed the 
HEPC to bypass band members and communicate instead with the Department of 
Citizenship and Immigration, Indian Affairs Branch. Elder Jacob Strong (1930-circa 
2004) of Dalles 38C Indian Reserve testified that developers rarely shared their plans 
with band members. To elucidate his point, Strong selected the blasting of the Dalles 
Channel (circa 1950) as an example. This environmental modification predated the 
construction of Whitedog Falls Generating Station by five years. Strong “just heard about 
it [when labourers] brought machinery through [the] bush.”92 Fisher also learned that the 
HEPC would modify his community through informal discussions with company 
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labourers. Fisher explains, “they [hydro workers] didn’t cut the trees down [at my 
father’s place], they wanted to see how high the water was going to come up.”93 Fisher 
learned that hydro workers expected the water to rise by talking about which trees were 
to be cut and why. Anishinabek men and women learned construction details through 
face-to-face contact. Given limited outreach from white-collar staff, Anishinabek men 
and women relayed their concerns to low-level employees during these same 
conversations. On-the-ground communication between band members and labourers thus 
became the most accessible (and most frequent) site for discussion about environmental 
modifications. 
Low literacy rates on reserve increased the importance of these face-to-face 
interactions with hydro labourers. In 1966, Heather Robertson bemoaned that “61 per 
cent [of all status Indian students] fail to reach grade eight; and 97 per cent fail to reach 
grade twelve.” Problematically, “grade attained is often no indication of the level of the 
Indian child’s achievement, since he is often promoted on the basis of size and age rather 
than competence.”94 In the Winnipeg River drainage basin, teachers salaried by Indian 
Affairs invested more energy teaching trades rather than literacy skills. Male pupils were 
responsible for caring for work horses and dairy cows, my great-grandfather (John 
Kipling Jr.) having once been assigned to the dairy at a competing Presbyterian school in 
Kenora. The photographic record from St. Mary’s Residential School suggests that girls 
were also trained for menial (here, domestic) labour. Girls are captured sweeping, 
cooking, and sewing on camera.95 A focus on trade skills was not unique to the Winnipeg 
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River drainage basin. Teachers across Canada assumed that Indigenous youth were best-
suited for labour jobs.96 As a result of Indian Affairs’ limited investment in Indian 
literacy, Robertson estimated that “35,000 adult Indians [were] considered illiterate” circa 
1966.97 Who was to write to the Hydro-Electric Power Commission on their behalf?  
Educational barriers that made it difficult for Anishinabek families to write down 
their complaints increased the importance of contact between band members and hydro 
employees. Face-to-face conversations were not necessarily effective; they are important 
because they happened, not because Anishinabek river users reached their outcome 
objectives. Indeed, Anishinabek river users failed to establish a feedback loop with the 
HEPC like the Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company had done. The record 
indicates that, at times, hydro labourers refused to engage in meaningful dialogue with 
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band members (much like their superiors). Attorney Andrew Chapeskie asked Elder 
Charlie Fisher, “Did you have any conversation with the guys who were slashing around 
One Man Lake?” Fisher responded in the negative: “No, because they were always 
busy.”98 And yet, Fisher pushed back when labourers shut down conversation. Face-to-
face contact allowed Fisher to challenge perceptual barriers of lack of interest. “We 
tried,” he maintained.99 Sustained communication attempts occasionally resulted in 
altercation. For example, Fisher attempted to negotiate an alternative to the relocation of 
One Man Lake Indian Reserve. The Hydro-Electric Power Commission allocated funds 
to move families from One Man Lake to Whitedog Indian Reserve (a merger approved by 
the Indian Affairs Branch). Fisher approached an anonymous hydro employee to discuss 
relocation plans. Fisher proposed moving One Man Lake Indian Reserve to higher 
ground; he rejected amalgamation plans designed by government men. This hydro 
employee – who may have lacked power to enact change – refused to hear Fisher’s 
proposal. Conversation shut down when this hydro employee asserted “All you guys 
[Anishinabek] just have to fuck off and that’s it – no more.”100 This example is important 
because it shows that Anishinabek river users (“you guys”) used physical proximity to 
challenge legal distances (i.e. the HEPC could and did direct communication through the 
Indian Affairs Branch and avoided dialogue with band members). During the 
construction process, however, physical proximity ensured that Anishinabek families 
were heard – even if their utterances were rejected or ignored by the Hydro-Electric 
Power Commission. Opportunities for communication (although never fully realized) 
existed on-the-ground.  
                                            
98 Elder Fisher, interview with Chapeskie, 22 March 1995. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Ibid. 
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In June 1958, with the construction of Whitedog Falls Generating Station 
complete, communication between Anishinabek and hydro labourers declined 
significantly. The Hydro-Electric Power Commission developed a site management plan 
that entrenched company resistance to dialogue with Anishinabek competitors. Consider 
that Whitedog Falls Generating Station was designed to be “remotely controlled from 
Kenora, with no resident attendants.”101 The HEPC operated few remote-controlled dams 
in the 1950s. A 1956 filing memorandum revealed that “the decision to make the 
Whitedog Falls plant remotely operated from Kenora T. S. was a … great departure from 
normal operating procedure.” To facilitate this deviation, the HEPC allocated monies to 
maintain a “minimum costs jeep type road.”102 Fisher suggests that the HEPC also used 
“jeep type” roads to transport materials from Kenora to dam sites.103 After 1958, road 
maintenance allowed for 24-hour access to the dam in emergency situations. New 
operating procedures meant that the HEPC had a transitory presence at Whitedog Falls 
Generating Station. Headquarters argued that sporadic attendance (for site checks) was 
necessary: there were no “satisfactory” candidates for employment living near Whitedog 
Falls Generating Station.104 Once the dam was completed, the HEPC dismantled its work 
camp and evacuated employees who had shared the dam site with Anishinabek families 
living along the Winnipeg River.  Given that Whitedog and One Man Lake reserves were 
the largest population centres near Whitedog Falls Generating Station, “satisfactory” 
                                            
101 OPG, Memorandum, “Whitedog Falls Generating Station: General Description and Design 
Requirements, 13 September 1955.” 
102 Ibid. 
103 Elder Fisher, interview with Chapeskie, 22 March 1995. 
104 OPG, “Minutes of Meeting re: Whitedog Falls G. S. and Deer Falls G. S. Methods of 
Operation, 7 September 1955,” Whitedog Falls Generating Station, Item 1042, 10-1-228. 
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implies non-Indigenous labourers. A refusal to hire Anishinabek men reduced 
opportunities for sustained communication between band members and the HEPC. 
The design of Whitedog Falls Generating Station further minimized contact 
opportunities between hydro employees and Anishinabek competitors during site checks. 
The timing and duration of site checks varied with seasonal or climatic conditions. For 
example, hydro men occupied the Powerhouse “when high flows [were] anticipated… or 
when flash floods [were] forecasted.”105 During these times, however, hydro men were 
relatively isolated from nearby Anishinabek communities. The HEPC recommended 
short-term accommodations for up to twelve men on-site. Hydro men were to occupy 
“three four-man rooms.”106 Bunking rooms were located inside the powerhouse. 
Interestingly, the design team proposed building rooms “without windows in view of 
unattended operation.”107 Maintenance personnel were to be physically enclosed by their 
workspace. Washroom and cooking facilities were also located inside the Powerhouse.108 
The Hydro-Electric Power Commission imported food from town by boat.109 Basic 
human needs – food, water, and sleep – could be met entirely within the Powerhouse. By 
                                            
105 OPG, “M. Ward, System Planning Engineer, to E. T. Ireson, re: Whitedog Falls Generating 
Station and Deer Falls Generating Station – Method of Operation, 30 August 1955,” Whitedog Falls 
Generating Station, FP3-L, Item 112, 8-3-242. 
106 OPG, “Minutes of Meeting re: Whitedog Falls G. S. and Deer Falls G. S. Methods of 
Operation, 7 September 1955.”  
107 OPG, Memorandum, “Whitedog Falls Generating Station: General Description and Design 
Requirements, 13 September 1955.” 
108 OPG, Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario, “Minutes of Meeting re: Whitedog Falls 
G. S. and Deer Falls G. S. Methods of Operation, 7 September 1955,” Whitedog Falls Generating Station, 
Item 1042, 10-1-228. 
109 “The Caribou Pushing North from Whitedog,” Kenora Daily Miner and News, 15 August 1956, 
1. In June 1956, the Kenora Miner and News announced that “Hydro at present is shipping considerable 
supplies from Kenora to Redditt, then by rail to Minaki, and then by truck to the two construction camps.” 
Please see “An Economic Necessity,” Kenora Daily Miner and News, 20 June 1956, 1. Anishinabek 
families appear to have used the grocery store constructed at the Whitedog Falls campsite to supplement 
their own food supply. The report of Rex McDonald’s drowning reveals that he was “crossing One Man 
Lake on [his] way to purchase groceries.” “13 Year Old Indian Drowned Thursday,” Kenora Daily Miner 
and News, 2 May 1958, 1. 
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funding a maintenance team of up to twelve men, the Hydro-Electric Power Commission 
reduced the need to seek companionship outside of the powerhouse (i.e. at nearby 
population centres like Whitedog Indian Reserve). Indeed, maintenance personnel had no 
physical need (and, limited physical opportunity) to converse with Anishinabek 
competitors during site visits. 
Unable to sustain face-to-face contact with the Hydro-Electric Power 
Commission, Anishinabek families living at Whitedog and One Man Lake reserves 
attempted to overcome environmental barriers to communication by filing a damage 
claim through the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Indian Affairs Branch. 
The first recorded claim was submitted in 1959, just one year after the HEPC dismantled 
its construction camps and began remote operation.110 In this submission, band members 
claimed over $260,000 in damages to their “wild rice, harvesting, fishing, [and] hunting” 
grounds.111 The Department of Citizenship and Immigration represented their complaint 
as follows: 
LOSS OF COMMERCIAL FISHING: 
Caused by drifting material, deadheads and 
snags resulting from cutting of forested areas. 
Nets torn and carried away in debris. 
 
Flooding of spawning beds and possible effect 
on new beds due to fluctuation water level. 
Loss per year -- $11.019.00 
Compensation for 10 years $110,190.00 
                                            
110 Indian Affairs Branch quoted in OPG, “Lorne McDonald, General Counsel, to C. F. S. Tidy, 
Special Negotiator, re: Caribou Falls Development – Flooding – Islington Indian Reserve No. 29 and One 
Man Lake Indian Reserve No. 29, 6 June 1961,” Whitedog Falls Generating Station, Item 1042, 10-1-228. 
111 The Annual Report of the Indian Affairs Branch (LAC, 31 March 1965) reiterated a loss of 
trapping income: “Rat trapping will not provide a livelihood for many families. Muskrats are not 
particularly plentiful and prices have been low for the past several years.” In 1959, Whitedog and One Man 
Lake Indian Reserves anticipated 10-years of economic decline. The Annual Report of 1965 – six years 
after the initial damage claim – suggests that long-term losses were reasonably predicted. Indian Affairs 
Branch quoted in OPG, “Lorne McDonald to C. F. S. Tidy re: Caribou Falls Development – Flooding – 
Islington Indian Reserve No. 29 and One Man Lake Indian Reserve No. 29, 6 June 1961.”  
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LOSS OF WILD RICE FIELDS: 
Average annual production 15 tons less 15 
tones @ 0.35 per lb. - $10,500.00 
 
Compensation for 10 years $105,000.00 
Equipment damaged $3,036.38 
[TRAPPING LOSS:] 
Muskrat loss - $2,275.00, 10 year period 
 
$22,750.00 
Beaver loss per year, $1,998.00, 10 year period $19,980.00 
TOTAL CLAIM: $260,956.00112 
 
This shift from the expression of on-site verbal complaints to the submission of written 
complaints through an intermediary must be seen as an adaptive strategy. Consider that 
many band members did not trust Indian agents; Fisher, for example, levelled insults at 
Chief and Council for participating in federally-directed band meetings.  Prior to 1959, 
band members were most likely to express discontent on-the-ground and without 
supervision by the Indian Affairs Branch. Historian Rhonda Telford, writing on 
Wikwemikong First Nation, has suggested that independent economic action – 
particularly attempts to negotiate the terms of non-Indigenous development on reserve – 
is an expression of sovereignty.113 I believe that increased reliance on the Indian Affairs 
Branch in 1959 was a subversive manoeuvre designed to protect an otherwise 
diminishing homeland. Relationships between local Anishinabek and federal bureaucrats 
had long been strained in the Kenora District. Animosity is implicit in Duncan Campbell 
Scott’s “Powassan’s Drum,” a poem composed on his expedition to James Bay in 1905-
1906. It is likely that this poem refers to Chief Powassan of Shoal Lake Indian Reserve, a 
                                            
112 Indian Affairs Branch quoted in OPG, “Lorne McDonald to C. F. S. Tidy re: Caribou Falls 
Development – Flooding – Islington Indian Reserve No. 29 and One Man Lake Indian Reserve No. 29, 6 
June 1961.” 
113 Telford, “The Wikwemikong First Nation,” 40-54. 
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signatory of Treaty #3, whom Scott threatened to disempower and imprison for 
shamanism. Scott presents Powassan as a “negative force who conjure[d] the hatred and 
superstition” that prohibited Indigenous assimilation into “the modern, Europeanized 
world.” 114 As a Treaty Commissioner – and, later as Deputy Superintendent of Indian 
Affairs – Scott defined Anishinabek in the Kenora District (men like Chief Powassan) as 
irrational and potentially violent. Anishinabek distrust of Ottawa men like Scott, by 
contrast, increased as community members were fined (or imprisoned) for practicing their 
culture. Thus, Anishinabek use of the Indian Affairs Branch does not reflect Anishinabek 
trust that Ottawa will best represent their interests. Indian Agent Gordon Cooper had 
already failed One Man Lake Indian Reserve. Instead, we find local Anishinabek 
creatively trying to force a response from the Hydro-Electric Power Commission. 
In 1963, it appears that local Anishinabek continued to use intermediaries to 
launch complaints against the Hydro-Electric Power Commission. Intermediaries 
remained necessary as the HEPC communicated with residents of Ontario through letters 
and service announcements. The HEPC’s standards of communication (particularly 
written communication) put Anishinabek competitors at a severe disadvantage. Let us 
revisit some of aforementioned education barriers. Captain Frank Edwards, an Indian 
Agent at Kenora, bemoaned the quality of education provided to Anishinabek children 
throughout the 1930s. In 1926, Edwards challenged the use of the word “training” as 
descriptor for Indian education and suggested Anishinabek children received, at best, 
“casual attention.”115 In 1938, he suggested that “academic training” was useless in a 
                                            
114 L. P. Weis, “D. C. Scott’s View of History & the Indians,” Nature, Natural, Naturalists, special 
issue of Canadian Literature 111 (Winter 1986): 33. 
115 Lake of the Woods Museum (LOWM). Captain Frank Edwards, “Records, c. 1926.” Folder: 
“Anishinaabe – Essays and Papers.”  
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society that refused to incorporate Indigenous graduates and suggested that Indigenous 
youth “be given a School training that would enable them to make a living and business 
out of natural resources.”116 These “casually attended” youth were fully-grown band 
members seeking recompense in 1963. Perhaps their Indian Agent, Eric Law, contacted 
William Moore Benedickson, Liberal member of parliament for Rainy River to follow-up 
on damage claims that same year. Benedickson inquired after “a damage claim by the 
Indians of Islington [Whitedog] Reserve No. 29 and One Man Lake No. 29.”117 
Benedickson’s query prompted a letter exchange between the HEPC’s engineering, 
property, and legal divisions. Benedickson successfully breached the HEPC’s 
communication barriers. His query resulted in a flurry of activity, including a 
memorandum from the Hydro-Electric Power Commission’s Chairman. It did not, 
however, produce the desired outcome: dialogue and recompense. Instead, the HEPC 
used the written word to justify its actions on and off reserve. Firstly, the HEPC 
implicated the Indian Affairs Branch in any failure. The Deputy Director of Property 
argued that “negotiations were carried on… to arrange proper compensation for rights.” 
He further claimed that “an agreement was reached with the Indians [in 1956] and 
approved by the Department of Citizenship and Immigration.” The HEPC claimed to 
have participated in the federal permission process – and, made clear that federal agents 
sanctioned development on Indian lands. In 1956, the HEPC was presumably unable to 
estimate the amount of land required for an access road, the amount of gravel and fill 
needed to fill the rock dam, etc. the HEPC promised, however, to settle with Whitedog 
                                            
116 LOWM. Captain Frank Edwards, Memorandum, “Indians in the Kenora District and Savanne, 
31 March 1938.” Folder: “Anishinaabe – Essays and Papers.” 
117 OPG, “Deputy Director of Property to H. A. Smith, Assistant General Manager, re: Caribou 
Falls Development and Flooding of Lands, 19 June 1963,” Whitedog Falls Generating Station, Item 1042, 
10-1-228. 
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Indian Reserve and One Man Lake Indian Reserve “when the surveys had been 
completed” and “proper compensation” could be calculated. In 1961, the HEPC appears 
to have unilaterally “compute[d] the amount of the damages” and sent a cheque of 
$20,310 to “the Indians through the Government at Ottawa.”118 The Indian Affairs 
Branch appears to have accepted a cheque valued at a twelfth of the damages estimated 
by band members themselves. Further, by accepting the HEPC’s cheque, the Indian 
Affairs Branch suggested that “proper compensation” need not consider ricing or 
trapping. The Deputy Director of Property then highlighted the HEPC’s additional 
expenditures to improve the quality of life for damage claimants: the Department of 
Citizenship and Immigration sanctioned the relocation of ten families from One Man 
Lake Indian Reserve into “new houses… approved by the Government.”119 Throughout 
the HEPC’s response, the Indian Affairs Branch was constructed as an informed partner. 
Earlier written documents – band council resolutions, cheques, and design plans – were 
listed to end discussion. Written evidence of complacency was used to refuse a 
conversation about access (and subsequent damages) to reserve lands. 
Secondly, the Hydro-Electric Power Commission turned to provincial documents 
to further counter damage claims. Hydro employees – such as the Deputy Director of 
Property – emphasized that fishing and ricing damages occurred off reserve, “that is to 
say on Crown Lands under the jurisdiction of the Ontario Government.” The Deputy 
Directory of Property appears to have mimicked General Counsel Lorne McDonald’s 
position on the 1959 claim: the HEPC is “not liable for…damages off of the reserves.” 
McDonald noted that the Department of Lands and Forests, a branch of the Ontario 
                                            
118 Ibid. 
119 OPG, “Lorne McDonald to C. F. S. Tidy re: Caribou Falls Development – Flooding – Islington 
Indian Reserve No. 29 and One Man Lake Indian Reserve No. 29, 6 June 1961.”  
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government, granted trapping and fishing licenses to local Anishinabek. Under Ontario’s 
licencing system “the law [is such that] Indians take conditions as they find them.” 
McDonald emphasized that Anishinabek had “no proprietary interest” in their trap lines 
or fishing grounds; Ontario strictly granted use.120 Issued licenses were called on to argue 
that local Anishinabek could launch “no claim in law against the Commission.” The 
Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Indian Affairs Branch, initially countered 
that Treaty #3 protected Anishinabek “right[s] to pursue their avocations of hunting and 
fishing throughout the tract surrendered” thus entitling them to compensation.121 
According to the Deputy Director of Property, however, the Indian Affairs Branch issued 
no formal response to Lorne McDonald’s opinion (issued in 1961).122 Implicit here is the 
suggestion that Benedickson – pursuing an issue dropped in 1961 – ought to be 
interrogating the Department of Citizenship and Immigration. The Hydro-Electric Power 
Commission had a document collection that suggested negotiations occurred to the 
satisfaction of the Government of Canada. Anishinabek damage claims, the HEPC 
argued, had no legal backing. Further dialogue was refused on these grounds. 
The Hydro-Electric Power Commission made no attempt to establish a working 
relationship with Anishinabek living in the Winnipeg River drainage basin. The HEPC 
cited provincial documents to bar conversations about treaty rights. Instead, General 
Counsel Lorne McDonald suggested further complaints might be suppressed through the 
                                            
120 Ibid. 
121 The Indian Affairs Branch’s counterargument mimicked the language of Treaty #3 which reads 
“Her Majesty further agrees with Her said Indians that they, the said Indians, shall have right to pursue 
their avocations of hunting and fishing throughout the tract surrendered.” “Treaty 3 between Her Majesty 
the Queen and the Saulteaux Tribe of the Ojibbeway Indians at Northwest Angle on the Lake of the Woods 
with Adhesions.” 
122 Such findings are not unique to the Winnipeg River drainage basin. In his analysis of three 
Indigenous communities in Manitoba and Saskatchewan, James B. Waldram argued that the Department of 
Indian Affairs functioned as an “interested observer” and did not effectively defend Indigenous land and 
water resources against provincial interests. See Waldram, As Long as the Rivers Run, 99. 
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provision of one-time payments. McDonald wrote that “consideration should be given to 
some compassionate allowances [for] losses of physical hunting and fishing equipment, 
small huts and so on.”123 Compensation was to take the form of a one-time payment in 
recognition of damages to items vital to Anishinabek economic activities. This solution 
did not take seriously Anishinabek complaints that damage would be sustained for 
multiple years – Anishinabek requested compensation for a projected ten-year loss. A 
lack of proprietary interest prevented serious consideration of Anishinabek damage 
claims. Consider that the HEPC representatives met with employees of the Ontario-
Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company and jointly investigated hydraulic equipment. The 
HEPC identified structural damage to mill properties like the Norman Dam and Kenora 
Powerhouse. The HEPC sought to understand the long-term industrial impacts of 
changed water levels. And, because the Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company 
owned damaged lands – and, visibly contributed to the local economy – the HEPC felt 
obliged to restore functionality through energy transfers. No such effort was made to 
explore territories deemed vital to Anishinabek industry (i.e. trapping and ricing). 
Instead, we find that the HEPC framed Anishinabek losses as short-term and recoverable 
(i.e. equipment could be replaced). When the HEPC examined Anishinabek damage 
claims, they saw individual material damages rather than the loss of traditional industries. 
This myopic understanding of industrial loss (and a refusal to discuss them with 
Anishinabek families) stymied economic recovery on-reserve lands. Indeed, the HEPC 
aggravated and sustained Anishinabek losses by refusing to consider Anishinabek rights 
to off-reserve lands and Anishinabek demands for financial compensation. 
                                            
123 OPG, “Lorne McDonald, General Counsel, to C. F. S. Tidy, Special Negotiator, Property 
Division, 6 June 1961,” Whitedog Falls Generating Station, Item 1042, 10-1-228. 
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CONCLUSION 
The story of hydroelectric development on the Winnipeg River, in particular the 
story of how competing users experienced environmental modifications, is, in large part, 
a story about communication between the Hydro-Electric Power Commission and 
“Others.” The HEPC engaged in face-to-face negotiations with representatives of the 
Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company. The socio-political environment 
necessitated this contact. The Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company had large 
property holdings in the Kenora District. More importantly, many of Kenora’s able-
bodied residents worked in paper production (or, in related industries). With the federal 
promise of full employment for veterans after 1945 and improved living conditions for all 
Canadians, the HEPC could not jeopardize mill operations over the long term. The HEPC 
thus invested human and capital resources into determining the Ontario-Minnesota Pulp 
and Paper Company’s legal right to Whitedog Falls and damages that would be incurred 
from site development. Unable to evade negotiations, the HEPC worked to establish 
positional authority before negotiating with mill representatives. 
To help ensure ideal operating conditions, the Hydro-Electric Power Commission 
used the Department of Lands and Forests to claim right of use at Whitedog Falls. The 
HEPC did not contact the Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company to discuss its 
dated leasehold; instead, the HEPC sought assurance of default from provincial 
authorities. The Hydro-Electric Power Commission subsequently pressured the Minister 
of Public Works into approving site plans, leveraging the province and local employment 
prospects against due process. Whitedog Falls Generating Station was thus born of socio-
economic pressures stimulated by the HEPC. 
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As predicted by hydraulic generation engineers, operations at Whitedog Falls 
Generating Station negatively impacted paper production at the Ontario-Minnesota Pulp 
and Paper Company. Raised water levels flooded the Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper 
Company’s turbines at Norman Dam at the outlet of Lake of the Woods. By the 1960s, 
the paper mill could no longer generate sufficient energy to maintain paper production. 
As predicted by the Hydro-Electric Power Commission’s hydraulic generation engineers, 
the Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company reached out from a position of failure 
(i.e. failure to generate sufficient electricity). Representatives of the paper mill sought 
compensation, compromise, from a disadvantaged position: the Ontario-Minnesota Pulp 
and Paper Company had become dependent on electricity generated by Whitedog Falls 
Generating Station. The Hydro-Electric Power Commission agreed to a compensatory 
regime that required monthly communications between the two river users. Through 
these communications, the HEPC would calculate and provide energy returns free-of-
charge. This settlement reveals that the HEPC did not seek to evade dialogue with the 
Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company. Instead, the HEPC forced the Ontario-
Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company into a disadvantaged negotiating position: the HEPC 
created an energy dependency that allowed the HEPC to operate at peak operating levels. 
And yet, through negotiations (however skewed), the economic stability of both 
companies – the HEPC and the Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company – was 
assured. The paper mill could continue to operate efficiently as the HEPC “funded” its 
recovery. 
By contrast, Anishinabek competitors did not receive compensation from the 
Hydro-Electric Power Commission for economic losses. Having estimated at least 
 
 
208 
$260,956 in damages to their trapping and ricing economies, the Hydro-Electric Power 
Commission relied on licenses issued by the Department of Lands and Forests to evade 
negotiations with Anishinabek living in the Winnipeg River drainage basin. This outcome 
is not surprising. Indeed, the HEPC made a concerted effort to avoid dialogue with local 
Anishinabek throughout the construction process. Consider that the HEPC acted on an 
unsigned Band Council Resolution under the assumption that the Indian Affairs Branch 
would support their developmental goals. The HEPC exaggerated permissions to access 
reserve lands without fear of reproach. And yet, local Anishinabek rejected the HEPC’s 
tenuous claim to reserve lands. Band members like Elder Charlie Fisher of One Man 
Lake Indian Reserve communicated disapproval on the ground, in direct conversation 
with hydro employees. Upon completion of Whitedog Falls Generating Station, the 
HEPC also closed these informal communication networks. Band members faced a 
remote-controlled powerhouse with their complaints. 
As previously indicated, it is easiest to ignore the illiterate. The Hydro-Electric 
Power Commission of Ontario engaged with its public through text. Local Anishinabek 
struggled to close the gap between Toronto Headquarters and reserve in writing. And so, 
band members turned to the Indian Affairs Branch and MP Benedickson to stimulate a 
conversation about Anishinabek losses. Dialogue remained barred: the HEPC cited a 
document series – from (unsigned) Band Council Resolutions to provincial licenses – to 
justify its actions and to refuse negotiations with local Anishinabek. Without open 
channels for communication, local Anishinabek failed to win compensation for their 
economic losses. As a result, Anishinabek families living on reserve but working off 
reserve felt flood damages more acutely than their non-Indigenous counterparts. 
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The story of hydroelectric development on the Winnipeg River thus reveals the 
importance of communication in economic recovery. A mutually-beneficial relationship 
emerged between Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company and the Hydro-Electric 
Power Commission. True, dialogue between these competing river users did not limit the 
HEPC’s attempts to establish positional authority, or to maintain a competitive edge in 
negotiations. It did, however, ensure that the Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper 
Company had a voice with which to demand compensation (here, equivalent energy 
returns). Underdevelopment on reserve, by contrast, was fostered by the HEPC’s refusal 
to negotiate with local Anishinabek. This story supports what Heather Robertson first 
hypothesized in 1966: “Indian poverty is neither a mistake nor an omission. It is a 
deliberate and inevitable product of Canadian attitudes and social structures.”124 
  
                                            
124 Robertson, Reservations are for Indians, 10. 
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Figure 11: GENERATORS AT THE BACKUS-BROOKS POWERHOUSE (C. 
1925)125 
 
This image features hydroelectric generators owned by the Ontario-Minnesota Pulp 
and Paper Company. These hydroelectric generators were operating at the Kenora 
Power Dam in the early 1920s. While the powerhouse at the Norman Dam would 
not be constructed until 1926, this image provides a sense of the layout of company-
owned powerhouses in the Winnipeg River drainage basin. 
                                            
125 Carl Linde, “Backus Brooks Powerhouse, c. 1925,” image donated to the author by Cuyler 
Cotton of Dovetail Resources, Kenora, Ontario. 
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Figure 12: SWITCH BOARD AND EQUIPMENT AT THE KENORA 
POWERHOUSE (1923)126 
 
This image features switch board equipment purchased by the Ontario-Minnesota 
Pulp and Paper Company from the Town of Kenora. This equipment was operating 
at the Kenora Power Dam in the early 1920s. The Company used this equipment to 
provide electricity to the Town of Kenora until the Hydro-Electric Power 
Commission became the dominant service provider in the 1950s. 
 
  
                                            
126 Carl Linde, “Switch Board and Equipment,” c. 1920, image donated to the author by Cuyler 
Cotton of Dovetail Resources, Kenora, Ontario. 
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Figure 13: WHITE DOG FALLS, (C. 1920)127 
 
This newspaper clipping is dated 11 December 1920. It features White Dog Falls, a 
site that Ernest Charles Drury, Premier of Ontario, leased to E. W. Backus in 
September 1920. Backus never developed White Dog Rapids. Instead, Backus 
purchased the Norman Dam and the Kenora Power House in 1919. After World 
War II, the Hydro-Electric Power Commission expressed interest in White Dog 
Falls and proposed a three unit generating station with a total capacity of 81,000 
brake horsepower. 
 
  
                                            
127 OPG, “White Dog Falls on the Rainy River near Kenora, Ont., 11 December 1920,” 010-
Whitedog Falls, Box 91.119, 11-23-71. 
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Figure 14: LICENSE OF OCCUPATION (1956)128 
This modified License of Occupation allowed the Hydro-Electric Power Commission 
to physically remove local Anishinabek from the permit zone. The policing permit 
thus had the potential to limit communications between Anishinabek families and 
the HEPC employees on off-reserve lands. 
                                            
128 OPG, Province of Ontario, Department of Lands and Forests, License of Occupation, No. 7194, 
January 26, 1956. Whitedog Falls Generating Station, ITEM 106, FP3-B, OHSC Central Records 8-3-242. 
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Figure 15: APPLICATION TO ACCESS LANDS CLAIMED BY THE HEPC 
(1956)129 
 
During the 1950s, the Hydro-Electric Power Commission recommended an 
application process that would allow property owners or licensees to move through 
lands claimed by the HEPC. This document outlines the conditions under which the 
HEPC allowed “bona-fide residents to use [the] access road.”130 The HEPC required 
applicants to be fully insured. Applicants were also barred from transporting 
firearms. These two conditions, as detailed in Chapter 3, limited Anishinabek access 
to and economic use of off-reserve lands claimed by the HEPC.  
                                            
129 OPG, The Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario, Application (1956). FP3-10726. 
Whitedog Falls Generating Station, FP3-10726, Item 153, OHSC Central Records 8-3-242. 
130 OPG, “A. J. G. Leighton, Construction Manager, to L. Ringham, District Forester, Department 
of Lands and Forests, 9 April 1956,” Whitedog Falls Generating Station, FP3-B, Item 106, OHSC – Central 
Records 8-3-242. 
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CHAPTER 4 
"KEEPING IT [RESERVE] ALIVE": ANISHINABEK LABOUR FOR THE 
HYDRO-ELECTRIC POWER COMMISSION IN ITS NORTHWESTERN 
DIVISION, 1950-1958 
 
In February 1958, Unit 1 of Whitedog Falls Generating Station began to produce 
electricity for the Northwestern Division of the Hydro-Electric Power Commission of 
Ontario. In 2014, Ontario Power Generation, an outgrowth of the Hydro-Electric Power 
Commission of Ontario, suggested that “it seemed natural that the Winnipeg should 
become a source of power for the province” – the Winnipeg River, on which Whitedog 
Falls Generating Station is built, was once known for its rapids, falls, and cascades.1 This 
outcome, however, did not seem “natural” in the aftermath of World War II. The Hydro-
Electric Power Commission had feared power shortages northwest of Marathon and 
southeast of Kenora. Technological innovations like transistor radios and electric wringer 
washers stimulated new household energy demands. High employment rates meant that 
more Canadians had the capital to purchase and plug in these electric devices. Industrial 
demands were also on the rise.2 When coupled together Canadian households and 
Canadian industry in the Northwestern District increased power demands by 250 percent 
                                            
1 “Whitedog Falls Generating Station,” Ontario Power Generation Inc., accessed 1 July 2015, 
http://www.opg.com/generating-power/hydro/northwest-ontario/Pages/whitedog-falls-station.aspx. In 1974, 
the HEPC was renamed Ontario Hydro. In 1998, the Energy Competition Act was passed by the province 
to restructure Ontario Hydro. As a result of the Energy Competition Act, hydroelectric power generation 
was separated from transmission. Today, Ontario Power Generation is responsible for hydroelectric power 
generation. Hydro One has assumed responsibility for the transmission of electricity. 
2 Historian Doug Owram suggests that “unemployment remained well under 4 per cent through the 
postwar period.” He claims that Canadians born between the “late war and about 1955 or 1956” were the 
“best-fed” and “best-educated” overall as they belonged to a period of sustained economic growth. Indeed, 
Owram argues that postwar affluence (and access to more disposable income) fueled both generational 
consciousness and youth activism during the 1960s. Individuals born during this period expected their 
standard of living to improve. Owram, Born at the Right Time. Journalist Robert J. Samuelson addressed 
the American case, arguing that Americans began “to take prosperity for granted” (35) in the postwar era. 
Robert J. Samuelson, The Good Life and Its Discontents. 
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between 1945 and 1957.3 But, the HEPC lacked the necessary infrastructure to service 
Ontarians at this rate of growth. To avoid power shortages and to streamline construction, 
the Hydro-Electric Power Commission limited negotiations with competing river users 
(e.g. Anishinabek families living along the Winnipeg River). Sam Horton, former Vice-
President of Ontario Hydro, told Former Chief Allan Luby (Ogemah) in 1992, “We were 
too busy building a country to think about the Aboriginal people living on the land [that] 
we would be affecting.”4 As the previous chapter demonstrated, the HEPC’s incursions 
onto Anishinabek territories were, consequently, communicated poorly and occurred 
rapidly. 
The Hydro-Electric Power Commission encroached on Anishinabek territories in 
the Winnipeg River drainage basin confident that it would receive provincial support for 
its expansionist program. Leslie Frost became premier of Ontario in 1949. Frost, much 
like his predecessor George Drew, emphasized better water resource management: Frost 
wanted energy security for Ontario.5 To achieve energy security, Frost established a 
program of cross-governmental cooperation that allowed for major riverine modifications 
such as the St. Lawrence Seaway. Frost committed Ontario to dam construction if Ottawa 
agreed to finance canal construction. Cost-sharing resulted in construction of the seaway 
between 1954 and 1959. The seaway, in turn, guaranteed an additional 912,000 kW for 
                                            
3 “Progress Scenes at Whitedog-Caribou Falls,” Kenora Miner and News, 4 September 1957, 1. 
4 Former Chief Allan Luby (Ogemah), email message to author, 15 July 2015. In his submission to 
the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (1993), Sam Horton, then Vice-President of Ontario Hydro’s 
Aboriginal and Northern Affairs Branch, echoed these same sentiments. Horton noted that “Ontario Hydro 
is really a company which failed to respect the Aboriginal people…. In short, we’ve pursued our own 
interests in our own ways and the result is that, while Ontario Hydro and its customers have enjoyed low 
cost-hydro electric energy, the life sustaining capabilities of many of the watersheds have been destroyed in 
the process” (4-5). See: “Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples: Presentation by Sam Horton, Vice-
President, Aboriginal and Northern Affairs Branch, Ontario Hydro,” Our Legacy, 3 June 2003, 
http://scaa.sk.ca/ourlegacy/solr?query=ID%3A31496&start=0&rows=10&mode=view&pos=0&page=5.  
5 Whitcomb, A Short History of Ontario, 59. 
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Ontario’s power supply.6 It was in this cultural climate – and under the threat of energy 
shortages in the Northwestern Division – that the municipality of Kenora pushed for a 
power arrangement with the Hydro-Electric Power Commission. There was little need to 
think about “the Indians” when over 9000 citizens were demanding service south of 
Whitedog Falls.7 
As early as 1950, Kenora residents anticipated an industrial boom in the 
Northwest Division with a “revival of mining on Lake of the Woods” and, as indicated in 
the previous chapter, a renewed demand for pulp and paper in North America.8 The 
Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company increased production during the war years 
and planned to expand its operations. In 1955, the paper mill announced a “$17,000,000 
enlargement and development program” that would take up to three years to complete.9 
Company officials estimated that the enlarged paper mill would require more electricity 
than the Norman Dam and Kenora Powerhouse could produce. Expansion required 
energy. Rumours circulated that the Hydro-Electric Power Commission might enter the 
Winnipeg River drainage basin to service new industrial demands. The Kenora Miner 
and News optimistically printed that “the possibility of work being started on the 
Boundary Falls power development should also bring new business.”10 In an attempt to 
                                            
6 Ontario Hydro, Ontario Hydro a Proud Tradition, 40. See also, Whitcomb, A Short History of 
Ontario, 59. 
7 In January 1950, C. S. McGimsie, Kenora’s town assessor and tax collector, noted that the 
population had reached an “all-time high” of 9012. By 1955, the population had grown to 9367. “Our 
Growing Population,” Kenora Miner and News, 3 January 1950, 4. See also “Kenora’s Population Edging 
near 10,000,” Kenora Miner and News, 4 January 1955, 4. 
8 In 1955, Robert Faegre, the executive vice president of the Minnesota and Ontario Paper 
Company, predicted a strong demand for paper and related products. Post-war consumer demand 
stimulated a “direct demand for newsprint and… labelling.” Faegre associated growing demand for 
consumer goods (and packaging products) with “[t]he apparent increase in spendable income… coupled 
with population increases.” “MANDO Anticipates Strong Demand for Products with National Business 
Increase,” The Kenora Miner and News, 13 January 1955, 1. See also “Our Growing Population,” 4.  
9 “Industrial Prospects Considered Excellent,” Kenora Miner and News, 25 March 1955, 1. 
10 “Our Growing Population,” 4.  
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provide more income opportunities for families in northwestern Ontario, James George 
White, member of the provincial parliament for Kenora-Rainy River (1948-1951), 
advocated for the electrification of rural districts.11 The Kenora Miner and News 
encouraged its audience to actively support White, suggesting that “Hydro brings [the] 
development of communities and the added business of appliances in the new resorts and 
private camps.”12 Citing an American study, the editorial team suggested that new 
industry could put an additional $360,000 per annum into local circulation.13 The 
equivalent sum in 2015 is approximately $3,250,000. The Hydro-Electric Power 
Commission, Kenora residents were encouraged to believe, would create jobs in energy 
production and thus stimulate retail business. Public pressure on James George White to 
secure power for the Kenora-Rainy River riding grew. 
By December 1950, White achieved his goal to have sections of his riding 
electrified. The Kenora Miner and News announced that “Hydro power was assured for 
the Kenora district, either through a possible development at Boundary Falls, or a hook-
up with the Thunder Bay circuit through Dryden and Atikoken.”14 Over the next ten 
years, the HEPC engaged in the “largest extension program it [had] ever undertaken in 
northwestern Ontario with six separate projects… under construction”15 Two of these 
projects – Whitedog Falls Generation Station and Caribou Falls Generating Station – 
were built within a 65-kilometre radius of Kenora. The postwar economic boom had 
                                            
11 “Grassy Narrows Highway Number One ‘Must’ for District,” Kenora Miner and News, 1 April 
1950, 1. 
12 “Editorially Speaking: Hydro Extensions,” Kenora Miner and News, 25 April 1950, 4. 
13  “What New Industrial Jobs Mean to a Community,” Kenora-Keewatin Daily Miner and News, 
25 January 1955, 4. 
14 “1950 Proved Eventful Year for Twin Communities,” Kenora Miner and News, 29 December 
1950, 1. 
15 “$26 Million Hydro Station for Lakehead, Caribou Falls; Whitedog Falls; Silver Falls; Manitou 
Falls; Cameron Fall and Alexander Generating Station,” Kenora Daily Miner and News, 4 September 1957, 
8. 
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reached northwestern Ontario. Unfortunately, the HEPC used the pressure to make 
money and to meet consumer demand to justify development without meaningful 
consultation with local Anishinabek during a period of economic stagnation on reserve. 
When the HEPC arrived in the Winnipeg River drainage basin, there was no guarantee 
that hydroelectric development would benefit First Nations. The HEPC’s presence, 
Anishinabek families argued, could be a blessing or a curse to their communities. 
This chapter explores pro-industry responses to the arrival of the Hydro-Electric 
Power Commission, detailing the experiences of Anishinabek labourers on Whitedog 
Falls Generating Station and Caribou Falls Generating Station.16 A careful examination 
of the economic challenges faced by Anishinabek labourers in the years leading up to 
1955 is provided to help contextualize Anishinabek decisions to work for pay. A detailed 
account of the jobs worked by Anishinabek men and the conditions of their labour (often 
shared with general, non-Indigenous labourers) follows. These descriptions make visible 
Anishinabek labour on hydroelectric dams. Megan Stanley’s Voices from Two Rivers is 
the first academic work to acknowledge Indigenous labour on hydro-electric generating 
stations in British Columbia. She writes, “[w]hen construction on the reservoir began…. 
Many Tsek’ene moved to Finlay Forks to take advantage of these opportunities.”17 And 
                                            
16 Employment with the Hydro-Electric Power Commission was not universally desired by band 
members. Elder May Greene testified that her father preferred an isolationist rather than pro-industry 
approach: “Dad used to keep an eye on the reserve as he did not want any Whiteman to come here” 
(Dovetail Resources, Interview synopses by Cuyler Cotton, 1993, Dalles 38C, Elder Interview Collection). 
Unlike the Kabestra family, the Greene family encouraged band members to keep among themselves. This 
chapter does not tell the Greene’s story. It tells the story of men like Robert Kabestra (Anamikipens) who 
believed that they could earn sufficient income through dam work to continually occupy Dalles 38C Indian 
Reserve. 
17 Stanley, Voices from Two Rivers, 110. Megan Stanley, however, is not the first to identify 
Indigenous peoples’ desire to work in the hydroelectric generation industry. In the 1980s, James Waldram 
argued that First Nations suppressed critiques of Manitoba Hydro in hopes of securing employment at 
Limestone Generating Station on the Nelson River. Manitoba Hydro started building Limestone Generating 
Station in 1985 and completed the project in 1990 – two years after Waldram released As Long as the 
Rivers Run. He wrote, “Much opposition by Natives seems to have been silenced, at least for the moment, 
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yet, Stanley’s acknowledgement of job opportunities in Voices from Two Rivers is 
undeveloped. It is suggestive. In 2013, Caroline Desbiens noted an “excessively low” 
number of Cree and Inuit employees worked for Hydro-Quebec. Indigenous labour 
experiences were, once again, under-documented.18 This chapter takes seriously Stanley’s 
and Desbiens’ suggestion of an Indigenous labour presence. What follows is an 
investigation into the working lives of a minority group in Canada’s energy industry. 
This chapter is based on a series of interviews that I conducted in 2012. Elder Bert 
Fontaine (birthdate unknown) of Sagkeeng First Nation worked for the Hydro-Electric 
Power Commission in 1956. Elder Larry Kabestra Sr. testified to his father’s (Robert 
Kabestra (Anamikipinens), 1920-1995) – experiences working with the HEPC during the 
1950s.19 Larry also described his own work in the dam business, particularly cleaning 
screens at Norman Dam.20 Both Larry Kabestra and Fontaine could name other 
Anishinabek men who had been employed by the HEPC. However, I was unable to 
gather further testimony using the snowball technique. When Fontaine was asked to refer 
his past colleagues, he responded, “They’re all dead.”21 This chapter is constrained by the 
much lower life expectancy of Anishinabek men. As late as 2000, the average life 
                                                                                                                                  
by a comprehensive plan to hire Native people for the dam’s construction” (12). Political scientist Peter 
Kulchyski revealed that Manitoba Hydro ultimately failed to alleviate unemployment in First Nations 
communities. In 2012, Kulchyski observed that “Manitoba Hydro has a racially stratified work force.” First 
Nations employees are offered “low-paid and menial work” and can be found “push[ing] brooms and 
fill[ing] plates” for non-Indigenous employees. Waldram (1988), like Stanley (2010), identified Indigenous 
interest in waged labour. Kulchyski (2012) observed that some Indigenous communities supported 
development in hopes of securing jobs for band members. Unlike Waldram and Stanley, however, 
Kulchyski associates paid work with failed promises and racial stratification. See Kulchyski, “Flooded and 
Forgotten: Hydro development makes a battleground of northern Manitoba.”  
18 Desbiens, Power from the North, 171. 
19 As noted in the introduction, Elder Larry Kabestra was born in 1948. 
20 The Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company owned the Norman Dam. The paper mill and 
the province of Ontario coordinated water levels on Lake of the Woods. The Norman Dam was not under 
the control of the Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario. While under contract with the Department 
of Lands and Forests, Elder Larry Kabestra Sr. received experience working on hydroelectric generating 
stations as a screen cleaner. 
21 Elder Larry James Kabestra Sr., interview with author, Dalles 38C Indian Reserve, 6 July 2012. 
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expectancy of Anishinabek men was only 68.9 years.22 When interviews were conducted 
in 2012, the Whitedog Falls Generating Station had already been in operation for 54 
years. If we assume that the earliest age at which an Anishinabek youth could seek work 
for pay was sixteen (the age at which school attendance was no longer compulsory),23 
potential interviewees were statistical anomalies. Fontaine and Kabestra thus represent a 
much larger pool of working Anishinabek men whose testimonies are now, quite literally, 
buried. I relied on textual sources like newspaper reports and the HEPC’s internal records 
to supplement oral testimony. 
In addition to detailed description, this chapter argues that Anishinabek labourers 
attached higher value to work for pay than their wages. In “Living the Same as White 
People,” Robin Jarvis Brownlie argued that Anishinabek (and Mohawk) women sought 
paid employment opportunities in southern Ontario during the interwar period. Work for 
pay, Brownlie argues, should not be conflated with approval of settler land 
expropriation.24 My research builds on Brownlie’s argument, revealing that Anishinabek 
men in Northern Ontario objected to the expropriation of their lands despite working for 
the Hydro-Electric Power Commission. Paid employment was seen as a tool to maintain 
year-round occupancy on reserve. Both Fontaine and Kabestra worked to reinforce family 
bonds and, by extension, to strengthen their communities. Work for pay not only 
represents a response to limited economic opportunities in the Winnipeg River drainage 
basin, but as Kabestra’s testimony suggests, it also represents a vision of the future – a 
                                            
22 “A Statistical Profile on the Health of First Nations in Canada: Vital Statistics for Atlantic and 
Western Canada, 2001/2002,” Health Canada, last edited 16 February 2011, accessed 1 February 2016, 
http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/fniah-spnia/pubs/aborig-autoch/stats-profil-atlant/index-eng.php#a634. 
23 Jean Barman, “Child Labour,” The Canadian Encyclopedia, last edited 4 March 2015, accessed 
24 July 2015, http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/child-labour/. 
24 Robin Jarvis Brownlie, “‘Living the Same as White People’: Mohawk and Anishinabe Women’s 
Labour in Southern Ontario, 1920-1940,” Labour/Le Travail 61 (spring 2008), 41-68. 
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future where Anishinabek labourers could ensure the socio-economic stability of reserve 
life. This vision of the future has yet to manifest on reserve, in part because the Hydro-
Electric Power Commission made no attempt to hire general Anishinabek labourers over 
the long-term (nor was the HEPC legally required to).25 Thus, it was only for a moment 
(circa 1955-1958) that work for pay with the Hydro-Electric Power Commission was also 
an act of hope. 
“WITHOUT PAYING ANYTHING TO THE INDIANS FOR IT”: ON-RESERVE ECONOMIC 
CONDITIONS, 1900-1950 
 
On-reserve underemployment created an incentive for Anishinabek men to work 
for pay in the 1950s. Limited infrastructure existed on reserves in the Winnipeg River 
drainage basin. For example, Dalles 38C Indian Reserve, One Man Lake Indian Reserve, 
and Whitedog Indian Reserve lacked roads, water, or sewage hook-ups that might have 
stimulated maintenance work.26 On-reserve employment sources were slim. Many able-
bodied Anishinabek men accepted seasonal jobs as fishing guides for American and 
                                            
25 The Hydro-Electric Power Commission had no legal obligation to hire Anishinabek labourers. 
The term “employment equity” did not come into use in Canada until the 1980s, when the Royal 
Commission on Equality in Employment coined the term to describe the elimination of discriminatory 
hiring practices. In 1986, the Commission’s report led to the enactment of the Employment Equity Act 
which seeks to “to achieve equality in the workplace so that no person shall be denied employment 
opportunities or benefits for reasons unrelated to ability and, in the fulfilment of that goal, to correct the 
conditions of disadvantage in employment experienced by… aboriginal peoples.” For more information, 
see Rosalie Silberman Abella, Report of the Commission on Equality in Employment (Ottawa: Government 
of Canada, 1984).  
26 In 1974, the Ministry of Transportation and Communications examined road conditions leading 
from Kenora to nearby reserves. At this time, the road to Whitedog Indian Reserve was partly paved – “half 
[was] a smooth, wide, gravel road.” There is no study of One Man Lake Indian Reserve as the Hydro-
Electric Power Commission of Ontario spurred its dissolution by raising water levels on the Winnipeg 
River. The HEPC helped to finance the relocation of band members from One Man Lake to Whitedog 
Indian Reserve in the 1950s. There is also no record of road conditions to Dalles 38C Indian Reserve at this 
time, perhaps because band members had abandoned the community due to environmental change caused 
by Whitedog Falls Generating Station. Of the First Nations communities surveyed in the 1970s, none had 
fully paved roads. Conditions varied from “surface-treated [road] but in poor conditions with many 
potholes” to “hard packed gravel” to narrow gravel roads that were “not well maintained.” AO, Transit 
Projects Planning Office, Project Planning Branch, “Kenora Area Indian Reserves Transit Study, 
November 1974,” Indian Branch – Indian Lands TO Indian Community Housing, Ministry of 
Transportation and Communications Ontario, RG 47-138, B212821. 
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Canadian tourists. Indeed, Captain Frank Edwards, Indian Agent of the Kenora and 
Savanne Agencies (1920-1948), identified guiding as a “main occupation” among his 
wards.27 Opportunities for paid employment for fishing guides peaked between May and 
September, or between Victoria Day and Labour Day. 
Anishinabek visibility in the guiding business was tied to market demand. 
Edwards claimed that few entrepreneurs wanted to hire Anishinabek labourers, but 
tourists demanded they did. Edwards wrote, “Most camps prefer to hire white men, 
although the Tourists like to have Indian guides.”28 Consumer preferences even led some 
camps – like the Canadian Pacific Railway’s Bungalow Camp near Rat Portage Indian 
Reserve – to hire “Indians almost exclusively for this purpose [guiding].”29 Newspaper 
reports and magazine articles published across North America increased vacationers’ 
interest in the Winnipeg River drainage basin, particularly Lake of the Woods. Canadians 
and Americans pictured lakes brimming with prize-winning fish.30 Visitors to the 
                                            
27 LOWM, Captain Frank Edwards, Memorandum, “Indians in the Kenora District and Savanne, 
31 March 1938,” Folder: Anishinaabe – Essays and Papers. 
28 Ibid. Claire Elizabeth Campbell, in Shaped by the West Wind: Nature and History in Georgian 
Bay (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005), found that Indigenous employment stemmed, in part, from a lack of 
navigation charts at the turn of the twentieth century. A paucity of resources “elevated the importance of 
experimental mapping, or navigating by memory” stimulating campers’ demand for local (i.e. Indigenous) 
guides (55). During the interwar era, tourists were drawn to Georgian Bay by the perceived “wildness” of 
the landscape and its Indigenous inhabitants (101-02). Tourists’ desire to access “terre sauvage” likely 
maintained demand for Indigenous guides. Sharon Wall’s chapter on “Totem Poles, Tepees, and Token 
Traditions,” pages 216-50 of The Nurture of Nature: Childhood, Antimodernism, and Ontario Summer 
Camps, 1920-1955 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009), supports this speculative claim. Wall found that 
Ontario summer camps hoped to create an “Indian atmosphere” (235). Camp organizers believed that 
children could be cured of urban malaise by reconnecting with nature. In order to facilitate reconnection, 
some camps – like Ahmek, Keewaydin, Tanamakoon, and Temagami – hired Indigenous guides and 
canoeing instructors (235). As in the Winnipeg River drainage basin, Indigenous men took advantage of 
American and Canadian stereotypes, securing “relatively good pay” before fall and winter trapping and 
hunting began (236). 
29 LOWM, Captain Frank Edwards, “Indians in the Kenora District and Savanne.” 
30 For example, Field and Stream (one of Canada’s most popular sport magazines in the 1950s) 
awarded multiple “Biggest Fish” prizes to the Kenora District. The biggest reported muskellunge in 1955 
was pulled from the English River. The fifth biggest muskellunge was pulled from Lake of the Woods. 
“Field and Stream Stories Tell of Success in District Waters,” Kenora-Keewatin Daily Miner and News, 25 
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Winnipeg River drainage basin demanded access to Indigenous knowledge of nearby 
fishing grounds. Unfortunately, seasonal demands for Anishinabek labour did little to 
counter discriminatory hiring practices year-round (or within the tourism industry itself). 
Regional entrepreneurs preferred to work with “white men.” Anishinabek labourers were 
siloed into guiding jobs that ended with the tourist season. Seasonal pay created incentive 
for Anishinabek labourers to seek out contracts in other industries. For this reason, some 
Anishinabek families saw the arrival of the Hydro-Electric Power Commission as an 
opportunity to earn pay year round.31 
Anishinabek women also found waged work at tourist camps, but as domestic 
labourers. This finding is not unique to the Winnipeg River drainage basin. Historian 
John Lutz contends that the decennial census hints that “domestic service was a long-
standing employer of aboriginal women.”32 Sharon Wall found evidence that Ontario 
summer camps hired Indigenous women as kitchen staff to help recreate a “wilderness” 
experience for attendees (circa 1920-1955).33 Helen Everson of Shoal Lake Indian 
Reserve (1908-date of death unknown) suggested that employment opportunities for 
Anishinabek domestics peaked from May until October in the Winnipeg River drainage 
basin.34 Hattie Martin (1910-date of death unknown), a non-Status woman from Kenora, 
                                                                                                                                  
February 1955, 1. A similar observation is made by Rick Brignal, “Lodged in the Past,” Lake of the Woods 
Vacation Are, accessed 24 July 2015, http://lakeofthewoods.com/stories-from-the-lake/lodged-in-the-past/. 
31 In his analysis of “Resource Ontario,” historian Rolf Knight suggested that “ingrained ethnic 
stereotypes” may have limited employment options for Indian workers in other industries, particularly at 
the railway camps of northern Ontario. Knight bases his claim on Bunkhouse Man, Edmund Bradwin’s 
account of the lives of stiffs and navvies employed by the Canadian National Railway between 1903 and 
1914. Knight, Indians at Work, 283. 
32 Lutz, Makúk, 217. 
33 Wall, The Nurture of Nature, 235. 
34 Helen Everson, May Whin Shah Ti Pah Chi Mo Win: Indian Stories of Long Ago (Alexandria, 
MN: Echo Printing Company, c. 1975), 12. While employment opportunities peaked during the summer 
months, some Anishinabek women like Helen Everson managed to secure full-time employment. Everson 
worked as a housekeeper for Eric Holmstrom for two continuous years sometime between 1926 and 1932. 
Ibid., 13-4. 
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found work as a cleaner and a cook at Flag Island Resort (circa 1933) on the Minnesotan 
side of Lake of the Woods. Martin’s employee-employer agreement required that she 
travel approximately 32 kilometres from Flag Island Resort to clean at Portage Bay 
Camp.  As a condition of her employment, Martin moved from Kenora to Northwest 
Angle, Lake of the Woods, for the tourist season.35 Martin may have learned how to cater 
to non-Indigenous customers from her mother, Matilda Martin of Dalles 38C Indian 
Reserve. After moving to Kenora, “Matilda… took in washing, hanging clothes on the 
line outside and sometimes inside…. She folded the shirts and pants with tissue paper in 
the folds, just like you would buy them in the store.”36 According to Hazel McKeever-
Martin, her mother, Matilda, out-competed local launderers.37  
Anishinabek women without camp employment produced handicrafts to sell to 
tourists during the summer months. Hattie Martin’s mother, Matilda, had made 
moccasins with floral motifs to sell to “white people” since the early 1900s. By mid-
century, Edwards suggested that handiwork was “not as remunerative an occupation for 
the Indians in this [Kenora] District as it [was] in Eastern Canada.”38 Matilda Martin 
                                                                                                                                  
Helen Everson was born at Shoal Lake Indian Reserve in 1908. Everson does not specify whether 
she was born at Shoal Lake #39 or Shoal Lake #40. Everson was removed from her community and 
registered at Cecilia Jaffray residential school around 1915. Everson would not be released from CJ until 
approximately 1926. 
35 Martin-McKeever, The Chief’s Granddaughter, 72. 
36 Ibid., 69. 
37 Ibid. 
38 LOWM, Captain Frank Edwards, “Indians in the Kenora District and Savanne.”  
Gender historians have revealed that Indigenous women throughout North America used 
handicraft sales to help manage immigration pressures and settler land grabs. Literature on handicraft sales 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries suggests that capital earned by female artisans sustained 
subsistence economies. Historian Colette A. Hyman, Dakota Women’s Work: Creativity, Culture & Exile 
(St. Paul:  Minnesota Historical Society, 2012), writing on Dakota women’s work in present-day 
Minnesota, has further argued that women’s handicraft prevented “cultural annihilation” – profits earned by 
selling traditional crafts were used to support independent Dakota communities (164-70). Other notable 
studies on Indigenous women’s handicraft include Sherry Farrell Racette, “Sewing for a Living: The 
Commodification of Metis Women’s Artistic Production,” Contact Zones: Aboriginal and Settler Women 
in Canada’s Colonial Past (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005), 17-46; Paige Raibmon, “The Practice of 
Everyday Colonialism: Indigenous Women in the Hop Fields and Tourist Industry of Puget Sound,” Labor 
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similarly remembered being unable to demand more than $2.50 for her beadwork as a 
young woman (circa 1900). Limited profit margins may help to explain why Anishinabek 
women in Treaty #3 adopted commercially produced dye in the 1930s. Anthropologist 
Ruth Landes observed that fewer “traditional” crafts were entirely homemade: 
Anishinabek women replaced homemade dye with store-bought colours.39 The use of 
commercial dye reduced the amount of time needed to produce saleable footwear. 
Artisans no longer had to factor colour production into their price point. This improved 
Anishinabek women’s chances of turning a profit in a difficult market. For Anishinabek 
women waged work in the tourist industry – and income generated in spin-off industries 
like handicraft production – was limited. 
During the fall, guides and domestic workers returned to their home reserves. 
Many Anishinabek families living at Dalles 38C Indian Reserve maintained at least two 
homes. Summer housing was often located near the shores of the Winnipeg River where 
it was easier for women and children to maintain subsistence gardens. These gardens 
were required to supplement meagre seasonal wages from guiding and/or cleaning. Elder 
Helen Everson of Shoal Lake Indian Reserve suggested that planting occurred after 
muskrat-trapping season (April to May).40  Planted gardens averaged 0.5 acres. Elder 
Charlie Fisher of One Man Lake testified that “everyone had a garden” before Whitedog 
Falls Generating Station inundated his reserve.41 Anishinabek families in the Winnipeg 
River drainage basin planted carrots, potatoes, onions, pumpkins and corn for household 
                                                                                                                                  
Studies in Working-Class History of the Americas 3 (2006): 23-56; Coll Thrush, “The Woven Coast,” 
Native Seattle: Histories from the Crossing-Over Place (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2007), 
105-25. 
39 Landes, The Ojibwa Woman, 126. 
40 Everson, May Whin Shah Ti Pah Chi Mo Win, 20. 
41 Families who did not garden were considered exceptional. Indeed, Elder Charlie Fisher could 
remember families who did not garden by name. Elder Fisher, interview with Chapeskie, 22 March 1995. 
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consumption. Guides and domestic workers likely returned to their summer homes to 
help harvest and preserve the garden produce that would feed them during the “off-
season.” 
After the harvest, many Anishinabek families left their riverside homes and 
moved inland so that able-bodied men could cut wood. Elder David Wagamese 
remembers moving from the river to the interior of Dalles 38C Indian Reserve throughout 
his youth. Elder Larry Kabestra of Dalles 38C confirmed this migration pattern. He 
testified that “there was a [winter] community at the present dump site” that was 
occupied primarily by Anishinabek men “cutting wood… cutting pulp.” Kabestra 
suggests that at least seven families actively logged on reserve in the 1950s. Neither 
Kabestra nor Wagamese could name their father’s employer.42 Edwards, however, 
reported that at least some men “[got] jobs cutting wood and freighting wood for the 
trading and mining companies” in the 1930s.43 Records exist to suggest that Anishinabek 
men started logging for pay as early as 1884. Historian Rolf Knight found evidence of 
Anishinabek bands “getting out railway ties” from Lake Nipissing southeast towards 
Kenora.44 What remained constant at Dalles 38C Indian Reserve was the style of winter 
employment; the employer changed from year to year as new industries opened and 
closed in the Winnipeg River drainage basin. Winter employment paid off, according to 
Edwards, who suggested that “some tribes have sustained a very good remuneration from 
the sale of pulp wood at their Reserves.”45 Such claims must be read cautiously: 
                                            
42 Elder Kabestra Sr., interview with author, 6 July 2012. Elder David Wagamese, interview with 
author, Dalles 38C Indian Reserve, 8 August 2012. 
43 LOWM, Captain Frank Edwards, “Indians in the Kenora District and Savanne.” 
44 Knight, Indians at Work, 283. 
45 LOWM, Captain Frank Edwards, “Indians in the Kenora District and Savanne.” 
Ontario First Nations did not universally receive “very good remuneration” for their timber stands. 
For example, historian Mark Kuhlberg uncovered that the Department of Indian Affairs facilitated the 
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Indigenous loggers did not always receive competitive rates for their timber. And yet, the 
wood cutting industry ensured pay during the slow winter months. 
Water fluctuations at the Norman Dam increased Anishinabek reliance on waged 
labour long before the Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario constructed 
Whitedog Falls Generating Station. Prior to 1898, before Ontario used Norman Dam to 
regulate lake levels, Crown agents associated manomin harvesting with Anishinabek 
independence. In 1868, for example, Treaty Commissioner Simon J. Dawson noted that 
women’s careful management of manomin (and garden produce) meant that Anishinabek 
families in the Winnipeg River drainage basin suffered “not so much from the scarcity of 
food, although game sometimes fails, as from the want of clothing.”46 Anishinabek 
families became increasingly reliant on waged labour after the International Joint 
Commission issued its 1917 recommendations for water regulation on Lake of the 
Woods. Manomin yields declined substantially as a result of the IJC’s 
recommendations.47 Manomin is highly sensitive to water fluctuations. Journalist Thomas 
Pawlick and social activist Kathi Avery explain: 
Water depth is one of the main determinants in the growth of wild rice. It 
affects the amount of sunlight which reaches the plants and, if too high at 
certain points – such as the floating leaf stage in June and July – the plant 
                                                                                                                                  
exploitation of timber resources by Charles W. Cox, a small timber contractor, at Gull Bay and Long Lac 
Reserves in the 1920s. Cox avoided paying his timber dues in full by underreporting trees harvested on 
reserve. Exploitation did not go unnoticed. Local Indian Agent, J. G. Burk, reported Cox’s misdeeds to 
Ottawa in an attempt to improve First Nations participation in the forest economy. However, patronage 
considerations in Ottawa prolonged Cox’s exploitation of First Nations timber stands. See Kuhlberg, 
“‘Nothing it seems can be done about it’: Charlie Cox, Indian Affairs Timber Policy, and the Long Lac 
Reserve, 1924-1940,” Canadian Historical Review 84, no. 1 (2003): 33-64. See also Kuhlberg, “‘Mr. Burk 
is Most Interested in Their Welfare’: J. G. Burk’s Campaign to Help the Anishinabeg of Northwestern 
Ontario, 1923-1953,” Journal of Canadian Studies 45, no. 1 (Winter 2011): 59-89, especially pages 64, 75. 
46 Simon J. Dawson quoted in Tim E. Holzkamm and Leo G. Waisberg, “‘A Tendency to 
Discourage Them from Cultivating’: Ojibwa Agriculture and Indian Affairs Administration in 
Northwestern Ontario,” Ethnohistory 40, no. 2 (spring 1993): 180. 
47 International Joint Commission. Final Report, 27. 
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expends all its energy in elongation and does not produce seed. Some 
plants fail to make it above water at all, and die.48 
 
Anishinabek harvesters argue that water levels on Lake of the Woods must be maintained 
between 1058 and 1059 feet (322.48 and 322.78 metres) above sea-level for optimum 
manomin growth.49 Records indicate that at no point between 1951 and 1955 – 
approximately five years before hydro’s arrival – were water levels at Norman Dam 
regulated to allow for optimum manomin growth. Information on water levels between 
1945 and 1950 is not readily accessible, but records indicate that Lake of the Woods was 
kept above 1059 feet (322.78 metres) during June and July (the floating leaf stage) from 
1941 to 1945.50 Similar conditions led Edwards to note that “[o]wing to the raising of the 
Lake at the Norman Dam, for commercial purposes, this article of food is becoming very 
scarce.” As early as 1938, Edwards reported that “there is no wild rice on the Lake of the 
Woods proper.”51 With international sanction, Norman Dam regularly drowned manomin 
crops to regulate lake levels after (if not before) 1917. When the Hydro-Electric Power 
Commission arrived in Anishinabek territories at mid-century, Anishinabek families had 
been struggling to win both economic and food security for years. Meagre wages and low 
manomin yields were common among band members. 
A paucity of sources makes it difficult to determine the effects of water regulation 
at Norman Dam on trapping and fishing activities along the Winnipeg River before the 
arrival of the Hydro-Electric Power Commission. Captain Frank Edwards, however, 
                                            
48 Kathi Avery and Thomas Pawlick, “Last Stand in Wild Rice Country,” Harrowsmith 3 (1979): 
44. 
49 Ibid.  
50 “Lake of the Woods 1941-1945,” Lake of the Woods Control Board, 18 June 2009, 
http://www.rlwwb-temp.lwcb.ca/permpdf/LW/5-Yr_LW-1941-1945.pdf; “Lake of the Woods 1951-1955,” 
Lake of the Woods Control Board, 18 June 2009, http://www.rlwwb-temp.lwcb.ca/permpdf/LW/5-Yr_LW-
1951-1955.pdf.  
51 LOWM, Captain Frank Edwards, “Indians in the Kenora District and Savanne.”  
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suggested that the gradual erosion of treaty rights by Ontario exacerbated economic 
challenges (e.g. seasonal underemployment, inability to manage native crops) faced by 
Anishinabek families. Provincial gaming laws “made it harder for the Indian” to subsist 
in the Winnipeg River drainage basin and prevented Anishinabek families from using 
country foods year-round. Edwards believed that poverty could be managed if “They 
[‘the Indians’] should all put up fish and meat for the winter, as they were wont to do in 
bygone days.” But, “the Ontario Game Laws make this [subsistence living] an 
impossibility.”52 Provincial game laws were not only enacted in the Kenora District, they 
were enforced. The local police court handed out various convictions for trapping 
violations during Edwards’ tenure as Indian Agent.53 Frank Belmore confirmed that game 
wardens were “zealous” in-and-around Kenora. The provincial crackdown on 
Anishinabek trapping included searching tikinaguns – a cradle board used by 
Anishinabek women – for “illegal” furs during the winter months. Game wardens 
searched for “preheated muskrat skins [placed] around a child’s feet in the bottom of the 
tikinagun.”54 Anishinabek women used muskrat skins to keep their children warm on 
trips to town. This childcare practice was eradicated around Kenora by mid-century as 
women “feared being hauled before the magistrate and convicted for out-of-season 
pelts.”55 Zealous officials made it difficult for Anishinabek families to trap in response to 
need. It is no wonder that able-bodied Anishinabek men sought logging work during the 
winter months – Anishinabek families may now have required wages to purchase items 
that had previously been homemade. 
                                            
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
54 LOWM, Frank Belmore, “The Tikinagun,” undated, Folder: Anishinaabe – Essays and Papers. 
55 Ibid. 
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Fishing activities on the Winnipeg River do not appear to have been seriously 
jeopardized until Whitedog Falls Generating Station began operations in 1958 (as 
detailed in Chapter 5). Anishinabek families’ ability to fish commercially, however, may 
have been complicated by preferential licencing. Edwards explained that “Few tribes 
have commercial licences.”56 Without a commercial licence, one’s ability to turn a profit 
was limited: “fish dealers are not allowed to purchase from Indians, unless the Indians 
have a licence.”57 Licence acquisition did little to alleviate competition with non-
Indigenous fishermen for premium fishing grounds. Competition was fierce in-and-
around reserve. Edwards complained that “licences are issued to white men to fish in 
waters, which are really Indian reserve waters.”58 Members of Dalles 38C Indian Reserve 
faced unexpected competition for territory from the Ontario Fish Hatchery. This facility 
opened in the early 1920s and closed its doors in 1961.59 Employee testimony reveals that 
Ontario set two nets on the Winnipeg River for pickerel each spring. According to Max 
Foster, one net was set just below the Dalles Rapids. The second net was set about two 
kilometres away.60 Provincial employees managed these nets from April or May until 
June. Nets that were set at Dalles Rapids were highly productive: the net below the Dalles 
averaged 800 pickerel a day, but Foster reports that on 10 May 1947 this net average was 
up to a thousand. He writes, “We had never seen it like that before. We had northern 
(pike) and 2 sturgeon which were about 150 pounds each. The [second net] averaged 
about 300 fish a day. This net did not produce like the upper net [in Dalles].”61 Biography 
                                            
56 LOWM, Captain Frank Edwards, “Indians in the Kenora District and Savanne.” 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. 
59 LOWM, “Max Foster letter to the Lake of the Woods Museum, undated,” Folder: Fish Hatchery 
Papers, File 2011.10.6. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid. 
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and oral testimony suggest that the site of the “upper net” had previously been used by 
the Martin family. Hazel McKeever-Martin claims that her mother, Matilda, used to set 
nets “50 to 100 ft. in length and 6 ft. or so in depth.”62 Matilda indicated that her family 
set their nets “maybe two [or] three miles from [Dalles 38C].”63 Not only did provincial 
agents displace Anishinabek fishermen for up to three months per annum, no 
remuneration was offered to band members for reserve access. In 1938, Edwards 
complained that “the local fish hatchery takes pickerel spawn from Indian waters (Dalles 
Reserve) without paying anything to the Indians for it.”64 Waged work, although 
discriminatory, provided necessary income in an era of increased resource competition, 
“zealous” game law enforcement, and declining manomin yields. 
Unfortunately, the chances of full-time employment in Kenora were slim. 
Preferential hiring practices made it difficult for Anishinabek men and women to work in 
town. Complaints that Kenora-based businesses did not hire Anishinabek workers date 
back to the 1930s. Edwards suggested that Anishinabek pupils graduated from residential 
school with little hope of employment. Reflecting on high rates of unemployment, he 
asked, “What effort have we made to assimilate them into our civilization after bringing 
them up in it?”65 Limited community effort had been made to integrate federal wards into 
town life. Some Anishinabek youth felt pressured to give up their treaty rights for 
employment purposes. John Kipling Jr., born at Dalles 38C Indian Reserve (1905-circa 
1962), found work as a millwright at the Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Mill. 
According to family lore, Kipling opted for enfranchisement to secure his position. 
                                            
62 Martin-McKeever, The Chief’s Granddaughter, 23. 
63 Elder Matilda Martin, interview with the Kenora Daily Miner and News, 30 June 1972.  
64 LOWM, Captain Frank Edwards, “Indians in the Kenora District and Savanne.”  
65 Ibid. 
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Discriminatory hiring practices continued well into the 1960s – at the Ontario-Minnesota 
Pulp and Paper Mill and elsewhere in town. One accomplished Indigenous typist simply 
stated that Kenora businesses “didn’t hire Indians.”66 Records of the Mayor’s Indian 
Committee from 1968 indicate that few entrepreneurs responded to municipal requests to 
establish summer employment programs for Indigenous youth (had Edwards still been 
alive, he certainly would not have been surprised).67 Anishinabek complaints concerning 
discriminatory hiring are substantiated by records from the Ministry of Communication 
and Social Services. In 1974, the Ministry identified Indian underemployment as one big 
problem in Kenora. Racism was the root cause: “native people are often not considered to 
be ‘good’ employees.”68 Writing in 1969, Cree activist Harold Cardinal argued that such 
race-based hiring bars did, indeed, exist and were endemic across Canada.69 
The Indian Affairs Branch did little to relieve on-reserve poverty that had been 
aggravated by discriminatory hiring practices in-town, resource competition, low 
manomin yields, and seasonal underemployment. Federal relief adhered to the principles 
of less eligibility: federal relief was to be so meagre that needy Anishinabek families 
would have rather worked the lowest paying job than depend on the Indian Affairs 
Branch for support. The 1966 Hawthorn Report revealed that the Indian Affairs Branch 
did not consider relief “the right of any Indian” at mid-century. Instead relief was to be 
                                            
66 AO, “Minutes of the Mayor’s Indian Committee Meeting Held on Friday, April 26th, 1968,” 
File: Indians-Kenora, RG 29-01-1474, B334469.  
67 AO, W. Welldon, Director, Ministry of Communication and Social Services, Memorandum, 
“Action on Kenora, 6 August 1975,” File: Kenora Action Recommendations, RG 47-138, B212821. 
68 AO, “Minutes of the Mayor’s Indian Committee Meeting Held on Friday, April 26th, 1968.”  
69 Harold Cardinal further claimed that Canadian employers used stereotype to justify their 
discriminatory hiring practices. He wrote, "[E]mployers... use this stereotype [drunk Indian] as a lever 
against government enforcement of fair employment standards." Cardinal, The Unjust Society, 5.  
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distributed “at the pleasure of the Branch to prevent suffering.”70 According to historian 
Hugh Shewell, Indian agents in the post-war era found little pleasure in providing relief 
to able-bodied men.71 This same observation can be made in the Kenora District. Elder 
Larry Kabestra Sr. claims that his father, a seasonal labourer, “never depended on 
welfare.” He further explained that “There was no such thing as welfare on this 
reserve.”72 Elder Alice Kelly substantiated Kabestra’s claim during an interview. She 
believed that her family garden was essential to survival because “they used to have a 
hard time to get welfare assistance. They have to work. It was hard for them.”73 Federal 
relief distributed in the immediate aftermath of World War II was most likely to be 
distributed in-kind. Policy documents written by Colonel H. M. Jones, superintendent of 
the Welfare Division, Indian Affairs Branch, recommended that “relief [be made] 
payable… through provision of food, fuel, clothing [and] household equipment.”74 
Shewell found that even these in-kind payments were restricted “in areas where game and 
fish are plentiful” and if the applicant was “physically capable of hunting or fishing.”75 
This policy did not seriously consider provincial game laws (or, in the Kenora District, 
provincial competition for fishing grounds). As early as 1938, Edwards argued that 
Indigenous people in-and-around Kenora “are becoming greatly discouraged and 
                                            
70 In particular, the 1966 Hawthorn Report quoted testimony provided by the head of the Welfare 
Division to the joint parliamentary committee in 1947. Quoted in Hugh Shewell, “Enough to Keep Them 
Alive”: Indian Welfare in Canada, 1873-1965 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 231. 
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war. It is my assumption – given Shewell’s earlier emphasis on “able-bodied” applicants – that “capable” is 
associated with “able-bodied.” Ibid., 237. 
72 Elder Kabestra Sr., interview with author, 6 July 2012. 
73 Elder Kelly, interview with author, 30 July 2012. 
74 Colonel H. M. Jones, “Welfare and Relief Assistance for Indians” (1952)” quoted in Shewell, 
‘Enough to Keep Them Alive,’ 239. 
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demoralized at being unable to earn a living.”76 Poverty seemed to be a universal 
condition on reserve during the first half of the twentieth century.77 
In response to endemic on-reserve poverty, Robert Kabestra (Anamikipinens) of 
Dalles 38C Indian Reserve routinely asked his wife, “What are we going to do?”78 The 
Hydro-Electric Power Commission provided at least one possible answer: work for pay 
on the development of Whitedog Falls Generating Station. Faced with few jobs, limited 
relief, and complicated harvested activities, dam labour offered a chance at economic 
security. Whitedog Falls Generating Station, a 54,000 kW facility, was to be built on the 
Winnipeg River. Caribou Falls Generating Station, a twin project of 67,500 kW, was to 
be built on the English River. These two construction projects created an employment 
boom in Anishinabek territory: road clearing work followed long-standing transportation 
routes. Oral testimony reveals that band members from Dalles 38C Indian Reserve 
learned about Whitedog Falls Generating Station through face-to-face encounters with 
Hydro employees; Anishinabek families and Hydro employees traversed the same 
spaces.79 By 1956, the HEPC’s surveying team had been joined by approximately 310 
men working on an all-weather road between Pistol Lake (three kilometres west of 
Minaki and very near Dalles 38C Indian Reserve) and the Whitedog Falls (four 
kilometres from Whitedog Indian Reserve). This same stretch of land (and river) was 
used by band members. Records from the Diocese of Keewatin (Anglican) reveal that 
                                            
76 LOWM, Captain Frank Edwards, Memorandum, “Indians in the Kenora District and Savanne.”  
77 Bryan Palmer echoes this claim. Palmer writes, “Native peoples made less money than whites, 
worked more irregularly, and were confined to the worst-remunerated and least-appreciated employments 
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78 Elder Kabestra Sr., interview with author, 6 July 2012. 
79 Dovetail Resources. Elder Jacob Strong, interview by Cuyler Cotton, Kenora, Ontario, 2 
October 1992, Dalles 38C, Elder Interview Collection. 
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members from Dalles 38C Indian Reserve travelled downstream to witness important life 
events like baptisms and to marry.80 Conversely, members of Whitedog Indian Reserve 
travelled upstream to trade.81 They also joined members of Dalles 38C Indian Reserve at 
Ena Lake and Corn Lake for berry picking.82 When Anishinabek families saw their lands 
being surveyed and cleared by the HEPC, they also saw employment opportunities. More 
importantly, work for pay was available in close proximity – just a boat’s ride away from 
the reserve. This was at a time when people travelled by motor boat, canoe, or by foot. 
The accessibility of employment was a major factor in attracting men to the HEPC 
construction sites. Paid work with the Hydro-Electric Power Commission did not require 
that men leave their reserve (and their families) for the tourist season (May to 
September). 
 “GET SOME GUYS IN THERE”: ANISHINABEK MEN’S WORK FOR THE HYDRO-
ELECTRIC POWER COMMISSION, 1955-1958 
 
How did Anishinabek men find work with the Hydro-Electric Power 
Commission? The Kenora Miner and News published the HEPC’s development program 
in spring 1956. The HEPC emphasized the immensity of the project: over 150,000 HP 
needed to be installed in the Northwestern District. Roads needed to be cleared. Dams 
needed to be built. And, once Whitedog Falls Generating Station and Caribou Falls 
Generating Station were installed, transmission lines needed to be erected to carry 
electricity. The HEPC broke this immense project down into three mutually dependent 
units. The work program was envisioned as follows: 
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1. Whitedog Falls: -- 
Access Road, Camp Construction, Cofferdams and Diversion Channel, 
Dewatering, Power House 
 
2. Caribou Falls: -- 
Access Road, Preliminary Investigations, Clearing, Cofferdams and Block Dams, 
Power House 
 
3. Planning the Construction Job: -- 
a. Sidings, warehouses, accommodation, crushing plants, concrete plants, 
concrete, placing, mechanic shop, carpenter shop, temporary power plants, 
hospitals, schools, cafeteria, commissary, recreation, fire and police 
protection, office and accounting. 
b. Field Engineering 
c. Planning and Cost Control 
d.  Safety.83 
 
This newspaper announcement suggested job availability in both dam work and 
community construction. Readers could imagine where, if at all, they might fit in the 
program. This newspaper announcement allowed able-bodied men to envision their 
contributions to the HEPC: readers became part of the program. 
Oral testimony makes visible Anishinabek labour in all three units. However, 
Anishinabek labourers did not apply for work in response to newspaper announcements. 
Anishinabek responded primarily to word-of-mouth and/or sought employment through 
kin networks. For example, Bert Fontaine was approximately eighteen years old when the 
HEPC began its expansion project in the Winnipeg River drainage basin. The Indian 
Affairs Branch had refused to fund Fontaine’s return to Sagkeeng, MB from residential 
school in Kenora (a distance of approximately 220 kilometres). Fontaine’s experience 
was not unique. Indeed, as historian Brenda Child found in the neighbouring state of 
Michigan, “children were not returned home when expected, sometimes even after their 
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terms of study had expired.”84 The Indian Affairs Branch routinely denied residential 
school graduates funds required to return to their reserves to encourage assimilation into 
non-Native communities. Fontaine appears to have been stuck in Kenora by these same 
assimilationist goals. Fontaine needed wages to fund his return to Sagkeeng First Nation. 
He explains, “out of school, you need money, you know.”85The newspaper did not draw 
Fontaine’s attention to employment opportunities with the HEPC. Instead, Fontaine 
learned about job openings through word-of-mouth. He recollects, "I think it was, 
somebody mentioned there was two dams coming up. So, I went to the office.”86 
Fontaine applied at the HEPC in response to local buzz – rather than local reporting – 
about the project. Through informal channels, Fontaine learned that he might be able to 
finance his way home. 
Robert (Anamikipinens) Kabestra, by contrast, was a father settled at Dalles 38C 
Indian Reserve in 1956. He had completed some schooling at St. Mary’s Residential 
School years earlier. Records held by the Notre Dame Parish in Kenora, Ontario, suggest 
that Anamikipinens originated from Shoal Lake Indian Reserve, but married Flora 
McLeod from Dalles 38C Indian Reserve at St. Mary’s in July 1940.87 The married 
couple settled along the Winnipeg River, perhaps to be near McLeod’s family. It is 
unlikely that newspaper announcements prompted Anamikipinens’ job-seeking activities. 
Interviewed by telephone, Mitch Wolfe, chief editor at the Kenora Miner and News, 
indicated that circulation records have been lost. And yet, a review of the 
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“Announcements” page from 1950 to 1958 suggests that local Anishinabek were 
excluded from the paper’s intended audience. The “Announcements” section of the 
newspaper targeted Kenora proper, Keewatin, and Jaffray Melick. Anamikipinens, it 
seems, responded to the physical proximity of Hydro work. The idea of approaching the 
HEPC to secure a temporary contract resulted in his eventual employ. Unlike Fontaine, 
Anamikipinens sought employment from the periphery.  
Having secured his position, Anamikipinens worked to “get some of the guys 
[from Dalles 38C Indian Reserve] in there to work.”88 He appears to have been first link 
in a chain of reserve workers. Once established on site, Anamikipinens arranged work-
for-pay opportunities for family members. Anamikipinens first secured employment for 
relatives of his wife, Flora McLeod. Larry Kabestra explains that “the McLeods, most of 
them [got jobs] at Whitedog Dam.”89 Work opportunities snowballed for Anishinabek 
men from Dalles 38C Indian Reserve in this manner: perform as an individual and then 
vouch for a relative. The use of kin networks to secure employment is not unique to 
Dalles 38C Indian Reserve; this strategy has been employed by other Indigenous groups. 
Anthropologist David Blanchard found that Mohawk steel workers frequently worked in 
family units. He identified “teenage boys working with their fathers and grandfathers” on 
industrial steel projects.90 By contrast, non-Indigenous labourers relied more heavily on 
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Similar trends are identified in the American southwest. Kurt Peters noted that the Laguna of New 
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professional networks like the union dispatch to secure employment.91 Given that 
Anishinabek labour had been overwhelmingly seasonal in nature, few able-bodied men 
were registered to benefit from these professional organizations. For Anishinabek men 
from Dalles 38C Indian Reserve, employment opportunities emerged from familial, not 
professional, connections. 
Walk-ins and kin networks functioned as effective job-seeking strategies for 
Anishinabek men because the Hydro-Electric Power Commission did not have a rigorous 
hiring process for manual labourers (Anishinabek or non-Indigenous alike). Fontaine did 
not remember a formal interview process. He explains, “You just tell them what you can 
do and you do it.”92 Fontaine’s description of this casual hiring process was echoed by 
other employees. In the post-war era, the HEPC showed greater interest in bodies (male 
and able) than credentials for labour jobs. 93 Indeed, the HEPC expected that labourers 
would learn by doing. Necessary skills were to be developed on the job. Little time was 
lost between job application and job performance. The Kenora Miner and News suggests 
that men could be hired and working overnight.94 The HEPC’s emphasis on learning-by-
                                                                                                                                  
Identity: Laguna Pueblo Railroaders in Richmond, California,” in American Indians and the Urban 
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doing made it possible for men like Fontaine and Anamikipinens to walk onto a job (and, 
in Anamikipinens’ case, to secure jobs for others). 
Anishinabek men filled a variety of positions. The earliest available labour job 
was clearing for roadwork. During the clearing phase, trees were felled. Anishinabek men 
may have owned the necessary equipment to participate in the process from pulp-cutting 
contracts. In this scenario, the HEPC would not need to purchase extra equipment to hire 
extra hands: it would have made financial sense to employ Anishinabek men to fell trees. 
Grubbing, that is, the clearing and removal of stumps and debris, followed. Newspaper 
records indicate that over 300 men were employed by road construction.95 Available oral 
testimony from Dalles 38C Indian Reserve does not speak to Anishinabek labour on this 
part of the project. 
Clearing work was also required to help create dam reservoirs. The Kenora Miner 
and News published more specific details about Caribou Falls Generating Station than 
Whitedog Falls Generating Station. Journalists noted that “[o]ne unusual aspect of the 
new development [is] the clearance of some 19,000 acres of land for the headpond” or 
reservoir.96 The HEPC needed hands to complete “the most extensive [clearing] operation 
of its kind ever undertaken by the Commission.”97 Anishinabek men were active on this 
phase of the project. Elder Charlie Fisher of One Man Lake Indian Reserve complained 
that the Hydro-Electric Power Commission hired Anishinabek men exclusively to fell 
trees, closing off alternative forms of employment. Fisher also felt that Anishinabek 
labour was confined to reserve. He claims, “We tried to get [talking about the project], 
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but they just slashed the reserve, cutting the trees down.... That’s all we got to do. Just the 
reserve part. Other than that we didn’t get any, any jobs.”98 Fisher felt that his job options 
with the HEPC were heavily restricted: as an Anishinabek worker he was confined to 
felling trees at One Mane Lake Indian Reserve. 
Barriers against Indigenous employment for Whitedog Falls and Caribou Falls 
generating stations do not appear to have been universally applied. Hydro’s big project 
required big machinery. The Kenora Miner and News reported that “Twenty hired trucks, 
ten bulldozers, six power shovels [were] working on the road and various types of 
machinery, such as rubber-tired tractors, all makes and sizes of trucks, jeeps, compressors 
and equipment to no end [could] be seen at the campsites.”99 J. A. Sherrett of the Kenora 
Chamber of Commerce, was impressed by the “huge cranes, fifteen ton capacity trucks, 
bulldozers [and] road graders” being used at Whitedog Falls Generating Station.100 
“Progress Reports” published by the Kenora Miner and News featured cranes and sheep-
foot rollers.101 What is missing from these reports is a description of their drivers. Larry 
Kabestra claims that his father, Anamikipinens, drove trucks for the Hydro-Electric 
Power Commission.102 This appears to have been Anamikipinens’ primary form of 
employ. Fontaine, by contrast, drove only once: 
Fontaine:  I’ll tell you a funny one. One day this boss comes up to 
me. He says, ‘Hey, Fontaine, can you drive a big 
truck?’ 
Just joking, I says, ‘Yeah.’ 
‘Well, see that big truck over there? Bring it up!’ 
[laughter] 
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So, I put in gear – and, I didn’t know the first thing 
about big trucks. I made it up. 
Luby:   You made it? You got it? 
Fontaine:  Oh, yeah. [Luby laughs]. 
Luby:   Did he have you driving lots after that? 
Fontaine:  No, no, just the one time [laughter].103 
 
Fontaine’s driving experience appears to have been in response to an acute labour 
shortage; no truck drivers were available on site. Full-time or infrequently, Anishinabek 
men remember (or are remembered) driving the machines that helped to construct 
Whitedog Falls and Caribou Falls generating stations. 
Big machinery required maintenance. The Kenora Miner and News claimed that 
"one of the main requirements [of a remote construction project] is to have a machine 
shop with facilities adequate to handle almost any repair or fabrication jobs 
imaginable."104 Importing new equipment was both difficult and costly. Before the access 
road was completed, equipment had to be shipped to Minaki by train and then barged to 
the construction site.105 In this environment, maintenance men were essential to cost 
management: they helped to ensure continuous operations by repairing equipment on site. 
The Hydro-Electric Power Commission invested considerable monies into building 
cutting-edge facilities for their mechanics. Men were provided with “a fully functioning 
modern machine shop for all repairs” – mechanics had access to the best tools.106 
Fontaine’s brother appears to have worked under the Mechanical Superintendent. He was 
primarily responsible for oiling the cranes. Fontaine, by contrast, worked on smaller 
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machines. He monitored the manual oxygen supply for divers – a job, perhaps, more 
strongly associated with the Safety Division. 
Machines maintained by Fontaine’s brother and driven by Anamikipinens remade 
the Winnipeg and English rivers. Trucks and bulldozers moved over 188,000 tons of rock 
at Caribou Falls Generating Station alone. Rock featured heavily in the minds of the 
HEPC’s planners. The Kenora Miner and News noted that “[the] road passes through 
some fairly rough country with numerous rock cuts” – blasting regularly predated 
construction for many jobs on the Canadian Shield. Blasting created a heavy burden of 
waste. Fontaine facilitated the disposal of this blasted rock. He explains, “[I was] spotting 
these trucks at night, where they dumped – like rock.”107 “‘Dump here!’” was a call 
Fontaine made on the job.108  
Once the road was cleared and the dam was constructed, the Hydro-Electric Power 
Commission needed to transmit electricity to the Kenora Switching Station. Anishinabek 
labour was used both to clear ground for the transmission lines and to construct 
transmission towers. Fontaine worked on a six-man team to “assemble towers for hydro, 
the hydro line.”109 Most of his workmates were Hungarian immigrants. He appears to 
have been the only Anishinaabe crew member. Larry Kabestra remembers an 
Anishinabek work crew installing transmission towers through Dalles 38C Indian 
Reserve. Kabestra identified none of these crew members by name. And yet, Fontaine’s 
and Kabestra’s testimony uncovers an Anishinabek presence across all units laid out by 
the HEPC’s work program. From clearing to machine maintenance, Anishinabek 
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labourers formed part of the team that helped to construct Whitedog Falls and Caribou 
Falls generating stations. 
 
“YOU’D HEAR THE POPLAR TREES CRACK”: LIVING AND WORKING AT THE DAM SITE, 
1950-1958 
 
Seasonal vagaries complicated jobs worked by Anishinabek men and non-
Indigenous men alike. The majority of less valued labour jobs, for which Anishinabek 
men were primarily hired, occurred outdoors. Anishinabek men were found felling trees 
in the bush (like Charlie Fisher) and spotting trucks (like Bert Fontaine). And, the 
Northwestern District is cold: the temperate dips well below 0 degrees Celsius for up to 
six months per annum. Bill Miller worked with a travelling line maintenance crew in the 
Northwestern District in the 1950s. He remembered winters so cold that “[y]ou’d hear the 
poplar trees crack.”110 Freezing weather was required to complete certain construction 
jobs. For example, the Hydro-Electric Power Commission scheduled much of the initial 
transmission line work – like construction by Fontaine – during the winter months. The 
HEPC needed its crews to work during the winter so that the line could be erected 
through swampland.111 Winter work reduced the risk of sinking (and potentially 
drowning) in bio-silt. Fresh water marshes average 0.3 to 1.8 metres in depth. With the 
ground frozen, Anishinabek men could move more freely through the construction site. 
Records indicate that work on the transmission line proceeded in December 1956 as 
planned: “Roads have been bulldozed through the snow in order to complete the work… 
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before the frost leaves the ground.”112 Winter 1956 was particularly harsh. The average 
maximum temperature was -12 degrees Celsius. The average minimum temperature was -
22.5 degrees Celsius (without accounting for the wind chill). When line construction 
began in December 1956, the bulldozer needed to clear 36 centimetres of snow from the 
ground. By February 1957, an additional 35 centimetres had accumulated. A total of 71 
centimetres was on the ground while Fontaine worked towards line completion. 
Managerial staff acknowledged that hydro crews were working under “extremely difficult 
conditions.”113 Extreme cold was a workplace reality for many Anishinabek labourers 
and their peers. 
Work was both environmentally and physically challenging for manual labourers. 
Shifts could last for up to ten hours per day and men worked an average of 50 hours per 
week. Given delays caused by harsh winter conditions in 1956, A. Gusen, a Program 
Planning and Control Engineer, asked R. G. Wykes, Construction Engineer, “to [step] up 
the construction program to advance the in-service date” of Whitedog Falls Generating 
Station.114 Wykes declined. His work crew was already taxed. Wykes explained “the job 
is already working 53-hours per week.” Manual labourers could be scheduled to work 
day or night. Wykes indicated that he had a “night shift on the most critical parts.”115 The 
HEPC officials approved of shift rotations, claiming that maximum production could be 
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achieved by running two ten-hour shifts per day.116 As a result, construction sites were 
active “24-hours per day for several days at a time” when concrete was being poured into 
the dam. 117 Oral testimony indicates that Anishinabek men accepted shifts around the 
clock. Fontaine remembers spotting trucks at night while Larry Kabestra remembers his 
father leaving for work in the mornings.118 
Many labour jobs, worked over long hours, were dangerous – even in the summer 
months. Anishinabek men regularly worked near open water and, according to some 
reports, on extraordinarily steep river banks.119 Anyone hired at Whitedog Falls 
Generating Station worked on an incline. The water below was deep, unusually so, for 
dam works. The Kenora Daily Miner and News noted that “The cofferdams are somewhat 
unusual in that they are being placed in very deep water.”120 During the early stages of 
construction, supervisors lacked sufficient information to accurately describe river 
conditions to their staff. Engineers struggled to accurately gauge the depth of Winnipeg 
River. They experimented with new technologies to sound the river bottom. Eventually, 
engineers confirmed that water was between fifteen and eighteen metres deep at 
Whitedog Falls.121 While the HEPC acknowledged the dangers of dam work, less valued 
labourers were provided with limited safety training. Fontaine chuckled when asked to 
describe safety protocol during his interview. He summarized, “Don’t go near the 
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rapids.”122 Safety practices – much like work-related skills – were picked up on the job. 
The power of Winnipeg River, for example, was reinforced when Fontaine’s cousin, 
Clifford, fell into the water. Luckily, “he had a life jacket.”123 This accident showed both 
water danger and the importance of personal flotation devices (PFDs). This lesson, 
however, was not universally shared among staff members. 
The Kenora Miner and News reported on two drownings from 1955 to 1958. 
Richard H. Bachmeier, aged 49, died at work at Caribou Falls Generating Station. An 
anonymous journalist speculated that Bachmeier fell off a “spray machine on the 
upstream side of the dam.”124 Unlike Clifford, Bachmeier was not fished out of the river. 
It is unclear whether Bachmeier was wearing a PFD. Later that year, Robert Neil Farling, 
aged 31, “lost his life by drowning at the falls.”125 It is suggested that Farling died during 
his leisure time: “his abandoned boat was found on a beach.”126 While the Hydro-Electric 
Power Commission was not responsible for its employees after hours, Farling did not 
seem to adopt Clifford’s personal safety protocol. Indeed, it seems that individuals 
developed their safety practices specific to their role (e.g. the use of PFDs) because the 
HEPC placed the onus for safety on individual labourers. This tendency was reinforced 
when W. I. Clifton of the Accident Prevention Division visited Whitedog Falls and 
Caribou Falls generating stations to conduct a workplace review. His review may have 
been prompted by the deaths of Bachmeier and Farling. Clifton recommended, in part, 
that Operations install a dangerous water sign. It appears that superiors did not discuss 
water safety with staff members. Instead, labourers were to acknowledge the sign and to 
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act accordingly. By installing signage, the Commission transferred responsibility for 
workplace safety to individual labourers, believing that observant workers could (and 
should) manage the risk they faced.127 
Safety norms for dam labourers do not seem to have improved substantively over 
the next decade. Fontaine repeated the message “Don’t go near the water!” when 
describing workplace safety in the 1950s. In 1968, when Larry Kabestra began working 
on Norman Dam, Fontaine’s experiential knowledge was now explicitly shared by 
supervisory staff. Kabestra explains, “That’s how you are trained – to be really careful 
where you step and how you approach the screen.” It is important to note that Norman 
Dam was owned by the Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company, not the Hydro-
Electric Power Commission. And yet, in Kabestra’s testimony, we find limited change in 
“best practice” in hydroelectric generation. As in the 1950s, employees learned best 
practices on the job. Kabestra stated, “You get used to it.”128 Labourers learned how to 
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move through the site and confidence increased with exposure. An emphasis on 
experiential learning is also reflected in the dangers that dam labourers raised. Fontaine, 
reflecting on Clifford’s near-drowning, discussed the importance of keeping a safe 
distance from the water (and, of wearing a life jacket).129 Kabestra downplayed the risk of 
drowning and emphasized the threat of being crushed inside the dam. Kabestra explained, 
“Well, to go against that screen – you’d have a hard time getting out of there! Bang 
[Kabestra moves his hand to imitate moving water]! You’d be stuck in there.”130 In each 
example, the potential of water to kill is explicit. But Kabestra identified water current as 
the greatest risk, whereas Fontaine focused more on drowning. This reflects the HEPC’s 
continued emphasis on the labourer to maintain his own safety. For undervalued 
labourers like Fontaine and Kabestra there was no universal safety standard. How general 
labourers defined and managed risk related directly to their lived experiences. 
 
“SO THAT THE PEOPLE CAN MAKE THEIR LIVING FROM THESE RESERVES”: 
ANISHINABEK LABOURERS’ EMPLOYMENT OBJECTIVES 
 
Anishinabek labourers learned that working for the Hydro-Electric Power 
Commission could be dangerous; they discovered that the hours would be long; and, 
Anishinabek labourers knew that work would be performed under extreme environmental 
conditions. What incentive did Anishinabek labourers have for assuming these risks? At 
least 30 years of suppressed economic activity increased the desirability of accessible 
paid work. The Hydro-Electric Power Commission offered more than an income 
opportunity. Anishinabek families attached higher meaning to their jobs. For displaced 
youth, such as Bert Fontaine, the Hydro-Electric Power Commission provided the wages 
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needed for family reunification. For local labourers, such as Robert (Anamikipinens) 
Kabestra, the HEPC provided the wages needed to subsist on reserve. 
Let us begin with Bert Fontaine. As previously indicated, the Indian Affairs 
Branch removed Fontaine from Sagkeeng First Nation, MB, to attend residential school 
in Kenora, ON. To finance his return to Sagkeeng First Nation, Fontaine moved to a 
temporary camp near the site of Caribou Falls Generating Station. Geographical isolation 
meant that municipal services were unavailable. Fontaine remembered, “We lived in 
tents.”131 Administrators bemoaned staff conditions, emphasizing a “lack of 
accommodation and necessary sanitary facilities to house and feed the estimated man 
power requirements” during the early stages of development.132 For many non-
Indigenous labourers, moving into these remote work camps meant “leaving friends and 
family behind.”133 A counter-narrative emerges for Anishinabek labourers like Fontaine. 
Some of Fontaine’s relatives –brothers and cousins – had also been relocated from 
Sagkeeng First Nation to Kenora. These relatives also needed to finance their return 
journey. And so, Fontaine was not alone in Kenora. Fontaine was stationed with his 
cousin Clifford on the English River. While Fontaine rarely saw his uncle, Fontaine knew 
that he could be found working at the main camp for Caribou Falls Generating Station. 
Fontaine also had family at Whitedog Falls. He explains, “Most of my brothers were 
[working] in Kenora.”134 Two of Fontaine’s brothers worked at Whitedog Falls 
Generating Station. Hydro camps thus provided a space for displaced relatives to 
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reconnect – an alternative to home in which to strengthen familial bonds. For Fontaine, 
work was valued both as a vehicle for family reunification, as well as earning money. 
For local Anishinabek labourers, such as Anamikipinens, work with the Hydro-
Electric Power Commission ensured the continuous occupation of reserve lands. 
Anamikipinens believed that labour agreements would help to maintain the territorial 
integrity of Dalles 38C Indian Reserve. Poor economic conditions had forced band 
members to leave Dalles 38C Indian Reserve in search of seasonal employment (e.g. 
fishing guides often left from late spring to early fall). Sometimes poor economic 
conditions resulted in long-term displacement. John Kipling Jr., for example, migrated 
from Dalles 38C Indian Reserve to Winnipeg, MB, for waged employment. Kipling later 
secured a permanent position with the Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company in 
Kenora. His family would not return to Dalles 38C Indian Reserve as full-time residents. 
Larry Kabestra Sr. remembered that prolonged economic hardship displaced multiple 
families. He claims that “the life of the reserve was totally damaged. People started 
moving away.”135 
The prolonged absence of band members facilitated the claiming of reserve lands 
by the waiâbishkiwedig. When band members left Dalles 38C Indian Reserve, they risked 
losing their ancestral lands. Anamikipinens, for example, returned from his trap line to 
discover that a Manitoban cottager has asserted ownership of Anamikipinens’ summer 
grounds. The waiâbishkiwedig had long taken advantage of seasonal rounds to claim 
Anishinabek territories as their own. Such practices were not unique to the Winnipeg 
River drainage basin. Indeed, as historian Paige Raibmon noted of British Columbia, 
“more than one Ahousaht family came home [from seasonal labour] to find a White man 
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occupying their home.”136 This practice stimulated Anamikipinens’ fear that prolonged 
absences by band members would result in the dissolution of Dalles 38C Indian Reserve. 
Paid work with the Hydro-Electric Power Commission, however, allowed Anishinabek 
men to continuously occupy reserve lands. Anamikipinens recognized that seasonal 
absences facilitated the taking of Anishinabek lands by the waiâbishkiwedig. 
Anamikipinens sought to protect his ancestral lands.  If we accept that boundaries are 
performed – that to occupy space is to claim space – then the performance of daily life is, 
at root, an act of sovereignty. Anamikipinens believed that employment was the most 
effective means to “keep it [the reserve] alive.”137 Work had higher meaning than pay. 
Work was seen as a strategy to protect Anishinabek homelands. 
For a time, paid work with the Hydro-Electric Power Commission allowed 
Anishinabek families to subsist on reserve. Larry Kabestra remembers that Anishinabek 
labourers made “good money.” Documents shared by Ontario Power Generation did not 
specify how much was earned by Anishinabek labourers per pay cycle. Labourers earned 
sufficient income, however, to allow Anamikipinens to “coax some of them [band 
members] to stay, to try to stay” on reserve and work at Whitedog Falls Generating 
Station.138 Work also created new opportunities to socialize. Anishinabek labourers from 
Dalles 38C Indian Reserve worked similar shifts (approximately ten hours per day for up 
to 53 hours per week). As a result of their shared schedules, Anishinabek labourers began 
travelling to and from work together. Larry Kabestra remembers the men from his 
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community piling into the same boat each morning. They travelled, united, to the work 
site. Bert Fontaine also remembers travel as a communal activity. He and Clifford “used 
to…come to work, we used to come on the barge.”139 These journeys, shared daily, 
created (and, later reinforced) a sense of shared purpose: Anamikipinens and his team 
were affirming their territorial grasp on reserve lands. Fontaine and his cousin were 
financing their return home (familial reunification). 
 
IMMENSE, ORDERLY, EFFICIENT: COMMUNITY AT WHITEDOG FALLS GENERATING 
STATION AND CARIBOU FALLS GENERATING STATION 
 
The immediate benefits Anishinabek families received from the Hydro-Electric 
Power Commission depended, in part, on whether one was born in the Winnipeg River 
drainage basin or displaced by the Indian Affairs Branch. The HEPC established camps 
for its overwhelmingly transient male workforce. Records indicate that its permanent 
camp at Whitedog Falls featured a “cafeteria, fire hall, school, hospital… and recreation 
facilities.”140 Journalists described the HEPC’s work camps as modern, clean, and 
orderly. Historian Megan Stanley argued that BC Hydro designed camps to keep its 
“mostly male and transient workforce… moderately comfortable and to feed them 
enough to keep them contented, even if a little bored.”141 The HEPC seems to have 
shared this design goal. Entertainment facilities at Whitedog Falls included bowling 
alleys, pool tables, and movies.142 And yet, Kenora residents anticipated that the HEPC 
workers would grow bored. Kenora-based businesses prepared for “these men…to come 
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out to the larger shopping centre on occasional weekends” for excitement.143 Displaced 
youth like Fontaine were more likely to live in and use these built communities; they 
were unable to commute home. Anishinabek labourers living on nearby reserves were 
less likely to use camp recreation facilities. Their presence at the HEPC campsites was 
temporary and driven by need. At least some Anishinabek families purchased groceries 
from the HEPC’s camp store.144 
The HEPC also serviced displaced Anishinabek labourers at its food facilities. 
The Fontaine family would have been provided with access to “the huge cafeteria dining 
room” while on contract. The HEPC committed to providing its labour force with 
“substantial meals.”145 Meals were served cafeteria-style. Given the heavy caloric 
demand of labour jobs, meals were carbohydrate and protein heavy. A sample meal 
included soup, a choice of three kinds of meat, vegetables, gravy, raisin pie, and coffee. 
The bakery alone produced 1,000 loaves of bread daily. 146 There is no indication, 
however, that general labourers hired from Dalles 38C Indian Reserve were provided 
with cafeteria access. Given their daily commute to and from the worksite, it seems most 
likely that local Anishinabek labourers ate meals at home. This may also help to explain 
the recorded use of grocery stores by Anishinabek families. Indeed, local Anishinabek 
labourers operated at the periphery of the HEPC’s camp community. Integration and the 
right to access food and entertainment facilities seem to have depended on whether one 
had accommodation in the camp. 
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For men who lived on site, the camp was more likely to be divided by class (i.e. 
education and perceived skill) than perceived race. J. A. Sherrett, a representative of the 
Kenora Chamber of Commerce, was “immediately impressed with the quiet efficiency, 
orderliness, and immensity of this large power development [at Whitedog Falls 
Generating Station].”147 The HEPC designated housing according to one’s position with 
the Commission. The HEPC provided 1,100 square foot houses to the Construction 
Manager, Construction Superintendent, and Field Engineer(s).148 Families with three or 
more children were provided with a 750-square-foot home, whereas families with fewer 
than three children lived in Commission-owned trailers. The HEPC generally hired 
displaced Anishinabek labourers for less valued jobs (e.g. felling trees, spotting truck). 
As a result, no identified status Indians lived in the big houses at Whitedog Falls or 
Caribou Falls generating stations. Displaced labourers were more likely to be 
accommodated with other manual workers in tent villages or staff houses. Differences in 
perceived skill, however, could be exacerbated by perceived race. As Harold Cardinal 
complained, “[W]e see the white society training its young people for life in the 
professional and technological world of the space age, we find the government 
attempting to train our people in skills that have not been required since the industrial 
revolution.”149 As a result of education barriers created by the Indian Affairs Branch, few 
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Anishinabek labourers received the education needed to compete for managerial 
positions. Fontaine’s uncle managed to become a tradesman. He worked as a pipe fitter 
and a plumber at Caribou Falls Generating Station’s main camp.150 He was the most 
skilled Anishinabek labourer identified by interviewees.  
Despite the geographic visibility of differences in perceived skill, the Hydro-
Electric Power Commission attempted to establish a shared mission among its 
employees. Democratizing attempts – or efforts to unite employees working across units 
– can be seen in the establishment of a staff newspaper. The HEPC launched Whitedog 
World to circulate among its 600 employees in 1956. The newspaper helped to strengthen 
community by reporting on (or alerting employees to) camp events. These events were 
also democratic in nature. For example, the Whitedog Scouts welcomed boys regardless 
of their parent’s (likely their father’s) position at camp. Media reports suggest that Scout 
Leaders instructed camp boys in fishing, swimming, and hiking. At least seven boys were 
actively involved with the program. It is unlikely that Anishinabek families benefited 
from this “open” children’s program. For the majority of the year, the Indian Affairs 
Branch boarded Anishinabek youth at one of three nearby residential schools: Cecilia 
Jeffrey (Presbyterian), St. Mary’s (Catholic), or Mackenzie (Catholic). While Indian 
Affairs began to integrate Indigenous children across Canada into regular school in 1940, 
Anishinabek children in the Winnipeg River drainage basin rarely had the benefit of an 
option; they simply lacked housing in-town and, until the HEPC’s arrival, many reserves 
lacked access roads.151 Residential schools in Kenora remained active long after the 
                                            
150 Elder Fontaine, telephone interview with author, 16 July 2012. 
151 Legacy of Hope Foundation, “Reclaiming History: The Residential School System in Canada 
[Timeline],” Where Are the Children?, accessed 25 July 2015, 
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HEPC’s arrival. While Whitedog Scouts was not necessarily designed for a non-
Indigenous audience, federal education programs racialized enlistment. The HEPC’s 
attempts to reduce social barriers between employees were made ineffective by schools 
jointly operated by the Indian Affairs Branch and the Catholic or Presbyterian Church. 
The Hydro-Electric Power Commission’s attempts to improve community life for 
Anishinabek peoples specifically (general band members rather than the HEPC 
employees) were also largely ineffective. Anishinabek labourers were disconnected from 
the Commission’s decision-making body. Work for pay thus did little to improve the 
Commission’s understanding of Anishinabek needs. The Indian Affairs Branch 
represented Anishinabek interests in official attempts to engage band members. Take, for 
example, the construction of an Anglican church for Whitedog (Islington) Indian 
Reserve. Whitedog Falls Generating Station is located approximately four kilometres 
away from Whitedog Indian Reserve. The HEPC wanted to offer a “gift” to band 
members for sharing their lands. Consultation resulted in a land grant. Eric Law, Indian 
Agent in Kenora, gave the HEPC reserve land for church construction. With federal 
encouragement, the HEPC designed a fully operational church, including an office, 
storage, organ platform, seating area, and chancel.152 A review of church records, 
however, makes clear that a new building would do little to enhance community life on 
reserve. The Anglican Church had struggled to attract Anishinabek congregants since its 
establishment in 1851. In 1891, fewer than 100 Anishinabek peoples used Anglican 
facilities at Whitedog (Islington). In 1909, there is no record to quantify church 
attendance. The historical timeline kept by the Diocese of Keewatin noted only that “few 
                                            
152 Diocese of Keewatin, Kenora, ON, R. E. Norris, “Whitedog Falls G. S. Church for Islington 
Indian Reserve [architectural drawing], 24 January 1958,” Folder: Whitedog – St. Mary’s Correspondence.  
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Indians” used Anglican facilities at that time. By 1912, the mission received so little 
support that it closed. G. Smith, head of the Islington Mission, assumed that “it is 
impossible to reach them [Indians].”153 Bishop Hives found “very little participation in 
the Services by the People” in 1954, suggesting that there was some attempt to revitalize 
the mission.154 And yet, the majority of band members had rejected Christianity and 
continued to participate in the Midewiwin Society. 
Anishinabek use of Anglican facilities appears to have been largely incidental – 
the Diocese of Keewatin established itself at the junction of the Whitedog and Winnipeg 
rivers (a high traffic area). Indeed, the mission was built near an “Old Indian Burial 
Ground,” suggesting long-standing use of the river junction.155 Band members displayed 
little interest in Christianity in their day-to-day activities at Whitedog Indian Reserve. In 
a failed attempt to build community, the HEPC prompted the expropriation of reserve 
land for an unwanted house of worship. The failure of the HEPC’s gift to serve Whitedog 
Indian Reserve is evident in its disuse and eventual destruction. In 1971 – just twelve 
years after its construction – the Diocese of Keewatin requested that Ontario Hydro cut 
power to the mission house. Three years later, Clarence Stuebe reported that band 
members had “badly vandalized” Anglican holdings.156 The HEPC’s gift did not align 
with the spiritual needs of the community. And thus, the church was not treated as a 
sacred space. Band members did not treat the “gift” with deference. Instead, the HEPC’s 
church stood as a symbol of territorial expropriation without active consultation. Eric 
                                            
153 Diocese of Keewatin, “White Dog or Islington [Historical Timeline], undated,” Folder: 
“Whitedog – St. Mary’s Historical.” 
154 Ibid. 
155 Diocese of Keewatin, “R. W. Landry, Superintendent of Reserves and Trusts, Kenora District, 
to The Right Reverend H. J. P. Allan, 25 August 1982,” Folder: Whitedog – St. Mary’s Correspondence. 
156 Diocese of Keewatin, “Clarence Stuebe to the Anglican Church [unspecified recipient], 29 
September 1975,” Folder: Whitedog – St. Mary’s Correspondence. 
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Law had reduced reserve holdings – an action that aligned more strongly with federal 
goals to assimilate (i.e. Christianize) Indian wards than the HEPC’s goals to build 
community on reserve. By 1982, the Mission House was unoccupied, leaving lands 
vested in the Synod Diocese of Keewatin unoccupied. 
While the Hydro-Electric Power Commission’s attempts at community outreach 
overwhelmingly failed, Anishinabek families developed community goals independent of 
the Commission. Oral testimony at Dalles 38C Indian Reserve suggests that Anishinabek 
labourers (like Anamikipinens) envisioned a future in which able-bodied males 
participated more actively in the wage economy; they hoped for the gift of continual 
employment. Anamikipinens worked to establish a foothold in the water resource 
industry that would ensure the socio-economic stability of reserve. Larry Kabestra, born 
in 1958, proudly remembers his father working for the Hydro-Electric Power 
Commission. He remembers band members hard at work: “They were out. They used to 
be all standing there. They were really [something] -- some of them used to build those 
towers and they'd climb them.” Kabestra identified Anishinabek labourers as brave and 
agile. He identified these characteristics as both masculine and desirable and a model to 
emulate. In her analysis of Algonquin families, historian Kim Anderson noted that 
“childhood was a time to begin to learn the disciplines of the community in anticipation 
of becoming a full contributing member.”157 As a child, Kabestra learned that work for 
pay with the Hydro-Electric Power Commission was valuable. From his father, Kabestra 
also learned that work for pay helped to maintain reserve boundaries. Able-bodied men 
                                            
157 Kim Anderson, Life Stages and Native Women: Memory, Teachings, and Story Medicine 
(Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2011), 66. 
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could use their strength and agility to earn wages that would protect ancestral lands. 
Anishinabek labourers provided the youth with a new vision of masculine work. 
As an adult, Larry Kabestra sought employment with the Department of Lands 
and Forests. He worked primarily as a firefighter, but also cleaned the screens on Norman 
Dam. Kabestra saw himself as participating in a family tradition at Norman Dam. He 
walked a road that his father, Anamikipinens, had blazed. When Kabestra cleaned the 
screens, he displayed the same bravery as his forefathers: the linemen. Linemen hung 
from transmission towers. Larry overlooked Winnipeg River with nothing more than a 
rope to prevent his fall.158 Larry was not alone in seeking work with the Department of 
Lands and Forests. He worked alongside his brother, Paul. But, he was also joined by 
other Anishinabek youth: "[The] Ogemahs…. Leo Ogemah, Charlie Ogemah, Fred 
Ogemah, Langton Ogemah... and, uh, Andy White... was there with his brothers…. 
Andersons."159 Kabestra emphasized that not all Anishinabek labourers worked on 
Norman Dam. Nevertheless, Kabestra was surrounded by Anishinabek youth who saw 
screen-cleaning at Norman Dam as valuable, professional work. It was, Kabestra 
suggested, a good job. It was, Kabestra suggested, a family tradition. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
During the 1950s, Anishinabek men took up work for pay with the Hydro-Electric 
Power Commission. Local labourers sought wages to prevent the occupation of reserve 
lands by the waiâbishkiwedig by ensuring continuous Anishinabek presence. Displaced 
youth sought wages to finance their return home. In each case, Anishinabek men sought 
employment to strengthen their home communities, head by head. The long-term 
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effectiveness of Anishinabek labour strategies, however, was compromised when the 
Hydro-Electric Power Commission evacuated the Winnipeg River drainage basin. 
As early as September 1958, the HEPC began to dismantle its labour camps. The 
Kenora Miner and News predicted that bustling hydro communities would become 
“ghost towns” as the HEPC labourers “moved to other projects.”160 Site evacuation (and 
the deconstruction of work camps) was not unique to Ontario. Historian Megan Stanley 
noted that Mica Camp (a BC Hydro holding) dropped from 1,500 to 150 workers during 
the final year(s) of construction. Many labourers from Mica Camp simply moved to the 
next construction site.161 But, this was not a viable option for Anishinabek labourers who 
took work-for-pay to stay on reserve. Men like Anamikipinens feared relocation and 
sought local jobs to prevent land grabs by the waiâbishkiwedig. The HEPC, however, was 
determined to provide provincial energy security – it was not directly interested in 
stimulating local employment. The Commission and its general Anishinabek labourers 
had developed, in relative isolation, conflicting long-term goals. 
Public announcements emphasize the Hydro-Electric Power Commission’s 
commitment to Ontarians. The HEPC’s slogan, dating back to the 1900s, read “power for 
the people” – and, the public at large would be served by Whitedog Falls and Caribou 
Falls generating stations. Commitment to “the people” did not require a commitment to 
federal wards (Anishinabek general labourers). And so, the HEPC made no attempt to 
maintain the hiring of Indigenous people over the long-term. Oral testimony suggests that 
Anishinabek labourers –hired primarily to fell trees and drive trucks – were not trained to 
operate permanent equipment installed at the generating stations. In the 1960s, John 
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Gordon, Acting Director of Indian Affairs, claimed that “Many Indians, particularly older 
ones, lacked both the training and the inclination which would have enabled them to 
make the transition [to industrial labour] satisfactorily.”162 Interviewees suggested that 
some Anishinabek labourers had “the inclination,” but few of them were given the 
necessary support to ensure their competitiveness of the job market. The HEPC hired 
Anishinabek men to perform less valued jobs; the Commission was interested in working 
their bodies. The HEPC’s failure to invest in skills development required that Whitedog 
Falls Generating Station became one of the first remotely-controlled stations in Ontario. 
It was argued that no “satisfactory” work candidates lived in close proximity to the dam. 
By moving operations to Kenora, the HEPC compromised Anishinabek plans for 
economic stability on reserve. It is for this reason, in part, that Larry Kabestra defined 
himself as a potential beneficiary of dam labour but was unable to secure a job with the 
Commission. 
Anishinabek labourers worked to modify the river environment. Socio-economic 
stability on reserve, so earnestly desired by Anishinabek labourers, was further 
complicated by environmental changes. It is important to remember that the Hydro-
Electric Power Commission did not clearly communicate anticipated changes to band 
members. It is unlikely that Anishinabek labourers anticipated the extent of flood 
damages that they facilitated. Whitedog Falls Generating Station permanently raised 
water levels on the Winnipeg River upstream of Whitedog Falls, collapsing an already 
fragile subsistence economy at Dalles 38C Indian Reserve. 
Whitedog Falls Generating Station further compromised already reduced 
manomin yields between Whitedog Falls and the northern outlet of Lake of the Woods. 
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One Man Lake and Whitedog reserves claimed an annual loss of $10,500.00 in ricing 
income as early as 1959.163 A comparable record of complaint from Dalles 38C Indian 
Reserve has yet to be found. And yet, oral informants testify that they have been unable 
to harvest a commercially viable crop from Winnipeg River for generations. Elder Alice 
Kelly explained that “the water comes both ways,” preventing manomin growth.164 Water 
is occasionally released from Lake of the Woods into Winnipeg River by the Norman 
Dam. This leads to flash flooding on the downstream side of Norman Dam (towards 
Dalles 38C Indian Reserve). Unfortunately, Dalles 38C Indian Reserve is located on the 
upstream side – or, the reservoir side – of Whitedog Falls Generating Station, which 
means that water levels have been continuously higher than natural since the mid-1950s. 
William Cobiness describes the results of high water as follows: “Water was high and it 
flooded the rice field.  When the wind came up, the rice fields would flood and the rice 
would fall.”165  Manomin along controlled waterways ceased flourishing at the new 
height. 
Pastor Carol Lawson, born to John Kipling Jr. in 1937, describes declining crops 
through dietary change. In the late 1940s, Lawson lived with her grandmother, Matilda 
Martin, of Dalles 38C Indian Reserve. Lawson remembered eating manomin on an almost 
daily basis. Martin’s pantry was stocked full with pounds of manomin. As a child, 
Lawson promised herself that she would never eat manomin as an adult. During an 
interview, Lawson stated, “I could eat my words.”166 Since large-scale aquaculture 
                                            
163 OPG, “Lorne MacDonald, General Counsel, to C. F. S. Tidy, Special Negotiator, Property 
Division, Memorandum, re: Caribou Falls Development – Flooding – Islington Indian Reserve No. 29 and 
One Man Indian Reserve, 6 June 1961,” Whitedog Falls Generating Station, Item 1042, 10-1-228.  
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collapsed on the Winnipeg River, Lawson no longer has the option of stocking her pantry 
with pounds of manomin. Her consumption of alternative carbohydrates – potatoes, rice, 
yams – is no longer a matter of choice. In response to flooding, wild rice harvesting has 
become “more of a reason for a weekend outing” than a reliable source of income (or 
subsistence).167  
The economic viability of trapping was also compromised by flooding.  
Indications of these changes are not found in the corporate records, but maintained by 
oral testimonies.  In Chief Simon Fobister’s own words: 
The flooding changed the natural flow, the natural water cycle.  For 
instance, historically, the water levels would go high in the summer and 
would eventually drop. Then the water would level and the beavers and the 
muskrats would build their houses at that certain water level.  When it 
became winter the water levels would not go up, they [muskrats and beaver] 
would be safe, their houses would be above water. Although the river would 
be frozen, the house would remain on top of the ice.  And then when they 
built these hydro dams, the water cycle was opposite.  The water levels 
would go up in the summer time and they would increasingly rise in level. 
So, the beavers and muskrats would build their houses at a certain level, but 
then in the winter time, water levels would be released upriver… and then 
the water levels would actually be going up again – the beaver houses and 
the muskrat houses would be totally flooded and the animals would simply 
drown. That impacted on the income of the trapper, as the beaver population 
would be destroyed. And the muskrats, there would hardly be any.168 
 
Federal advisor Anastasia Shkilnyk confirmed Fobister’s report, suggesting that 
after the 1958 flooding caused by Caribou Falls Generating Station, muskrat 
catches declined and have fluctuated around a much lower average since.169  Even 
though the price of furs increased in the mid-1960s, income potential failed to 
stimulate increased catches at Grassy Narrows First Nation.  As Shkilnyk 
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concludes, “muskrat catching never again reached the levels of production 
recorded on the old reserve.”170 
The collapse of manomin cropping and muskrat trapping on Winnipeg River 
confirms historian John Lutz’s hypothesis that “Aboriginal people were drawn into… 
paid-work relationships [that] made them unwitting participants in the very process that 
was transforming and displacing their own communities.”171 Anishinabek labourers 
unknowingly helped to modify the same river that sustained their “unemployed” (or, 
seasonally employed) relatives and their ancestors. Anishinabek labourers unknowingly 
helped to modify the same river that they hoped would sustain their descendants. Many 
Anishinabek labourers had, ironically, adopted work for pay in an attempt to ensure the 
socio-economic viability of river-based communities. Unfortunately, the stress placed on 
the subsistence economy by Whitedog Falls Generating Station led to unpredictable – 
and, notably diminishing – returns. As yields declined, resource competition among band 
members increased. This competition is evident in at least two competing narratives 
about Anamikipinens told at Dalles 38C Indian Reserve. According to one tale, 
Anamikipinens succumbed to “the greediness and the selfishness of the white man.”172 
His work-for-pay activities are seen as self- rather than community-motivated. His son, 
Larry Kabestra, tells an alternate story. He argues that his father was motivated to “keep 
                                            
170 Ibid., 138. 
171 In Flooding Hope, a documentary on St. Martin First Nation, Dr. Myrle Ballard et al. reveal 
corroborating evidence. During his interview, Russel Prince testifies, “I worked in that [Portage] 
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from the city. The Portage Diversion increased lake levels on Lake St. Martin. As water levels rose on the 
lake so too did poverty rates at Lake St. Martin First Nation. In this way, Prince unwittingly contributed to 
the economic hardship faced by his own community. Flooding Hope: The Lake St. Martin First Nation 
story YouTube video, accessed 30 July 2015, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SQStePF5jeg. See also 
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Collection. 
 
 
267 
it [the reserve] alive” by stimulating employment opportunities.173 Anamikipinens did not 
predict the extensive flooding of his homeland. Kabestra is pained by how some band 
members misinterpreted his father’s intentions: “Each generation is taught to hate, you 
know. And, why do we do that?”174 This hatred, Kabestra believes, is fueled by the 
conflation of outcome (i.e. flooding) with process (i.e. work for pay). Hatred is bred from 
the misinterpretation of Anamikipinens’ intentions (i.e. socio-economic stability on 
reserve) and community explanations for endemic on-reserve poverty (i.e. collapse of the 
subsistence economy as well as commercial ricing, trapping, and fishing). 
It is important, however, to separate process from outcome in telling the history of 
water development in the Lake of the Woods watershed. An examination of process 
reveals that Anishinabek labourers envisioned an alternative future – a future where paid 
work facilitated the continuous occupation of reserves. The HEPC’s commitment to 
Ontario’s energy security, however, limited its desire to build capacity on reserve 
specifically: continued employment for general labourers – Anishinabek and non-
Indigenous alike – required moving to the next development site. Oral testimony 
collected in 2012 reveals that Anishinabek men remain proud of their history working for 
the Hydro-Electric Power Commission. These men laboured outdoors in 71 centimetres 
of snow. They worked for long hours overlooking turbulent waters. And, many 
Anishinabek labourers took these environmentally and physically challenging jobs 
thinking of home: displaced youth worked with a hope to return their communities. Local 
labourers worked with the hope of preserving reserve boundaries. For a short time, many 
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Anishinabek men saw work for pay as the key to socio-economic stability. Their vision 
of the future, however, has yet to be realized. 
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Figure 16: SHACKER’S CAMP (1956)175 
The earliest available labour job with the Hydro-Electric Power Commission was 
clearing for roadwork. During the early stages of development, the HEPC 
administrators bemoaned staff conditions, emphasizing a “lack of accommodation 
and necessary sanitary facilities to house and feed the estimated man power 
requirements.” This image depicts one such “shacker's tent” from 1956. 
175 OPG, Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario, “Caribou Falls Headpond: Shacker’s 
Tent, 1956,” [photograph] Caribou Falls Generating Station, FP4-10101-13, V. 1, Item 178, OHSC-Central 
Records 8-3-243.  
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Figure 17: CLEARING (1956)176 
This image depicts clearing work for the Caribou Falls Generating Station in the 
1950s. Elder Charlie Fisher of One Man Lake Indian Reserve complained that the 
Hydro-Electric Power Commission hired Anishinabek men from One Man Lake 
Indian Reserve exclusively to fell trees, closing off alternative forms of employment. 
He states, “cutting the trees down.... That’s all we got to do.... Other than that we 
didn’t get any, any jobs.”177 
176 OPG, Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario, “Clearing, 1956,” [photograph], Caribou 
Falls Generating Station, FP4-10101-13, V. 1, Item 178, OHSC-Central Records 8-3-243.  
177 Elder Fisher, interview with Chapeskie, 22 March 1995. 
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Figure 18: BLASTED ROCK FROM DAM WORKS (1925)178 
This image depicts blasted rock at the Norman Dam site in 1925. Blasting created a 
heavy burden of waste for hydroelectric developers in the 1920s and 1950s alike. 
Oral testimony reveals that Anishinabek men like Bert Fontaine facilitated the 
disposal of blasted rock at Caribou Falls Generating Station in the 1950s.179 
178 LOWM, Carl G. Linde, “General View after ledge removal above C. P. R. Bridges, 16 July 
1925,” [photograph]. 
179 Elder Fontaine, telephone interview with author, 16 July 2012. 
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Figure 19: ORGANIZATIONAL FLOW AT WHITEDOG AND CARIBOU FALLS 
DEVELOPMENTS (1955)180 
This organization diagram represents the flow of power at Whitedog Falls 
Generating Station from the Director of Construction (top tier) to the Carpenter 
Superintendent (bottom tier). Oral testimony suggests that Anishinabek men 
worked primarily below the bottom tier and performed manual labour for the 
Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario. 
180 OPG, “J. E. Stark to G. D. Floyd, Assistant General Manager – Engineering, re: Whitedog 
Development, 8 November 1955,” FP3-C, Item 107, OHSC- Central Records 8-3-242. 
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Figure 20: CAMP VILLAGE AT CARIBOU FALLS GENERATING STATION 
(C. 1956)181 
For men who lived permanently on site, the work camp was more likely to be 
divided by class (i.e. education and perceived skill) than perceived race.  Families 
with three or more children were provided with a 750-square-foot home, whereas 
families with fewer than three children lived in Commission-owned trailers. The 
Hydro-Electric Power Commission generally hired displaced Anishinabek labourers 
for less valued jobs (e.g. felling trees, spotting truck). As a result, no identified status 
Indians lived in the big houses at the Whitedog or Caribou Falls camps. Displaced 
Anishinabek labourers were more likely to be accommodated with other manual 
workers in tent villages like the one featured here. 
181 Ontario Power Generation, letter to author, 27 June 2008. 
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WEST DIRECTION 
WHENCE DARKNESS COMES 
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CHAPTER 5
“TURNING [THE] RIVER SEPTIC”: MUNICIPAL WASTE SYSTEMS, WATER 
REGULATION, AND WATER QUALITY IN THE WINNIPEG RIVER 
DRAINAGE BASIN, 1900-19751 
Nobody remembered Elder Clarence Henry (1929-1997) working at the Norman 
Dam.2 Nobody remembered Henry working at Whitedog Falls Generating Station either. 
Henry fished for his living. As a child, Henry likely followed his family onto the river, 
participating in the sturgeon (name) harvest between May and August. A team was 
required to successfully bring hooked (or netted) sturgeon to shore – it took at least four 
people and two canoes to move a grandfather fish. Henry recalled the Winnipeg River 
teeming with fish and a vibrant reservation community. When a large sturgeon was 
caught, the entire camp divided the meat.3 Henry feasted and danced and eventually grew 
up beside the Jameson, Savage, and McLeod families. Then, in the 1950s, everything 
changed. Rapids, once deep and wild, were blasted to widen the Winnipeg River and to 
relieve flood conditions in Kenora.4 By 1955, the Hydro-Electric Power Commission of 
Ontario had started to survey lands near Henry’s fishing grounds. The HEPC 
incorporated Dalles Channel into its reservoir plans for Whitedog Falls Generating 
Station. This station was to serve the Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company – a 
1 Dalles Historical Resources (DHR), “D. J. Collins, Ontario Water Resources Commission, to 
Stanley Randall, Minister of the Department of Trade and Development, 24 September 1969, re: 
Memorandum of August 29 Concerning Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company Ltd.,” Winnipeg River 
Watershed – Water Pollution, 1965-1995 – Correspondence
2 According to the records of Notre Dame Parish in Kenora, Ontario, Clarence Henry was born to 
Catherine Hunter and Guy Henry on 6 July 1929. Notre Dame Parish, “Bird, Sa Baptiste,” Whitefish 
Record of Families. 
3 Elder Clarence Henry’s childhood experience has been extrapolated using anonymous Elder 
testimony from Dalles 38C Indian Reserve. Elder #5, interviewed by Sheldon Ratuski at Dalles 38C Indian 
Reserve, 17 February 2010. Interview referenced in Ratuski, “Gathering Traditional Knowledge”, 5. 
4 “Escape Channel at Dalles Rapids is Blown Open,” Kenora Miner and News, 12 May 1950, 1. 
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paper mill located approximately thirteen kilometres upstream that was in desperate need 
of power. 5 Within twenty years, Henry caught garbage in his nets and found sturgeon 
belly-up on Winnipeg River. He had never seen anything like it. When Henry looked for 
possible explanations for the garbage that ruined his nets, his eyes turned southeast to the 
town of Kenora. He saw new subdivisions that pumped human waste into Lake of the 
Woods. He knew that Lake of the Woods drained into Winnipeg River. He saw the 
Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company, a sulphite-operating paper mill, dump 
industrial waste into Rideout Bay.6 After 1958, human and industrial waste from Kenora 
settled in the upper reach of the Winnipeg River. This chapter focuses specifically on 
waste accumulation between Rideout Bay and Dalles 38C Indian Reserve. But, waste 
disposal alone could not explain declining water quality on reserve; water regulation by 
the HEPC kept solid waste suspended in the Winnipeg River. Unless the HEPC opened 
its gates at Whitedog Falls Generating Station, human and industrial waste had nowhere 
to go. 
                                            
5 The Kenora Miner and News noted that “hydro crews [had] been working on surveys of possible 
developments in the north” in summer 1955. In June, the HEPC had already started to build a camp at 
Whitedog to house engineers. An unidentified journalist suggested that hydroelectric development at 
Whitedog Falls – and in northwestern Ontario more generally – was “critical” to avoiding power shortages 
in Ontario’s “fast-expanding economy.” “Power Line to Feed Kenora Mill Started,” Kenora Miner and 
News, 11 June 1955, 1. 
6 In 1971, the Fort Frances Times and Rainy Lake Herald noted that “the Kenora mill… produced 
its own chemical pulp by the sulfite process.” The Mandonian, a magazine published by the Ontario-
Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company’s Industrial Relations Department, acknowledged the need to dispose 
of spent sulphite liquor produced in sulphite digesters as early as 1954. However, the Industrial Relations 
Department does not specify how sulphite liquor was handled in the 1950s. One exception was noted in 
International Falls, Minnesota. At this location, the company sprayed spent sulphite liquor on dirt and 
gravel roads as a binding agent. Oral testimony suggests that the company dumped spent sulphite liquor 
directly into Rideout Bay in Kenora, Ontario. “O-M Kraft Mill now in production: Why Fort Frances? 
Much Study Preceded Actual Construction,” Fort Frances Times, November 1971, accessed 1 March 2016, 
http://www.fftimes.com/100-years-100-stories/whyFF.html; “Good Roads From Sulphite Mill Waste 
Product,” The Mandonian, September-October, 1954, 6.; Ray Boivin, Senior Environmental Officer, 
Kenora Area, Ministry of the Environment, meeting with author, 24 May 2012.  
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In the mid-1950s, Mayor Peter Ratuski and members of the Kenora town council 
seemed blissfully unaware of Henry’s garbage-laden nets and dead fish on the Winnipeg 
River. During Ratuski’s term, Kenora residents celebrated National Electric Week and 
arranged a speech competition to address how electricity made “life more interesting, 
more comfortable and pleasant” – that water regulation would suspend human and 
industrial waste near someone’s home seemed unlikely, if not impossible.7 Indeed, letters 
published by the Kenora Daily Miner and News suggested that Lake of the Woods 
carried waste away from municipal intake sites:  waterways operated to benefit Kenora 
residents.8 Scientific publications acknowledged (albeit discouraged) dilution as an 
effective waste management system for low-density regions like Kenora.9 The problem, 
however, lay in Ratuski’s and his constituents’ definition of community and how town 
council designed and approved waste systems to serve community needs. Hydroelectric 
and waste systems were developed to serve Kenora, Norman, and Keewatin. Community 
boundaries were determined by colonial settlement and industrial production.10 
Unfortunately, social boundaries conflicted with environmental boundaries: Kenora and 
Dalles 38C Indian Reserve belonged to the same drainage system. Although the two 
communities (settler and Indian) were connected by water, they were disconnected in 
                                            
7 National Electric Week (1958) ran from 9-15 February, 1958. Kenora Daily Miner and News 
published National Electric Week advertisements on 10 February 1958 (page 4) and 11 February 1958 
(page 5).  See also “Festival Public speaking Entrants to Choose Electricity as Topics,” Kenora Daily 
Miner and News, 25 November 1958, 1. 
8 “E. Hutchinson, Letter to Editor,” Kenora Daily Miner and News, 24 November 1955, 15. 
9 A. E. Berry, “Sewage Disposal Practice in Canada,” Sewage Wastes Journal 18, no. 1 (1936): 
110. 
10 The Diamond Jubilee Guide helps to define “community” as perceived by settlers at the north 
shore of Lake of the Woods. Author Hugh Hughes largely describes Rat Portage (now known as Kenora) 
by its retailers and service providers; his introduction, however, does not include Anishinabek 
communities. Hughes, Souvenir, Diamond Jubilee Guide, 4-12. 
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municipal thought and practice: Indian reserves like Dalles 38C fell under federal 
jurisdiction.  
 This chapter asks what happens when social boundaries conflict with 
environmental boundaries. It argues that municipal failure to consider the natural and 
managed flow of Winnipeg River in the development of waste management systems 
compromised biological and social health downstream at Dalles 38C Indian Reserve. 
From the two interconnected examples of Kenora’s sewage system and Ontario-
Minnesota Pulp and Paper Mill’s industrial waste system, it becomes evident that 
seemingly rational decisions to facilitate growth and manage waste in-town relied on an 
irrational conception of space that simply relocated (rather than processed) pollutants. 
What follows is a story about power structures – both hydroelectric and governmental – 
and the unintended consequences of controlling nature for economic profit. 
 
WASTE MANAGEMENT AND THE ROLE OF NATURAL AND MANAGED FLOWS ON THE 
WINNIPEG RIVER  
 
The earliest known written descriptions of Dalles Rapids (circa 1823) emphasize 
the swiftness of an unregulated river. For example, Major Stephen Long’s men pulled 
their canoes up onto “perpendicular precipices of granite” to avoid further thrashing by 
the Winnipeg River.11 Major Long described his experience at Grandes Dalles as follows: 
Our paddles had a comparatively easy task all day except at one place, 
where they attempted to paddle up the stream…. This place, called the 
‘Grandes Dalles,’ presents the most rapid current against which we have 
ever seen a canoe paddled. It is a narrow strait, not exceeding forty yards 
[36.58 metres] in breadth... great exertions are required on the part of the 
canoe-men in order to ascend this, and one of the canoes, after two 
                                            
11 Stephen H. Long, Narrative of an expedition to the source of St. Peter’s River, Lake Winnepeek, 
Lake of the Woods, &c., &c, 105. 
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unavailing attempts to stem the current with paddles, was towed up with a 
line.12 
 
Explorer David Thompson affirmed Major Long’s observations of rapid current (circa 
1797). He called Winnipeg River a “bold, deep stream,” suggesting that shooting 
Grandes Dalles necessitated courage and daring.13 Thompson’s biographer, D’Arcy 
Jenish, described the Winnipeg River as “short” and “surly.” It was characterized by 
“raging rapids and thunderous waterfalls” in the 1790s.14 While Anishinabek families 
living near Dalles Rapids when Long and Thompson journeyed upstream towards Lake 
of the Woods did not publish their recollections, community practice indicated a need to 
manage water risk. Anishinabek travellers visited “the sacred rocks where they made 
offerings for a safe trip” before taking to the waters by boat.15 
 In the early 1900s, Dalles Rapids appeared on a chart of “Water Powers in 
Ontario and Manitoba” as a Dominion property holding. The anonymous surveyor 
deemed their potential horsepower “unimportant,” but provided yet another detail of their 
shape: Dalles Rapids had a 4.5-metre head (or a 4.5-metre difference in elevation from 
the peak of the rapids to the base).16 Considered of little industrial importance, this same 
4.5 metres of wild water impressed itself on Ontario Land Surveyor T. D. Green. In the 
1910s, Green took extensive note of the land and water near Dalles 38C Indian Reserve 
                                            
12 Ibid. 
13 Canadian artist Don McMaster produced a series of paintings that reflected David Thompson’s 
travels through North America. McMaster conducted “extensive research into Thompson’s travels,” 
consulting both Thompson’s diaries and the environment to produce his work. Indeed, “McMaster travelled 
throughout Manitoba, Saskatchewan,” and, most importantly for this project, Lake of the Woods. David 
Thompson quoted in “Running the Dalles,” The Art of Don McMaster, accessed 15 December 2015, 
http://members.shaw.ca/aborsuk9/Thompson/T8.html. Don McMaster’s project is described by Neil 
Babluk, “Painting David Thompson,” Canada’s History, accessed 1 March 2016, 
http://www.canadashistory.ca/Magazine/Online-Extension/Articles/Painting-David-Thompson. 
14 D’Arcy Jenish, Epic Wanderer: David Thompson and the Opening of the West (Toronto: 
Anchor Canada, 2004), 58. 
15 Mike Aiken, “Winnipeg River/Dalles Tour: A Journey Back in Time,” Kenora Daily Miner and 
News, 21 July 2008, unpaginated. 
16 LOWM, “Water Powers in Ontario and Manitoba, c.1930,” Folder: Powerhouse and Dams. 
 
 
280 
to produce a map of the Winnipeg River. Green identified Dalles Rapids as a notable 
feature of the landscape.17 Given that Green participated in a European cartographic 
tradition that made, in the words of Renee Fossett, “representation of terrain… the central 
element and goal of mapping.”18 Green’s notes suggest that he felt this stretch of the 
Winnipeg River, relatively unmarked by the waiâbishkiwedig, was hazardous: here was a 
site worth identifying in provincial map-making programs. Travelogues, ceremonies, 
charts, and cartographic records memorialize Dalles Rapids as wild water, substantiating 
Henry’s testimony that “Before this channel was build [sic] the whole area use to be over, 
over-flooded, over-floating… The water was high and flowed rapidly.”19 
 Such descriptions of Dalles Rapids along the thirteen kilometre stretch of the 
Winnipeg River relevant to this study are essential to understanding scant evidence of 
complaint about water quality prior to 1950. Up until the mid-twentieth century, the 
stretch of water near Dalles 38C Indian Reserve was in moderate health: the waterway 
sustained native vegetation and aquatic species despite the continued dumping of human 
and sawmill wastes by the triune communities of Kenora, Norman, and Keewatin since at 
least 1879. How did the Winnipeg River near Dalles 38C help to manage municipal 
inputs? Aerobic bacteria thrived in the turbulent waters of the Winnipeg River. Naturally 
occurring rapids helped to aerate the water, providing energy for microbial 
decomposition. Aerobic bacteria used dissolved oxygen to breakdown organic material 
that was dumped into Lake of the Woods and Rideout Bay by the waiâbishkiwedig. 
                                            
17 AO, T. D. Green, “Diary. Of survey of Pistol Lake, Winnipeg River and summer resort 
locations, November 1911,” microfilm MS 924, reel 28. 
18 Renee Fossett, “Mapping Inuktitut: Inuit Views of the Real World,” Reading Beyond Words: 
Contexts for Native History, edited by Jennifer S.H. Brown and Elizabeth Vibert (Peterborough, ON: 
Broadview Press, 2003), 113. 
19 Elder Clarence Henry, interview by Cuyler Cotton, 14 June 1993, transcript, Dovetail Resources 
Ltd., Kenora, ON. 
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Grandes Dalles, as traversed by Long and Thompson, thus helped to maintain the 
equilibrium between oxygen content and organic inputs (i.e. excreta and wood cellulose 
fibre) prior to riverine modifications.  
 Rapids are caused by varying combinations of gradient, constriction, obstruction, 
and flow. Records suggest that gradient, flow, and constriction (as described by Major 
Long) created Dalles Rapids. In 1950, the Kenora Miner and News reported that Dalles 
Rapids would be blasted open to relieve flooding conditions in town. Town planners 
predicted that a wider channel would allow rising waters on Lake of the Woods to flow 
downstream more quickly, thus reducing urban property damage. On 12 May 1950, an 
unnamed journalist reported that the “Escape Channel” had been “Blown Open.” The 
rock, the constriction causing the rapids, had been excavated through a draw to create the 
channel. The new channel was described as “150 feet wide, 1600 feet long and 30 to 40 
feet deep” – approximately nine metres wider than Major Long reported in 1824.20 
Subsequent reports affirm that blasting “dramatically changed the current around the 
community.”21 While blasting increased the surface area of the water (increasing surface 
air-to-water contact), total aeration likely decreased with the deconstruction of Dalles 
Rapids: the churning and spraying of waters ceased. Nevertheless, human and industrial 
wastes continued to flow downstream, preventing an accumulation of excreta and wood 
cellulose fibre near Dalles 38C Indian Reserve. Up until 1955, pollutants flowed into and 
out of the “Escape Channel.” 
 When the Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario modified flow through 
the “Escape Channel” in 1955 with work on their “not-too-secret Whitedog Falls 
                                            
20 “Escape Channel at Dalles Rapids is Blown Open,” Kenora Miner and News, 12 May 1950, 1. 
21  Aiken, “Winnipeg River/Dalles Tour: A Journey Back in Time,” unpaginated. 
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project,”22 total aeration decreased yet again. Unit 1 of the Whitedog Falls Generating 
Station began operations in February 1958. Unit 2 entered service about one month later, 
and Unit 3 followed in June 1958. Prior to construction, Winnipeg River functioned like a 
drain: water flowed from Lake of the Woods through the Winnipeg River and towards the 
south arm of Lake Winnipeg. Units 1 to 3 worked to plug the drain 48 kilometres 
northwest of Kenora.23 Lake of the Woods, upstream from the dam, functioned as a 
massive reservoir for Whitedog Falls Generating Station. The HEPC generated power by 
releasing stored water through the dam machinery before allowing the water to continue 
its journey towards Lake Winnipeg. Turning Lake of the Woods into a reservoir for 
hydroelectric power production, however, meant that Whitedog Falls Generating Station 
also plugged water in the “Escape Channel.” During high organic loading, Chongrak 
Polprasert explains that “the bacteria [responsible for composting waste] require more 
oxygen for their oxidation and synthesis, resulting in the depletion of oxygen in a water 
body which is detrimental to aquatic life.”24 The HEPC reduced the Winnipeg River’s 
ability to dissolve sufficient amounts of oxygen for aerobic composting near Dalles 38C 
Indian Reserve. Furthermore, damming compromised the seasonal flushing of waste. As 
Raymond Coppinger and Will Ryan noted in their discussion of the James Bay 
Hydroelectric Project, “[t]he natural seasonal rhythm without the dams consists of a 
tremendous discharge in the spring when the ice melts, tapering to a trickle in the fall, 
                                            
22 “Development Planned: Hydro Starts Road from Minaki to White Dog and Deer Falls,” Kenora-
Keewatin Daily Miner and News, 16 September 1955, 1. 
23 “Whitedog Falls Generating Station,” Ontario Power Generation, 15 December 2015, 
http://www.opg.com/generating-power/hydro/northwest-ontario/Pages/whitedog-falls-station.aspx.  
24 Chongrak Polprasert, Organic Waste Recycling: Technology and Management, 3rd ed. (London, 
UK: IWA Publishing, 2007), 57. 
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followed by freeze-up.”25 Alongside annual spring discharges, the Lake of the Woods 
was characterized by cyclical flooding prior to both blasting and blocking: “High water 
levels are usually experienced every eleven years…. In 1916, the water level reached 
1064; in 1927 it was 1062.9 at the end of May; in 1938, 1061.55.”26 The normal regulated 
range of the lake is now 1056-1061.25 feet (321.87-323.47 metres).27 By capturing and 
storing the spring flow in Dalles Channel, the HEPC prevented the river from flushing 
the system and diluting (if not redistributing) waste – both raw sewage and industrial 
pollutants – from reserve lands and waterways. 
 At the time the HEPC developed Whitedog Falls Generating Station, engineers 
acknowledged the positive correlation between damming and declining water quality. 
Richard D. Hoak, Senior Fellow at the Mellon Institute of Industrial Development 
Research, was quoted in the trade journal Industrial and Sewage Wastes (1954): 
[L]ow-flow augmentation is incidental to efficient power stream 
operation, rather than to stream needs…. Thus, the average flow of a 
stream below a hydroelectric dam could be relatively consistent while the 
actual hydrograph would show wide fluctuations. Where such conditions 
prevailed on a fairly heavily polluted stream [,] the hydro dam might 
actually be deleterious to stream quality because of diurnal effect.28  
 
Community members also commented on the relationship between damming and 
declining stream health. Elder Robert Kabestra (Anamikipinens) explained, “Water gets 
                                            
25 Raymond Coppinger and Will Ryan, “James Bay: Environmental Considerations for Building 
Large Hydroelectric Dams and Reservoirs in Quebec,” in The Social and Environmental Impacts of the 
James Bay Hydroelectric Project, edited by James F. Hornig (Montréal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 1999), 42. 
26 “Lake of the Woods Now Approaching 1062 Level,” Kenora Miner and News, 16 May 1950, 1. 
27 Canada, Parliament, Convention and Protocol between His Britannic Majesty in the Respect of 
the Dominion of Canada and the United States for Regulating the Level of the Lake of the Woods, 
1925 (Sessional Papers 1925, No. 98). 
28 Richard D. Hoak, Senior Fellow, Mellon Institute of Industrial Development Research quoted in 
Don E. Bloodgood, “Dilution Factors for Industrial Wastes,” Sewage and Industrial Wastes 26, no. 5 (May 
1954): 644. 
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into these bays and doesn’t get out – trapped there.”29 What is the connection between 
damming and decline? In the absence of oxygen, anaerobic bacteria begin the process of 
anaerobic composting. Anaerobic bacteria produce chemical compounds like hydrogen 
sulphide – a substance toxic to fish, beneficial bacteria, and insects – into the river when 
decomposing organic inputs. Further, anaerobic decomposition is less effective, taking 
longer to breakdown organic inputs like excreta and wood cellulose fibre. Congrak 
Polprasert explains, “In anaerobic composting, the free energy (heat) produced is much 
less than that of aerobic compositing thus the longer time required for organics to 
decompose.”30 River modification, both blasting and damming, reduced aeration and, by 
extension, the rate of waste stabilization. In reducing aeration and preventing the flow of 
wastes downstream, Whitedog Falls Generating Station worked (unintentionally) to 
suspend waste along Dalles 38C. 
 
INCREASED MUNICIPAL INPUTS: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HYDRO-ELECTRIC 
DEVELOPMENT, EXCRETA, AND DECLINING WATER QUALITY 
 
Understanding the role of unregulated flow in waste stabilization along Dalles 
Channel, however, does not adequately explain anaerobic conditions along this stretch of 
the Winnipeg River. To understand changing oxygen levels (or, perhaps more accurately, 
declining water quality), one must explore multiple system inputs and the connections 
among urban development, human excreta, and hydroelectric development. Prior to the 
economic growth initiated by dam and mill construction, the Kenora-Keewatin Daily 
Miner and News published the truism that “economic expansion is reflected usually in 
general community growth, with increases in population, school enrollment, and all the 
                                            
29 Elder Robert Kabestra (Anamikipinens), interview by Cuyler Cotton, 29 September 1992, 
transcript, Dovetail Resources Ltd., Kenora, ON.  
30 Polprasert, Organic Waste Recycling, 94. 
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rest.”31 Locals had long associated population growth with industrial expansion, 
predicting that hydroelectric development would “grow” their town.32 News reporting 
thus encouraged the belief in a causal link between power production and urban 
development among the readership. By 1955, population increased as men began work on 
Whitedog Falls Generating Station and families arrived in connection with mill 
construction.33 By 1957, local employment seemed guaranteed as headlines declared 
“New MANDO Machine Adds 150 to Local Payroll – 250 to Timber Department.” Mill-
related jobs also cropped up along Kenora’s periphery as additional wood requirements 
promised “jobs for some 50 men in the company’s logging camps and provide[d] a 
market for about 200 extra independent operators and tree farmers.”34 Population trends 
illustrate how urban growth mirrored mill expansion which, in turn, mirrored 
hydroelectric development. An economic ecosystem had developed in Kenora whereby 
the growth of one industry (or municipality) depended entirely on the provision of 
electricity by Hydro-Electric Power Commission. 
Population growth that followed the damming of Winnipeg River, however, meant 
that more people were producing not only more paper, but more waste. Approximately 
one year after Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company announced its expansion 
program, “[p]ermits of new dwelling construction for the first seven months of 1956 total 
                                            
31 “What New Industrial Jobs Mean to a Community,” Kenora-Keewatin Daily Miner and News, 
25 January 1955, 4. 
32 “Our Growing Population,” 4. 
33 In March 1955, the Kenora-Keewatin Miner and News commented on the installation of a new 
paper machine by the Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company. Construction was associated with 
“subsequent addition to staff” at the paper mill (“Industrial Prospects Considered Excellent,” 25 March 
1955, 1). In September 1955, the Kenora Miner and News noted that “[p]reliminary work on the required 
access road” to Whitedog Falls Generating Station was underway (“Road to Whitedog Starts,” 30 
September 1955, 1). By February 1956, the Hydro-Electric Power Commission had 310 men on payroll for 
the Whitedog Falls Project (“310 Men now Working on Whitedog Project,” 1). 
34 “New MANDO Machine Adds 150 to Local Payroll – 250 to Timber Department,” Kenora 
Daily Miner and News, 11 February 1957, 1. 
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61 – a figure equal to the average annual new-house construction of the past several 
years.”35 By Christmas 1956, three additional new building permits had been issued by 
the Town of Kenora. At the same time locals celebrated the “Building Boom,” the 
newspaper reported that “[t]he sewage question has become more acute… by reason of 
Kenora’s growth.”36 The sewage question centered on processing human waste that had 
long been privately disposed (e.g. through outside privies).37 The dredging of 
Laurenson’s Creek illuminates how Kenora residents used Lake of the Woods and 
outflowing streams for waste disposal. The Kenora Chamber of Commerce complained 
that people used the creek, particularly “in the vicinity of bridges,” to sink “old tires, 
bicycles and other objects.” Originally believed to be the result of child’s play, material 
dragged up by the Department of Public Works revealed that adults also used local 
waterways for waste disposal: “baby carriages – not doll carriages – tires, mattresses, 
axles, drill steels, as well as lumber slabs and loose rocks [were] removed.” The 
normalization of Laurenson’s Creek as a dumping site is highlighted by the accumulation 
of waste on the creek bed and stopped water traffic; dredging by Public Works allowed 
for “approximately three feet” of clearance and permitted small boat travel.38 News 
reporters concluded that many Kenora residents “willful[ly] disregard… ordinary safety 
                                            
35 “Building Permits total $747,700: Ahead of 1955 Record Year by $1/4 Million; 61 Houses 
Started,” Kenora Daily Miner and News, 10 August 1956, 1. 
36 “Ratepayers to be Asked to Vote on Sewage Question Again,” Kenora-Keewatin Daily Miner 
and News, 25 October 1955, 1. 
37 Lake of the Woods Writers’ Group and Kenora Centennial Committee, Through the Kenora 
Gateway, 129.  Direct references to privies and/or private disposal can also be found in “Letter to the 
Editor,” Kenora Daily Miner and News, 8 November 1955, 9; “District Health Good Says December 
Report,” Kenora Daily Miner and News, 12 January 1955, 10. 
38 “Creek Clean-Up Permits Use Now by Small Boats,” Kenora Daily Miner and News, 11 July 
1958, 1. 
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and cleanliness rules” when individually responsible for waste disposal.39 No wonder the 
sewage question also considered how best to centralize multiple outfalls released into 
Lake of the Woods and how best the municipal government could address above ground 
lines that posed “grave sanitation problems” west of the urban centre.40 
By May 1955, Kenora announced a sewer and water project to “solve” some of the 
waste problems in the Central Park area. Council agreed to lay a sanitary sewer to serve 
residents living near Central Park and “for residents of Railway Street between 7th and 8th 
Avenues.” And yet, no system for sewage treatment was announced. Instead, human 
wastes, were to be “pick[ed] up” and “carr[ied] to the Creek,” which in turn would flow 
northwest through Kenora Bay, past Tunnel Island, and then through Rideout Bay before 
becoming trapped in the now-slow moving waters of the Dalles Channel.41 Within six 
months, pressure from the Ontario Department of Health prompted town council to hold a 
vote on a more complex three-stage sewage disposal program.42 The proposed treatment 
solution serviced only Kenora’s higher density centre and retained dumping practices that 
                                            
39  “Creek Yields Varied Materials to Dragging Crew,” Kenora Daily Miner and News, 10 July 
1956, 1. The earliest known complaint about private dumping into local waterways was issued in 1893. An 
anonymous person had “dumped refuse” into Lake of the Woods. Mr. Fletcher, Rat Portage’s health 
inspector, considered dumping into Lake of the Woods near D. L. Mather’s wharf an act of “gross 
carelessness” as locals consumed water from that area (“Keewatin,” Rat Portage Weekly Record, 21 April 
1893, 2). By 1910, Walter Atkinson was hired by the Town of Kenora to work with H. King, sanitary 
inspector. Town records suggest that locals used Lake of the Woods to dispose of their waste – both human 
and household – at this time. During summer 1910, Atkinson was paid to remove a “pig from creek,” “a 
dead dog from lake,” “rotten beef and dead fowls from lake,” “meat and cats from lake shore” and a “box 
of rubbish from lake shore.” (LOWM, “Town of Kenora Police Department Records of Sanitary Inspector 
H. King, August 1910,” Folder: Waterworks and Public Utilities.). Local use of Lake of the Woods to 
dispose of waste, however, did not become an acute problem until the population explosion of the 1950s. 
40 “Norman Says: Must Have Year-Round Water-Sewer Service,” Kenora Daily Miner and News, 
28 June 1956, 1. 
41 “Council Gives ‘Go-Ahead’ Signal to Sewer and Water Projects,” Kenora-Keewatin Daily 
Miner and News, 4 May 1955, 1. 
42 The Kenora-Keewatin Daily Miner and News suggested that delays resulted in part from 
“difficulties in providing services in the new housing development.” Indeed, “It is known that sewer and 
water problems are the main stumbling block to final approval of plans.” “With Time of the Essence 
Engineer Flies to Housing Conference,” Kenora-Keewatin Daily Miner and News, 18 April 1955, 1. The 
proposed three stage sewage disposal program was detailed in “Ratepayers to be Asked to Vote on Sewage 
Question Again,” Kenora-Keewatin Daily Miner and News, 25 October 1955, 1.  
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moved waste to Dalles Channel: “Stage 1 involves the connecting up a [sic] sewage 
outfalls in the Creek and carrying the effluent out into fast-moving water in the vicinity 
of the hospitals, from where it would be carried down the [Winnipeg] river.”43 Local 
resistance to the proposed treatment program was voiced in the Kenora-Keewatin Daily 
Miner and News, but complaints did not include concerns about downstream water 
quality. Instead, E. Hutchinson argued that, “Water runs down to the lake carrying the 
sewage at present. Would not a sewer line connecting existing outlets to the creek, laid 
down to the creek and out to deep water function without a pumping station [‘an added 
cost to no purpose’]?”44 Concerns focused on the cost of establishing a pumping station 
when the creek appeared to manage waste at limited expense. Resistance, however, was 
rare. Few residents seemed to question Stage 1. Expressions of pride included the 
publication of statistics such as the fact that 1750 of Kenora’s 2500 households were 
provided with town-operated water and sewer facilities.45 Excreta continued to flow 
untreated (and in increased quantity) downstream while urban residents lauded 
“automatic telephones, paved streets, new schools and soon, adequate water and sewer 
systems” as markers of positive growth.46 Local desires to maximize on Ontario-
Minnesota Pulp and Paper Mill’s income potential and to quickly provide quality housing 
to working families thus pushed town council to rely on simple, inexpensive systems of 
aerobic composting long after the socio-environmental conditions that had assured its 
efficacy had changed.  
                                            
43 “Ratepayers to be Asked to Vote on Sewage Question Again,” 1. 
44 “Letter to Editor,” Kenora Daily Miner and News, 24 November 1955, 15. 
45 “Town’s Brief to Water Resources Commission is Well Received,” Kenora Daily Miner and 
News, 26 September 1956, 1. 
46 “Our Editorial Viewpoint: Housing Break-Through,” Kenora Daily Miner and News, 10 
September 1956, 1. 
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Winnipeg River’s inability to handle increased municipal inputs became visible in 
solid waste accumulation. Between 1955 and 1958, Kenora’s population grew from 9,813 
to 10,538. The average person releases 132.6 gallons of urine per year and 360.7 pounds 
of feces. Should all of Kenora’s population have been connected to the municipal sewer 
system, an additional 96,135 gallons of urine and an additional 261,507 pounds of feces 
would have flowed down Winnipeg River per annum. Elders from Dalles 38C, just 
thirteen kilometres downstream from town, did not share in Kenora’s celebration of 
progressive waste management, associating the “Building Boom” with suspended solids 
instead. Henry remembered, “There was so many thing [sic] we found in our nets, toilet 
paper for example.”47 Elder Jacob Strong (b. 1930, d. unknown) also recalled “Raw 
sewage coming down the river – shit, hate to mention the word – as well as ‘rubber 
things’ [condoms] snagged in nets.” The ubiquity of waste in Dalles Channel led to a 
series of jokes about urban waste. Strong explained, “When someone caught or snagged 
‘those things’ in the net we used to laugh at them.”48 Waste suspension was linked, in 
part, to the slow process of anaerobic composting. While members of Dalles 38C 
experienced a river unable to process municipal waste, limited communication between 
town and reserve affirmed urbanites’ assumption that dilution worked: waste only 
became “stuck” once outside municipal boundaries that artificially divided the Winnipeg 
River drainage basin into settler and Indian lands. 
Dilution as a common method of treatment for raw sewage had declined by the 
1950s. Chemical precipitation, sewage farming, and experimentation with sand filtration 
existed as accepted alternatives to dilution for sewage treatment although, according to 
                                            
47 Elder Henry, interview by Cotton, 14 June 1993. 
48 Elder Strong, interview with Cotton, 2 October 1992. 
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Dr. A. E. Berry, municipalities “situated on large bodies of water” (e.g. Lake of the 
Woods) continued to discharge human waste into the adjacent body of water (e.g. the 
Winnipeg River).49 Despite the common practice of lakeside towns identified by Berry, 
changing industrial standards deemed dilution subpar if outfalls caused a nuisance or 
endangered health.50 The push towards sewage treatment amplified over the years “for 
the prevention of disease transmission.”51 By the mid-1950s many Canadian 
municipalities had adopted “[b]iofiltration and activated sludge type facilities… and 
some use [had] been made of sewage lagoons.”52 And yet, dilution – the least preferable 
form of sewage treatment – had not been professionally condemned for low-density 
regions where waste could be “carried away by tide [or wave] action.”53 By defining 
community by colonial settlement and industry rather than Anishinabek settlement and 
drainage basin, Kenora’s town council appeared to meet industry standards: the Winnipeg 
River removed waste from high density regions into Kenora’s nether-regions. Kenora’s 
treatment strategy can be seen as behind Canadian trends in waste disposal, but not 
condemnable. At the time Kenora dumped approximately 261,507 pounds of feces into 
the Winnipeg River, less than half of Ontario residents received partial or full treatment 
of their sewage.54 Here, social boundaries that conflicted with physical geographies 
allowed town council to serve local citizens to the detriment of its “invisible” neighbours. 
                                            
49 H. W. Clark, “Past and Present Developments in Sewage Disposal and Purification,” Sewage 
Works Journal 24, no. 4 (October 1930): 561; see also A. E. Berry, “Sewage Disposal Practice in Canada,” 
110. 
50 H. W. Clark, “Past and Present Developments in Sewage Disposal and Purification,” 561-71. 
51 E. K. Day, "Sewage and Waste Disposal Problems," Public Health Reports 66, no. 29 (July 
1951): 923. 
52 J. R. Menzies, “Sewage Disposal and Waste Treatment in Canada,” Sewage and Industrial 
Wastes 28, no. 3 (March 1956): 276. 
53 Day, “Sewage and Waste Disposal Problems,” 927. 
54 Menzies, “Sewage Disposal and Waste Treatment in Canada,” 278. 
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Acceptable by Canadian standards at large, the accumulation of waste in the upper 
reach of the Winnipeg River becomes problematic when compared to local standards for 
disposal and national practices (not yet regulations) for drinking water. By 1958, Kenora 
moved towards the final stage of its sewage program and, as the Kenora Daily Miner and 
News reported, a “Portion of Mill Site [was] Allotted for Sewage Disposal Plant.”55 
Engineers ratified a plan to establish a treatment plant with 60 percent purification.”56 
Kenora’s Chamber of Commerce voiced dissatisfaction with the announced treatment 
plan, expressing their concern that “40% [waste] will take place in the bay,” a site that 
became popular for tourists interested in visiting the Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper 
Mill.57 The Chamber pitched relocation, asking the Town of Kenora to move the plant to 
“Hospital Bridge [where] the 40% remaining will run directly into the river.”58 Members 
of Kenora’s business community demanded a treatment program that removed waste 
from high traffic areas. Their relocation plans would not prevent waste from settling in 
the upper reach of the Winnipeg River – it simply allowed waste to follow a 
northwesterly path that skirted Rideout Bay. The Chamber’s petition sought to maintain 
the economic vitality of mill tours to produce (and keep) dollars in their community. 
Council did not demand full treatment of wastes; instead, Council asked that waste 
remain less visible: pure(r) waters in Rideout Bay were demanded to maintain tourist 
dollars, not to protect band members. While the municipality forged ahead with the mill 
                                            
55 “Portion of Mill Site Allotted for Sewage Disposal Plant,” Kenora Daily Miner and News, 15 
July 1958, 1. 
56 “Chamber of Commerce Seek Alternate Site for Sewage Plant,” Kenora Daily Miner and News, 
6 November 1958, 1. 
57 Ibid. For an example of a mill tour advertisement see: “You are Invited to Visit MANDO’s 
Kenora Mill, June 19-20,” Kenora Daily Miner and News, 11 June 1957, 4. 
58 “Chamber of Commerce Seek Alternate Site for Sewage Plant,” Kenora Daily Miner and News, 
6 November 1958, 1. 
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site, Dalles 38C received waste whose accumulation was now deemed publicly 
unacceptable in town.  
Standards for drinking water during the 1950s were substantively higher than 
standards for sewage disposal. Writing about the Great Lakes, Joseph W. Ellms noted as 
early as 1931 that “[t]he water in the Great Lakes is usually of excellent quality for public 
water supplies when unpolluted by sewage,”59 drawing a clear link between sewage and 
contamination. Even dilution – although an acceptable treatment solution for human 
waste – was considered unsafe if drinking water was to be drawn from nearby outfall 
sites: “dilution of sewage and trade waste discharges with the purer water of the lake… 
tending to diminish the concentration of pollution matter, is an uncertain factor of safety 
owing to the erratic and irregular diffusion of these discharges.”60 Risks associated with 
pollution (industrial and human) included water-borne disease. In the 1950s, for example, 
substantive debate continued over the transmission of tuberculosis (TB) through 
waterways and the relationship between untreated sewage and TB as a water-borne 
disease. While TB was known to affect Anishinabek children who attended federally-
operated residential schools in town, no known attempts to determine associations 
between municipal dumping and summertime exposure to untreated water were made by 
health officials.61 It is worth noting that definitions of quality drinking water in the early-
to-mid twentieth century did not include clarity. As Dr. A.E. Berry, active in the Kenora 
region throughout the 1950s, explained: 
                                            
59 Joseph W. Ellms, “Water Purification and Sewage Disposal on the Great Lakes,” The Scientific 
Monthly 33, no. 5 (November 1931): 424. 
60 Ibid., 425. 
61 For a summary of works dealing with the possible transmission of tuberculosis through sewage, 
see: Arnold E. Greenberg and Edward Kupka, “Tuberculosis Transmission by Waste Waters: A Review,” 
Sewage and Industrial Wastes 29, no. 5 (1957): 524-37. For references to tuberculosis at Kenora District 
Residential Schools, see:  LOWM, “Bakaan nake’ii ngii-izhi-gakinoo’amaagoomin: We were taught 
differently,” (Kenora: Lake of the Woods Museum, 2011), 20. 
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In safe water all bacteria have been killed and do not pose a direct hazard to 
life. Good quality water contains no sediment and discolouration. When I 
first started that often could be found in safe water. [Safe water] didn’t show 
anything of a hazardous nature, such as cholera or other organisms.62 
 
As such, the accumulation of sawdust (discussed below) upstream of Dalles 38C would 
not have made water unfit for consumption on the reserve – although, urban residents did 
occasionally complain about foreign matter in municipal water supplies.63 But, the 
accumulation of toilet paper, “shit,” and “rubber things” near the reservation meant that 
band members were done a great disservice by the municipality, which compromised 
Anishinabek water quality, and did not acknowledge (or plan for) the accumulation of 
waste on reserve territories. 
Kenora’s lack of interest in Dalles 38C does not reflect a lack of awareness of 
unorganized communities and their water quality issues on the outskirts of town. 
Residents of Kenora’s “North End” from 15th Avenue North to 19th Avenue North were 
off the town grid as rocky outcroppings made it impossible for the town to hook “North 
Enders” up to their rudimentary water system. Residents without privately-owned wells 
were finding it necessary to carry water for more than two blocks while other residents 
depended on the town to deliver water once a week.64 Alderman B. Paterson refused 
“North Enders” water service, citing the cost of installation “due to the nature of the 
terrain.”65 Inconveniently located – not tainted – water sources, however, entitled “North 
Enders” to a municipally-organized truck delivery service. Town Council also extended 
truck delivery service to TransCanada Pipeline employees whose enclosed village was 
                                            
62 Albert E. Berry, interview by Norman Ball and Robert Ferguson, 1983, transcript, Public Works 
Oral History, Chicago: Public Works Historical Society (1988), 9. 
63 “District Health Good Says December Report,” Kenora-Keewatin Daily Miner and News. 12 
January 1955, 10. 
64 “Residents of N.E. Area Seek Water Service,” Kenora Daily Miner and New, c. spring 1957, 1. 
65 Ibid. 
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established near Rideout Bay. In October 1968, M. J. W. German of the Ontario Water 
Resources Commission confirmed that “Unserviced sections of the town receive water by 
tank truck or from wells.”66 Redditt, an unorganized community north of Dalles 38C, was 
also considered a region of concern by Kenora residents. Much like the North End, the 
municipality refused Redditt water services as it was too far from town to be connected. 
Prior to 1950, the Canadian National Railway (CNR) provided water service to citizens 
of Redditt. When CNR cut service to Redditt in May 1950, the Kenora Miner and News 
suggested that the CNR had committed an injustice as water service was “beyond the 
means of the community to provide.”67 Journalists called for the Department of Health to 
“find some regulation in the statutes” and to mandate a waiting period during which 
alternative services could be established before cut-off.68 Limited service was also 
identified as a “real health menace.”69 While Dalles 38C fell under federal jurisdiction, 
Kenora’s concern for provincially-administered communities like Redditt indicates an 
awareness of water supplies on their periphery. Given jurisdictional boundaries, Kenora 
cannot be faulted for failing to consider provisional solutions for reserve land. However, 
continued dumping when compared to active service provision to unorganized settler 
communities suggests an awareness of compromised water quality in northwestern 
Ontario: Kenora residents deemed private intake unacceptable and, in Redditt’s case, a 
health hazard. Town Council then developed – and, occasionally, petitioned for – service 
solutions on their periphery. Kenora residents advocated for water service north of Dalles 
66 Sheila McRae, interview by author, Kenora, Ontario, 18 May 2012; DHR, M. J. W. German, 
“A Study of the Pollution Status of Rat Portage Bay and the Winnipeg River,” Toronto: Ontario Water 
Resources Commission (October 1968): 2. Winnipeg River Watershed – Water Pollution, 1965-1995 – 
Reports.  
67 “Redditt’s Water Suply,” Kenora Miner and News, 16 May 1950, 4. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid. 
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38C, but demanded no provisional solutions for the reserve, an Indian territory and, by 
extension, a site of federal concern. 
Given records of organized municipal dumping of untreated sewage, perhaps it is 
unsurprising that band members came to associate their own ailments with polluted water 
in Dalles Channel. Jacob Strong explained, “Water from the river gave us diarrhea.”70 
According to oral testimony, Indian Affairs failed to investigate health complaints in the 
1960s. While I have been unable to find federal health statistics on waterborne illnesses 
for Dalles 38C Indian Reserve, reports of diarrhea match scientific studies of the 
relationship between untreated human feces and infections of the gastrointestinal tract. 
Donald Wigle of the World Health Organization identified Giardia intestinalis (or G. 
lamblia) as a “globally important cause of waterborne diarrheal disease and the most 
common protozoan infection of the human small intestine” in the developed world, 
making it a likely explanation for Strong’s health complaints.71 G. lamblia is transmitted 
through fecal-oral routes, oftentimes through the consumption of fecally-contaminated 
water and food. Other common causes of diarrhea in developed regions of Canada and 
the United States include rotavirus and enteric adenovirus; however, rotavirus and enteric 
adenovirus are primarily responsible for infantile watery diarrhea and were thus unlikely 
causes of Strong’s gastrointestinal complaint given that his recollections focused on his 
youth at Dalles 38C.72 Such explanations remain speculative and, given Strong’s death, 
are no longer verifiable. Plausibility lies in commonality: in northern Ontario, studies 
                                            
70 Elder Strong, interview by Cotton, 2 October 1992. 
71 D. T. Wigle, “Water,” in Child Health and the Environment (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2003), 357. 
72 Ibid., 358. 
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confirmed G. lamblia in nearly ten percent of stool samples in First Nations communities 
into the 1980s.73  
Linda Wasakkejick (b. unknown), an off-reserve member, reports “We weren’t 
even told the water was contaminated after flooding. We used to wash and bathe in it. My 
sisters developed disease from this.”74 While Wasakkejick was the only interviewee to 
associate bathing with ill health, scientific studies conclude that a rash can be a possible 
symptom of infection by an enteric pathogen of fecal-to-oral transmission like the 
coxsackie virus. The coxsackie virus is reported to display itself through various 
symptoms, including rash, and is a known cause of disease in Canada and the United 
States.75 Wasakkejick’s complaint makes sense in the context of “infections [of 
coxsackievirus B5] in epidemic proportions” in the late 1950s and early 1960s.76 The 
Virus Laboratory of the Ontario Department of Public Health reported that “one-third of 
the [enterovirus] isolates were coxsacieviruses” from specimens shipped to Toronto from 
across Ontario between 1956 and 1965.77 Strain B5 predominated in 1958 and again in 
1961; strain B3 was most frequently encountered in 1961, whereas strain B1 manifested 
itself most strongly in 1964 and 1965.78 Yet again, a lack of historical testing on the 
reserve makes it impossible to verify band members’ associations between fecally-
contaminated water and ill health. But, the commonality of the above-noted pathogens 
prohibits us from discrediting band complaints. Whether “dirty water,” the perceived 
cause of diarrhea and rash, is real, municipal dumping opened Dalles 38C Indian Reserve 
                                            
73 T. Kue Young, The Health of Native Americans: Towards a Biocultural Epidemiology (Toronto: 
Oxford University Press, 1994), 92. 
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77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid., 801. 
 
 
297 
up to infection. Town Council’s decision to use the Winnipeg River to remove untreated 
sewage exposed band members to unnecessary risk at least, real infection at worst. 
Despite health complaints on the reserve (and, more audibly, concerns for water 
quality in settler communities), tax resistance posed a series of challenges – financial and 
political – for the Town of Kenora in the establishment of a waste treatment centre and 
prolonged dumping into Lake of the Woods. Ratepayers defeated a motion to modernize 
waste systems in 1954, leading Town Council to request residents to vote on the sewage 
question again 1955.79 Dissent galvanized Kenora’s East Enders: “We of the East end of 
town are taxpayers and are also going to be asked to vote on this project, yet… there is no 
hope for us.”80 Geography prevented municipal hook-up. Residents of the East End saw 
little value in supporting municipal wastewater extensions as tax increases would not 
provide any immediate benefit to ratepayers. As the phrase “little hope” suggests, “East 
Enders” feared that wastewater systems would limit their ability to prosper alongside 
Kenora proper – wastewater systems could drain “East Enders’” pockets. Indeed, 
working-class home-owners saw no benefit in waste treatment, particularly when Lake of 
the Woods funneled waste northwest.  Questions mailed into the newspaper focused on 
fears of the rising cost of homeownership: “What will the tax be?” citizens asked in 
“Letters to the Editor.”81 Mayor J. V. Fregeau published his estimate in the Kenora Daily 
Miner and News, but clarified that residents would be called to vote on sewer as a utility 
not “to vote on the capital cost question.”82 The Town of Kenora tried to shift the debate 
away from utilities cost to utilities service, but rhetorical wrangling proved ineffective. 
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By 1956, the sewer question cropped up in Norman. Concerns surrounded cost yet again: 
“Kenora ratepayers are going to be asked a $276,000 question on December 10th – should 
a water and sewer system be installed in Norman?”83 Residents wondered how they were 
going to balance their personal budgets while financing new utilities, knowing that “for 
every $1000 assessment, it would increase taxes by $1.00.”84 More often than not, 
taxation needed to fund waste treatment systems was perceived as a detriment to the 
individual. As such, the Town of Kenora did not try to sell waste treatment to residents as 
a health need. Instead, government employees emphasized neighbourly duty, arguing that 
Norman “had always supported money by-laws for the town” and that similar support 
was owed to the suburb.85 Such debates illustrate that residents of Kenora valued personal 
savings over waste treatment. 
It is unlikely that many Kenora residents knew of the suspension of solid wastes 
in Dalles Channel. Municipal concern for Kenora’s economic vitality, a belief in the 
dilution principle, and a desire to lower taxes worked against the early establishment of a 
sewage treatment plant. In an attempt to provide cost-effective services to ratepayers and 
quick housing to a growing population of working families, Town Council centralized 
dumping into Lake of the Woods. Waste systems, however, did not consider physical 
geographies. Excreta made its way into the dammed river to save money in the town. 
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INCREASED INDUSTRIAL INPUTS: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HYDRO-ELECTRIC 
DEVELOPMENT, WOOD CELLULOSE INPUTS AND DECLINING WATER QUALITY 
 
The Town of Kenora, however, was not solely responsible for declining water quality 
on Winnipeg River. Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company played an important 
role in anthropomorphic eutrophication (the artificial addition of nutrients to bodies of 
fresh water as a result of human activity), doubling wood cellulose inputs into Rideout 
Bay in the mid-1950s – a change made possible by hydroelectric power production at 
Whitedog Falls Generating Station. The Kenora Daily Miner and News sporadically 
reported on the link between mill operations and power production. Local journalists 
boosted hydroelectric development, predicting that electrical service would allow 
communities like Kenora “to grow and develop.”86 When MPP White announced the 
HEPC’s plan to develop Boundary Falls he assured the public that “no Kenora district 
industry need worry about adequate power supply.” Abitibi Power and Paper Company, 
Great Lakes Paper Company, and Ontario Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company each filed 
requests for electrical power with the HEPC between 1956 and 1957. By 1958, the 
companies demanded increased energy to power industrial expansion. Regional sawmills 
did, indeed, depend on hydroelectric development.87 
Within weeks of signing a contract with Hydro-Electric Power Commission, the 
Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company announced a $17,000,000 enlargement 
program that included a new barker, eight new grinders, new screening facilities, and a 
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new steam boiler. 88 The Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company anticipated that the 
“modernization project,” announced in March 1955, would be completed by 1958. 89  
Projected timelines further illustrate the link between power production and industrial 
potential: the HEPC began work on Whitedog Falls Generating Station in 1955 and 
began full operations in 1958 (about one year after Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper 
Company installed its new paper machine). A guaranteed supply of power allowed 
Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company to “more than [double] present newsprint 
production which is now in the neighborhood of 350 tons a day” to “more than 700 
tons.”90 Indeed, local news reporters deemed expansion unlikely without hydroelectric 
development as “[t]he new paper machine requires an additional 17,000 kilowatts of 
power increasing the present total for the mill, the town and rural areas from 30,000 to 
47,000 kilowatts”91 – a power load that the mill’s privately owned generating station, 
Norman Dam, could not supply.92 While the linkage between power and production may 
seem intuitive, understanding the interdependent relationship between the HEPC and 
Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Mill is essential to recognizing declining water quality 
as a spin-off effect of hydroelectric power generation. Increased production at Ontario-
Minnesota Pulp and Paper Mill was a direct result of power production at Whitedog Falls 
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Station; increasing pollution – a result of doubled production and unchanged industrial 
waste systems – was to become the indirect and largely unrecognized result of damming 
Winnipeg River. 
Exact records of effluent released from Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company 
are not included in corporate records maintained by Archives of Ontario or Lake of the 
Woods Museum making exact descriptions of waste – both type and quality – difficult to 
quantify. Records of chemical inputs prior to expansion include “96,000 tons of coal and 
lignite [and] 3,200 tons of sulphur.”93 An Environmental Site Assessment conducted by 
Golder Associates Ltd. in 2008 assessed soil and groundwater for traces of metals, 
petroleum hydrocarbons, benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene and xylene compounds, volatile 
organic compounds, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, polychlorinated biphenyls, and 
semi-volatile organic compounds.94 Testing revealed “elevated concentrations of several 
metals in the groundwater near Rideout Bay,” including barium (soil-based) and boron, 
chromium, copper, lead, nickel, vanadium, and zinc (water-based).95 This chapter, 
however, will focus predominately on wood waste dumped from the wooden waste 
conduit into the river and wood fibre rubbed off of trees during shipment rather than 
chemical reactions (and outputs) associated with paper processing. 
Up until the Ontario Water Resources Commission ordered Ontario-Minnesota Pulp 
and Paper Mill to reduce riverine outputs in 1970, Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper 
Company regularly dumped in excess of 25,000 pounds of waste into Rideout Bay 
                                            
93 “During 1955… Mandonians,” Kenora Daily Miner and News, 22 March 1956, 4. 
94 Golder Associates Ltd., “Report on Phase II Environmental Site Assessment, Kenora Pulp and 
Paper Mill,” March 2008, Mississauga, ON, i. 
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daily.96 Descriptions of the “modernization” program in the 1950s do not include waste 
treatment facilities or the relocation of the wooden waste conduit. Indeed, the new 
facilities were designed so that the new barker drum aligned with Winnipeg River: “The 
new facilities will be led out along the south side of the present mill incorporating the 
straight line of production with the wood room located west of the paper machine room 
on the Winnipeg River… the wood room will be altered to accommodate a new Weldrum 
barker drum.”97 That the mill used the Winnipeg River to funnel its waste was no secret. 
Dr. Peter Playfair, Medical Officer of Health and Director of the Northwestern Health 
Unit, reported that “the Ontario Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company dumps its industrial 
wastes into Rideout Bay [which] flows into the Winnipeg River.”98 
Dumping, however, was not the only source of pollution associated with mill 
operations; shipment also produced non-point source pollution. Considerable bark loss 
occurred through the repeated handling of logs during booming, transport, and storage 
along Winnipeg River. It is impossible to estimate exactly how much bark rubbed off of 
trees during shipment as variables including size and species influenced bark loss. We do 
know, however, that Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company processed between 
120,000-162,000 cords of wood during 1955 suggesting that 240,000-324,000 cords of 
wood passed through the company per annum after 1958 because of increased capacity.99 
By the 1970s, whether from dumping or transport, wood cellulose fibre “deeper than a 
 96 DHR, “D. S. Calvary, General Manager of Pulp and Paper Mills at Kenora, Fort Frances, and 
Dryden, memorandum to the Honorable G. A. Kerr, Minister of Department of Energy and Resources 
Management, 21 May 1970,” Winnipeg River Watershed – Water Pollution, 1965-1995 – 
Correspondence. 
97 “Predict Completion MANDO’s Kenora Mill in Record Time,” Kenora Miner and News, 1 
October 1955, 1. 
98 DHR, “P. F. Playfair, Medical Officer of Health and Director of the Northwestern Health Unit 
to Sanitary Engineering Division of the Ontario Water Resources Commission, 17 September 1963,” 
Winnipeg River Watershed – Water Pollution, 1965-1995 – Correspondence. 
99 “During 1955… Mandonians,” Kenora Daily Miner and News, 22 March 1956, unpaginated. 
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standing human” had settled along the bottom of Winnipeg River.100 Such benthic 
deposits are rare where river current is strong, but common to industrial dumping areas 
where water flow is slow.101 Oral testimony allows us to better envision how wood waste 
piled up between Rideout Bay and the Dalles Channel following industrial expansion. 
Elder Jacob Strong explained that “Close to Kenora, you could see ‘bubbles’ in the 
water… a whole chunk of sawdust and all that crap coming up to the surface.”102 “All 
that crap” interfered with travel to and from Dalles 38C Indian Reserve. Anamikipinens 
remembered that there was “So much muck going downstream, the boat would stall every 
time you hit a bunch of sawdust or crap. The motor would be so thick of [sic] 
sawdust.”103 Elder Henry complained that his fishing nets collected mill waste in the 
1950s:  
The stuff off the paper mill would be stuck on our nets… We would pull our nets 
and clean that stuff out… But the stuff from the mill ruined our nets. It stuck right 
on to our nets.104 
 
The above quotation reveals that Henry had not adapted his fishing practices by the mid-
1950s, suggesting that he had yet to identify a financial incentive (e.g. the cost of 
replacing nets) to do so. This, in turn, suggests that nets had not previously acted as a 
sieve for mill waste: unregulated flow had allowed for waste dispersal, preventing the 
accumulation of wood debris near the reserve. Henry appears to have maintained fishing 
practices that he had established prior to Whitedog Falls Generating Station and mill 
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British Columbia, 1974), 40. 
102 Elder Strong, interview by Cotton, 2 October 1992.  
103 Elder Kabestra (Anamikipinens), interview by Cuyler Cotton, 29 September 1992, transcript, 
Dovetail Resources Ltd., Kenora, ON. 
104 Elder Henry, interview by Cuyler Cotton, 14 June 1993. 
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expansion; it was not until those two industries operated in tandem that Henry needed to 
change his fishing practices. Henry’s personal history shows that environmental 
modifications caused organic wastes to settle near reserve. 
While it is difficult to imagine organic inputs like wood debris as pollution, 
particularly given the natural presence of wood fibre in healthy river systems through 
erosion, it can exert a biochemical demand on holding waters and upset oxygen levels. R. 
A. McKenzie noted the relationship between oxygen levels and mill waste as early as 
1930: “It has been found that the coarse material, bark, limbs, and chips settle out in 
deeper and less rapid part of the stream… As a result of the decomposition of this fine 
material, the oxygen content of the bottom water appears to become lowered.”105 When 
oxygen levels change the health of many freshwater fish is affected. Indeed, a prolonged 
reduction in dissolved oxygen can cause species-based or water-wide mortality. Of the 
many fish consumed by Anishinabek in the Winnipeg River drainage basin (e.g. 
whitefish, walleye, and northern pike), sturgeon was least tolerant of hypoxia.106 As 
oxygen levels declined in the Winnipeg River drainage basin, so to do the availability of 
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sturgeon for commercial and household use. According to transcriber Verna Perrault, 
Elder Janet Green “recalled how plentiful the wildlife used to be and how good the 
fishing was, but they [band members] gradually lost everything due to the blasting and 
the dirty water.”107 Elders emphasized the collapse of the sturgeon population in their 
accounts of on-reserve life in the 1950s. Sturgeon had formed part of the local diet at 
Dalles 38C for generations prior to hydroelectric development. Reflecting on his traverse 
of Dalles Rapids in 1823, Major Stephen Long wrote “While we were resting on one of 
the islands, an Indian came up in his canoe with his family and supplied us with fresh 
sturgeon and with dried huckleberries.”108 Sturgeon was eaten fresh, but also made into a 
product like bison pemmican “consisting of a special blend of sturgeon oil and dried and 
pounded sturgeon meat packed into sturgeon skin bags,” making it a valuable food source 
in all seasons.109 In October 1992, Jacob Strong informed interviewer Cuyler Cotton that 
“Fish were affected by pollution… Sturgeon were dying for some reason. Maybe by 
pollution in the water.”110 Henry affirmed Green’s and Strong’s suspicions, and identified 
a strong causal link between declining sturgeon populations and mill operations. Henry 
reported to Cotton that: 
The fish feed off the bottom of the river where this stuff from the mill is. 
The fish are killed off by this stuff they are eating in the bottom… I’ve 
seen the fish floating around, even fish like suckers (mallets) – they suck 
the water from the bottom. When I was a young man… there were still 
sturgeon around, quite a lot of them… The sturgeon, like the suckers, feed 
off the bottom and ate the stuff which eventually killed them off.111 
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According to elder testimony, a combination of riverine modifications and urban 
pollutants compromised band members’ access to a prized dietary staple: sturgeon. 
Officials from the Ontario Water Resources Commission and the Department of 
Trade and Development generally acknowledged the deleterious results of paper 
production in northwestern Ontario as early as 1969. In a memorandum to Stanley 
Randall, Minister of Trade and Development, D. J. Collins of the Ontario Water 
Resources Commission considered the cost-benefit of waste treatment in the north. Using 
the Rainy River example, Collins argued that a three to four million dollar treatment 
facility was most desirable. Influent released by the Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper 
Company into Rainy River “grossly impaired” alternative water use.112 Collins indicated 
that mill pollution had been known for “destroying fish life sometimes for up to 30 miles 
[about 50 kilometres] downstream” across Canada.113 George Kerr, Minister of Energy 
and Resources Management, would later weigh in on modernization debates. Kerr noted 
that modernization, particularly at Fort Frances and Kenora, would cause “improvement 
in the present unsatisfactory water pollution problems.”114 However, Kerr advised against 
funding these “slow-growth” areas. Kerr suggested that Randall should refuse Ontario-
Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company’s request for provincial funding “unless this was a 
last-result solution to enable our resources to be utilized and our existing populations in 
112 DHR, “George A. Kerr, memorandum, to Stanley Randall, Minister of the Department of 
Trade and Development, 16 September 1969, re: Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company 
Limited.,” Winnipeg River Watershed – Water Pollution, 1965-1995 – Correspondence. 
113 DHR, “D. J. Collins, Ontario Water Resources Commission, to Stanley Randall, Minister of 
the Department of Trade and Development, 24 September 1969, re: Memorandum of August 29 
Concerning Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company Ltd.,” Winnipeg River Watershed – Water 
Pollution, 1965-1995 – Correspondence.  
114 DHR, “Kerr to Randall Minister of the Department of Trade and Development, re: Ontario-
Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company Limited, 16 September 1969,” Winnipeg River Watershed Water 
Pollution, 1965-1995 – Correspondence. 
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the area to be employed.”115 Collins did not launch an economic argument. As Chairman 
of the Ontario Water Resources Commission, he was unable to determine “whether or not 
an industry is in an economic position to put in a proper waste treatment measures.” 
Evading financial questions, Collins concluded that long-permitted dumping of raw 
wastes was “turning [the] river septic.”116 Pollution problems, however, were not unique 
to Ontario. From Collins’ memorandum, particularly his use of the term “septic,” it 
becomes evident that by 1969 provincial officials acknowledged that mill wastes had 
created anaerobic environments in otherwise healthy river systems. Provincial policies on 
waste management had in the past created conditions ripe for species-based (sturgeon) 
mortality. Yet, Ontario officials like Kerr argued for the continued use of substandard 
waste treatment systems lest the province “[put] a premium on inefficiency” as the forest 
industry in Ontario declined. 
One could argue that the accumulation of industrial waste at Dalles Channel ought 
not to be examined in critical detail as Canada’s environmental movement did not gain 
momentum until the 1970s, making Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company’s waste 
system “normative” by contemporary standards. And yet, industry standards were 
changing by the mid-1950s. Professionals published findings that denounced the relative 
merits of dilution. In 1954, Sewage and Industrial Wastes published the transcript of the 
26th Annual Meeting of the Federation of Sewages and Wastes Associations. Watson, a 
panel participant for “Water Dilution Factors and Industrial Wastes,” argued “Where it 
applies to an individual plant, dilution is probably not an answer to the wastes problem.” 
He identified an exception whereby clean water used to dilute “must be disposed of 
115 Ibid. 
 116 DHR, “D. J. Collins to Stanley Randall, 24 September 1969, re: Memorandum of August 29 
Concerning Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company Ltd.”  
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anyway.”117 Co-participant Frank W. Jones agreed, suggesting that “Dilution per se 
doesn’t always accomplish what it is intended to.” Yet, Jones too identified an exception: 
“if there is enough water to take away the visual evidence of sewage and to give the fish 
enough oxygen to live on without coddling them too much, the benefits of dilution are 
factual and real.”118 While dilution is here recognized as a viable strategy for waste 
reduction, Kenora’s mill surpassed Jones’ acceptable limits for waste – the Ontario Water 
Resources Commission noted that the Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company 
“grossly impaired” northwestern waterways.119 Sanitation engineer Jones explained that 
“certain things can be tolerated in some streams, but a park stream where children play 
should be of the best quality.” It became particularly important to monitor discharge for 
downstream communities as factors beyond corporate control could jeopardize water 
quality. Jones noted that “If a sudden downpour came… not giving sufficient time for 
purification and dilution, that festering mass from upstream was carried down into the 
clear [recreational] section.”120 According to Jones, nature could compromise “best 
practice,” if the pulp mill relied on dilution for waste disposal. Given that Anamikipinens 
and Henry reported that mill waste interfered with motoring and fishing activities, 
dilution as practiced by Ontario-Minnesota’s Pulp and Paper Company failed to meet 
industrial standards as set by industrial professionals at the time of (and, indeed, prior to) 
expansion. 
117 Don E. Bloodgood, "Water Dilution Factors for Industrial Wastes," Sewage and Industrial 
Wastes 2. no. 5 (May 1954): 645. 
118 Frank Jones quoted in Ibid., 646. 
119 DHR, “D. J. Collins to Stanley Randall, 24 September 1969, re: Memorandum of August 29 
Concerning Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company Ltd.” 
120 Frank Jones quoted in Bloodgood, "Water Dilution Factors for Industrial Wastes," 646. 
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Sturgeon collapse in the Winnipeg River drainage basin failed to spark a municipal or 
provincial reassessment of waste management or water regulation. René Brunelle, 
Minister of Lands and Forests (1966-1972), estimated that the forest industry accounted 
for 69 percent of all manufacturing employment in northwestern Ontario in the late 
1960s. Given that “pulp and paper [was] responsible directly or indirectly for one dollar 
out of every eight earned by all Canadians” and that Kenora operations alone “provided 
employment for over 800 men and women during the year,” high employment rates 
provided one reason for Kenora’s limited interest in pollution abatement.121 Demands for 
waste management plummeted throughout the 1960s as Ontario’s “once favourable 
competitive position eroded through rising wood costs, increasing power rates, and 
greater transportation charges.” In 1969, Brunelle advocated for Ontario’s forest industry, 
suggesting that “it is highly desirable that we create a suitable economic environment to 
stimulate forest industry growth in these areas.”122 While Brunelle made no direct 
reference to industrial pollution, he desired concessions from the Department of Trade 
and Development that would reduce operating costs. Band members at Dalles 38C Indian 
Reserve suffered from unabated industrial waste to keep Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and 
Paper Mill’s engines running. Costs could (and would) be saved by postponing the 
modernization of waste disposal systems. Municipal priorities and provincial 
development goals, which excluded Dalles 38C Indian Reserve (not out of not malicious 
intent but because of jurisdictional limits), thus ensured the continued flow of waste into 
121 “Biggest Industry: Pulp and Paper,” Kenora Miner and News, 2 April 1955, 6; “During 1955… 
Mandonians,” unpaginated. 
 122 DHR, “Minister René Brunelle, to Stanley Randall, Minister of the Department of Trade and 
Development, 9 October 1969, RE:  Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Co. Ltd.,” Winnipeg River Watershed 
– Water Pollution, 1965-1995 – Correspondence.
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Dalles Channel. Mill and hydro planners simply failed to understand how their use of 
Winnipeg River overlapped. 
It was not until the 2000s that biologists confirmed Elders’ suspicions and 
attributed an accumulation of wood fibre on the riverbed to declining sturgeon 
populations. Reporting on the release of 50,000 freshly-hatched sturgeon fry into the 
Winnipeg River, journalist Dan Gauthier suggested that “water flow and level 
fluctuations” negatively impacted the sturgeon population. He cites the opinion of 
biologist for Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR) Scott McAughey that Hydro, the 
Ministry of Natural Resources, and the Lake of the Woods Control Board ought to agree 
to reduce fluctuations during the spawning period to help the population recover.123 In 
contrast, journalist Jon Thompson focused less on water fluctuations and more on the 
“anoxic mush” at the bottom of the Winnipeg River. He provided a visual description of 
accumulated waste, suggesting that decomposed bark was at least two metres deep in the 
1970s.124 The amount of oxygen released from photosynthesis compared to the amount of 
oxygen removed by animal and microbial respiration determines any waterway’s oxygen 
content. “If,” as Scott Brennan and Jay Withgott explain, “nutrients flow into water 
bodies faster than they flow out or are broken down, the water bodies become 
increasingly laden with plant material and lower in dissolved oxygen.”125 As shown 
earlier, woody material sunk on its way to and from Kenora’s mill: inputs exceeded 
                                            
123 Dan Gauthier, “Restocking program attempts to restore Winnipeg River sturgeon fishery,” 
Lake of the Woods Enterprise, 3 June 2005, accessed 20 June 2012, 
http://www.kenoradailyminerandnews.com/ArticleDisplay.aspx?archive=true&e=1856585. 
124 Jon Thompson, “Elders, biologists confer on Winnipeg River sturgeon,” Kenora Daily Miner 
and News, 8 October 2010, accessed 20 June 2012, 
http://www.kenoradailyminerandnews.com/2010/10/08/elders-biologists-confer-on-winnipeg-river-
sturgeon. 
125 Scott Brennan and Jay Withgott, Essential Environment: The Science Behind the Stories (San 
Francisco, CA: Pearson Education Ltd., 2005), 244. 
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outflow in Dalles Channel, forcing sturgeon to compete with bacterial colonies for 
oxygen. Disrupted flow between Rideout Bay and Whitedog Falls Generating Station 
caused by blasting and damming reduced the amount of oxygen that could be dissolved 
by the river. No wonder the central question Thompson posed was, “Is there enough food 
and oxygen to support [sturgeon] now?”126 
Industrial enthusiasm and poor planning ensured the flow of waste into Rideout 
Bay, but federal inaction affirmed environmental inequalities resulting from careless 
municipal dumping practices. Federal officials in Ottawa, removed by almost 2,000 
kilometres from the contaminated site, had no legal imperative to act on behalf of Dalles 
38C Indian Reserve: in the mid-1950s no environmental laws existed to protect water 
quality in Dalles Channel. The Boundary Water Treaty of 1909 provided limited 
protection over Canadian waterways and read “the waters herein defined as boundary 
waters and waters flowing across the [American-Canadian] boundary shall not be 
polluted on either side to the injury of health or property on the other.”127 Anishinabek 
residents living at Dalles 38C found no protection under the clause as pollutants flowed 
northwest, towards Lake Winnipeg, and away from the international boundary on Lake of 
the Woods. Limited protection may also have been provided to band members under the 
Navigable Waters Protection Act which, as J. R. Menzies noted “place[d] restriction on 
the discharge of materials of certain kinds into navigable waters or waters flowing into 
navigable waters.”128 But, here again northwesterly flows worked against Anishinabek 
interest: the steamboat economy flourished upstream of Dalles 38C Indian Reserve on 
                                            
126 Thompson, “Elders, biologists confer on Winnipeg River sturgeon.”  
127 “Article V,” in Treaty between the United States and Great Britain Relation to Boundary 
Waters, and Questions Arising between the United States and Canada (1910), International Joint 
Commission, http://www.ijc.org/rel/agree/water.html#text. 
128 Menzies, “Sewage Disposal and Waste Treatment in Canada,” 275. 
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Lake of the Woods. Further, by the time Anamikipinens’ boat stalled, his motor thick 
with sawdust, federal interest in navigation on Lake of the Woods had declined. Canada 
had limited economic incentive to carefully monitor Kenora’s waterways as early as 1901 
when the Canadian National Railway joined “Winnipeg and Port Arthur and [ran] along 
the south shore of Lake of the Woods through Minnesota and along the north shore of the 
Rainy River.”129 By 1911 Canada’s interest in navigation on Lake of the Woods became 
prosaic: buoys were placed on Lake of the Woods to guide boating enthusiasts. As a 
result of northwesterly flow, members of Dalles 38C Indian Reserve lost whatever 
limited federal protection they were entitled to under law in the 1950s. Flow patterns 
decreased Canada’s political incentive to monitor local water quality. A failing steamship 
economy further reduced Canada’s economic imperative to keep Winnipeg River free of 
suspended solids.  
 
CONCLUSION 
When looking at municipal dumping of excreta into Lake of the Woods and industrial 
dumping of wood fibre into Rideout Bay, it becomes evident that an accumulation of 
waste near Dalles 38C Indian Reserve resulted from the short-sightedness of Town 
Council and mill operators in designing waste systems. Prior to the blasting of the Dalles 
Channel, wastes flowed down Winnipeg River, through Dalles Rapids, and aerobic 
composting ultimately prevented waste suspension near the reserve. By the mid-1950s, 
however, water flow had been modified by Hydro-Electric Power Commission to 
encourage industrial growth and to benefit urban residents. Despite sharing the same 
water, a town boundary that ended near Rideout Bay prevented Kenora’s Town Council 
                                            
129 Lake of the Woods Writers’ Group and Kenora Centennial Committee, Through the Kenora 
Gateway, 32. 
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and mill operators from seeing the negative effects of dumping downstream. Federal 
inaction reinforced environmental inequities that shifted the burden of industrial and 
human waste from settlers to Indians. The Hydro-Electric Power Commission alone did 
not jeopardize Anishinabek fisheries. Anishinabek food security declined when three 
competing water users – the Town of Kenora, the Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper 
Company, and the Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario – began to operate in 
tandem. 
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Figure 21: “RUNNING THE DALLES”130 
This image is Don McMaster’s artistic imagining of the Winnipeg River before 
hydroelectric development at the north shore of Lake of the Woods. This image is 
based on “extensive research into [David] Thompson’s travels” along the Winnipeg 
River and into Lake of the Woods in the 1790s. 
130 “Running the Dalles,” The Art of Don McMaster, accessed 15 December 2015, 
http://members.shaw.ca/aborsuk9/Thompson/T8.html. 
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Figure 22: “WATER POWERS IN ONTARIO AND MANITOBA,” (C. 1930)1 
This document reveals that Dalles Rapids had a gradient of 15 feet (or 4.5 
metres) prior to environmental modifications by the Town of Kenora and the 
Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario in the 1950s. At present, there is 
less than 1 metre of head at Dalles Rapids. 
1 LOWM, “Water Powers in Ontario and Manitoba, c. 1930,” Folder: Powerhouse and Dams. 
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Figure 23: “RAPIDS NEAR THE FIRST FALLS” (C. 1893)132 
This image depicts one of the many swift stretches on the Winnipeg River that 
would be dammed between 1893 and 1958. The Kenora Powerhouse is now located 
at this site. Norman Dam is located approximately two kilometres downstream. 
Whitedog Falls Generating Station, by contrast, is located approximately 48 
kilometres northwest of this site. 
132 “Rapids near the First Falls,” Special Supplementary Number of the Colonist, September 1893, 
8.
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Figure 24: MUNICIPAL SEWAGE DISPOSAL INTO LAKE OF THE WOODS (C. 
1930)133
Residents of the triune communities of Kenora, Keewatin, and Norman relied on 
Lake of the Woods to dilute human and household wastes. As this image depicts, 
municipal pipes simply released wastewater into the lake. This practice continued 
into the 1970s. Proctor & Redfern Limited designed the Kenora Area Water 
Treatment Plant on contract with the Ontario Ministry of Environment in 1975. 
Two years later, Matthews Limited of London, Ontario, was hired to construct the 
facility. The plant began operating in spring 1979. 
133 LOWM, Photographer unknown, “Municipal Sewage Disposal into Lake of the Woods, c. 
1930,” [photograph] Folder: Waterworks and Public Utilities. 
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Figure 25: “LOG BOOM” (C. 1932) 134 
This image depicts a bush worker preparing logs for the spring thaw in 
northwestern Ontario.  The Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company 
transported wood along the Winnipeg River and Lake of the Woods to the mill in 
Kenora. Considerable bark loss occurred through the repeated handling of logs 
during booming, transport, and storage along Winnipeg River. It is impossible to 
estimate exactly how much bark rubbed off of trees during shipment as variables 
including size and species influenced bark loss. However, by the 1970s, decomposed 
bark at least two metres deep had settled at the bottom of the Winnipeg River.135 
134 Thunder Bay Public Library, “Log Boom, c. 1932,” [photograph] accessed 1 March 2016, 
http://images.ourontario.ca/gateway/56380/data?n=9. 
135 Thompson, “Elders, biologists confer on Winnipeg River sturgeon.” 
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CHAPTER 6 
“ALL SHE USE IS WHITEFISH SOUP TO HAVE MILK ON HER 
BREAST”: ANISHINABEK MOTHERS’ RESPONSES TO HYDROELECTRIC 
FLOODING IN THE WINNIPEG RIVER DRAINAGE BASIN, 1900-19751 
 
  
The women of Dalles 38C Indian Reserve experienced Whitedog Falls Generating 
Station differently than their male counterparts (fathers, husbands, brothers, and sons). 
Reflecting on her years growing up on Dalles 38C Indian Reserve between 1885 and 
1908 Anishinabek Elder Matilda Martin remembered working alongside her 
grandmother, Jane Lindsay, to maintain their family home.2 During the fall, Martin 
helped to prepare a winter supply of whitefish under Lindsay’s supervision. As they 
worked side-by-side gutting the fish from caudal fin to gill, Lindsay passed down 
women’s knowledge of family care. Martin may have learned that expectant mothers who 
consumed whitefish produced breast milk of the highest quality – a lesson she passed 
down to her granddaughter, Carol Kipling, years later.3 Lindsay likely taught Martin to 
recognize whitefish soup as alternative to breast milk that could be bottle-fed to infants – 
an observation then shared with a journalist at the Kenora Daily Miner and News. As a 
mother in the early 1900s, Martin would catch, prepare and consume whitefish in an 
attempt to ensure her children’s health. While her husband’s paid labour promised the 
family economic stability, Martin’s unpaid mother-work ensured the physical well-being 
of household members. Martin’s experience as a key contributor to household welfare 
was not unique to Dalles 38C Indian Reserve. Anishinabek women throughout 
                                            
1 Elder Kelly, interview with author, 30 July 2012. 
2 Martin-McKeever, The Chief’s Granddaughter, 9-11. 
3 Pastor Carol (Kipling) Lawson, interview with author, 12 July 2012. 
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northwestern Ontario in the early twentieth century worked in partnership with men to 
raise healthy families. 
In the 1950s, however, hydroelectric development along the Winnipeg River 
jeopardized Anishinabek women’s access to the local resources that were essential for 
mother-work. Whitedog Generating Station disrupted the flow of the Winnipeg River 
past Dalles 38C Indian Reserve, and thus facilitated an accumulation of sewage and pulp 
waste in nearby fishing waters. High levels of organic loading by the Town of Kenora 
and the Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company raised the biochemical oxygen 
demand and exacerbated hypoxia. As oxygen levels in the upper Winnipeg River 
drainage basin declined so too did sturgeon populations. While other fish populations 
(e.g. walleye, whitefish, and northern pike) survived, they became highly toxic to 
humans. As microorganisms digested pulp waste in-and-around Dalles Channel, naturally 
occurring methyl mercury was released into the Winnipeg River and accumulated up the 
food chain. Martin’s great-grandchildren risked poisoning their infants with methyl 
mercury if they relied on country foods (i.e. whitefish) while pregnant or breastfeeding. 
This chapter explores the shift in Anishinabek women’s abilities to feed their children 
since the development of Whitedog Generating Station on the Winnipeg River. I argue 
that hydroelectric power generation on the Winnipeg River disrupted the environment’s 
ability to provide resources necessary to maintain women’s reproductive health 
(especially breast milk). Indeed, food shortages caused by hydroelectric development 
since the 1950s have continually compromised Anishinabek women’s ability to maintain 
the household economy and to raise families in accordance with cultural expectations. 
The history of methyl mercury contamination at Dalles 38C is a useful case study which, 
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when considered along with more egregious examples such as Grassy Narrows and 
Whitedog First Nations, illustrates some of the ways in which colonization and land 
alteration affected the lives and health of Indigenous communities in Canada in the 
twentieth century.4 
According to Dan Pine, an Anishinabek Elder from Garden River First Nation, 
women were traditionally responsible for household maintenance. He explains that, 
“Kina gewii kinoomaajgaazo wa shkniigkwe nikeyaa ezhi-nokiimgag kina ge-goo ezhi-
bmingaademgag maa biindig” – “a young woman is taught everything, how everything 
works inside, how everything is managed.”5 Inside tasks included child-rearing. During 
the first few years of a child’s life, Anishinabek women were primarily responsible for 
food provision, which was dominated by breast milk. To produce the best quality breast 
milk, Anishinabek girls and women avoided objects they believed may have harmed or 
impeded their breasts, such as bows and constricting bras, to ensure their breasts could 
continue to feed their children.6 Pregnant and lactating women followed strict dietary 
regimes to ensure that high quality food – believed to have medicinal qualities – would 
                                            
4 As summarized by Robert M. Bone, “Between 1962 and 1975 Dryden Chemicals Ltd, a 
subsidiary of Reid Paper Ltd., produced chlorine and other chemicals used as bleach in the pulp and paper 
mill of Reid Paper at Dryden, Ontario. The mill flushed its waste products into the Wabigoon River. The 
mill effluent contained a relatively high level of mercury, which worked its way into the aquatic food chain 
of the river system. In 1970, the Ontario government discovered that the level of mercury found in fish in a 
500-km stretch downstream from the pulp and paper mill was dangerous to health, and advised the Ojibway 
communities at Grassy Narrows and Whitedog reserves not to eat fish from these rivers.” Unfortunately, 
large numbers of band members, many of whom relied heavily upon country foods, already displayed 
symptoms of Minamata disease. Robert M. Bone, The Geography of the Canadian North: Issues and 
Challenges, 3rd edition (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2009), 199. See also Lee Manko, “The Grassy 
Narrows and Islington Band Mercury Disability Board: A Historical Report, 1986-2001,” Grassy Narrows 
and Islington Bands Mercury Disability Board, September 2006, accessed 1 July 2014, 
http://www.mercurydisabilityboard.com/booklet.pdf.   
5 Dan Pine, “Anishinaabe Miikan/The Anishinaabe Road,” in Gechi-Piitzijig Dbaajmowag/The 
Stories of Our Elders, edited by Alan Corbiere (West Bay, Ontario, Ojibwe Cultural Foundation, 2011), 14-
5. Henry Rowe Schoolcraft, commenting on Anishinabek household relations near Sault Ste. Marie, 
Michigan, almost a century earlier similarly noted that “[t]he lodge itself, with all its arrangements, is the 
precinct of the rule and government of the wife.” Schoolcraft is quoted in Priscilla Buffalohead, “Farmers, 
Warriors, Traders: A Fresh Look at Ojibway Women,” Minnesota History 48, no. 6 (Summer 1983): 241. 
6 Elder Kelly, interview with author, 30 July 2012. 
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be provided to their nursing infant(s).7 If women could not nurse, they used local 
resources, like manomin (wild rice) and whitefish, to feed their child. Substitutions for 
breast milk will be discussed further in this chapter. 
Anishinabek girls like Martin learned how to perform “womanly duties” from 
their mothers and grandmothers. Writing in the early 1900s, American ethnographer 
Frances Densmore found that “a Chippewa girl… learned many household tasks by 
watching and helping her mother.”8 Gendered teachings continued to shape Anishinabek 
women’s expectations and activities well into the 1940s and 1950s in Anishinabek 
territories along the Winnipeg River. For example, an unidentified “Older Woman” from 
Dalles 38C Indian Reserve remembered being sent to her grandmother to learn about 
family provision: 
Your grandmother would teach you, your great-grandmother. But mostly 
your mother turn[ed] you over to your grandmother. Because, you know, 
your mother, you wouldn’t listen to her… but you respected your 
grandmother [ – you] listen to an Elder tell stories.9 
 
School attendance, particularly at day school, did not interfere with lessons on 
appropriate women’s work. Elder Alice Kelly, born at Dalles 38C in 1946, credits her 
mother for teaching her how to maintain a happy home-life. As a school girl, Kelly would 
“come home,” “do homework,” and then “do chores inside or whatever.” By the time she 
married (circa 1962-1965) Kelly “knew everything” about providing for her family. In 
her words, “It was good.”10  
                                            
7 Ibid. See also: Anderson, Life Stages and Native Women, 44. 
8 Densmore, Chippewa Customs, 6. 
9 “An Older Woman” quoted in Jennifer Leyson, “Looking Forward, Looking Back: Chronic 
Disaster, Collective Trauma, and Community Restoration in the Ochiichagwe’Babigo’Ining First Nation 
[Dalles 38C Indian Reserve],” (M.A. thesis, George Mason University, 2002), 117.  
10 Elder Kelly, interview with author, 30 July 2012. 
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MILK-MEDICINE: ANISHINABEK MOTHER’S ROLE IN INFANT CARE  
The bodies of Anishinabek women were (and, indeed, still are) imbued with 
medicinal power by their communities. Like the Earth, pregnant women displayed the 
ability to (re)generate life. These conceptual linkages between pregnancy and medicinal 
power were made manifest in Anishinabek healing places, particularly the sweat lodge. 
Cree knowledge keepers Eric Robison and Henry Bird Quinney suggest that sweat lodges 
were initially designed to mimic “the belly of a pregnant woman” and explained that 
Indigenous men “use[d] the Sweat Lodge to go through the womb of a mother to try to 
understand the Creation process of Women and Mother Earth.” 11 By passing through the 
symbolic womb, Indigenous men sought to renew their bodies – the sweat bath was used 
as both a general curative and relief for stressed muscles. Indigenous women, by contrast, 
did not enter sweat lodges as often, as female bodies cleansed themselves monthly and 
had the inherent ability to create. 12 Given the long history of political alliance and 
intermarriage between Anishinabek and Cree families in the Treaty #3 District, Robison 
and Quinney’s testimony is particularly relevant.13 Their testimony reveals that female 
bodies were medicine bodies in many Anishinabek and Cree territories.14  
                                            
11 Eric Robinson and Henry Bird Quinney, The Infested Blanket (Winnipeg: Queenston House, 
1985), 11-2. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Peter Bakker, author of A Language of Our Own: The Genesis of Michif, the Mixed Cree-
French Language of the Canadian Metis (Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press, 1997), identified a 
number of historical sources which demonstrated land-sharing between Anishinabek and Cree communities 
around Lake of the Woods (now part of the Treaty #3 District) in the eighteenth century (256). As early as 
1790, for example, Edward Umfreville observed that “These two nations have always been in strict alliance 
with each other, and many of the Ochipawas [Anishinabek] live in a promiscuous manner among the Ne-
heth-aw-as [Crees]” (266).  
14 The seclusion of Anishinabek women during their menses further speaks to the perceived 
medicinal power of female bodies. However, a full description of menstrual seclusion is outside the scope 
of this article. Mary Inez Hilger, Chippewa Child Life and Its Cultural Background, (St. Paul: Minnesota 
Historical Society Press, 1951), 50-5.  
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Given Anishinabek women’s perceived medicine power, it is perhaps not 
surprising that breast milk was believed to be both “a gift [from the Creator] and a 
medicine a mother gives her child.”15 Recognized as a healing liquid, breast milk was the 
most highly valued food for infants;16 Anishinabek women recommended breast milk to 
lactating mothers over known alternatives like whitefish and/or manomin soup. Breasts 
were seen as medicinal tools that both strengthened infants and maintained overall family 
health by limiting family size. Along the Winnipeg River, Elder Matilda Martin strongly 
associated pregnancy with the weaning of previous children, suggesting that 
breastfeeding may have been considered a form of contraception.17 Today, breastfeeding, 
when used as a form of contraception, is known as the Lactational Amenorrhea Method 
(LAM). LAM depends upon hormonal changes experienced by lactating mothers, 
particularly the reduced production of hormones associated with ovulation. It is most 
effective within six months of giving birth.18 LAM also works best if the mother “feeds 
her baby at least every four hours during the day and every six hours at night.”19 Given its 
                                            
15 Unidentified Traditional Educator quoted in Joan Dodgson and Roxanne Struthers, “Traditional 
Breastfeeding Practices of the Ojibwe of Northern Minnesota,” Health Care for Women International 24, 
no. 1 (2003): 57. 
16 Written records of breast milk’s socio-cultural significance to Anishinabek families date back to 
1826. Totoashaúbo, translated “milk” or “breast liquor,” featured in Thomas McKenney’s “Vocabulary of 
the Algic, or Chippeway Language,” copies of which the Department of War gave to American 
missionaries. McKenney deemed totoashaúbo as important to learn as waydokaugadgig (allies), 
puckway’zhegun (bread), shominau’bo (wine) and mey’im (victuals). Thomas L. McKenney, “Vocabulary 
of the Algic, or Chippeway Language,” in Sketches of a Tour to the Lakes, of the character and customs of 
the Chippeway Indians, and of incidents connected with the Treaty of Fond du Lac (Barre, MA: Imprint 
Society, 1972), 407-13. 
17 Elder Martin, interview with the Kenora Daily Miner and News, 27 July 1972. Kim Anderson, 
who researches Algonquian peoples in northwestern Ontario, focuses on the use of herbal mixtures to limit 
family size, citing no examples of breastfeeding to consciously space pregnancies. Anderson, Life Stages 
and Native Women, 40-1. Oral informants from Dalles 38C Indian Reserve made no reference to herbal 
mixtures as a form of birth control. However, Mary Inez Hilger found that Anishinabek woman used tea 
decoctions to induce abortion in the Boundary Waters District (Hilger, Chippewa Child Life, 28).  
18 M. Vekemans, “Postpartum Contraception: The Lactational Amenorrhea Method,” European 
Journal of Contraception and Reproductive Health 2, no. 2 (June 1997): 105-11.  
19 “Breastfeeding as Birth Control,” Planned Parenthood Federation of America, accessed 1 
March 2016, https://www.plannedparenthood.org/learn/birth-control/breastfeeding. 
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conditional effectiveness, Anishinabek mothers realized that suckling was not always a 
successful method of birth control. At Lac Courte Oreille, Minnesota, an informant told 
anthropologist Mary Inez Hilger that toddlers and their infant siblings sometimes nursed 
together.20 Women observed that breastfeeding did not necessarily prevent multiple 
births. If breastfeeding was a reliable contraceptive, siblings at different life stages would 
not have shared the breast. 
Anishinabek girls born on Dalles 38C Indian Reserve prior to the development of 
Whitedog Falls Generating Station were raised under the assumption that they too would 
breastfeed. Oral testimony reveals that girls born in the 1940s were educated in breast 
care by their mothers. Rules existed discouraging the use of hunting tools and constrictive 
bras to facilitate the future flow of milk-medicine. Elder Alice Kelly explained: 
[M]y Mom used to say, ‘Don’t ever touch’ – I don’t know what they call 
those, slingshots and, I don’t know, a bow and arrow – ‘don’t touch 
those.’ 
‘Why?’ [I’d ask.] 
‘Your breasts. They gonna drag your breasts.’21 
 
Kelly explained that girls were not allowed to touch “the boys’ stuff” to protect their 
breasts. Toying with predominately male tools – like the bow or the slingshot – was 
believed to “drag” the breast. Kelly mapped the drag on her body, gesturing from her 
collarbone to her lower ribs. Whether Anishinabek mothers feared that their daughters 
would develop a boy-like chest, harm their breasts, or prematurely age their breasts (and 
hence be unable to lactate) by using “boys’ stuff” is unclear. What is clear, however, is 
that Anishinabek mothers believed that “dragging” the breast could produce a body 
incapable of lactation. It is important to note that although post-menopausal women were 
                                            
20 Hilger, Chippewa Child Life, 28.  
21 Elder Kelly, interview with author, 30 July 2012. 
 
 
326 
no longer able to produce milk-medicine, they did not lose their medicine powers at-
large. Female Elders harvested herbal medicines and produced herbal decoctions and 
poultices.22 In later life, botanical knowledge supplemented reproductive power amongst 
some post-menopausal women.  
When Kelly became pregnant in the early 1960s, her mother provided further 
advice to encourage the flow of milk-medicine and warned Kelly against using “White 
women’s stuff.” The waiâbishkiwedig had long displayed breasts differently than 
Anishinabek women. Throughout the nineteenth century, middle- and upper-class women 
used corsets to bind their torsos. This constraining undergarment “impressed apparently 
natural virtues upon the shape of a woman’s body” by shaping an hourglass figure.23 A 
bound waist accentuated the bust. By making the torso appear narrow and slender, the 
breasts appeared larger by contrast. American historian Elizabeth Matelski has suggested 
that the straight front corset made “the monobosom” fashionable until World War I.24 
Indeed, many non-Indigenous North Americans associated the monobosom with feminine 
beauty. Non-Indigenous women not only manipulated their flesh to enhance their 
physical appearance, but to represent feminine virtue. Wendy Dasler Johnson has noted 
that North Americans associated the torso with morality and “the chest as the seat of 
emotions.”25 She argued that “in a nineteenth-century corset, a woman’s moral zone 
                                            
22 Martin-McKeever, The Chief’s Granddaughter, 18; Hilger, Chippewa Child Life, 11. 
23 Wendy Dasler Johnson, “Cultural Rhetorics of Women’s Corsets,” Rhetoric Review, 20: 3-4 
(2001): 204. 
24 Elizabeth Matelski, The Color(s) of Perfection: The Feminine Body, Beauty Ideals, and Identity 
in Postwar America, 1945-1970 (Ph.D. Dissertation, Loyola University Chicago, 2011), 51. 
Writing on the Canadian context specifically, Cynthia R. Comacchio (“War and Reconstruction: 
‘Normalcy’ and Its Discontents,” The Infinite Bonds of Family: Domesticity in Canada, 1850-1940 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999) confirms that “the large-breasted, wide-hipped, maternal 
feminine ideal” remained desirable until after World War I when “a slender boyish frame” became more 
popular (73). 
25 Johnson, “Cultural Rhetorics of Women’s Corsets,” 211. 
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[was] ‘thrown into prominence’ while her appetites [associated with the abdomen] would 
be kept well under control.”26 Binding thus helped non-Indigenous women to control 
their waistlines and to display virtue for non-Indigenous men. 
Anishinabek women did not traditionally bind the waist to accentuate the bust. As 
ethnologist Basil Johnston suggests, an Anishinabek “woman’s worth was not measured 
by a lithe body [or] full breasts.” 27 An Anishinabek women was valued for her industry 
and her skill (e.g. cooking and sewing).28 Traditional teachings warned Anishinabek 
youth against choosing a partner for his/her appearance. For example, one Anishinabek 
man rejected suitable brides within his own village. He travelled until “he found a 
yellow-haired woman of great beauty.” Her beauty, however, did little to ensure his well-
being – this woman did not cook or sew. Overtime, her beauty faded and she became a 
burden. In this story, good looks are no virtue. The young man had married Dandelion.29 
Given that breasts had limited sex appeal, Anishinabek women had little pressure (or, 
indeed, incentive) to showcase their bust with restrictive clothing. Before transatlantic 
trade, Anishinabek women wore loose-fitting deerskin skirts and dresses.30 Frances 
Densmore noted that “[i]n early times the clothing of a woman consisted of a single 
garment made of two deerskins, one forming the front and the other the back of the 
garment, the two parts being fastened together at the shoulders and held in place with a 
                                            
26 Ibid. 
27 Basil Johnston, Ojibway Ceremonies (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Ltd., 1982), 79. 
28 Ibid., 79, 84. 
29 Ibid., 84. 
30 In History of the Ojibway People, William Warren noted that “their shirts and leggins [sic] were 
made of finely dressed deer and elk skins sewn together with the sinews of these animals” (98). Warren 
associates this style of dress with the early eighteenth century. In Chippewa Child Life, Mary Inez Hilger 
suggests that “[i]n the early days adults wore clothing made of finely tanned hides of deer, moose, bear, and 
elk; and of dressed skins of rabbit, beaver, and other small fur-bearing animals” (129). Hilger’s temporal 
framework is unclear. 
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belt.”31 The belt is described as a functional, rather than fashionable, item. To 
demonstrate their worth, Anishinabek women adorned their clothing with beads made out 
of animal bone, stone, and shell. Overtime Anishinabek women replaced handcrafted 
beads with glass, ceramic, and metal beads acquired through trade with the 
waiâbishkiwedig.32  
Anishinabek women also fashioned trade blankets into clothing. The adoption of 
European cloth did not precipitate the suppression of Anishinabek chests or torsos. 
Densmore explained that “The blanket was wrapped around the limbs like a tight skirt 
and fastened with a belt; the upper part of the blanket was then thrown loosely around the 
arms and shoulders.” This style of dress eased mother-work: “A woman could put her 
baby in the blanket [or] drop the upper part of the blanket entirely, drawing it around the 
waist.”33 Blanket skirts did not showcase the bust; instead, skirt styles made it easier for 
Anishinabek women to free the breast to nurse. Clothing designed specifically for the 
chest was also functional. Densmore indicated that “[a] muskrat skin, tanned with the hair 
on it, was worn [seasonally] as a ‘chest protector.’”34 The “chest protector” was worn by 
both genders, but more commonly by men on hunting expeditions.35 It was placed inside 
blanket coats, perhaps to cut wind. Unisex clothing like the “chest protector” reinforces 
that the bust was not eroticized in Anishinabek communities – undergarments were not 
designed to enhance the chest, but to protect it from the elements. 
                                            
31 Densmore, Chippewa Customs, 31. 
32 Katherine Krohn, Calico Dresses and Buffalo Robes: American West Fashions from the 1840s 
to the 1890s (Minneapolis: Twenty-First Century Books, 2012), 11. 
33 Densmore, Chippewa Customs, 33. 
34 Ibid., 32. 
35 Ibid., 31. 
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As trade increased, Anishinabek women replaced loose-fitting deerskin dresses 
and skirts with ready-made fabric. In the 1860s and before, the waiâbishkiwedig 
exchanged broadcloth with the Anishinabek for furs. Much like deerskin dresses, 
broadcloth dresses were “held in place by strips over the shoulders and confined at the 
waist by a belt or a sash.” While Anishinabek women adopted new material, they rejected 
Western pressure to bind the torso. Intercultural exchange did influence how women 
showcased (and, perhaps, envisioned) their assets in the 1860s. Anishinabek women 
added “front pieces” to their dresses around this time. The “front piece” extended across 
the chest and “was the first part of a woman’s dress to be decorated in color [sic].”36 
Worsted braids sewn onto the front piece, instead of constricting undergarments, drew 
attention to the chest. In the early 1900s, Anishinabek women used pointed waistlines to 
create an hourglass figure. Women also adopted some European-influenced 
undergarments. Elder Matilda Martin made bloomers from flannelette and used cotton to 
make slips.37 Cost and the day-to-day reality of Anishinabek women’s lives, however, 
made corseting impractical. Martin relied on creative stitching (i.e. the pointed waistline) 
to enhance her physical appearance as a bride. Martin married in a European-influenced 
duveteen jacket and skirt.38 Shortly after her church wedding, however, Martin was 
required to paddle home.39 A restrictive corset would have prevented such physical 
exertion. At the turn of the century, beading and stitching offered practical alternatives to 
                                            
36 Ibid., 32. 
37 Elder Matilda Martin, interview with the Kenora Daily Miner and News, 11 July 1972. 
38 “Mrs. Martin’s Wedding Dress,” Kenora Miner and News, undated, unpaginated. This undated 
document can also be found in an unpublished memoir at the Lake of the Woods District Museum. See 
LOWM, Lucille Burton, “Memoirs of Matilda Josephine Lavergne Kipling Martin,” 1987. 
39 Elder Martin, interview with the Kenora Daily Miner and News, summer 1972. 
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Anishinabek women who wanted to accentuate their curves without limiting their ability 
to work. 
While Anishinabek women refused the corset, they were familiar with body 
binding. Infants were bound to encourage healthy development. The tikinagun, or 
cradleboard, is perhaps the most famous example. In the Winnipeg River drainage basin, 
cradleboards were commonly “2½ feet long, fitted with a U-shaped shelf to contain the 
baby, and over which a drawstring-fitted cloth covering is placed.”40 This “drawstring-
fitted cloth” is known as a dikineyaab. It was used by Anishinabek mothers to keep 
infants securely attached to the cradleboard.41 Indian enthusiast Frank Belmore claimed 
that infants “[appear] so tightly packed in that [they] can scarcely move.”42 The head and 
arms, however, remained free. Children were protected from falls by “a stiff circle of 
wood” that was attached at “a convenient distance above the head.”43 Anishinabek 
mothers bound children to protect them from harm. Belmore explained that “it prevents 
[children] from getting burned at the fire, cutting [themselves] on the sharp skinning 
knife.”44 He determined that the tikinagun was an Anishinabek tool that “defied 
improvement.” Binding also allowed Anishinabek women to “[carry] small children on 
dog-team and canoe trips.”45 Elder Matilda Martin suggested that the tikinagun enabled 
women to work by freeing their arms. The tikinagun allowed Martin to paddle and to pick 
berries. By constricting their children, Anishinabek women freed themselves to labour.46 
                                            
40 LOWM, Frank Belmore, “The Tikinagun,” undated, Folder: Anishinaabe – Essays and Papers.  
41 Bruce White, We Are at Home: Pictures of the Ojibwe People (St. Paul: Minnesota Historical 
Society Press, 2007), 21. 
42 LOWM, Belmore, “The Tikinagun.” 
43 “Uncivilized Man,” The Eclectic Magazine of Foreign Literature, Science, and Art, 51 (1861): 
471.  
44 Belmore, “The Tikinagun.”  
45 Ibid. 
46 Elder Martin, interview with the Kenora Daily Miner and News, 11 July 1972. 
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Parents also used the tikinagun to direct growth. For example, Anishinabek parents 
sometimes attached miniature moccasins to the “stiff circle of wood” in hopes of raising a 
good runner. Miniature bows and arrows, by contrast, were used to encourage the 
development of a good hunter.47 Bonnets were also used to direct growth. Elder Jane 
Lindsay, whose birthdate is unknown, instructed Martin to “put the bonnet on after the 
baby is born because their heads are not a very good shape.” Lindsay had been born two 
generations before Martin and believed that a “tight bonnet” would encourage healthy 
bone development. Martin observed that other Anishinabek families, not just her own, 
used restrictive garments to shape the head in the early 1900s.48 
American and Canadian styles of breast management changed significantly after 
World War I, although women continued to manipulate their chest for fashion. By the 
1920s, the brassiere had replaced the corset. Early bras offered little support – their sole 
purpose was to restrict movement. Some women opted to bind their breasts by 
repurposing old sheets to achieve “the look” without the cost.49 Ideas of feminine beauty 
had changed: the hourglass figure was replaced by a tubular silhouette. Non-Indigenous 
North Americans now preferred a bound chest over a protruding monobosom. This form 
of binding was short-lived. Uplift became fashionable in the 1930s. But, it was not until 
1947 that the first padded bra became wildly popular amongst Canadian and American 
                                            
47 “Uncivilized Man,” The Eclectic Magazine, 471. 
48 Elder Martin, interview with the Kenora Daily Miner and News, summer 1972. 
49 Kathleen Morgan Drowne and Patrick Huber, American Popular Culture through History: The 
1920s, edited by Ray B. Browne (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2004), note that “during the 1920s 
women’s underwear… became lighter and less constricting” than the corset (105). Older women, however, 
continued to purchase corsets despite the rising popularity of the brassiere. Drowne and Huber explain that 
most undergarments “manufactured during the 1920s were intended to flatten rather than accentuate 
women’s breasts” (106). See also: Carol Wood, “Bust Support Comes of Age: The Bra in the 1920s and 
1930s,” The Virtual Costumer 8:3 (2010): 19. 
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women. Manufacturers used foam rubber or felt to help women augment their chest.50 In 
1948, breasts throughout North America “got a lift” with the first mass-produced push-up 
bra, “The Rising Star.”51 Matelski argues that many non-Indigenous North Americans 
associated an ample bust with attractiveness, particularly to the opposite sex. Young 
women expressed “anxiety about breast size, more than any other body part.”52 Industry 
responded. In addition to padding and underwire, American and Canadian women 
purchased vitamins, bust creams, and hydro massage to increase their breast size.53 
Anishinabek women were taught to ignore the trend for high, formed breasts. Kelly’s 
mother warned: “‘Don’t put your tits like this [lifts them as if in an underwire bra]. Let 
them be down.’” Anishinabek women, unlike the waiâbishkiwedig, did not believe that 
men desired an ample bust.”54 Anishinaabemowin, the Anishinaabe language, suggested 
that men wanted companions. The word for relationship, weedjeewaugun, roughly 
translates “he who goes with” or “she who walks with.”55 Ritual wedding words 
encouraged husband and wife to “be kind to one another” and to “be kind to [their] 
children.”56 Oral stories emphasized that good parents nourished their children.57 
Clothing that improved breast function was thus more valuable than clothing that 
increased breast size. Women do not hold their children upright to feed. A lower, more 
accessible breast would have allowed Kelly to nurse her infant at a more comfortable 
                                            
50 Maysa Rawi, “The first ever push-up bra: So, bust-boosting dates back to the 1800s,” Daily 
Mail, 23 April 2010, accessed 1 March 2016, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/femail/article-1268276/The-
push-bra-Bust-booster-dates-1800s.html#ixzz2omt0AAR9; Jane Farrell-Beck and Colleen Gau, Uplift: The 
Bra in America (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002), 121. 
51 Rawi, “The first ever push-up bra,” 23 April 2010. 
52 Matelski, The Color(s) of Perfection, 99, 62. 
53 Ibid., 65-9. 
54 Ibid., 99. 
55 Johnston, Ojibway Ceremonies, 79. 
56 Ibid, 91-2. 
57 Ibid., 90. 
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angle – on a practical level, push-up bras may have complicated mother-work. Kelly 
believed that her mother’s advice worked, conceptually linking her milk supply to 
intergenerational guidance: “When I was carrying my kids, I could feel the milk 
already… [It was] dripping when my baby was just about to come out.” Kelly associated 
her maternal success with unrestrictive clothing. Kelly then reiterated her mothers’ 
advice, reassuring me, an interviewer of childbearing age, that “milk will start coming 
[a]ll the time” if one’s breasts are not artificially pushed up.58  
Best practice for lactating mothers extended from dress into pre-and-postnatal 
diet. Diets recommended to lactating mothers at Dalles 38C reinforced the value of “wild 
foods,” or food found naturally in the local environment. Many Anishinabek women 
believed that wild foods were essential to increasing milk supply without draining the 
mother of essential nutrients. Kim Anderson found that northern Algonquian peoples 
designed prenatal diets under the assumption that “whatever the pregnant woman took in 
would be ingested by the baby.”59 Kelly suggests a similar modus operandi shaped 
postnatal diets in northwestern Ontario: “My Mom eat the wild food and whatever she eat 
we suck her [laughter]. Breastfeeding.”60 Given that infant health depended heavily upon 
quality breast milk, it was important that the mother ate select, nutrient-rich crops, fish, 
and game. In Minnesota, Joan E. Dodgson and Roxanne Struthers found that manomin 
(wild rice) was highly recommended by contemporary Anishinabek knowledge keepers.61 
Working throughout the 1930s among “the Chippewa” in Minnesota, Wisconsin, and 
Michigan, Hilger found that lactating mothers were also encouraged to eat wild foods 
                                            
58 Elder Kelly, interview with author, 30 July 2012. 
59 Anderson, Life Stages and Native Women, 44. 
60 Elder Kelly, interview with author, 30 July 2012. 
61 Dodgson and Struthers, “Traditional Breastfeeding Practices of the Ojibwe of Northern 
Minnesota,” 58. 
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such as “venison, wild rice, lake trout and whitefish.”62 In the Treaty #3 District, Elder 
testimony reveals that whitefish soup was similarly identified as a key component of 
postnatal diets. Kelly explained, “My Mom breastfeed us, all of us. All she use is 
whitefish soup to have milk on her breast.”63 The use of beaver soup to encourage 
lactation, however, appears to be unique to Anishinabek living in the Treaty #3 District – 
similar findings have yet to be identified by other researchers.64  
Anishinabek women carefully monitored and regulated their diets to encourage 
the production of milk-medicine. The possibility of jeopardizing milk-medicine through 
improper diet is made evident by Anishinabek dietary restrictions for potential mothers. 
Kelly suggests that turtle soup was believed capable of compromising one’s reproductive 
health: 
Kelly: But, we weren’t allowed to eat it [turtle soup]. Just the old 
people. We used to peek and watch them, me and my 
friends, my relatives. They looked but don’t eat it… ‘You’ll 
kill your virgin [reproductive health],’ that’s what my Mom 
told me. Whatever we have in our – I don’t know, you ruin 
where the baby is. 
Luby: Alice, was there anything else you weren’t supposed to eat 
to stay healthy? 
Alice: That’s the only thing they never let us eat. The turtle soup. 
 
Kelly did not provide the rationale behind this dietary restriction. Hilger suggests that 
turtle, a recognized emissary of the spirit world, was banned during pregnancy – for 
Anishinabek mothers and fathers – in Mille Lacs, Minnesota. Eating turtle was believed 
to cause the baby to “stretch all the time.”65 If we extrapolate from Cree testimonies, it 
                                            
62 Hilger quoted in Anderson, Life Stages and Native Women, 44. Hilger also found that many 
Anishinabek women believed that porridge boiled in fish broth could increase milk secretion. See Hilger, 
Chippewa Child Life, 29. 
63 Elder Kelly, interview with author, 30 July 2012. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Hilger, Chippewa Child Life, 6-7. 
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seems likely that taboos around turtle involve “taking the baby back”66 or stretching the 
child between worlds. Anderson found that it was considered “particularly dangerous to 
take the newborn into environments where he or she might come into contact with 
negative energy, or where there may be spirits waiting to take the baby back.”67 Capable 
of living both on land and in water, of living between worlds, Turtle may have tempted 
the child’s spirit to follow Him through the physical world. Cree knowledge keepers 
Robinson and Quinney suggest that infants, being “closest to the Creator’s Creation and 
Spirit World having come more recently from the Womb,” face greater temptation to 
leave the physical plane.68 Anderson suggests that many northern Algonquian people 
believe this openness to the spirit world comes from the fontanelle or “soft spot” in the 
baby’s head.69  
While Anishinabek restrictions on material culture and diet were designed to 
ensure the production of milk-medicine, labour demands and/or bodily stress sometimes 
prevented mothers from breastfeeding their children. Oral testimonies demonstrate how 
Anishinabek mothers in the Treaty #3 District were encouraged to utilize alternatives like 
whitefish, sturgeon, and manomin (wild rice) soup. For example, Kelly testified that 
when her mother left to harvest, a bottle of whitefish soup was left with her caregiver. 
Kelly’s mother explained, “‘whitefish soup, that’s what I feed you [when] I couldn’t do it 
because I had to go look for food for you.’” Bottles were made from recycled goods to 
                                            
66 Basil Johnston identifies the turtle as a symbol of “communication, emissary” in Johnston, 
Ojibway Heritage, 53. 
67 Anderson, Life Stages and Native Women, 57. 
68 Robinson and Quinney, The Infested Blanket, 9. 
69 Anderson, Life Stages and Native Women, 57. While Anderson suggested that the fontanelle 
was associated with an openness to the spirit world, Hilger found that Anishinabek women attached no 
meaning to the fontanelle (circa 1930). According to Hilger’s observations, the fontanelle was only 
recognized as a sensitive area. She found that the fear of injury encouraged many Anishinabek peoples to 
refrain from washing the top of an infant’s head. See Hilger, Chippewa Child Life, 18. 
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feed infants while the mother was at work. Kelly described homemade bottles: “they have 
these kind of old, old fashioned nipples. I used to laugh at my Mom. They used to have 
these old pop bottles… and they used to put the nipples like this [motions putting nipple 
over bottleneck].” Sometimes, particularly while mothers were at work, “the milk was 
fish soup.”70 
Supporting evidence for fish-based alternatives to breast milk discussed by Kelly 
date back to the mid-1890s. Former Dalles 38C resident, Matilda Martin, recalled how 
Anishinabek mothers made bottles of rabbit bone and fish gut: 
I heard one time a woman have no milk and, mind you, [s]he make that 
baby drink that, small baby you know. [S]he made something to suck it, to 
suck it out of, jackfish guts, you know, out of jackfish guts. I think [s]he 
cooked the jackfish guts and [s]he made a hole in here and then [s]he put a 
rabbit bone there… that’s the way that baby suck that fish bouilla [sic].71  
 
This quotation makes evident that fish soup (or bouillon) was a longstanding remedy for 
women unable to lactate.  
Anishinabek mothers valued wild food alternatives to manufactured baby foods. 
Commercial infant formulas were introduced to the market in 1867 with the development 
of Justus von Liebig’s appropriately named Liebig’s Soluble Food for Babies. By the turn 
of the twentieth century, Nestle’s Milk, Mellin’s Infant Food, and Ridge’s Food 
functioned as formula alternatives to Liebig’s.72 However, there is no evidence to suggest 
that formula was readily available to mothers in Rat Portage. Much like their 
Anishinabek neighbours, Anglo-Canadian mothers were encouraged to fortify their blood 
for nursing. In the 1910s, the Kenora Miner and News carried regular advertisements for 
                                            
70 Elder Kelly, interview with author, 30 July 2012. 
71 Elder Martin, interview with the Kenora Daily Miner and News, 27 July 1972. 
72 Harvey Levenstein, “‘Best for Babies’ or ‘Preventable Infanticide’? The Controversy over 
Artificial Feeding of Infants in America, 1880-1920,”Journal of American History 70, no. 1 (1983): 75-95. 
See also S. Radbill, “Infant Feeding through the Ages,” Clinical Pediatrics 20, no. 10 (1981): 613-21. 
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Maltum Stout, a caramelized malt powder for nursing mothers. Mothers could order this 
“wholesome, positively non-intoxicating” powder from Winnipeg suppliers through their 
local grocer.73 It appears that commercial infant formula first became available in Kenora 
around 1923. Klim Powdered Whole Milk, “pure, fresh liquid milk… with only the water 
removed,” could be ordered from Canadian Milk Products Ltd. in Winnipeg. 
Advertisements urged Anglo-Canadian mothers to order Klim, calling it “safe milk.” 
Considerable social pressure existed to replace breastfeeding with formula feeding as 
Canadian doctors argued that formula – like Klim – was “best for babies.”74 And yet, oral 
testimony suggests that Anishinabek mothers along the Winnipeg River did not actively 
seek scientifically approved formulas. 
Long before Klim entered the northwestern market, Anishinabek mothers resisted 
cash incentives to bottle-feed. Town Councillor E. W. Chadwick promoted the benefits 
he perceived of goat’s milk for nursing infants as early as 1905.75 For example, Chadwick 
entered five goats into the livestock show at the Kenora Agricultural Fair. Chadwick 
displayed his animals “in the grounds to the rear of the Hudson’s Bay stores,”76 a known 
Anishinabek gathering site. Indeed, Matilda remembered routinely boiling a pot of tea 
behind the Hudson’s Bay Store.77 Here Chadwick may have vocalized his published 
                                            
73 E. L. Drewry, Ltd., located in Winnipeg, Manitoba, supplied Maltum Stout to businesses in the 
Kenora District. E. L. Drewry, Ltd. regularly advertised Maltum Stout in the Kenora Miner and News 
during the fall of 1918. For example: “Maltum Stout [advertisement],” Kenora Miner and News, 7 
September 1918, 3. 
74 Levenstein, “‘Best for Babies,’” 83.  See also: “Klim Powdered Whole Milk [advertisement],” 
Kenora Miner and News, 15 September 1923, 3; “Klim Powdered Whole Milk [advertisement],” Kenora 
Miner and News, 1 December 1923, 3; “Klim Powdered Whole Milk [advertisement],” Kenora Miner and 
News, 2 February 1924, 4. 
75 C. W. Chadwick quoted in “Have Goats a Place in Ontario,” Kenora Miner and News, 4 
November 1916, 2. 
76 “The Fair Decided Success,” Kenora Miner and News, 28 August 1915, 1. 
77 “Old Time Resident Fondly Recalls Walk from Dalles,” Kenora Miner and News, undated, 
unpaginated. This undated document can also be found in an unpublished memoir at the Lake of the Woods 
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opinion that goat’s milk reduced indigestion in children: “the butter globules [in goat’s 
milk] are so fine that curdling on a child’s stomach is most improbable.” In an attempt to 
improve the physical health of northern Ontarians, Chadwick offered cash incentives and 
money-back guarantees to families willing to incorporate goat products into their diets.78 
Chadwick’s efforts anticipated federal attempts to introduce goat’s milk into Indigenous 
diets. In 1919, new “Indian” hospitals in Ontario began to replace cow’s milk with goat’s 
milk in-house.79 Oral testimony, however, suggests that Anishinabek mothers along the 
Winnipeg River rejected municipal and federal pressure to bottle-feed. Martin did not 
recall any livestock rearing at Dalles 38C Indian Reserve.80 Elder Charlie Fisher of One 
Man Lake, a neighbouring community (now flooded), similarly claimed Anishinabek 
families displayed a limited interest in livestock rearing. Fisher explained that families 
“couldn’t really look after cattle at the same time [they went trapping].”81 As a result of 
their mobility requirements, Anishinabek families may have rejected cash incentives to 
bottle-feed. Anishinabek mothers maintained that breast was best. Whitefish soup trailed 
close behind and was served in handcrafted bottles.  
Given the perceived importance of whitefish soup to promoting milk supply and 
acting as a healthful alternative to milk-medicine, it is unsurprising that Matilda put 
extraordinary emphasis on teaching her granddaughter, Carol Kipling, how to make fish 
bouillon. Kipling remembers bringing Martin home to eat with her four boys: 
There [were] some things that [were] her specialities – like she loved her 
whitefish bouillon. And, uh, even in her later years, when she was in 
                                                                                                                                  
District Museum. See LOWM, Lucille Burton, “Memoirs of Matilda Josephine Lavergne Kipling Martin,” 
1987. 
78 “He Kept the Goat,” Kenora Miner and News, 27 October 1915, 3. 
79 “Goats for Hospital,” Kenora Miner and News, 20 August 1919, 3. 
80 Elder Martin, interview with the Kenora Daily Miner and News, 27 July 1972. 
81 Elder Fisher, interview with Chapeskie, 22 March 1995. 
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Pinecrest [Nursing Home] – in the fall, I would always go to the fish 
market and buy a big whitefish and go pick her up and bring her home.82  
 
While Martin may have acted as “head chef,” Kipling was not allowed to be a passive 
observer in the kitchen. Kipling remembers how she was carefully taught (and retaught) 
how to prepare whitefish bouillon for her family: 
[S]he would always have to clean it right from the beginning to the 
end… And, every year it was like she’d never done it in front of me 
before or [like] I didn’t know anything about making fish bouillon. She 
would have to show me step by step how to scale the fish, how you cut 
off the head. Now you do this. Now you do that. And so she would 
make this fish bouillon as if it was the very first time.83 
 
Martin’s dedication in teaching Kipling how to prepare whitefish bouillon reflects the 
importance both she and her community attached to it. Although Kipling “married out” 
and raised her children off-reserve, Martin provided her with the key to preserving infant 
health. Martin ensured that her granddaughter could prepare the best known alternative to 
breast milk, a weaning staple, although the river they had long fished on was beginning to 
change. 
DAMMED RIVER: ANISHINABEK MOTHERS RESPOND TO ENVIRONMENTAL 
CONTAMINANTS IN COUNTRY FOODS 
 
The construction (1955 to 1958) and operation (1958 to present) of Whitedog 
Generating Station curtailed Anishinabek women’s ability to provide milk-medicine to 
their children at Dalles 38C. Increased levels of methyl mercury in predatory fish (like 
whitefish) were identified and made public by the Ministry of the Environment after the 
Hydro-Electric Power Commission entered the region. Whitedog Generating Station has 
limited subsequent generations – like my own – from raising children according to local, 
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cultural standards. But, in addition to mercury contamination the question still remains: 
how did Whitedog Generating Station initiate this decline? Band members of Dalles 38C 
Indian Reserve link fish toxicity to effluent and wood cellulose fibre released into 
Rideout Bay by the Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company. While the triune 
communities of Rat Portage (Kenora), Keewatin, and Norman had dumped mill wastes 
into Winnipeg River since 1879, food crises did not emerge until almost a century later. 
Why? Imagine the thirteen-kilometre stretch of the Winnipeg River between Kenora and 
Dalles 38C Indian Reserve acting like a giant aerobic composter. Aerobic microbes – the 
organisms responsible for decomposing organic inputs – need sufficient oxygen to break 
down wastes like wood cellulose fibre. Land-based compost piles are commonly aerated 
by the turning of piles or dropping floors. The rapids on Winnipeg River between Kenora 
and Dalles 38C helped to aerate decomposing wood fibre. “Wild” waters, such as rapids 
and falls, dissolved oxygen by churning the water and pulling air back into its fold. 
Indeed, R. A. McKenzie, a fisheries employee, associated healthy fish populations 
downstream from Rideout Bay to “the various swift stretches in the river” and subsequent 
oxygenation of the water, despite dumping by the paper mill.84 Using available oxygen, 
aerobic microbes were able to transform Kenora’s waste to carbon dioxide (CO2), 
ammonia (NH3), energy (heat), and other end products that could be managed by the 
river. Aerobic composting, however, is a two-part process: bacterial reactions produce 
energy for cell synthesis. The production of new oxygen-dependent bacterial cells is a 
natural phenomenon. At low levels of organic loading, decomposition and synthesis 
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occur in a state of dynamic equilibrium.85 R. A. McKenzie critiqued the poorly-
understood dumping of wastes into Winnipeg River by the Kenora mill in 1930.86 After a 
series of oxygen tests, McKenzie concluded that healthy fish populations along the 
Winnipeg River depended on nature rather than effective waste management by mill 
employees: 
In all cases oxygen content of the water is well above the 2.5 c.c. per litre, 
which is supposed to be about the minimum for fish life… This high 
oxygen content is no doubt due largely to the falls [,] the various swift 
stretches in the river and the thorough mixing of the water during the fall 
turn-over of the water.87 
 
‘Wild’ water thus helped to maintain the equilibrium between oxygen content and 
organic inputs (such as wood cellulose fibre) prior to the construction of Whitedog 
Generating Station.  
When the Hydro-Electric Power Commission modified flow through Dalles 
Channel between 1955 and 1958, 88 the total amount of oxygen dissolved by water 
declined. The aeration of water occurs most quickly “by wind (creating waves), rapids, 
waterfalls, ground water discharge or other forms of running water.”89 Whitedog Falls 
Generating Station prevented water from running downstream. As a result, less “natural 
mixing” of the elements occurred after 1958. The higher the amount of organic material 
present in a body of water, the more oxygen is required for the microbial decomposition 
of waste. Increased energy demands by aerobic bacteria responsible for composting waste 
can lead to oxygen depletion. Once oxygen levels are upset, sulphate-reducing bacteria 
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can release naturally-occurring mercury from the sediment as an accidental process of 
microbial activity (e.g. anaerobic composting). Sulphate-reducing bacteria require two 
inputs to survive: sulphate and organic matter. In short, they need energy (provided by 
sulphate) and food (provided by organic matter like wood debris). Ontario-Minnesota 
Pulp and Paper Mill was a sulfite-operating mill. As in the Rainy River case, dissolved 
sulfide was a toxic compound present in pulp-and-paper mill effluents.90 By dumping its 
waste directly into Rideout Bay, Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Mill provided one of 
two necessary inputs needed to prompt microbial methylation. Transport, storage, and 
wet-barking, by contrast, increased the presence of organic matter in the river, providing 
sulphate-reducing bacteria with food. Methylmercury released during the process of 
decomposition accumulates up the food chain. As oxygen levels in the river decreased, 
fish habitat changed. As fish habitat changed, mercury levels in predatory fish increased. 
While whitefish continued to thrive in Dalles’ fishing territories, band members 
believed that mill operations negatively affected fish quality in terms of taste (not 
toxicity) in the 1950s. Indeed, whitefish remained a dietary staple. Nevertheless, band 
members closely associated mill production with fish health and taught their children to 
monitor industrial dumping. Children were taught that pulp waste directly influenced 
food quality. Kipling describes a family fish fry during her youth: 
Kipling: They always poured the sewer from the mill – that would 
be like the baths from the wood and the sludge that came 
from the mill – and the sewer would go right into the river. 
And, they said the fish was never the same. They never 
tasted the same. They always had a tainted taste. I 
remember them saying that… 
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Luby:  So, while you were sitting down having [fish] would your 
dad or somebody say, ‘Oh, that doesn’t taste the same as 
when I was young.’ Was it sort of like that? 
Kipling:  No. No. He would just – they would just make a comment 
that it’s not as good. You know how when you sit down 
everyone just seems to pig out when you have a family fish 
fry? ‘Oh so good’ [I would say]. 
‘Oh, you don’t have any idea how good it 
used to taste before the mill came.’ 
They’d say things like that…they would 
mention that [mill].91 
 
As adults, these same children noted an accumulation of mill wastes near the Dalles 
Channel, now a reservoir of the Hydro-Electric Power Commission. Robert Kabestra 
echoed Kipling family sentiments regarding pollution and flavour. Kabestra claimed that 
“meat doesn’t taste the same” in the 1990s.92 This change in flavour altered Anishinabek 
perceptions of locally-harvested foodstuffs and resulted in many families questioning 
their ability to feed their children from the river.   
Many Elders believed that pollution from the Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper 
Company changed not only the taste but the healthfulness of country foods. Clarence 
Henry observed that “[f]ish got sick from the worms” near the mill.93 Similarly, Kabestra 
testified that disease in fish and game manifested physically. He said, “[b]listers, spots 
[appear] on the liver, lungs, kidneys [of game animals]… it was the organs that were full 
of blisters.”94 Band members feared that human ingestion of “sick” fish and game might 
cause illness. Henry suggested that “a human would get sick if they got worms in their 
body.”95 Oral testimony indicates that Anishinabek families discarded “sick” animals to 
prevent the transfer of disease between species. Kabestra remembered, “Joe [Wagamese] 
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mentioned cutting a duck’s chest and discovering white veins in the chest. He threw it 
away.”96 Anishinabek families clearly monitored consumption to maintain good health. 
The Ministry of the Environment confirmed Anishinabek fears that country food could 
cause disease in the 1970s. Federal officials did not comment on worms, blisters, or 
spots. Instead, the Ministry of the Environment reported an invisible problem: mercury 
levels in excess of 0.5 ppm in northern pike, smallmouth bass, sucker (redhorse and 
white), and walleye. This finding meant that large fish populations near Dalles 38C were 
deemed unfit for human consumption.97  
Federal recognition of fish toxicity in the Winnipeg River drainage basin raised 
Anishinabek fears about mercury poisoning at Dalles 38C Indian Reserve. Regular 
interaction with Grassy Narrows – a neighbouring community that intermarried and 
shared harvesting grounds with Dalles 38C – alerted families to the risk of Minamata 
disease. Members of Dalles 38C were attuned to multiple symptoms being displayed at 
Grassy Narrows, including, but not limited to: “numbness of the mouth, lips, tongue, 
hands, and feet; tunnel vision [;] impairment of hearing; speech disorders; difficulty in 
swallowing; loss of balance [;] disturbances in coordination [;] extreme fatigue [and] 
mental depression.”98 By 1973, Anishinabek in-and-around Kenora feared that mercury 
caused death as indicated by the inquest into Thomas Strong’s death. H. B. Cotnam, 
supervising coroner for the Province of Ontario, argued against the popular Anishinabek 
belief that Strong died of mercury poisoning. Cotnam confirmed that Strong died of “an 
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acute coronary thrombosis” rather than “high levels of mercury.”99 His test provided 
limited reassurance to Anishinabek families, however, as “expert evidence during the 
inquest revealed recent mercury analysis of blood and hair from Indians in the area were 
higher than normal, and some were in the known dangerous range.” Strong’s inquest led 
the Ministry of Health to establish preventative health measures for band members of 
Grassy Narrows, including a twice annual “mercury analysis of blood and hair samples” 
by Dr. J. Stopps of the Environmental Health Services Branch.100 Stopps did not offer 
comparable testing at Dalles 38C Indian Reserve. Family networks made Dalles’ band 
members aware of the hazards of consuming fish from nearby waters, but provided them 
with none of the benefits of federal monitoring. Band members came to live in a constant 
state of apprehension, wondering if ‘dirty water’ was poisoning their families.101  
Historians have long discussed mercury methylation and its effect on fish 
populations. And yet, researchers to date have discussed this link almost exclusively in 
relation to rising male unemployment and welfare rates in Indigenous communities as 
Indigenous men are unable to guide or to fish commercially. Little attention has been paid 
to how declining catches by male family members – husbands, brothers, fathers, uncles – 
                                            
99 H. B. Cotnam, Supervising Coroner, to T. M. Eberlee, Deputy Minister of the Ministry of 
Community and Social Services, 6 February 1973, “Re: Inquest into the Death of Thomas Strong deceased 
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have influenced Anishinabek women’s ability to care for their children.102 Indeed, such 
changes are difficult to identify as childcare practices like breastfeeding cannot be 
tracked in the same way as fishing licenses available in the archives. Within Anishinabek 
communities, however, such changes are writ large. For example, many women who 
were raised to care for their breasts in hopes of providing milk-medicine were unable to 
follow Anishinabek dietary recommendations for lactating mothers, which emphasized 
the importance of whitefish in breast milk production. One Elder from Dalles 38C 
remembers an unidentified medical official visiting her community around 1970. This 
moment was the first time she was told “not to eat any more fish, not even muskrat, or 
beaver.” She describes the visit as follows: 
I remember a nurse came with a doctor. They told us not to eat game, fish, 
not to eat any of those things anymore that we got from the river, that… 
they were polluted with mercury and waste from that paper mill… It was 
terrible.103 
 
In April 1973, Anishinabek women at Grassy Narrows organized the “Women’s Mini-
Conference” and invited women from other reserves in the Treaty #3 District to exchange 
knowledge and voice women’s concerns. Women feared that federally appointed field 
nurses working on-reserve downplayed their concerns about reproductive health to 
obscure the mercury problem (and thus maintain the milling economy).104 Lacking 
reliable federal support, Grand Council Treaty #3 sought alternative medical advice. 
Throughout 1973, Council Fire published Dr. A. Burnstein’s warnings to Treaty #3 
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subscribers: “If a pregnant mother has mercury, then the mercury will concentrate on the 
unborn baby. The mercury will cause improper growth to the child.”105 Burnstein 
implored pregnant Anishinabek women in the Treaty #3 District to visit Winnipeg 
General Hospital and be tested for mercury intoxication, indicating an awareness of the 
challenges that Anishinabek women faced finding acceptable protein substitutes in 
isolated communities. For example, the federal government shipped canned salmon to 
Grassy Narrows First Nation, but it was left untouched in the local dump because it did 
not yet have a recognized place in the local diet.106 As a result, Anishinabek women were 
faced with the choice to either eat whitefish or breastfeed without the sense of breast milk 
as milk-medicine. 
In response to Elder fears, Anishinabek women organized events like the 
Women’s Mini-Conference to increase awareness about the risk of consuming wild foods 
while pregnant and/or breastfeeding. On-reserve schools also launched programs like 
“Cleaning up Grassy” to teach children that mercury pollution was bad for community 
health; for the first time, children were being taught at home that Anishinabek waters and 
foodstuffs could be poison. Figure 26, a story by Tony Ashopenase, reveals that children 
understood that the dangers of mercury were often invisible. Ashopenase could clean his 
backyard. Ashopenase could pick up pop cans, papers, bags, boxes, and bottles. But, 
“theres [sic] still mercury pollution” and Ashopenase could not clean it up – even in his 
childhood fantasy of being a well-paid employee of Treaty #3 Council.107 Much like 
Anishinabek mothers who could not see the damage their diet inflicted upon the fetus, 
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children were taught that they could not see the dangers in their river. They were, 
however, taught that this invisible danger was as real as a pop can. Figure 27, an 
unsigned image, depicts a tap filling a household tea cup. This tea cup is marked with a 
skull and crossbones, the standard symbol for poison. The image reveals that band 
members had come to recognize daily fare – like a cup of tea – as potentially toxic.108 
Unlike their mothers, children growing up in the late 1960s and early 1970s were taught 
to avoid foods harvested from the river. Unlike their mothers, these children were not 
taught that whitefish had medicinal qualities – rather, they learned that whitefish could 
harm them. Further, as Anishinabek women worked to eliminate breastfeeding within 
their communities, the strict rules for breast care – from regulations around push-up bras 
to slingshots – declined.  
CONCLUSION 
 Children growing up on Dalles 38C Indian Reserve after the construction of the 
Whitedog Generating Station do not share in the memories of their older siblings, 
cousins, and neighbours. For many, life at Dalles 38C throughout the 1950s and early 
1960s is remembered as a hungry time. Elder Roberta Jameson recalls her baby brother 
screaming out in hunger. Her father’s nets had been ripped from the shore by dead heads 
– trees uprooted by flooding, but not removed from the water by the Hydro-Electric 
Power Commission. Debris from the dam prevented her father from bringing home fish 
even before her mother learned that they had been poisoned. Jameson’s mother was 
unable, or refused, to breastfeed. On the shelf sat one box of Pablum baby cereal. 
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Jameson’s mother fed the screaming infant one spoonful at a time. She and her older 
siblings watched, their tummies grumbling, unable to take from the baby.  
According to Jameson, she was shipped to residential school shortly after her 
parents stopped being able to provide for her family. Jameson boarded the train in 
Minaki, Ontario, and attended Cecilia Jeffrey Residential School where her parents 
believed that the Presbyterian Church would feed her.109 Elder Alice Kelly also 
remembers being registered for residential school in the mid-1950s. Her mother enrolled 
Kelly at St. Mary’s Residential School when she started “having a tough time to support 
us.” Prior to the construction of Whitedog Generating Station, Kelly remembered “We 
were eating fish and potatoes. Bannock, that’s how I was grown up.” But, as she entered 
her pre-teen years, that was “not the way they were feeding their kids.” For Kelly, 
residential school started when fish and potatoes stopped.110 At Dalles 38C Indian 
Reserve today, Elders like Roberta Jameson and Alice Kelly clearly associate food 
insecurity with institutionalization. 
Some Anishinabek parents relied on federal institutions – like residential schools 
– to feed their children because of the food shortage caused by hydroelectric 
development. The solution was temporary – parents voluntarily split up their families in 
hopes of keeping their children well-fed. At Dalles 38C Indian Reserve, chubby was 
desirable – parents believed that the healthiest children had meat on their bones.  Pastor 
Carol Kipling explained that: 
[Grandma] wanted me to be fat. And, when I would bring 
friends home, girls who were on the chubby side, she’d say 
'Oh, they so good lookin!’’ She'd say, ‘Why don't you put 
on some weight?' She wanted me to be fat too -- that was a 
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big thing with her. If you were fat, you were healthy and 
that was good.111 
 
In his research on Pikogan, Quebec, Roger Spielmann similarly found that additional 
weight was a desirable physical attribute, explaining that “someone who has plenty of 
meat on their bones is considered healthy and strong.” Spielmann suggests that “[p]art of 
the reason for this goes back to when people were living in the bush… It was always 
important to have plenty of flesh on your bones to tide you through the time when game 
was scarce.”112 But, parents in the Winnipeg River drainage basin could not raise 
“healthy” children on rationed teaspoons of Pablum.  
The Children’s Aid Service (CAS) took notice of parents’ failure to feed their 
families. Throughout the 1960s, CAS scooped children up from Dalles 38C Indian 
Reserve. Provincial intervention into Indigenous family life was not unique to 
northwestern Ontario. In 1966, H. I. Hawthorne published a report recommending the 
extension of provincial welfare services to reserves across Canada to close the gap 
between Indians and others. According to Nancy and Judy MacDonald, Indigenous 
children “quickly became over-represented” and made up to “40-50% of the total number 
of children in care” for many years after Hawthorne’s Report.113 Patrick Johnston coined 
the phrase “Sixties Scoop” in Native Children and the Welfare System to describe the 
mass removal of Indigenous children from their natal homes into foster or adoptive care 
with, primarily, non-Indigenous families.114 Many social workers believed that foster or 
adoptive care would save Indigenous youth from poverty, substandard housing, poor 
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sanitation, and malnutrition on reserve.115  Unlike other victims of the Sixties Scoop, 
some children from Dalles 38C Indian Reserve may have been placed with other Status 
Indian families. If these speculations are accurate, CAS did not relocate these children to 
assimilate them. An unidentified Elder told sociologist Jennifer Leyson:  
[T]hese kids and everything got taken away by CAS, the Children's Aid. 
And there are some sad stories there… I'll give you an example of my 
brother there. He was taken away and sent up north… They put them in a 
plane, told them they were gonna go for a plane ride and they would be… 
going home later on.  
  
But what actually happened was… those kids got… got flown up and they 
landed somewhere in [another] community.116 
 
In such cases where Anishinabek mothers lost control – not only of their ability to feed 
children, but their ability to place children – families broke up permanently. The 
Department of Indian Affairs assigned children adopted by Indigenous families with new 
band numbers, creating significant challenges for birth parents trying to track their 
children through federal registries.117  
And yet, Anishinabek mothers developed adaptive strategies to manage 
environmental change within their families. For example, many Anishinabek mothers 
adopted canned, condensed, and sweetened Carnation Milk as a substitute for breast milk. 
Canned milk could be picked-up at the Kenora Friendship Centre and some have even 
suggested in interviews that Indian Affairs distributed Carnation Milk to Anishinabek 
families as a form of in-kind welfare.118 While many Anishinabek mothers can no longer 
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provide milk-medicine (fortified by whitefish consumption) to nursing infants, they have 
fashioned Carnation cans – which have become symbols of welfare dependence – into 
healing regalia. In the Kenora District, Carnation cans are widely agreed to make the best 
jingle cones for jingle dresses.119 Today, female jingle dancers are provided with tobacco 
by community members seeking healing prayers for themselves or their loved ones. 
Holistic medicinal practices (like jingle-dancing) have come to reinforce and reinvigorate 
women’s work. By saving the tops of Carnation cans, by washing them and rolling them 
to fashion jingles, Anishinabek mothers help their daughters to develop new forms of 
medicine power.120 
Whether enrolling their children in residential school, applying for food stamps, 
or (re)fashioning healing regalia, Anishinabek mothers developed creative strategies to 
preserve their families after 1955. They had to. The spin-off effects of hydroelectric 
                                                                                                                                  
Kenora District in the 1960s. For instance, Paul Driben and Robert Sanderson Trudeau noted that cash 
began to replace government benefits “in the form of goods and services” by 1965 at Fort Hope Indian 
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development along the Winnipeg River complicated mother-work. Rising levels of 
methyl mercury (caused by a change in microbial ecology) tainted foodstuffs 
recommended to Anishinabek mothers for increasing breast milk production. While 
protein substitutes like salmon are now available for purchase in Kenora’s grocery stores, 
there is no simple substitution for the culturally specific diets of breastfeeding mothers. 
And so, the stories Anishinabek women tell about how they fed (or did not feed) their 
families, about how children ate (or did not eat), reveal that Whitedog Generating Station 
forever changed mother-work along the Winnipeg River.  
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Figure 26: CHADWICK FAMILY GOAT FARM (C. 1920)121 
At the north shore of Lake of the Woods, municipal official E. W. Chadwick 
promoted the benefits he perceived of goat’s milk for nursing infants as early as 
1905.122 Chadwick argued that “the butter globules [in goat’s milk] are so fine that 
curdling on a child’s stomach is most improbable.”123 He advocated for young 
families to feed their children with goat’s milk to prevent infant indigestion or 
tummy trouble. 
121 LOWM, “Chadwick Family Goat Farm, c.1920,” [photograph]. 
122 C. W. Chadwick quoted in “Have Goats a Place in Ontario,” Kenora Miner and News, 4 
November 1916, 2. 
123 “He Kept the Goat,” 3. 
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Figure 27: MATILDA MARTIN WITH GRANDCHILDREN CAROL AND RAY 
KIPLING (C. 1945)124 
This image depicts interviewee Carol Kipling with Matilda Martin, her 
grandmother. Martin made certain that Kipling could prepare whitefish bouillon. 
Kipling remembers how she was carefully taught (and retaught) how to prepare 
whitefish bouillon for her family: “[E]very year it was like she’d never done it in 
front of me before or [like] I didn’t know anything about making fish bouillon. She 
would have to show me step by step how to scale the fish, how you cut off the 
head.”125 
124 Image provided by Pastor Lawson during interview on 12 July 2012. 
125 Pastor Lawson, interview with author, 12 July 2012. 
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Figure 28: ANISHINABEK CHILDREN DISCUSS MEHG POLLUTION ON THE 
WABIGOON RIVER (C. 1973)126 
Treaty #3 Council Fire, a newsletter published by Grand Council Treaty #3, 
circulated community thoughts and concerns. Grade 6 children from Grassy 
Narrows submitted a series of letters themed “Cleaning up Grassy,” many of which 
displayed an awareness of mercury pollution – a health hazard that the federal 
government would not take seriously until 1978 with the establishment of the Royal 
Commission of Northern Environment.  
126 Tony Ashopenase, “Cleaning Up Grassy,” Treaty #3 Council Fire 2, no. 5 (1973): 5. 
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Figure 29: ANISHINABEK REPRESENTATIONS OF WATER QUALITY (C. 
1973)127
This cartoon by an unknown artist was published in the same newsletter as the 
“Cleaning up Grassy” series. “Cleaning up Grassy” was a school unit undertaken 
by Grade 6 students at Grassy Narrows School.  Although it is unsigned like the 
school submissions by Gloria Keewatin and Ross Loon, it meets the same 
educational goals as other unit pieces.  
127 Unidentified Artist, “Gov’t stops mercury pollution?!!!,” Treaty #3 Council Fire 2, no. 5 
(1973): 3. 
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CONCLUSION 
“SO THAT OUR NEXT GENERATION WOULD KNOW”: A REFLECTION ON 
WATER RESEARCH AND ANISHINABEK RESPONSES TO WATER 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE WINNIPEG RIVER DRAINAGE BASIN, 1873 – PRESENT1 
 
When I was younger, I asked my father – as most children are wont to do – why? In 1987, 
as Mom carried the weight of my brother Michael inside her, I wanted to know “Why is 
Mommy’s tummy so big?” In 1990, shortly after my sister Ashley was born, I wanted to know 
“Why do babies cry?” By the time I reached adolescence, I wanted to know why our family was 
displaced from Dalles 38C Indian Reserve. Why were Michael, Ashley, and I raised in town? 
How had we come to be “third generation born and raised off the land”? What made my great-
grandfather, John Kipling Jr., leave the place of his birth? As a toddler, John would pull his 
tikinagan (cradleboard) towards Ogimaamaashiik, my paternal great-great-grandmother, hoping 
to be carried through our ancestral territories. From his tikinagan, John watched Ogimaamaashiik 
paddle towards the manomin fields. He saw Ogimaamaashiik and her peers pick blueberries for 
home use and for sale. As a child, he had loved Dalles 38C Indian Reserve and off-reserve 
harvesting grounds, yet John left. Why? 
To answer my questions, Dad drove me to Norman Dam at the western outlet of Lake of 
the Woods. He parked the truck and asked me to walk alongside him. Norman Dam, Dad 
explained, changed how water flowed through the Winnipeg River drainage basin. I learned that 
my heart is composed of water (an estimated 73 percent). I learned that my blood is composed of 
                                            
1 This title is inspired by Anishinabek activist Leanne Simpson’s claim that resistance stories empower 
Like Simpson, I have devoted my research to finding stories of resistance. This dissertation uncovers three 
types of resistance – adaptation, cooperation, and passive resistance – that predate 1969. I do not intend to downplay 
the very real legal and material disadvantages my ancestors faced. Instead, I seek out instances of survivance, a term 
defined by Gerald Vizenor as “an active sense of presence.” Manifest Matters: Narratives on Postindian Survivance 
(Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), vii. This form of resistance is about endurance, about surviving 
as a people. 
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water. Just like a clogged artery had caused my grandfather’s heart to stop, Norman Dam and the 
Whitedog Falls Generating Station further upstream had stopped the natural flow of water from 
Lake of the Woods towards Hudson Bay. Water regulation had killed members of the Kelly 
family – Nokomis drowned on a walk to town when the ice road collapsed. Water regulation 
killed the four-leggeds and the swimmers too. Muskrat drowned as backed-up waters inundated 
their dens. Sturgeon suffocated as wood waste accumulated in the upper reach of the Winnipeg 
River. Anishinabek mothers stopped producing best-quality breast milk as mercury levels 
increased in predatory fish. John Kipling Jr. wanted to give us, his descendants, a full life. We 
moved to escape, to avoid hunger, and to work for pay as the subsistence economy on reserve 
flat-lined. 
Other Anishinabek families living along the Winnipeg River chose to relocate. Dalles 
38C Indian Reserve was nearly abandoned after the Hydro-Electric Power Commission of 
Ontario incorporated the stretch of river between Norman Dam and Whitedog Falls Generating 
Station into their reservoir system. Journalist Lloyd Mack reports that “[b]etween 1956 and 
1970, the population declined steadily until there was nobody left.” Concerns over the water and 
its effects on local wildlife spurred massive outmigration.2 Testimony left by Elder Clarence 
Henry aligns with Mack’s observation. Henry testified, “Everything was dying away, just like 
that. Eventually there were hardly any people left. People my age spread out.”3 Henry named 
specific families who migrated, including Paddy Strong’s family, Old Jamieson’s family, Pete 
Savage’s family, and the McLeod family.4 Elder Alice Kelly testified that her mother, Catherine 
Hunter, relocated her children to Whitefish Lake Indian Reserve near Sioux Narrows, Ontario, in 
2 Lloyd Mack, “Utility chairman apologizes to Dalles members,” Kenora Daily Miner and News, 4 July 
2008, accessed 1 March 2016, http://www.kenoradailyminerandnews.com/2008/07/04/utility-chairman-apologizes-
to-dalles-members. 
3 Elder Henry, interview with Cotton, 14 June 1993. 
4 Ibid. 
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response to food insecurity.5 Historian Bryan Palmer has suggested that Indigenous peoples 
across Canada – not just members Dalles 38C Indian Reserve – hoped to escape poverty through 
out-migration. According to Palmer, the percentage of status Indians in Canada who lived in 
urban centres rose approximately ten percent between 1959 and 1972. The population on reserve 
decreased accordingly.6 
In 1974, the Ministry of Transportation and Communication showed (albeit 
unintentionally) the abandonment of Dalles 38C Indian Reserve on a map. The Project Planning 
Branch produced a feasibility study in response to a request from the Indian Affairs Branch for a 
transportation service from Kenora to nearby reserves. Dalles 38C Indian Reserve is strikingly 
absent from the map included in the feasibility study. By 1974, there was no resident population 
to consider. One Man Lake Indian Reserve is also missing. The Indian Affairs Branch had 
merged its band members with Whitedog Indian Reserve in response to rising water levels. 
Between 1950, when Dalles Channel was blasted open, and the 1970s, when the Ministry of the 
Environment identified methyl mercury in the Winnipeg River, the human geography of 
Anishinabek territories had changed. While a paucity of historic data makes it difficult to 
quantify the effects of hydroelectric development on Anishinabek bodies, provincial maps allow 
us to see its effect on physical communities: band members left Dalles 38C Indian Reserve in 
hopes of raising healthy families elsewhere. In 1984, I was born in the Lake of the Woods 
District Hospital. Living off-reserve was my best chance at achieving physical and economic 
                                            
5 Elder Kelly, interview with author, 30 July 2012. Journalist Mike Aiken has similarly reported that Dalles 
38C Indian Reserve was “eventually deserted, as inhabitants could no longer live their traditional lifestyle.” Aiken 
attributes socio-economic challenges to environmental modifications, particularly the damming of the Winnipeg 
River by the Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario. Aiken notes that Dalles 38C Indian Reserve was only 
recently repopulated (circa 1980). Please see “Flood Memorial at Dalles,” Kenora Daily Miner and News, 19 
October 2010, accessed 1 March 2016, http://www.kenoradailyminerandnews.com/2010/10/19/flood-memorial-at-
dalles. 
6 Palmer, Canada’s 1960s, 386. 
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well-being. Leaving Dalles 38C was an unfortunate ‘gift’ from my great-grandfather, John 
Kipling Jr., who never returned home after residential school. 
What has been presented here is a history of hydroelectric development in the Winnipeg 
River drainage basin that blends Anishinabek and settler-colonial sources to reconstruct a 
plausible, mutually comprehensible narrative of environmental and social change in 
Northwestern Ontario. My personal narrative is essential to a culturally relevant and culturally 
appropriate telling of water development in the Winnipeg River drainage basin. Anishinabek 
researcher and activist Leanne Simpson calls for intellectuals “who exist in the world as an 
embodiment of contemporary expressions of our ancient stories and traditions.”7  Linda T. Smith 
has similarly called on Indigenous scholars to use research to demonstrate and to validate 
Indigenous methodologies. Scholars are encouraged to immerse themselves in community, to 
honour Indigenous voices in their research, and, by so doing, to build resistance to dominant 
discourses.8 If we, as scholars, honour Anishinabek voices, we learn that knowledge is tied to 
experience. While many formally trained academics seek objectivity in their work, I adhere to a 
worldview (a tradition) that makes “objectivity” implausible. Anishinabek historian Basil 
Johnston explains that “to know” is a rough translation of the Anishinaabemowin word 
w’kikaendaun, but this is inaccurate; “to know” suggests that it is possible to have a clear and 
complete idea of something. Where I come from it is understood that, in the words of Basil 
Johnston, “knowledge may not be exact.” Instead, a person who claims to “know” something “is 
saying that the notion, image, idea, act that that person has in mind corresponds to and is similar 
                                            
7 Simpson, Dancing On Our Turtle’s Back, 31 
8 Linda T. Smith, Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples (London, UK: Zed 
Books Ltd. and Dunedin, NZ: University of Otago, 1999), 15-16, 166, 199. 
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to what he or she has already seen, heard, touched, tasted or smelled.”9 The research findings 
presented here – what I “know” about water development – is based on my growing-up 
experience in Kenora and my interactions with Elders at Dalles 38C Indian Reserve. 
I also adhere to an Anishinabek understanding of w’daeb-awae. Johnston explains that 
w’daeb-awae, an approximate translation of “truth,” means that “a speaker casts his words and 
his voice as far as his perception and his vocabulary will enable him or her.”10 And so, in 
response to Simpson and Smith, I offer a dialectic narrative of environmental change in the 
Winnipeg River drainage basin. In this dissertation, I have presented “crossing points” instead of 
“truths.” Our stories – my personal narrative, my family history, and Elder testimonies – have 
been corroborated with archival sources from the Lake of the Woods Museum, the Kenora 
Public Library (particularly their holdings of the Kenora Miner and News), the Fort Frances 
Museum and Cultural Centre, the Archives of Ontario, the Ontario Power Generation Archives, 
and Library and Archives Canada. This corroboration allows us to see that economic stability on 
reserves in the Winnipeg River drainage basin collapsed after World War II. In particular, the 
HEPC’s program of development jeopardized Anishinabek opportunities to benefit from state-
sponsored growth. Despite federal and provincial mismanagement of Anishinabek resources, 
Anishinabek living in the Winnipeg River drainage basin found diverse ways to manage change. 
Below is a detailed summary of the “truths” that I believe to be worthy of discussion. 
 
 
 
 
                                            
9 Basil Johnston quoted in Jill Doerfler, Niigaanwewidam James Sinclair, and Heidi Kiiwetinepinesiik 
Stark, eds. Centering Anishinaabeg Studies: Understanding the World through Stories (East Lansing, MI: Michigan 
State Press and Winnipeg: University of Manitoba, 2013), 7. 
10 Ibid., 6. 
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RECONSTRUCTING NATIONAL NARRATIVES: DIALECTICS OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC 
GROWTH IN INDIAN COUNTRY, 1945 – PRESENT 
After World War II, the Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario launched an 
expansionist program that required increased access to water resources in northwestern Ontario. 
Industrial and consumer demand had skyrocketed since the HEPC’s inception in 1906. 
Canadians demanded 389 times as much power in the 1940s as they did in 1910.11 The HEPC 
required new hydroelectric generating stations to meet this ever-growing demand. Without new 
facilities, the HEPC feared that industry and consumers alike would suffer from power shortages 
that could thwart production or dim household lights. In response to predicted energy demands, 
the HEPC started building five hydroelectric generating stations to the west of Marathon, Ontario 
in the early 1950s.12 This dissertation focuses on the development of Whitedog Rapids to serve 
(primarily, but not exclusively) the town of Kenora and the Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper 
Company located at the north shore of Lake of the Woods. Kenora was one of the largest urban 
centres west of Marathon, only significantly outnumbered by Port Arthur and Fort William (the 
twin cities now known as Thunder Bay). The Ontario-Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company was 
one of the largest employers in this area with additional plants located in Fort Frances and 
International Falls. Whitedog Falls Generating Station was to serve this locus of demand. 
Major development was not unique to Northwestern Ontario or the energy industry. 
World War II is generally believed to have ushered in a period of “unparalleled economic 
growth” across Canada.13 Historians J. M. Bumsted and Douglas Owram have linked an increase 
                                            
11 Consumption increased from 4,000kW to 1,558,500kW between 1910 and 1939 alone. The increase from 
4,000 to 1,558,500 is 38,863 percent. Exact figures for the period from 1914 to 1939 are not readily accessible. 
Ontario Hydro, Ontario Hydro a Proud Tradition, 26. 
12 As noted by staff at the Kenora Daily Miner and News, “Whitedog Falls G.S. will be the Commission’s 
fifth new power source to be undertaken in Northwestern Ontario since 1945.” See: “Road to Whitedog Starts, 
Power Development slated Early 1956,” Kenora Daily Miner and News, 30 September 1955, 1. 
13 Bumsted, A History of the Canadian Peoples, 358. 
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in per capita income with improved standards of living nationwide.14 My research demonstrates 
that Anishinabek families living in the Winnipeg River drainage basin did not prosper with 
Canadians at large. Instead, Anishinabek families living in the Winnipeg River drainage basin 
experienced a precipitous decline in living standards on reserve. While the Ontario-Minnesota 
Pulp and Paper Company used hydroelectricity to expand newsprint production, Anishinabek 
unemployment increased as the Hydro-Electric Power Commission disassembled work camps 
once Whitedog Falls Generating Station began operations. Prior to the establishment of 
Whitedog Falls Generating Station, Anishinabek labourers supported their families by combining 
wage work with seasonal harvesting. As suburbanites used new electric appliances to lessen the 
burden of domestic labour in Kenora, Anishinabek mothers downstream struggled to feed their 
infants with best quality breastmilk. Prior to the establishment of Whitedog Falls Generating 
Station, Anishinabek women resisted federal and municipal pressures to bottle-feed. Indeed, 
hydroelectric development after World War II exacerbated the socio-economic divide between 
settler-colonists and Anishinabek families. 
Histories of post-war Canada have often missed the widening economic gap between 
Canadians and First Nations after 1945 due to two popular misconceptions, widely thought to be 
‘historical facts.’15 Firstly, it has been assumed that 1951 amendments to the Indian Act, which 
increased Indian control over First Nations’ affairs, also improved the economic standing of 
                                            
14 Ibid. and Owram, Born at the Right Time, preface. 
15 It is difficult to identify the origins of these misconceptions. They have become accepted “historical 
facts” and circulate in general texts (e.g. Canadian textbooks, encyclopedia entries, and teacher resources). In her 
textbook, Dickason claims that the revised Act of 1951 “heralded in the dawn of a new era,” but tempers this 
statement, adding that the revised Act “can hardly be called revolutionary” (248). The sense that Canada “removed 
some of the most egregious political, cultural and religious restrictions” with the 1951 amendment is also identified 
by Zach Parrott, “Indian Act,” Canadian Encyclopedia, 02/07/06, accessed 1 March 2016, 
http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/indian-act/#h3_jump_2. It is echoed in teacher resources like Erin 
Hanson, “The Indian Act,” Indigenous Foundations, accessed 1 March 2016, 
http://indigenousfoundations.arts.ubc.ca/home/government-policy/the-indian-act.html#amendments.  
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Indians on reserve.16 However, few historical narratives compare this increased political control 
with the effects of concurrent federal programming (e.g. industrial expansion and full 
employment) on reserve lands and labour practices. Canada gave Indians increased control over 
First Nations’ affairs at exactly the same time that industry jeopardized the economic functioning 
of reserves; Indians gained very limited control over a decreasing land base and declining 
resource base. While federal programs were designed “to help” status Indians build sustainable 
communities in the postwar era, the shift of responsibility in 1951 has obscured the role of 
industrial development in economic collapse. 
Secondly, explanations for endemic poverty on reserve have been tied to the allocation of 
reserve lands in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. The existing historical literature 
has emphasized poor soils that prevented Indigenous peoples from growing crops for home use 
or for sale. For instance, Mary-Ellen Kelm has noted that reserve life in British Columbia 
fostered malnutrition as reduced access to traditional harvesting areas stymied Indigenous food 
production.17 Poverty has also been associated with the isolation of reserves themselves: Indians 
were separated from markets. However, sustainable reserves have garnered limited attention, 
making economic erosion in the 1950s harder to identify. Economic disempowerment that was 
rooted not in nineteenth-century legislation, but in twentieth-century economic development, has 
                                            
16 Other historians have emphasized the extent to which the 1951 amendments were failed remedial 
legislation. In her discussion of failure, Dickason mentions that Canada prevented status Indians from establishing 
their own forms of government (A Concise History of Canada’s First Nations, 248). Bands lacked complete control 
over their funds until 1958 (249). Parrott centres his argument about failed remedial legislation around gender, 
concluding that “additional restrictions on the transfer of status did harm to First Nations women and children” 
(“Indian Act”). Lynn Gehl, an Anishinaabe advocate, makes similar claims in her public education video “Sex 
Discrimination and the Indian Act,” accessed 1 March 2016, http://www.lynngehl.com/video-publications.html. 
Hanson does not explicitly state the limits of the 1951 amendments, but references the Royal Commission of 
Aboriginal People to claim that amendments were “ultimately unsuccessful.” None of these authors refer to 
concurrent federal programming that limited Indigenous opportunities to benefit from the 1951 amendments to the 
Indian Act. 
17 For sustained analysis of the impact of colonization on Indigenous diet and nutrition, see Mary-Ellen 
Kelm, “‘My Young Men Are Angry’: The Impact of Colonization on Aboriginal Diet and Nutrition,” Colonizing 
Bodies: Aboriginal Health and Healing in British Columbia, 1900-1950 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1998), 19-37. 
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led to a number of erroneous conclusions about the nature of First Nations poverty. For example, 
assumptions about isolation and economic failure have led political scientist Tom Flanagan to 
advocate for the dissolution of reserve lands as a solution to welfare dependency. Flanagan 
assumes that Indigenous peoples have refused “to move to where jobs and investment 
opportunities exist.”18 He does not address how job opportunities on reserve only recently 
declined in regions like the Winnipeg River drainage basin. This dissertation has demonstrated 
that Anishinabek reserves were economically sustainable until the 1950s. The Winnipeg River 
example shows that endemic poverty was not the necessary result of poor soil, geographic 
isolation, or a refusal to participate in the free market economy. By shifting attention away from 
seemingly progressive legislative amendments to material realities on reserve, from the distant 
past to the recent past, this dissertation has exposed the negative cumulative impacts of federal 
policy on Anishinabek economies after 1945. Endemic poverty on reserve resulted from federal 
and provincial polices that emerged from Canada’s peacetime program. 
Historians who identified socio-environmental inequity after 1945 have explained how 
the “common good” narrative justified development on Indigenous lands, suggesting that 
comparatively few Indians suffered to provide lighting and power for settler-colonists who 
resided in urban centres.19 While historians have challenged the “common good” argument, few 
have challenged Hydro’s representation of space. Historians, like Canadian hydro companies, 
have maintained that development served the “centre.” 20 Post-war development is said to have 
                                            
18 Tom Flanagan, First Nations, Second Thoughts (Montréal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 2008), 7. 
19 Waldram, As Long as the Rivers Run, xv, xvi, 4, 6, 123, 172-173, 179-180. 
20 Notable exceptions include Richard White’s The Organic Machine and The River Returns: An 
Environmental History of the Bow (Montréal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2009) by Christopher 
Armstrong, Matthew Evenden, and H. V. Nelles. In his analysis of the Columbia River, White found that “[Euro-
Americans] regarded the space at the Cascades and the Dalles as open, as culturally empty. Indians regarded it as 
full” (15). Armstrong, Evenden, and Nelles similarly found that “the Bow River was at once a homeland and a 
margin [before Euro-Canadian settlement]. As a homeland, it lay at the centre of an indigenous world…. As a 
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occurred in “peripheral” spaces, or spaces without social and economic systems valued by the 
waiâbishkiwedig.  This definition of space has assumed a shared citizenship across these two 
zones (“centre” and “periphery”), normalizing European conceptualizations of space that 
overwrote Indigenous homelands. It also overlooks that Indigenous peoples live at the “centre” 
of their own communities. I have made Anishinabek territories “central” to draw attention to 
lived space. Anishinabek men and women in the Winnipeg River drainage basin did not see 
themselves as “peripheral.” They lived under separate jurisdiction. When we acknowledge 
jurisdictional divides, we do not find a “common good.” Instead, we find the unequal distribution 
of damages between residents of Ontario and treaty partners. These two groups had little in 
common under the law. This dissertation reminds us that Anishinabek living on federally 
designated lands saw few benefits from post-war expansion. Canadian citizens, by contrast, saw 
little of the suffering just outside of the town line. 
When Indigenous communities are made central it gives nuance to histories of 
environmental change. My work reveals that there was no single “Indian” experience of flooding 
in the Winnipeg River drainage basin. Hydroelectric development fractured Anishinabek 
communities. Individuals had to make difficult choices about how to respond to the HEPC and 
their options were shaped by labour and by gender. Elder Robert Kabestra (Anamikipinens), a 
general labourer, planned to use his wages to sustain Dalles 38C Indian Reserve. Elder Clarence 
                                                                                                                                             
margin, the Bow existed at the ragged southwestern edge of a continental fur trade” (24). In this story, the Bow 
River becomes central to Euro-Canadians as they settle the region in the 1880s. While both the Organic Machine 
and The River Returns acknowledge Indigenous centres, Indigenous peoples themselves operate in the background. 
Neither White, nor Armstrong, Evenden, and Nelles sustain an “Indigenous centre,” shifting readers’ attention 
instead to Euro-American and Euro-Canadian activities on the Columbia and the Bow.  
A subtle nod to an Indigenous homeland is also made by Christopher Armstrong and H. V. Nelles 
in Wilderness and Waterpower: How Banff National Park Became a Hydroelectric Storage Reservoir (Calgary: 
University of Calgary Press, 2013). Armstrong and Nelles note that “Native peoples” and their antecedents formed 
the “first human habitation[s]” on the upper reaches of the Bow (10). Armstrong and Nelles, however, do not make 
these habitations central. Wilderness and Waterpower more accurately begins in 1883 with the identification of the 
Bow, particularly the hot springs near present-day Banff, Alberta, as a site of potential development by the Canadian 
Pacific Railway. 
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Henry, by contrast, continued to fish along Winnipeg River. The Hydro-Electric Power 
Commission of Ontario informed neither Kabestra nor Henry of the anticipated impacts of 
Whitedog Falls Generating Station on the Winnipeg River. When the HEPC abandoned the 
worksite, both Kabestra and Henry would find themselves struggling to find steady employment. 
Hostilities against wage-earning families like the Kabestras, however, increased significantly. 
Kabestra’s attempt to sustain the reserve through cooperation with the HEPC was misinterpreted 
as collaboration with the waiâbishkiwedig. Flora McLeod, Kabestra’s wife, did not work for the 
HEPC like her husband. She was busy maintaining the family home. Mothers like McLeod 
experienced Whitedog Dam differently than their husbands and, indeed, post-menopausal 
women. After Whitedog Falls Generating Station began operations, increased methyl mercury 
levels on the Winnipeg river were made public by the Ministry of the Environment. Anishinabek 
women had to change their breastfeeding practices to maintain child health, a challenge that 
burdened Anishinabek mothers specifically. 
Previous works on hydroelectric development have tended to simplify Indigenous 
experiences of hydroelectric development. For example, in 1974, journalist Boyce Richardson 
followed three Cree families – Blacksmith, Jolly, and Voyageur – to their winter hunting 
grounds. In the closing minute of the film, Richardson articulated Cree fears that “the project 
will destroy their way of life.”21 Viewers are provided with little sense of what makes 
Blacksmith, Jolly and Voyageur representative of the Cree and their way of life. And yet, 
reviewers Thomas Waugh, Ezra Winton and Michael Baker recently celebrated the film as 
“unequivocal in its presentation of a Cree perspective on a proposed Hydro-Quebec project in the 
                                            
21 Cree Hunters of Mistassini, 1974. 
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James Bay Region.”22 But, what is “a Cree perspective”? What, if anything, distinguishes Cree 
labourers from Cree hunters? What, if anything, differentiates Cree women from Cree men? 
Canadian filmmakers (and historians) have written extensively on “Indian” responses to water 
regulation, using male hunters’ and trappers’ bodies to illuminate socio-economic crisis. My 
research demonstrates a plurality of Indigenous experiences of environmental change. 
The history of hydroelectric development in the Winnipeg River drainage basin, 
however, allows us to do more than challenge simplified representations of dynamic 
communities. The HEPC is my vehicle to challenge narratives about Indigenous activism after 
World War II. Long before 1969, Indigenous communities responded to settler-colonial activity 
by adapting to, cooperating with, or passively resisting the waiâbishkiwedig. Prior to the 
construction of the Whitedog Falls station, older generating stations had prompted important 
questions about Anishinabek treaty lands in the area. The Norman Dam, constructed by the 
Keewatin Lumber and Power Company, had jeopardized Anishinabek mobility along the 
Winnipeg River since the 1890s. Water fluctuations reduced the structural integrity of ice roads, 
which, in turn, reduced safe access to trap lines between Kenora and Dalles 38C, One Man Lake, 
and Whitedog Indian Reserve. Ice instability also increased the risk of travelling to town for 
provisions or Western medical aid. By the 1900s, Anishinabek families living in the Winnipeg 
River drainage basin knew that water regulation affected their ability to live from the river. They 
responded creatively to environmental change and adjusted labour and saving practices to 
maximize available resources to meet new circumstances. Anishinabek families continued to sell 
blueberries to generate income during the summer months, but now occasionally banked 
“blueberry monies” in Kenora. Capital could be drawn during the winter months should the trap 
                                            
22 Boyce Richardson’s documentary film was selected by Thomas Waugh, Ezra Winton, and Michael Baker 
(editors) as part of their complementary playlist for Challenge for Change: Activist Documentary at the National 
Film Board of Canada (Montréal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010).  
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line fail. Writing on blueberry sales in the United States, historian Brenda Child has identified 
“participat[ion] in the broader cash economy as an antidote to poverty.”23 Like Child, I argue that 
adaptation ought to be identified as a form of resistance to the expropriation of natural resources 
by settler-colonists. Adaptation allowed Anishinabek communities to endure despite increased 
incentives to abandon the reserve and to assimilate into the body politic. Adaptation allowed 
Anishinabek families to retain their special homeland. 
By the 1950s, when the HEPC began work on Whitedog Falls Generating Station, 
Anishinabek families had every reason to assume that water regulation would change how they 
occupied their lands once again. They required a new strategy to ensure the continuous 
occupation of reserves like Dalles 38C along the Winnipeg River. Some able-bodied 
Anishinabek men chose to cooperate with the HEPC and worked for the Commission. My 
discussion of cooperation with the HEPC breaks new ground. Historians to date have focused on 
the economic losses of fishers, hunters, and trappers – not the economic gains of general 
labourers.  
Historians like Caroline Desbiens, for example, have associated Indigenous labour with 
cultural disruption. Desbiens suggests that Indigenous, particularly Cree, workers struggled to 
identify with celebratory symbols of industrial labour produced by Hydro-Québec. She roots the 
supposed struggle of Cree workers to associate with Canadian symbols to “a different cultural 
experience of James Bay.” She assumes that Cree labourers generally changed their way of being 
in the world (presumably, as hunters and fishers).24 Using Whitedog Falls Generating Station as 
                                            
23 Brenda Child, Holding Our World Together: Ojibwe Women and the Survival of Community (New York: 
Penguin Group, 2012), 85. 
24 While Desbiens expands on her claim, suggesting that, “Cree and Inuit people fared worse… in the… 
workforce,” she provides little evidence to substantiate this claim (Power from the North, 171). Desbiens also 
applies her argument about cultural disruption to women: “Women could not easily… partake into [sic] ‘the grand 
spectacle’ of hydroelectric development. For Aboriginal women, the likelihood of identifying with these figures, 
was of course, even more reduced” (159). Her citation for this statement does not substantiate her claim. In footnote 
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a case study, I argue instead for cultural continuity. While Anishinabek labourers may have been 
anomalous in their communities, they created social and cultural space for Indigenous labourers 
at the dam site and in the wage economy more generally. Anishinabek men earned wages 
clearing brush, driving trucks, and erecting transmission lines. This work allowed them to use 
locally earned dollars to support their family on reserve. Unfortunately, this strategy – which 
temporarily allowed Anishinabek families to resist assimilation pressures – failed over the long 
run. Oral testimony suggests that the HEPC did not employ Anishinabek men in the Winnipeg 
River drainage basin after 1958. Yet, Anishinabek cooperation with the HEPC emerges as a new 
resistance strategy designed to protect reserve boundaries by finding ways to survive using 
resources and employment opportunities available off reserve. Anishinabek labourers thus 
emerge as both uncommon (in that Anishinabek participation in power generation was a new 
practice) and representative (in that creative responses to settler encroachment were much older 
practices). By uncovering the logic behind cooperation, my research creates space for anomalies 
and demonstrates that Indigenous general labourers worked to sustain treaty lands.  
At the same time as Anishinabek attempts to sustain reserves through employment with 
the HEPC failed, men and women upheld a vision of a special homeland that conflicted with 
provincial redefinitions of treaty rights, reserve lands, and water use. Anishinabek families 
passively resisted the flooding of their lands by the HEPC (and, indeed, by earlier water 
developers like the Keewatin Lumber and Power Company). Members of Whitedog Indian 
Reserve turned to settler advocates like the local MP Benedickson to demand that the HEPC 
                                                                                                                                             
40, page 249, Desbiens refers to Anne McClintock’s Imperial Leather: Race, Gender and Sexuality in the Colonial 
Context. This text focuses primarily on Britain (as centre) and South Africa (as colony). How, if at all, the 
experiences of the indigenous peoples of South Africa apply to the Cree of James Bay is not clear. Desbiens 
provides no Cree, nor even Canadian, source to prove that Indigenous women struggled to “partake into [sic] ‘the 
grand spectacle’ of hydroelectric development” (159). 
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consider Anishinabek complaints about the loss of their trapping income. Letter writing indicates 
a nonviolent response to environmental change. It is important to remember that Whitedog Falls 
Generating Station was remotely controlled from Kenora, with no resident attendants.25 
Vandalism and property destruction were viable options for resistance. Indeed, band members at 
Whitedog Indian Reserve expressed frustration over territorial expropriation by damaging an 
Anglican Church.26 The decision to write to the HEPC and earlier attempts to build relationships 
with the HEPC (i.e. through waged labour) suggest that Anishinabek families did not necessarily 
oppose hydroelectric development. Resistance strategies identified by my research – adaptation, 
cooperation, and passive resistance – suggest that, given the new reality of hydro development 
on their ancestral lands, some band members desired a relationship with the HEPC that allowed 
them to help determine how water regulation affected reserve lands and harvesting grounds. My 
research thus expands our knowledge of Indigenous responses to Canadian expansion by 
highlighting moderate responses to water development.  
To date, Canadian historians have largely ignored moderate responses to settler-
colonialism. Moderate actors worked for change outside of the Canadian legal system. They 
worked within their own communities or within their families to manage environmental change. 
A refusal to operate within the Canadian state may be an Anishinabek expression of sovereignty: 
moderate actors sought change from within their ancestral territories. Yet the year 1969, when 
Indigenous peoples united to oppose the Canadian government’s proposal to dismantle the Indian 
Act (White Paper), has been upheld as a watershed moment in which Indigenous peoples from 
British Columbia to Nova Scotia united to defend their treaty rights and to assert their special 
                                            
25 OPG, Memorandum, “Whitedog Falls Generating Station: General Description and Design 
Requirements, 13 September 1955.” 
26 Diocese of Keewatin, “Clarence Stuebe to the Anglican Church [unspecified recipient], 29 September 
1975,” Folder: Whitedog – St. Mary’s Correspondence. 
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relationship with the Crown.27 Historian Bryan Palmer has argued that Indigenous peoples 
entered a “period of self-discovery” in the 1960s. Palmer attributes this socio-political 
awakening to “national and international currents of dissent” from Québécois nationalists’ cries 
for sovereignty to African-American demands for equality under the law.28 Indigenous peoples, 
he suggests, were inspired (if not radicalized) by external forces. Palmer describes a decidedly 
pan-Indian Red Power movement. This political ideology acknowledged the shared struggles of 
colonized peoples (e.g. Nehiyaw, Haudenosaunee, and Anishinabek) and demanded change en 
masse (i.e. as “Indians” under the Indian Act). A “failure” to unite before 1969, however, need 
not be equated with defeat. My dissertation challenges readers to rethink 1969 as a “period of 
self-discovery.” While moderate action was largely ineffective at achieving legislative change in 
Canada, it operated within and thus reinforced pre-colonial boundaries (an Anishinabek 
homeland). Ironically, unified resistance in the 1960s required a suspension of unique interests – 
Anishinabek activists demanded better treatment as “Indians” under the Indian Act, not as a 
treaty nation.  
By studying moderate action, it becomes evident that the year 1969 did not mark a 
revival of treaty demands; rather it marked a change in strategy that acknowledged federal 
legislation. Localized, moderate responses to the Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario 
provide an alternative definition of Indigenous resistance. I argue that resistance requires (1) a 
strong sense of one’s treaty rights, (2) a powerful, anti-colonial sense of one’s territorial limits, 
and (3) an unwavering desire to maintain a special homeland by living in it. These tenants allow 
                                            
27 Cardinal, The Unjust Society, 90; Naithan Lagace and Niigaanwewidam James Sinclair, “The White 
Paper, 1969,” Canadian Encyclopedia, accessed 1 March 2016, 
http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/the-white-paper-1969/; Ray, I Have Lived Here Since the World 
Began, 335; “The White Paper 1969,” Indigenous Foundations, accessed 1 March 2016, 
http://indigenousfoundations.arts.ubc.ca/home/government-policy/the-white-paper-1969.html.  
28 Palmer, Canada’s 1960, 378. 
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us to better envision Indigenous resistance on a continuum. My research provides an alternative 
to “before 1969” and “after 1969” depictions of anti-colonialism in Canada. By so doing, it 
allows readers to imagine how the average person endured settler-colonialism. 
 
TOOLS FOR HEALING: THE IMPORTANCE OF INDIGENOUS HISTORY TO TWENTY-FIRST-
CENTURY ENERGY USERS 
 
Research into the day-to-day experiences of and reactions to hydroelectric development 
by Anishinabek peoples helps us to identify flaws in Ontario’s remedial process. Apologies 
issued by Ontario Power Generation (OPG, formerly known as the Hydro-Electric Power 
Commission of Ontario) have not explicitly presented reserves as economically unsustainable. 
However, in 2008, the OPG presented Anishinabek labour in the Winnipeg River drainage basin 
as anti-modern (“traditional”) in a public statement about flooding at Dalles 38C Indian Reserve. 
The apology begins “[l]ong before Ontario Hydro… came to build hydro-electric facilities on the 
Winnipeg River… the people of [Dalles 38C Indian Reserve] were a self-sufficient people.”29 
Readers are transported to a time before living memory. Self-sufficiency is located in the distant 
past – a time when Anishinabek families “share[d] and care[d] for all of creation… the waters, 
water and fish life, plants, medicines, trees, animals, birds.”30 Economic decline is associated 
(implicitly) with settler arrival in the Winnipeg River drainage basin. OPG does not accept 
responsibility for crashing the mixed economy (i.e. the loss of guiding jobs), for laying off 
Anishinabek labourers, or for jeopardizing women’s reproductive labour in the 1950s. Instead, 
OPG presents hydroelectric flooding as a threat to “hunting, trapping, fishing and harvesting in 
                                            
29 OPG, Ontario Power Generation Apology to Ochiichagwe’Babigo’Ining Ojibway Nation [Dalles 38C 
Indian Reserve], 3 July 2008. Bill McKinlay, Senior Communications Advisor, Ontario Power Generation, email to 
author, 9 July 2008, author’s collection. 
30 Ibid. 
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balance and harmony with the land.”31 Canadian historians have suggested that these economic 
activities had already been compromised by settler encroachment and federal surveys. The 
apology suggests that OPG contributed to, but did not cause, endemic poverty on reserve. The 
OPG claims to have “further impacted the resources and way of life of the people” of Dalles 38C 
Indian Reserve.32 OPG thus participated in a metanarrative of endemic poverty on reserve that 
locates blame with our colonial predecessors (such as traders, missionaries, federal surveyors, 
and settlers). 
Having located self-sufficiency in the distant past (pre-contact), OPG minimized its 
blame for recent environmental damages (post-World War II). Ontario Power Generating 
apologized for “not resolving these past grievances [i.e. disruption of ‘traditional ways’] 
sooner.”33 While a cash settlement was successfully negotiated between Dalles 38C Indian 
Reserve and OPG in 2008, damages are recurring and ongoing. As recently as October 2015, 
band members asked Ontario and Canada to provide compensation for the swampification of 
reserve lands. Property value is declining in the present as a result of water fluctuations caused 
by Whitedog Falls Generating Station. Unless we think critically about how continued energy 
use floods reserve lands, we risk thinking that the apology is a cure. Anishinabek activist Leanne 
Simpson has noted that “the perception of most Canadians is that post-reconciliation, Indigenous 
Peoples no longer have a legitimate source of contention.”34 As energy users, we need to 
understand how human (Anishinabek and settler-colonial) and natural systems (Winnipeg River 
drainage basin) interact. My dissertation reveals the interplay between these distinct systems. I 
uncover the relationships between industrial development, settlers, governments, the Winnipeg 
                                            
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid.  
33 Ibid. 
34 Simpson, Dancing on Our Turtle’s Back, 22 
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River, and Anishinabek peoples. Cash settlement did not (and does not) change how these 
systems interact. Current historical literature on post-war affluence does not teach the average 
citizen to read for system overlaps. It is my hope that this dissertation provides a counter to 
public apologies that shift the burden of responsibility from current energy users to past federal 
and provincial administrators. 
Indeed, this dissertation illuminates how the benefits of development have been 
inequitably distributed in the Winnipeg River drainage basin. My research makes clear how 
Canadian political, cultural, and economic systems have functioned and interacted to the 
detriment of Anishinabek families. My research enables the average Canadian to recognize the 
far-reaching implications of their day-to-day decisions about energy use. I take seriously 
historian Paige Raibmon’s argument that Canadians need to take responsibility for privilege 
rather than seeking to blame Indian policy (or ancestral land grabs) for the socio-economic 
disadvantages of First Nations. Raibmon argues that it is not all nameless, faceless bureaucrats 
who dispossessed and disinherited Indigenous peoples. Canadian citizens continue to benefit 
from earlier dispossessions.35 Every time I turn on a light in Kenora, I place demand on an 
electrical grid that causes the periodic flooding of my ancestral home. It is my hope that my 
readers ask, “Where is electricity being generated?” It is my hope that my readers ask, “Whose 
lands are inundated for my convenience?” 
This dissertation reveals how Canadian energy demands after 1945 stimulated 
hydroelectric development in northwestern Ontario.36 It also illuminates how Canadian energy 
                                            
35 Raibmon, “Unmaking Native Space: A Genealogy of Indian Policy, Settler Practice, and the 
Microtechniques of Dispossession,” in The Power of Promises: Rethinking Indian Treaties in the Pacific Northwest, 
edited by Alexandra Harmon (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2008), 78. 
36 In 2015, Matthew Evenden published Allied Power: Mobilizing Hydro-electricity during Canada’s 
Second World War (Toronto: University of Toronto Press). This dissertation functions as a necessary complement: 
Evenden spends little space talking about projects in northwestern Ontario. Allied Power focuses primarily on the 
Hydro-Electric Power Commission’s activities in central Ontario. Further, Evenden’s emphasis on national policy 
!
!
378 
demands negatively affected Anishinabek labour – trappers, fishing guides, nursing mothers, and 
general contractors alike all struggled to provide for their families once Whitedog Falls 
Generating Station began operations. Endemic poverty on reserve is not and should not be 
associated with “past actions” or “historical grievances.”37 On-reserve poverty has been 
aggravated by the unconscious decisions of thousands of Canadians in the Winnipeg River 
drainage basin since 1958. I do not ask our treaty partners to turn off their lights, to unplug their 
phone chargers, or to shut down their laptops. Instead, I ask our treaty partners – all residents on 
Canadian soil – to become conscious energy consumers. As in 1958, water flows northwest from 
Kenora to Hudson Bay. Whitedog Falls Generating Station continues to impound water southeast 
of Whitedog Falls Generating Station, raising water levels on Anishinabek reserves and in 
Anishinabek harvesting areas. First Nations – like band members of Dalles 38C, One Man Lake, 
and Whitedog Indian Reserves – still carry the burden of hydroelectric power generation in 
Ontario. Despite environmental challenges, Anishinabek families never relinquished their vision 
of a special homeland on reserve. If you listen carefully, you can still hear the water drum sound 
in the Winnipeg River drainage basin. Anishinabek families continue to resist the erosion of their 
homelands. Drum songs remind us that reserve lands are not inherently unsustainable. We 
continue to make them so. 
 
                                                                                                                                             
during World War II does not allow for sustained discussion of First Nations. My dissertation provides a necessary 
follow-up and reveals how wartime decisions affected First Nations after 1945. 
37 OPG, Ontario Power Generation Apology, 2008.  
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